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Abstract 
 
This study investigates the effects of ownership level, concentration and owners’ identity on stock 
market liquidity in the UK. The study also examines the effect of the recent financial crisis on the 
relationship between ownership level, concentration, owners’ identity and market liquidity in the 
UK.  The sample includes 226 non-financial companies from the FTSE All-Share Index listed on 
the London Stock Exchange, over the period between 2003 and 2012. After controlling for two 
types of Endogeneity, i.e., simultaneity and unobserved heterogeneity, through the application and 
use of a pooled OLS year and industry dummies, this study finds the evidence suggesting that 
ownership level, concentration and owners’ identity are important determinants of market liquidity 
in the UK.  
 
The results suggest that insider ownership and ownership concentration are negatively correlated 
with market liquidity.  In contrast, institutional ownership has been identified as positively 
correlated with market liquidity. While analysing the effect of owners’ identity on market liquidity, 
it was revealed that executive and non-executive directors’ ownership both decrease market 
liquidity. The findings also suggest that the existence of controlled shareholders (i.e., investment 
banks, government, pension fund, and foreign ownership) have a negative impact on firms’ market 
liquidity. However, the presence of free float shareholders in a firm’s ownership structure has a 
positive impact on market liquidity. As a result, this study regards the free float shareholders as 
uninformed investors whereas controlled shareholders and insiders are regarded as informed 
investors because they have access to a firm’s private information.   
 
After considering the effect of financial crisis, it was revealed that both the insider ownership and 
ownership concentration insignificantly negatively affect market liquidity in the pre-crisis, crisis 
and post-crisis periods of the recent financial crisis. However, institutional ownership had a 
significantly positive impact on market liquidity during the 2007-2009 financial crisis. With respect 
to insider identity, both executive and non-executive directors’ ownership have a negative impact 
on market liquidity. Nevertheless, controlled shareholders (i.e., investment banks, government, 
employee, pension fund, foreign) ownership had an insignificantly negative impact on market 
liquidity, whereas free float shares had an insignificantly positive impact on market liquidity during 
the recent financial crisis. Keeping in mind the importance of market liquidity in the economy, it 
can be argued that the findings of this research have implications for the current and potential 
investors, policymakers and practitioners. As a result, the outcome of this study demands that firms 
should pay more attention to their ownership structure disclosure policy and improve quality of the 
disclosed information as much as possible. 
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Chapter 1 
An Overview of the Research  
 
1.1 Introduction and Background  
 
The last two decades have witnessed significant changes in the composition of ownership structure 
around the world. For instance, the UK has experienced a dramatic increase in institutional 
ownership of publicly listed companies. On the one hand, the ownership of UK shares held by 
individuals fell from 54% in 1963 to 11% in 2012. On the other hand, foreign investors who held 
just 7% of UK shares in 1963 held over 53% of UK quoted shares in 2012
1
. As a result, these 
changes in ownership structure have provided a reason for more corporate governance codes of 
practice to encourage institutional investors to take an active role in the monitoring process. For 
example, a recent study by Goergen et al. (2008) states that institutional blockholders in most listed 
UK firms do little company monitoring.  
 
Moreover, the recent financial crisis of 2007-2009, which has been described as the worst of its 
kind since the Great Depression, also revealed weakness in the corporate governance mechanisms 
regarding institutional shareholder engagement in the monitoring process (Kirkpatrick 2009). In the 
light of the recent crisis, the Walker Review (2009) recommended the use of institutional 
Stewardship Code as the official UK code of practice for institutional investors. As a result, the UK 
Stewardship Code (2010) was established which strongly focuses on enhancing the level of 
engagement between institutional investors and companies to help enhance long-term returns to 
shareholders and the efficient exercise of governance responsibilities. 
  
Furthermore, existing literature states that institutional investors seem to adopt a passive role 
towards monitoring and disciplining a firm’s management (Maug 1998; Plender 1997). Prior 
studies have suggested that institutional investors rarely take action in corporate monitoring 
because they regard liquidity as more important than playing an active role in monitoring the firm’s 
management (Bhide 1993; Coffee 1991). Moreover, institutional shareholders are blamed for their 
passivity and their focus on short-term rather than long-term returns during a crisis period (Chen & 
Poon 2007; Chu & Song 2010; Mitton 2002). Consequently, most corporate governance codes 
                                                          
1 ‘ONS (Office for National Statistics) report 2012’. 
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around the world emphasise the importance of institutional investors as one of the corporate 
governance mechanisms. 
 
In the UK, the recent 2012 Stewardship Code aims to encourage institutional shareholders to play 
an active role in corporate governance mechanisms. In particular, the main aim behind the 
Stewardship Code (2012) is to increase the engagement activities of institutional investors, which 
require them to publicly disclose their commitment to a stewardship obligation or to explain their 
alternative investment approach if they are unwilling to assume such a commitment. Moreover, this 
code has emphasised that some institutional investors such as pension funds must take a more 
active role in the monitoring process. 
 
A large body of ownership structure literature has focused on the composition and the structure of 
ownership in order to take into consideration the above-mentioned changes. In this regard, most of 
the existing literature has studied the relationship between ownership structure and board 
composition (Chung & Zhang 2011; Lemmon & Lins 2003; Singh & Davidson 2003). Other 
studies have examined the determinants of ownership structure (De Moura Costa et al., 2013; Lim 
& Kim 2005), ownership structure and executive compensation (Haid & Yurtoglu 2006; Mehran 
1995). Similarly, there is also evidence on the effect of ownership structure on corporate 
performance (Demsetz & Villalonga 2001; Florackis et al., 2009; Kirchmaier & Grant 2004). 
Nevertheless, the relationship between ownership structure and market liquidity represents a heated 
topic of debate in the corporate finance literature. The existing literature regarding the effect of 
ownership level
2
 on market liquidity focuses primarily on the effect of insider and institutional 
ownership on market liquidity (Chiang & Venkatesh 1988; Dennis & Weston 2001; Kini & Mian 
1995; Rubin 2007). A vast body of research has argued that insider ownership leads to a wider bid-
ask spread, which reduces market liquidity (Glosten & Milgrom 1985; Grossman & Stiglitz 1980; 
Kyle 1985). However, institutional investors tend to hold large stakes of capital for trading 
purposes that may have a positive impact on market liquidity (Gompers & Metrick 2001; Hamilton 
1978; Schwartz & Shapiro 1992; Tinic 1972). 
  
In addition to ownership level, another strand of literature suggests that ownership concentration 
may affect market liquidity. Previous literature has focused mainly on the ownership concentration-
liquidity relationship (Bhide 1993; Bolton & Von Thadden 1998; Holmstrom & Tirole 1993; Maug 
                                                          
2 Ownership level is the aggregate percentage of holdings for insider and institutional investors (Rubin 2007). 
3 
 
1998). These studies argue that there is a trade-off between liquidity and control. For example, 
Bhide (1993) mentions that active shareholders who reduce agency costs by providing internal 
monitoring also reduce market liquidity by creating an adverse selection problem in the capital 
market. Nevertheless, extant empirical studies have reported mixed results about the effect of 
ownership concentration on market liquidity (Brockman et al., 2009; Heflin & Shaw 2000; Jacoby 
& Zheng 2010). For instance, Heflin & Shaw (2000) and Jacoby & Zheng (2010) find a negative 
impact of blockholders on market liquidity, which supports the notion that blockholders have 
access to private and value-relevant information. In contrast, Brockman et al. (2009) conclude that 
blockholders have no impact on information costs of market liquidity. 
  
Despite many valuable insights that earlier theoretical and empirical studies provide, recent studies 
have used different proxies for ownership concentration in order to determine the exact direction of 
the relationship between ownership concentration and market liquidity (Jacoby & Zheng 2010; 
Rubin 2007). For example, Rubin (2007) uses different measures of ownership concentration such 
as the blockholders and the top five non-insider institutional investors; he argues that one advantage 
of the latter measure is that it is not subject to the arbitrary inclusion cut-off point of 5%. In 
addition, Jacoby & Zheng (2010) believe that blockholders ratio can be a poor measure of 
ownership concentration when considered exclusively and that it does not fully reflect ownership 
concentration. Therefore, unlike other studies that use the blockholders as sole measure of 
ownership concentration (Brockman et al., 2009; Heflin & Shaw 2000; Kini & Mian 1995), this 
study uses two measures of ownership concentration, blockholders and top five non-insider 
institutional investors. 
  
Nevertheless, most of the above-mentioned studies have investigated the association between 
ownership concentration and market liquidity and have largely ignored the effect of owners’ 
identity on market liquidity. For instance, the relationship between institutional blockholders’ 
identity and market liquidity is a widely controversial issue (Barabanov & McNamara 2002; Naes 
2004; Poon et al., 2013). Barabanov & McNamara (2002) state that institutional 
ownerships’identity has different impacts on market liquidity. For example, independent 
investment advisors’ ownership has a more significantly negative impact on bid-ask spread than 
banks and insurance companies’ ownership. Moreover, Naes (2004) mentions that the impact of 
larger non-financial investors has a more negative impact on relative bid-ask spread than other 
investors. In the UK, the proportional ownership of foreign investors has increased dramatically in 
recent years and has recently reached above 41%. Moreover, UK institutional investors – such as 
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insurance companies and pension funds – now hold around 26% of the total capital (ONS 2010, p. 
4). Consequently, this study expects that the owners’ identity of institutional blockholders will play 
a different role in market liquidity in the UK capital market.  
 
Furthermore, the break-up between executive and non-executive directors’ ownership is also 
important from the perspective of UK corporate governance codes (Cadbury 1992; Greenbury 
1995; Hampel 1998; Higgs 2003). These codes have enacted a major role in enhancing the 
usefulness of UK boards of directors. In particular, the Cadbury Report (1992) and Higgs Review 
(2003) call attention to the distinction between executive and non-executive directors, and that 
share ownership by non-executive directors remains generally low, although it has been steadily 
increasing since the 1990s (Mura 2007). In contrast, executive directors are considered as the 
second-largest shareholder class in the UK (Florackis & Ozkan 2009). Thus, this study separates 
the effect of executive and non-executive directors’ ownership on market liquidity in the UK 
capital market. 
 
Consequently, this study uses the changes in the ownership structure in the late 1990s and early 
2000s as a step that can potentially help us better understand how changes in investor composition 
could influence market liquidity. Moreover, as mentioned above, the last two decades have 
witnessed a number of reforms, which has resulted in lower transaction costs and have made the 
London Stock Exchange (LSE) more attractive for foreign investors. As a consequence, the fraction 
of LSE equities held by foreign investors increased by more than 50% in 2012. Nevertheless, it is 
difficult to state whether foreign investors are better informed about a firm’s private information 
than domestic investors in the UK (Park 2009). There are clear disadvantages associated with 
operating in a foreign culture; however, despite the difficulties associated with analysing foreign 
companies, there is evidence that some larger foreign investors may be better informed about a 
firm’s future prospects (Hamao et al., 2010). 
 
1.2 Motivations of the Study 
 
In the aftermath of the recent financial crisis, the importance of market liquidity as an important 
aspect for financial stability in the capital markets has received an extensive amount of attention 
from researchers and regulators. For instance, the Economist (1999) highlighted the relevance of 
market liquidity, as “the possibility that liquidity might disappear from a market, and so not be 
available when it is needed, is a big source of risk to an investor”. In this regard, one of the most 
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important determinants of market liquidity is ownership structure, which has received little 
attention in the existing literature. For instance, Rubin (2007, p. 219) describes studying the 
ownership structure in relationship to market liquidity as “An unresolved area in the field of finance 
is the relation between share ownership structure and liquidity”. By reviewing a large body of 
ownership structure literature, it is clear that ownership  structure has been extensively studied with 
corporate performance (Demsetz & Villalonga 2001; Florackis et al., 2009; Kirchmaier & Grant 
2004), while only a few studies take into consideration how ownership structure is related to market 
liquidity.  
 
As mentioned above most prior ownership structure studies have focused mainly on corporate 
performance and has paid little attention to market liquidity. In the existing literature on the 
relationship between ownership structure and market liquidity, some studies have focused on 
insider ownership (Chiang & Venkatesh 1988; Comerton-Forde & Rydge 2006; Dennis & Weston 
2001; Kini & Mian 1995; Rubin 2007; Sarin et al., 2000; Zhou 2011). Other studies have examined 
the relationship between institutional ownership and market liquidity and have ignored insider 
ownership in their analysis (Barabanov & McNamara 2002; Blume & Keim 2012; Fehle 2004; 
Poon et al., 2013). Similarly, other recent studies have focused mainly on ownership concentration 
and have ignored ownership level in their investigations (Attig et al., 2006; Brockman et al., 2009; 
Ginglinger & Hamon 2007; Heflin & Shaw 2000; Jacoby & Zheng 2010; Naes 2004).  
 
Nevertheless, it can be argued, that owners’ identity seems to be important in ownership structure 
studies. The existing literature has largely addressed the effect of owners’ identity on corporate 
performance (Claessens & Djankov 1999; Klein et al., 2005; Pedersen & Thomsen 2003). These 
studies indicate that different owners will have different objectives, and it is likely that the identity 
of owners will matter to a firm’s performance. For example, managers of corporations under 
governmental control may have different incentives and will behave differently to managers of 
corporations in the private sector (Klein et al., 2005). For this reason, ownership concentration and 
the identity of owners are those variables that exert a simultaneous, but different, influence on firm 
performance.  
 
However, with respect to market liquidity, to the best of the author’s knowledge very few studies 
have examined the relationship between owners’ identity and market liquidity, which further 
indicates a clear gap in the literature. In contrast, one of the most striking differences between 
countries’ corporate governance systems is in the ownership and control of firms, and the identity 
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of controlling shareholders. Moreover, this study is also motivated to investigate the impact of 
executive and non-executive directors’ ownership on market liquidity. This relationship is weakly 
addressed in the literature since the focus of existing literature is mainly based on the aggregate 
level of insider ownership and market liquidity (Chiang & Venkatesh 1988; Comerton-Forde & 
Rydge 2006; Kini & Mian 1995; Zhou 2011).  
 
In addition, the majority of the above-mentioned studies are based on the US market, and it is 
difficult to generalise the findings of these studies to other countries such as the UK. The 
differences in regulations, disclosure and governance practices justify the need for more research in 
this area for the UK. For instance, there are clear differences in the disclosure requirements of 
ownership structure between the UK and the US. In particular, the disclosure requirements in the 
UK are narrower than the US. For example, in the UK, blockholders who hold 3-5% or more stock 
of a public limited company are required to disclose the increase in their holdings if the magnitude 
of the change goes above 1-5% of stock within a period of 2-5 days. In contrast, the US disclosure 
rules require blockholders to report their increase in holdings within 10 days of the acquisition of a 
5% holding, with changes of 1% or more thereafter (Short & Keasey 1999). Moreover, it is 
important to note there is a difference in the definition of insider between the UK and US. For 
instance, Fidrmuc et al. (2006) state that, in the US, insiders are defined as officers, directors, other 
key employees and shareholders with more than 10% of any equity class (Lakonishok & Lee 2001). 
However, the UK definition of insider is stricter; it includes the members of the board of directors 
(both executives and non-executives), and excludes other key employees and large shareholders. As 
a result, this study expects to find a clear difference in the relationship between ownership structure 
and market liquidity from a UK perspective. 
 
Furthermore, Short & Keasey (1999) and Guest (2008) among others indicate that the UK and the 
US have an active market for corporate control but it is stronger in the UK. It is also important to 
note that the concentration of institutional ownership in the US is lower than that in the UK.  
Moreover, institutional investors in the UK are mainly pension funds and insurance companies and 
play a more active role in monitoring on the board, while in the US, institutional investors are 
mainly mutual funds that face legal restrictions, which results in a lower monitoring role on the 
board (Short & Keasey 1999). Taken together, it is obvious that several differences exist between 
the UK and US economies. In general, the differences are mainly related to ownership structure, 
market for corporate control and other regulatory and disclosure requirements. Consequently, it will 
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be appropriate to use country-specific data to examine the effect of ownership structure on market 
liquidity in the UK. 
 
In the context of the 2007-2009 financial crises, few studies have focused on the effect of the 
ownership level, concentration and owners’ identity on market liquidity. In this regard, Poon et al. 
(2013) state that institutional investors tend to sell their shares during the crisis period, which 
produces a negative impact on market liquidity. In particular, prior studies have documented that 
highly leveraged institutional investors have the ability to sell their shares more speedily than other 
types of investors, such as banks and hedge fund investors, during a market downturn (Gatev & 
Strahan 2006; Brunnermeier & Pedersen 2009). Thus, this study examines the relationship between 
ownership level, concentration, owners’ identity and market liquidity for the UK firms in three sub-
periods. These periods are pre-crisis period (2004-2006), crisis period (2007-2009) and post-crisis 
period (2010-2012).   
 
1.3 Objectives of the Study 
 
In recent years ownership structure has received more attention in corporate finance literature. 
Existing studies have emphasised the role of ownership – both the level and concentration in capital 
markets. The importance of studying the ownership level stems from its effect on determining the 
level of market liquidity (Chiang & Venkatesh 1988). In this study, ownership level refers to 
insider and institutional ownership since these variables are the most debated in ownership-liquidity 
studies (Rubin 2007; Zhou 2011). For example, several studies document that insider ownership 
affects market liquidity. Both Comerton-Forde & Rydge (2006) and Rubin (2007) argue that 
insider ownership has a negative impact on market liquidity. The authors explain that higher insider 
ownership increases the probability that the insiders may trade on their private information. 
However, other studies indicate that the effect of insider ownership on market liquidity is still 
mixed and inconclusive (Heflin & Shaw 2000; Zhou 2011). 
 
Institutional shareholders tend to hold large amounts of stock for trading purposes. They trade more 
frequently than other investors, which may increase market liquidity (Gompers & Metrick 2001; 
Hamilton 1978; Poon et al., 2013; Schwartz & Shapiro 1992; Tinic 1972). Nevertheless, in terms of 
the role of institutional ownership on market liquidity existing literature has reported mixed results. 
For example, Chiang & Venkatesh (1988) and Kini & Mian (1995) conclude that there is no 
relationship between institutional ownership and bid-ask spread. However, Fehle (2004) reports 
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that institutional ownership lowers bid-ask spread, which is inconsistent with the notion that 
institutional owners are informed investors about the firm’s private information. In contrast, Sarin 
et al. (2000) and Dennis & Weston (2001) find a positive relationship between institutional 
ownership and bid-ask spread. However, Sarin et al. (2000) state that the positive relationship 
between institutional ownership and bid-ask spread is due to their positive effect on trading 
activity. In contrast, Dennis & Weston (2001) conclude that the positive effect on bid-ask spread is 
because of the adverse selection effect of institutional ownership.  
 
In addition to ownership level, another strand of literature suggests that ownership concentration 
may affect market liquidity. Specifically, Bhide (1993) presents a theory based on the view that 
large shareholders who reduce agency costs by providing internal monitoring also reduce market 
liquidity by creating an information asymmetry in the capital market. However, extant empirical 
studies have reported mixed results about the effect of ownership concentration on market liquidity. 
For instance, Heflin & Shaw (2000) find a positive impact of blockholders on bid-ask spread after 
controlling for the real friction of market liquidity (i.e. number of trades and trade size), which 
supports the notion that blockholders have access to private  and  value-relevant information. In the 
same spirit, Jacoby & Zheng (2010) reveal that blockholders have a positive impact on bid-ask 
spread. In contrast, Brockman et al. (2009) show that blockholders have no impact on bid-ask 
spread after controlling for the real friction (i.e., trading activity measures) of market liquidity. 
They imply that blockholders have no impact on information friction of market liquidity.  
 
Based on the above discussion, this study has the following objectives. First, this study investigates 
the impact of ownership level and concentration on market liquidity in the UK public firms. More 
specifically, this study examines the effect of insider, institutional and ownership concentration; 
blockholders and largest shareholders on stock market liquidity. This is mainly based on the 
argument that until now only a limited numbers of studies in the UK have addressed the ownership-
liquidity relationship.  In addition, most of the findings from the published literature are mixed and 
inconclusive. As a result, this study provides empirical evidence on the ownership-liquidity 
relationship by using a sample of UK listed companies.   
    
Second, this study aims to investigate the effect of owners’ identity on market liquidity in the UK. 
In particular, it seeks to identify whether institutional and non-institutional owners determine 
market liquidity. It also tests whether the executive and non-executive directors’ ownership has an 
effect on market liquidity or not. The “information hierarchy hypothesis” postulates that those 
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directors who are more familiar with the day-to-day operations of the company trade on the basis of 
more valuable information (Seyhun 1986). Moreover, Jeng et al. (1999, p. 32) argue that, “some 
insiders are more insider than others”. Third, this study seeks to provide evidence from the recent 
financial crisis by investigating the relationship between ownership level, concentration, owners’ 
identity and market liquidity during the crisis. To do so, this study creates three sub-samples: pre-
crisis, crisis and post-crisis periods, to highlight the effect of ownership level, concentration and 
owners’ identity on market liquidity in these three periods on UK firms. 
 
In order to meet these objectives, this study will try to answer the following research questions: 
1. Does the ownership level and concentration determine the market liquidity in UK firms? 
2. Does owners’ identity have an effect on market liquidity in UK firms?  
2.1. Does the institutional blockholders’ identity affect market liquidity? 
2.2  Does the non-institutional blockholders’ identity affect market liquidity? 
2.3. Does the insiders’ identity affect market liquidity? 
3. Did ownership level, concentration and owners’ identity determine market liquidity of UK 
firms during the recent financial crisis? 
 
1.4 Contributions of the Study  
 
This study is one of very few studies that examine the effect of ownership structure on market 
liquidity in the UK. As discussed above in the motivation section, there is a clear difference in 
ownership structure between the UK and US. By recognising this gap in the literature, this study 
aims to fill it and open a new line of research that could enhance our understanding of the 
relationship between ownership level, concentration, owners’ identity and market liquidity 
empirically in the UK. Therefore, this study contributes to the ownership structure studies by 
assessing the relationship between ownership level in terms of insider and institutional and market 
liquidity in the UK.  
 
Moreover, ownership concentration is included in this study besides ownership level. This study, 
therefore, contributes to the ownership structure literature by investigating the effect of ownership 
level and concentration on market liquidity in the UK. More importantly, to the best of the author’s 
knowledge, this study is the first of its kind that investigates whether ownership structure is a 
determinant of market liquidity in the UK or not. We argue that due to the importance and role of 
the UK stock market in the global economy and the limited number of studies in this area of 
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research, this study would add further insights to the existing literature.  Keeping this in mind, an 
examination of the ownership structure and liquidity relationship in the UK market provides a 
motivation to conduct this study.  
 
Further, this study contributes to the existing literature on ownership structure in determining 
market liquidity by exploring the effect of owners’ identity on market liquidity in the UK. More 
specifically, the role of insiders’ identity in understanding whether market liquidity would differ if 
the owners were executive and non-executive directors of companies. This is particularly important 
due to the recent increase in the number of non-executive directors in UK companies (Mura 2007). 
For example, in the UK, the insider definition is narrower, including the members of the board of 
directors (both executives and non-executives), but excluding other key employees and large 
shareholders. However, US insiders are defined as officers, directors, other key employees and 
shareholders with more than 10% of any equity class (Lakonishok & Lee 2001). Thus, this study 
contributes to the ownership structure literature by investigating the effect of insider ownership 
composition on market liquidity. In addition, this study contributes to the ownership structure 
literature by providing evidence on how ownership level, concentration and owners’ identity is 
related to market liquidity during the recent financial crisis, 2007-2009. The study examines this 
relationship for the UK firms in three sub-periods. These periods are pre-crisis period (2004-2006), 
crisis period (2007-2009) and post-crisis period (2010-2012).   
 
Furthermore, some of the published literature in this area indicates that the ownership variables are 
endogenously determined (Fehle 2004; Heflin & Shaw 2000; Naes 2004; Rubin 2007). In the 
existing literature, the most common technique used to control for endogeneity is to use the lagged 
values of ownership structure variables (Brockman et al., 2009; Heflin & Shaw 2000). Moreover, 
other studies recommend the use of instrumental variables method for this purpose (Rubin 2007). 
However, there is no agreed number of instrumental variables to control for the endogeneity 
problem (Naes 2004; Rubin 2007). Furthermore, other traditional methods like ordinary least 
squares and fixed or random effects models, used by most ownership structure related studies, have 
provided biased and inconsistent results. For instance, while these methods may be able to control 
for the unobserved heterogeneity; they fail to control for tackling the problem of simultaneity.  
 
As a consequence, this study first employed two methods of estimations, fixed effects models and 
random effects models of estimation in examining the relationship between ownership level, 
concentration, owners’ identity and market liquidity. However, the result of Hausman (1978) model 
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specification tests show, the fixed effects models as the appropriate technique for examining the the 
relationship between ownership level, concentration, owners’ identity and market liquidity. 3  In 
addition, as highlighted by Poon et al. (2013), most of the previously published studies in this area 
failed to control for two types of endogeneity, namely, unobserved heterogeneity and simultaneity. 
This study therefore, uses three different steps for minimising the effect of endogenenity in the 
estimations. First, this study follows Brockman et al. (2009) for controlling the effects of 
simultaneity by using “lagged values” of the ownership variables. Second, in order to control for 
unobservable heterogeneity, this study follows Poon et al. (2013) and includes year and industry 
dummies in all the model specifications. Third, this study estimates robust standard errors to 
control for serial correlation and heteroskedasticity using the option “Robust” in STATA 11.   In 
light of this, I would argue that the choice of estimation method and controlling the problem of 
endogeneity are the two most important elements in this examination, which has helped in the 
provision of robust and consistent conclusions.   
 
1.5 Structure of the Thesis 
 
This chapter has provided an overview about the background and rationale of the study. The study 
motivation, objectives and contributions have also been highlighted. Chapter 2 provides a review 
of the theoretical and empirical literature on the relationship between ownership level, 
concentration and owners’ identity, and market liquidity. The chapter begins with a detailed review 
of the agency theory, and then discusses the adverse selection and trading hypotheses as the two 
main hypotheses in the ownership-liquidity relationship. The review then evaluates findings of 
existing empirical literature in this area and generates research gaps.  The last part of this chapter 
discusses those empirical papers in this area which covers the effect of financial crisis on the 
ownership structure - liquidity relationship. 
Chapter 3 provides details of the methodological framework employed in this research. This 
chapter presents details of the data collection process and sample selection criteria. The chapter 
also contains information about the empirical models employed in this research and explains the 
definitions and measurements of the study variables.  In addition, there are also discussions about 
potential econometric issues raised by previous studies in this area and the measures this study took 
in tackling those issues.  In addition, this chapter presents an overview of the application of pooled 
                                                          
3 The Hausman (1978) test results for examining the effect of ownership level and concentration on market liquidity and the effect of 
owners’ identity on market liquidity, are respectively as follows; prob<chi2= 0.8587 and prob<chi2= 0.7458. As a result, this study 
employs fixed effect models over and above the random effects models of estimation.  
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OLS year and industry dummies as the main estimation method and provides justification for the 
selection of this method.  
Chapter 4 presents empirical evidence on the relationship between ownership level, concentration 
and market liquidity in the UK. The chapter first presents details of the research hypotheses and 
then explains the empirical analysis obtained through the application and use of pooled OLS year 
and industry dummies as the main estimation method of this investigation. The empirical findings 
presented in this chapter indicate that ownership level and concentration affect market liquidity in 
the UK.  Moreover, further analysis and robustness tests are also included in this chapter. 
Chapter 5 discusses the empirical findings on the relationship between owners’ identity and market 
liquidity. The chapter begins with the hypothesis development. It then moves to discuss the 
empirical analysis and results obtained through the application of pooled OLS year and industry 
dummies as the estimation method used in this chapter. The empirical findings indicate that 
owners’ identity has different impacts on market liquidity in the UK. In addition, further analysis 
and robustness tests are also included in this chapter. 
Chapter 6 examines the impact of ownership level, concentration and owners’ identity on market 
liquidity during the recent 2007-2009, financial crisis. This chapter’s analyses are divided into three 
different sub-periods, i.e. pre-crisis, crisis and post-crisis periods. This helped the author in 
differentiating the effects of the recent financial crisis in different periods.  The main estimation 
method employed in this chapter is again the pooled OLS year and industry dummies’ approach. 
Furthermore, the chapter evaluates the findings and provide discussions about the effects of the 
crisis over the three different periods.  Finally, Chapter 7 provides a short summary of the overall 
contents and empirical findings of the study and concludes the thesis. In addition, this chapter 
provides details of the study contributions and implications, limitations and also specify avenues 
and recommendations for future research.     
1.6 Summary 
This chapter has explained the underlying motivations for pursuing the study, and discussed its 
objectives. The chapter has also explained the potential contributions of the study’s findings, and it 
provides an overview of the content of the whole thesis; it is expected, that the brief overview of all 
the chapters will make it easier for the reader to locate any particular areas of interest. The next 
chapter presents a brief overview of existing literature in this area of research. The chapter provides 
an assessment of relevant theories and empirical literature, and also identify gaps in the subject 
area. 
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Chapter 2 
 
Literature Review  
 
2.1 Introduction  
Over the last two decades, the relationship between ownership structure and market liquidity has 
stimulated the interests of many academics, regulators and researchers. The root of this relationship 
can be attributed to the separation of ownership and control, and diffused versus concentrated 
ownership (Berle & Means 1932; Maug 1998). Nevertheless, the existing literature has suggested 
investigating the above-mentioned relationship from two perspectives (Rubin 2007). The first one 
is the adverse selection perspective, which states that when informed shareholders possess superior 
information about the firm’s prospects compared to other shareholders, an information asymmetry 
arises, which decreases market liquidity (Easley & O'Hara 1987; Glosten & Milgrom 1985; 
Grossman & Stiglitz 1980; Kyle 1985). The second one is the trading perspective, which 
documents that when investors turn over their portfolio more frequently, transactions costs are 
reduced, which increases market liquidity (Demsetz 1968; Merton 1987; Schwartz & Shapiro 
1992). As a result, studying the relationship between market liquidity and ownership structure is 
ambiguous. 
 
This chapter starts with a review of agency theory, which provides the theoretical background for 
explaining the nature and context of the principal-agent relationship (Jensen & Meckling 1976). 
Thus, understanding agency theory is the first step in knowing about ownership variables such as 
how blockholders and large shareholders can affect market liquidity through the liquidity-control 
trade-off. The chapter then moves to focus on the adverse selection and the trading hypotheses. 
After providing the theoretical explanations for the above-mentioned theories and hypotheses, the 
empirical work on the ownership level and concentration and market liquidity is also reviewed and 
discussed.  
 
The second part of this chapter focuses on the role of owners’ identity on market liquidity. In this 
regard, the existing literature indicates that the identity of different owners has different impacts on 
market liquidity (Fehle 2004; Poon et al., 2013). Keeping this in mind, this chapter presents a 
review of both the theoretical and empirical literature on the relationship between owners’ identity 
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and market liquidity. Furthermore, the last part of this chapter reviews the effect of ownership 
level, concentration and owners’ identity on market liquidity during the recent financial crisis.  
 
The rest of this chapter is organised as follows: Section 2.2 reviews the agency theory, the sources 
of conflict in the agency relationship and their relevance to market liquidity. Section 2.3 discusses 
the ownership structure - liquidity approaches. Section 2.4 covers details of the empirical work on 
the relationship between ownership level, concentration and market liquidity. Section 2.5 presents 
the ownership structure trends in the UK. Section 2.6 presents an overview of the theoretical and 
empirical literature on the relationship between owners’ identity and market liquidity. Section 2.7 
presents the relationship between ownership level, concentration, owners’ identity and market 
liquidity during the recent financial crisis. The final section concludes this chapter by providing a 
short summary of the contents and generates links with the next chapter.   
 
2.2. Agency Theory 
 
The origin of conflicts, which emerge from the separation of ownership and control, was first 
explained in the seminal work of Berle & Means (1932). According to Berle & Means (1932), 
when a firm begin its operation it is small in size and where owners are also act as managers of the 
firm. However, the case is different when the firm grows larger in size because more capital is 
needed for financing its operations. The firm would therefore, seek external capital from the market 
due to which, other investors also provide funds and share the ownership with the existing owners.  
At this point due to disperse ownership managers are appointed for controlling the firm’s 
operations. Consequently, the division of labour is now clear; the firm’s managers have the needed 
skills and knowledge to run the firm more effectively. The relationship between dispersed owners 
and manager was described as the agency relationship by Ross (1973) and Jensen & Meckling 
(1976), which provide a detailed explanation of the principal-agent relationship explained under the 
agency theory framework.  
  
Jensen & Meckling (1976, p. 5) define the agency theory relationship as “ a contract under which 
one or more persons- the principal- engage another person- the agent – to perform some services 
on their behalf which involves delegating some decision making authority to the agent”. In other 
words, agency theory is the divergence of interest between shareholders and managers (Eisenhardt 
1989). In particular, the agents may take decisions that serve their own interests. Nevertheless, 
Shleifer & Vishny (1997, p. 741) provide another definition for the agency problem: “the 
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difficulties faced by financiers in assuring that their funds are not expropriated or wasted on 
unattractive projects”. Thus, agency theory assumes that managers deviate from shareholders’ 
wealth maximisation and serve their own personal interests (Jensen & Meckling 1976). As a result, 
the agency theory framework has been applied and expanded by researchers in different contexts all 
over the world.  
 
While discussing concentrated ownership in firms, Holderness (2009) explains that the shared 
benefits of control and the private benefit of control as two main reasons, which may encourage 
shareholders to concentrate their ownership in the firm. In this regard, Shleifer & Vishny (1997) 
argue that large blockholders would seek to maximise their wealth because they have the power 
and ability to control the management to some extent. Furthermore, existing corporate governance 
literature has also indicated the benefits of large blockholders by considering these as a source of 
power in firms. For instance, Hoskisson et al. (2002) state that a large shareholder is considered to 
be an effective monitoring tool for managerial actions and decisions.  
 
However, despite the clear advantage of large blockholders, their existence in a firm carries a cost 
as well. Large blockholders may be motivated to expropriate the firm’s resources or have some 
special benefits that are not available to the minority shareholders (Holderness 2009). The main 
problem is that, while large investors use their voting power to serve their own benefit, this is not 
necessarily matched with other investors’ interests in the firm, or that of employees or even the 
managers (Shleifer & Vishny 1997). Further, Shleifer & Vishny (1997 p. 758) state that “ the 
process of using his control rights to maximize his own welfare, the large investors can therefore 
redistribute wealth – in both efficient and inefficient ways – from others”.  Therefore, two types of 
agency conflicts have been explained in the corporate governance literature.  The first one is the 
classic owner-manager conflict described by Berle & Means (1932) and Jensen & Meckling (1976), 
which Villalonga & Amit (2006) refer to as type 1 agency conflict. Within this context, monitoring 
can be effective only if a single party becomes large enough to internalise the cost of control 
(Grossman & Hart 1980). In contrast, large shareholders may expropriate wealth from minority 
investors (Shleifer & Vishny 1997). Consequently, the second type of agency problem emerges 
between large and minority shareholders, which has been regarded as type 2 agency theory conflict 
(Villalonga & Amit 2006). However, large shareholders may monitor the mangers’ behaviours due 
to their position as the controlling shareholders, and moderate their influence and power (Pagano & 
Roell 1998). Still, due to their potential, their presence in a firm may add professionalism and 
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experience to firms and contribute to better decision-making (Bolton & Von Thadden 1998; 
Lehmann & Weig 2000; Winton 1993).  
 
In line with the above, one of the causes of agency problem is the shareholders’ diffuse ownership, 
which makes shareholders less motivated to monitor mangers, which leads managers to engage in 
self-interested decisions (Jensen & Meckling 1976). In contrast, a vast body of literature has 
considered the ownership concentration as a tool that may reduce the principal-agent conflict 
(Shleifer & Vishny 1997). According to agency theory, investors with concentrated ownership are 
highly motivated to monitor the management of firms (Shleifer & Vishny 1997). Nevertheless, the 
concentration of ownership may create another conflict, which is known as the principal-principal 
(P-P) agency problem (Globerman et al., 2011; Wu et al., 2011). 
 
Young et al. (2008) state that the principal-principal (P-P) conflict mainly occurs between the 
controlling and minority shareholders of the firm due to two different reasons. First, due to the 
existence of shareholders with concentrated ownership this would negatively affect the rights of 
minority shareholders. Second, the existence of weak corporate governance mechanisms as well as 
a legal system cannot effectively protect minority shareholders’ rights. Consequently, the P-P 
agency problems typically exist between the firm’s majority and minority shareholders. In general, 
majority shareholders own substantial equity ownership in the firm and would therefore manage 
access to more private information (Shleifer & Vishny 1997). 
 
Nevertheless, acquiring a controlling position can be prohibitively costly for large shareholders due 
to their preferences for diversification and liquidity of their portfolios (Admati et al., 1994; Bhide 
1993; Parrino et al., 2003). In this regard, some studies argue that monitoring gains can still be 
achieved through ownership changes in public transactions (Admati et al., 1994). In particular, in 
circumstances when trading is conducted under information asymmetries (Khan & Winton 1998; 
Maug 1998). The ability of shareholders monitoring for capturing gains is likely to depend on 
factors such as, available monitoring technologies and diversification concerns (Admati et al., 
1994), trading liquidity (Maug 1998), and firm transparency (Khan et al., 2005). This study 
therefore explains the effect of ownership structure on market liquidity in the context of P-P agency 
relationship highlighted in some recently published studies in this area (see for example, Young et 
al., 2008; Globerman et al., 2011; Wu et al., 2011). Furthermore, the corporate governance 
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literature indicates some causes for the conflicts in the agency relationship such as moral hazard 
and the adverse selection problem explained below. 
 
Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection  
 
Another source of conflict is known as moral hazard, which refers to the possibility of the agent 
being less responsible and not exerting the maximum effort (Alchian & Demsetz 1972). For 
instance, Eisenhardt (1989, p. 61) defines moral hazards as “lack of effort on the part of the 
agent”. In other words, moral hazards exist because the principal cannot observe the managerial 
action all the time and, consequently, cannot judge the quality of the management team (Eisenhardt 
1989). In the light of incomplete contracts and moral hazards, it is difficult for shareholders to 
control such conflicts in the principal-agent relationship. According to Denis (2001), the 
shareholders fail to conduct effective monitoring because they lack the proper experiences, which 
means that they may not understand the managerial actions. In addition, they lack incentives to 
perform this monitoring, especially when they own only a small equity in the firm and the 
monitoring cost may outweigh the benefit. 
 
Agency theory assumes that a firm’s mangers, who run the daily affairs of the business, have more 
information than its shareholders (Fama & Jensen 1983). This leads to an information asymmetry, 
which is considered a source of conflict in the agency relationship. The existence of information 
asymmetry limits the shareholders’ ability to properly monitor managerial actions and make sure 
that those mangers are working in the shareholders’ interests (Adams 1994). Furthermore, the 
inability of shareholders to access all the information and therefore judge the managerial decisions 
creates another problem, so-called adverse selection.  
 
According to Eisenhardt (1989, p. 61), “adverse selection refers to the misrepresentation of ability 
by the agent. The argument here is that the agent may claim to have certain skills or abilities when 
he or she is hired. Moreover, the adverse selection arises because the principal cannot completely 
verify these skills or abilities either at the time of hiring or while the agent is working”. 
Consequently, the existing literature suggests several actions to mitigate the information asymmetry 
effect (Watts & Zimmerman 1983, 1986). These studies state that the disclosure and financial 
reporting of private information forces mangers to disclose certain information to shareholders. 
Moreover, they emphasise the need for information intermediaries such as financial analysts who 
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may reduce information asymmetry through facilitating disclosure between a firm’s managers and 
shareholders.  
 
From a market liquidity perspective, a vast body of literature has examined the issue of monitoring 
incentives of firms with market liquidity. An influential view generally attributed to Hirschman 
(1970), states that when monitors can easily ‘exit’ the firm they tend not to exercise their ‘voice’. In 
other words, blockholders cannot be relied upon to monitor management actively if they have the 
option to sell their stake instead (Black 1990). Moreover, existing literature has argued that it is 
precisely the highly liquid nature of US markets that makes it difficult to provide incentives to large 
shareholders to monitor management. This issue has been analysed by Khan & Winton (1998) and 
Maug (1998), among others. For example, Khan & Winton (1998) show how market liquidity can 
determine large shareholders’ incentives to monitor by giving them incentives to trade on private 
information rather than exercising their vote. They argue, however, that incentives to speculate may 
be small for blue chip companies, where a large shareholder is unlikely to have a significant 
informational advantage over other market participants. In the same spirit, Maug (1998) points out 
that in liquid markets it is also easier to build a block. This gives large shareholders an added 
incentive to invest in information gathering and gain against uninformed investors.  
 
Another perspective is that large shareholders may want to limit their stake to ensure minimum 
market liquidity. In this regard, Holmstrom & Tirole (1993) argue that share prices in the secondary 
market provide valuable information about a firm’s performance. To obtain accurate valuations, 
however, the secondary market must be liquid. Indeed, liquidity raises the speculator’s return for 
acquiring information and thus improves the informativeness of the secondary market price. The 
more informative stock price can then be included in compensation packages to provide better 
incentives to mangers. According to this view, it is the market that does the monitoring exercise, 
and it may only be necessary for the large shareholders to act on the information produced by the 
market (Barlett 1994; Gomper & Lerner 1999; Levin 1995). 
 
In other words, there may be a natural complementarily between speculators in market liquidity and 
monitoring by large shareholders. This idea is pursued further in Faure-Grimaud & Gromb (1999) 
and Aghion et al. (2000). These models show how large shareholders’ monitoring costs can be 
reduced through better pricing of shares in the market liquidity. The basic idea is that more accurate 
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pricing provides not only greater liquidity to the large shareholders, but also enhances their 
incentives to monitor by reflecting the benefit of their monitoring activities in the stock price. 
 
Outcome of the above discussions suggest, that market liquidity could also affect ownership 
structure in reverse order. In other words, the market liquidity may affect the monitoring incentives 
of large shareholders and blockholders (Holmstrom & Tirole 1993; Maug 1998). Nevertheless, 
taking into consideration that this study examines the effect of ownership structure on market 
liquidity, the following section explains the theoretical framework of the ownership-liquidity 
relationship. In this regard, existing literature that examines the relationship between ownership 
structures and market liquidity specify two main approaches. The first approach covers the 
liquidity-control trade-off approach to market liquidity, whereas, the second approach link the 
market microstructure to market liquidity (Ginglinger & Hamon 2007; Rubin 2007). The next 
section thus explains these two approaches. 
 
2.3 Ownership Structure- Liquidity Approaches  
 
The Liquidity-Control Trade-off Approach to Market Liquidity 
 
A vast body of literature has documented that large shareholders face a free-rider problem because 
they bear the costs of monitoring alone, whereas all the small shareholders benefit from their 
monitoring efforts. The impact of free riding depends mainly on the stake of shares, which has two 
effects. On the one hand, the lock-in effect: owning a larger share makes the return on the 
company’s shares more significant for the large shareholder. As a result, it stimulates them to 
engage more in the monitoring process. On the other hand, the liquidity effect: this postulates that, 
if a large shareholder owns a significant fraction of the total shares, this makes the market less 
liquid, which reduces the large shareholder’s expected gains from trading on private information.   
 
Large shareholders make a direct profit through trading at the expense of uninformed liquidity 
traders (i.e. individuals); this conjecture is built from the fact that large shareholders have decided 
to monitor a company that provides them with private information relative to the outside market 
participants. Moreover, large shareholders also make a profit on their initial stake because shares 
initially trade below their intrinsic value; on the other hand, individual investors are only willing to 
hold shares at an adverse selection discount that reflects the expected loss from trading with 
informed investors in the future. 
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The theoretical work on the relationship between ownership structure and market liquidity refers 
back to the seminal work of Coffee (1991), who states that there is a trade-off between liquidity and 
control. In other words, the concentrated ownership that is needed for efficient control as an 
internal corporate governance mechanism may reduce the market liquidity. Moreover, Holmstrom 
& Tirole (1993, p. 696) document that “an insider who holds some fraction of the firm as a long 
term investment, if he decides to decrease his ownership, there will be more shares actively traded 
and the liquidity of the market will go up”. Overall, concentrated ownership increases the extent to 
which stock market participants monitor the firm, and decreases the amount of information 
available about the firm, which leads to lower market liquidity.  
 
In the same spirit, Bhide (1993) mentions that active stockholders who reduce agency costs by 
providing internal monitoring also reduce market liquidity by creating information asymmetry 
problems. This is particularly true for firms with higher ownership concentration where all 
investors play an active role in the internal corporate governance mechanisms; their stock, 
however, cannot be readily traded in the capital market. As a result, market liquidity is decreased 
because the number of shareholders available to trade is smaller. Furthermore, existing literature 
has documented that, if a firm has a dispersed ownership of shares, there are more shareholders to 
trade with, but the probability of efficient corporate control is weaker (Bolton & von Thadden 
1998a, b; Maug 1998). For example, Bolton & Von Thadden (1998 a, b) examine the relationship 
between ownership dispersion and market liquidity. They state that, in countries with dispersed 
ownership, capital markets are usually liquid, such as the US and UK capital markets. The opposite 
holds for countries with more concentrated ownership and a control-oriented corporate governance 
regime, like Germany’s capital market.  
 
In particular, Bhide (1993, p. 45) mentions that ‘If the proportion of firm’s equity held by diffuse 
investors is subsequently increased; liquidity increases because larger number of stockholders will 
participate in the trade’, providing further support in the US for this perspective. Similarly, 
Holmstrom & Tirole (1993) and Bhushan (1989) state that, with more liquidity traders, it becomes 
easier for an informed party (a speculator) to distinguish his private information and make money 
on it. In addition, as reported by Kothare (1997), market liquidity increases when ownership 
becomes more diffuse and decreases when ownership becomes more concentrated. In the UK, 
Maug (1998), argues that a higher degree of market liquidity in the market makes it more attractive 
for large shareholders to sell their shares rather than to stay and monitor. He suggests that, while 
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liquid markets reduce large shareholders’ incentive to monitor because they can sell their holdings 
easily, such markets make corporate governance more effective as it is cheaper and easier to 
acquire and hold large stakes. Thus, higher market liquidity may reduce monitoring by large 
shareholders (Khan & Winton 1998). To the best of the author’s knowledge, the there is abundance 
of research contributions on the role of liquidity in spurring monitoring. In contrast, few studies 
have investigated the effect of ownership structure on market liquidity. Furthermore, prior studies 
have also suggested that the effect of ownership structure on market liquidity can be better 
explained from a market microstructure perspective. Consequently, the next section discusses the 
ownership-liquidity relationship from a market microstructure perspective.  
 
The Market Microstructure Approach to Market Liquidity  
 
Bagehot (1971) first examined the relationship between ownership structure and market liquidity. 
He classifies traders into liquidity traders (uninformed traders) and informed traders, with the latter 
possessing private information about the firm’s prospects. However, liquidity traders do not have 
the ability to access private information, unlike informed traders. In line with this, Chiang & 
Venkatesh (1988) state that ownership structure can affect market liquidity from a market 
microstructure perspective. On the one hand, some studies regard uninformed traders as “noise 
traders”, who trade for rebalancing motives or simply because they believe they have information 
(see for example, Admati & Pfleiderer 1988; Copeland & Galai 1983). On the other hand, there are 
other studies which argue that informed traders have private information about the firm’s prospects 
and they trade upon it (see for example, Glosten & Milgrom 1985; Kyle 1985). Similarly, evidence 
in the existing literature suggest also show how trading by informed investors creates information 
asymmetry in the capital markets and the way market makers recapture their losses suffered in 
trading with informed investors (Admati & Pfleiderer 1988; Copeland & Galai 1983; Easley & 
O’Hara 1987; Glosten & Milgrom 1985; Kyle 1985). For instance, Kyle (1985) shows that the 
larger the number of uninformed investors, “liquidity traders”, the lower is the bid-ask spread. In 
contrast, in a market where transactions are more likely to be initiated by informed traders, the bid-
ask spread is larger, and the price impact ratio is stronger, which decreases liquidity in the market.  
 
In the same spirit, Admati & Pfleiderer (1988) state that there are two motives for trading in the 
financial market, which are information and liquidity, which gives more emphasis to the idea that 
there are two types of trader, informed and uninformed. Figure 2.1 in this study shows the motives 
of investors and traders according to the theoretical relationship between ownership structure and 
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market liquidity from the market microstructure perspective. Two streams of literature have 
emerged to investigate the above-mentioned relationship. On the one hand, some studies have used 
high-frequency data to study the ownership-liquidity relation such as the insider trading and the 
adverse selection component of bid-ask spread (Admati & Pfleiderer 1988; Copeland & Galai 
1983; Easley & O’Hara 1987; Glosten & Milgrom 1985; Jaffe 1974; Kyle 1985). These studies 
assume that insider and institutional investors are better informed about the firm’s private 
information than uninformed individual investors. In particular, insiders are actively involved in 
managing and overseeing the firm; thus, it is natural to expect that they would have access to 
information that others would not have.  
 
In contrast, institutional investors do not have the ability to access the private information about the 
firm’s prospects, unlike insiders, but still they can create an information asymmetry between the 
firm and market by exploiting economies of scale information acquisition and processing. Since 
their marginal costs of gathering and processing information are lower than for individuals, this 
may reduce the information asymmetry for firms with a large percentage of institutional investors. 
On the other hand, prior studies have used ownership structure as a proxy of the information 
asymmetry between the firm and market (Chiang & Venkatesh 1988). They examined market 
assessment of the institutional and insider holding through their effect on the bid-ask spread. 
Chiang & Venkatesh (1988) report that there is a negative relation between bid-ask spread and 
insider holding, whereas there is no effect between institutional holding and bid-ask spread. Their 
results are in line with the work of Demsetz (1986), who notes that institutional owners differ from 
corporate insiders in that they do not specialise their portfolios, and do not have direct access to 
non-public information. These differences may reflect the legal and fiduciary constraints facing 
institutional investors. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                  Figure 2.1 Informed versus Uninformed Investors’ Motivations 
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2.4 Survey of the Empirical Studies 
 
The previous discussion indicates that there are two approaches in order to examine the relationship 
between ownership structures and market liquidity, liquidity-control trade-off and market 
microstructure. In particular, this study mainly investigates the relationship between ownership 
level, concentration and owners’ identity on market liquidity. In the next section, this study will 
present the empirical studies that investigate the relationship between ownership level, 
concentration and market liquidity. Then, the study will discuss the empirical studies that test the 
relationship between owners’ identity and market liquidity. 
 
2.4.1 The Impact of Ownership Level on Market Liquidity 
  
Previous literature has intensively investigated the impact of ownership level on market liquidity. It 
has mainly focused on examining the effect of insider and institutional ownership on market 
liquidity. This section conducts a review of the empirical studies on the relationship between 
insider, institutional ownership and market liquidity in order to identify the research gaps in the 
literature.  
 
2.4.1.1 Insider Ownership 
 
Capital market literature has predicted a negative relationship between market liquidity and insider 
ownership (Copeland & Galai 1983; Glosten & Milgrom 1985; Grossman & Stiglitz 1988; Seyhun 
1986). These studies emphasise that one cause of illiquidity in the capital market is the higher 
insider ownership in a firm. For instance, Seyhun (1986) and Demsetz (1986) suggest that the level 
of insider ownership in a firm may influence market liquidity and that there is a positive 
relationship between insider trading and stock holding. In particular, the market maker would 
regard that all those firms, which have higher insider ownership to experience a higher probability 
of trading with informed investors. Furthermore, Demsetz & Lehn (1985) argue that the benefits of 
higher insider ownership are greater in firms where the profit potential of a manager’s action is 
uncertain. As a result, there is a link between the level of information asymmetry and the 
uncertainty of the firm’s value. Moreover, existing literature has suggested that there is a positive 
relationship between insider ownership and information asymmetry (Chiang & Venkatesh 1988; 
Copeland & Galai 1983; Sarin et al., 2000; Zhou 2011). 
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In order to investigate the relationship between insider ownership and market liquidity two strands 
of literature have emerged. The first strand of literature was emerged first in 1980s and mostly 
investigate the relationship between insider ownership and market liquidity by using the bid-ask 
spread as a sole measure of market liquidity (see for example, Chiang & Venkatesh 1988; Kini & 
Mian 1995). Similarly, other studies in this strand of literature cover the adverse selection 
hypothesis, and suggest that insiders have better ability to possess private information about the 
firm’s future prospects than outside investors (Glosten & Milgrom 1985; Glosten & Harris 1988; 
Grossman & Stiglitz 1980; Kyle 1985). In particular, the adverse selection hypothesis assumes that, 
as the insider ownership increases, the information asymmetry between inside and outside investors 
will also increase which would lead to a decrease in market liquidity. Consequently, an increase in 
insider ownership has been regarded as an additional motivation for insiders to access more private 
information about the firm’s prospects which would decrease market liquidity. By using 37 NYSE 
firms in 1973, Chiang & Venkatesh (1988) find a negative relationship between the market 
liquidity and the level of insider ownership. Specifically, their findings show there is a positive 
relationship between insider holding and quoted bid-ask spread. This suggests that a high level of 
insider shareholdings increases the information asymmetry between the inside and outside investors 
and decreases market liquidity.  
 
Nevertheless, Kini & Mian (1995) examine the relation between bid-ask spread and ownership 
structure based on 1985 for 1063 NYSE firms. They document a negative and significant 
relationship between insider ownership and bid-ask spread and no relationship between insider 
trading and bid-ask spread.  However, the empirical evidence regarding the relationship between 
insider ownership and market liquidity is inconsistent. Some studies have reported a positive 
relation between the two variables; others have found a negative relationship. This evidence has 
been supported by Sarin et al. (2000), who use a sample of 786 for AMEX and NYSE for the year 
1985 and conclude that the relative and quoted bid-ask spread were found to be positively 
significantly associated with insider ownership, whereas, there is a negative relationship between 
insider ownership and quoted depth. They suggest that higher adverse selection costs in firms with 
higher factional insider ownership are consequences of the increased probability of insider trade.  
 
Moreover, their result indicates that, after controlling for insider trading, they observe an 
insignificant relation between information asymmetry and insider ownership. This suggests that the 
higher level of information asymmetry in the firms with larger insider ownership is a result of 
higher probabilities of insider trading. Dennis & Weston (2001) provide further support in the US 
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for this perspective; they study the association between insider ownership and the quoted bid-ask 
spread for 5500 NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ firms and find that firms with higher proportions of 
insider ownership have a higher quoted bid-ask spread. However, they regard insiders as informed 
investors.   
 
The second strand of literature that tests the relationship between market liquidity and insider 
ownership emerged in the late 2000s and states that this relationship is ambiguous and that previous 
studies in the first generation failed to take into account the multidimensional concept of market 
liquidity (Rubin 2007; Stoll 2000)
4
. The existing literature has suggested that insider ownership 
affects both the real and information friction of market liquidity (Comerton-Forde & Rydge 2006; 
Rubin 2007). These studies document that insiders are informed investors about the firm’s private 
information but tend to turn over their portfolio less often than other investors do, which increases 
the bid-ask spread and leads to a decrease in market liquidity. Moreover, it has been documented 
that “an insider who holds some fraction of the firm as a long term investment, if he decides to 
decrease his ownership, there will be more shares actively traded and the liquidity of the market 
will go up” (see Holmstrom & Tirole 1993, p. 701). Therefore, insider ownership in this case is 
likely to have a negative impact on market liquidity. 
 
For the US market, Rubin (2007) examines the effect of insider ownership on market liquidity 
using a sample of 1369 NYSE firms for the period 1993-2003. He documents a positive and 
significant relationship between insider ownership and quoted, effective and realised bid-ask spread 
and Amihud (2002) illiquidity ratio. In contrast, he concludes that there is a negative relationship 
between insider ownership and trading volume. In Australia, Comerton-Forde & Rydge (2006) 
investigate the effect of insider ownership on illiquidity. Using 667 ASE listed firms from 1998 to 
2003, their findings show a statistically significant positive relationship between insider ownership 
and market liquidity between 0% to 5% insider holdings; then a more statistically significant and 
positive relationship between 5% to 10% insider holdings; and finally a statistically significant and 
negative impact at 10% and more insider holdings. In particular, they suggest that at a low level of 
insider ownership there is a positive and significant relation between insider ownership and market 
liquidity; this signals to the market that insiders are providing effective monitoring, which enhances 
the firm performance “convergence of interest hypothesis”. In contrast, the “entrenchment 
hypothesis” begins to offset monitoring benefits at a level of 10% insider ownership and shows a 
                                                          
4 Real friction is the trading activity measures of market liquidity such as number of trades and trade size. However, information 
friction is the proportion of market liquidity that measures the degree of adverse selection level.  
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negative and significant relationship between insider ownership and market liquidity. Further, Zhou 
(2011) examines the relationship between ownership structure and liquidity and trade 
informativeness, using a sample of NYSE firms for the period July to September 2000. He finds 
that there is a negative relationship between insider ownership and market liquidity. Zhou (2011) 
regard insider investors as informed investors about the firm’s prospects and find a statistically 
positive relationship between insider ownership and quoted as well as effective bid-ask spread. 
Zhou (2011) also documents a positive and statistically significant relationship between insider 
ownership and trade informativeness.  
 
From the above discussion, this study notices that there was a mixed result in the relationship 
between insider ownership and market liquidity. Existing literature has documented that one of the 
reasons that leads to this conflict in findings is the so-called endogeneity problem, which will be 
discussed in detail in Chapter 3. Many studies have used different techniques in order to resolve 
two types of endogeneity: unobserved heterogeneity and simultaneous equation. From the 
unobserved heterogeneity perspective, some studies have used different robustness tests to check if 
there is any unobserved heterogeneity problem (Comerton-Forde & Rydge 2006; Denis & Sarin 
1999; Gompers & Metrick 2001; Heflin & Shaw 2000; Kini & Mian 1995; Sarin et al., 2000). 
Existing studies use different robustness checks to detect if there is an unobserved heterogeneity 
such as the firm size effect (Chiang & Venkatesh 1988; Kini & Mian 1995) and simultaneous 
equation (Comerton-Forde & Rydge 2006; Dennis & Weston 2001; Rubin 2007). Consequently, 
this study uses different techniques to take into account the endogeneity problem. Moreover, this 
study notices that most of the studies that have been conducted to test the relationship between 
insider ownership and market liquidity used data from the US market. To the best of the author’s 
knowledge, no study examine the above- mentioned relationship in UK. 
  
2.4.1.2 Institutional Ownership 
 
The relationship between market liquidity and institutional ownership is ambiguous. Some studies 
consider institutional owners as informed investors and others regard them as uninformed investors. 
Therefore, the literature has attempted to examine theoretically and empirically the impact of 
institutional ownership on market liquidity, and has reported inconsistent conclusions. 
Theoretically, this relationship stems from both the adverse selection and trading hypotheses. 
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From the adverse selection perceptive, institutional investors are less informed about the firm’s 
private information than insider investors (Brockman et al., 2009; Chiang & Venkatesh 1988; Kini 
& Mian 1995; Rubin 2007). Using 63 NYSE firms in 1973, Chiang & Venkatesh (1988) report that 
there is no relationship between institutional ownership and bid-ask spread, and they state that 
institutional investors are not informed traders. However, Kini & Mian (1995) document a 
significant and negative relationship between institutional ownership and bid-ask spread for 1063 
NYSE listed firms for 1985. In contrast, Sarin et al. (2000) use a sample of 786 for AMEX and 
NYSE for the year 1985 and find a positive relation between institutional ownership and bid-ask 
spread and negative relationship between institutional ownership and quoted depth. Nevertheless, 
they document that the positive relation between institutional ownership and bid-ask spread is 
because of the active trading of institutional investors, rather than because of their adverse selection 
effect. In other words, Sarin et al. (2000) regard institutional investors as uninformed investors.  
 
In the same spirit, Fehle (2004) examines the impact of institutional ownership on market liquidity, 
measured by quoted and effective bid-ask spread, in 10,107 NYSE listed firms, over the period 
from 1980 to 1996. He reports a negative relationship between institutional ownership, quoted and 
effective bid-ask spread and documents that institutional owners are uninformed investors. In 
contrast, Dennis & Weston (2001) investigate the impact of institutional ownership on bid-ask 
spread, adverse components of bid-ask spread and probability of informed trading in 5500 NYSE, 
AMEX, and NASDAQ firms, over the period from Q4 1997 to Q4 1998. They find a significantly 
positive relationship between institutional ownership and quoted as well as the adverse selection 
component of the bid-ask spread and suggest that as compared to other investors institutions are 
better informed.  
 
However, another stream of existing studies has suggested that institutional ownership can affect 
market liquidity from a trading perspective. According to the trading hypothesis, institutional 
investors trade more frequently, which increases market liquidity (Gompers & Metrick 2001; 
Hamilton 1978; Schwartz & Shapiro 1992; Tinic 1972). Consequently, recent literature has 
suggested the use of different proxies of market liquidity in order to capture the multidimensional 
nature of market liquidity (Rubin 2007; Stoll 2000). Comerton-Forde & Rydge (2006) investigate 
the relationship between institutional ownership and illiquidity measured by Amihud (2002) price 
impact ratio and turnover ratio. They report that there is a positive relationship between 
institutional ownership and turnover ratio and negative relationship with price impact ratio. 
Moreover, in the US Rubin (2007) examines the effect of institutional ownership on market 
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liquidity using a sample of 1369 NYSE firms for the period 1993-2003. He documents that there is 
a positive relationship between institutional ownership and market liquidity, suggesting that 
institutional investors trade more than other investors (i.e. insiders) do. In particular, he concludes 
that institutional ownership is positively related to the trading volume and depth. In contrast, 
institutional ownership is negatively related to quoted and effective bid-ask spread and price impact 
ratio.  
 
In line with other prior studies (Demsetz & Lehn 1985; Denis & Sarin 1999; Falenstein 1996; 
Helfin & Shaw 2000), Rubin (2007) applies the simultaneous equation estimation of the three-step 
least squares (3SLS); he finds that institutional ownership is affected by market liquidity. In 
particular, institutional ownership decreases with increases in quoted and effective bid-ask spread. 
Furthermore, he documents that institutions prefer large and liquid stocks. As a result, market 
liquidity and institutional ownership may be simultaneously determined; that is, an institutional 
investor’s decision to become a shareholder or a blockholder may depend on the firm’s market 
liquidity. Furthermore, Jennings et al. (2002) explore the relationship between institutional 
ownership and quoted bid-ask spread and the adverse selection component of bid-ask spread for 
NASDAQ firms 1Q 1983-3Q 1991. They report a negative relationship between institutional 
ownership and bid-ask spread. Furthermore, they investigate how the institutional identity affects 
bid-ask spread. Specifically, they find that independent advisors ownerships’ have the strongest 
effect on the bid-ask spread. In contrast, investment companies ownerships’ have little impact on 
the bid-ask spread.  
 
Additionally, Jennings et al. (2002) employ Granger causality test in order to deal with the 
endogeneity problem; they document a negative relationship between institutional ownership and 
bid-ask spread. In particular, Granger causality test finds that changes in bid-ask spread cause 
changes in institutional ownership. Nevertheless, they find that increase in institutional ownership 
lead to a decrease in bid-ask spread. Furthermore, Jennings et al. (2002) show that changes in the 
institutional ownership causes a change in the informational environment surrounding the firms. 
 
In contrast, Sarin et al. (2000) use a sample of 786 for AMEX and NYSE for the year 1985, and 
find that the relationship between institutional ownership and bid-ask spread (depth) is positive 
(negative); however, they report that there is no relationship between institutional ownership and 
adverse selection costs. Moreover, they document that there is a positive relationship between the 
average trade size and institutional ownership. They use ordinary least square (OLS) as the main 
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method of estimation. As a further check, they use simultaneous equations; they report that there is 
a negative relationship between bid-ask spread and institutional ownership and a positive 
relationship between institutional ownership and trading volume. In a further US study by Zhou 
(2011), tests the relationship between ownership structure, market liquidity and trade 
informativeness. By using a sample of firms from the New York Stock Exchange over the period 
between July and September 2000, he reported a positive relationship between institutional 
ownership and market liquidity. He also documents a positive relationship between institutional 
ownership and informativeness of trades and argues that institutional investors are better informed 
about the firm’s private information regarding the firm’s prospects.  
 
A further stream of literature has emerged to resolve the endogeneity problem (Barabanov & 
McNamara 2002; Dennis & Weston 2001; Fehle 2004; Rubin 2007; Sarin et al., 2000). Each of 
these studies takes a slightly different approach in dealing with the endogeneity problem that is 
potentially latent in cross-sectional regression. For example, some studies have used panel data 
(Fehle 2004), simultaneous equation (Rubin 2007; Sarin et al., 2000), and simultaneous equation 
and 2SLS (Barabanov & McNamara 2002). Recently, Poon et al. (2013) used Pooled OLS year and 
industry dummies to alleviate concerns about endogeneity and spurious inferences. They include 
industry fixed effects to control for time-invariant omitted industry-level factors that affect 
liquidity. Moreover, they also include year effects to control for cross-sectional dependence; that is, 
market-wide factors that affect market liquidity. Furthermore, Poon et al. (2013) cluster the errors 
at the firm level in order to control for time-series dependence. 
 
2.4.2 The Impact of Ownership Concentration on Market Liquidity 
  
The literature has intensively investigated the impact of ownership concentration on market 
liquidity. It has mainly focused on examining the effect of blockholders on market liquidity. This 
section conducts a review of the empirical studies on the relationship between ownership 
concentration and market liquidity. 
 
2.4.2.1 Ownership Concentration   
 
The existing literature has stated that blockholders possess economies of scale in the collection of 
information or might have access to private and value-relevant information (Brockman et al., 2009; 
Heflin & Shaw 2000; Jacoby & Zheng 2010). Thus, there is a strong belief, backed by the 
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theoretical models of Copeland & Galai (1983) and Glosten & Milgrom (1985), which suggest that 
market participants face an adverse selection problem from these informed investors. As a result, 
market makers increase the bid-ask spread, which leads to lower market liquidity. Nevertheless, the 
empirical studies that have examined the impact of blockholders on market liquidity have been 
inconsistent (Brockman et al., 2009; Heflin & Shaw 2000; Jacoby & Zheng 2010). In the US, Kini 
& Mian (1995) document a significant and positive relationship between blockholders and bid-ask 
spread for 1063 NYSE listed firms for 1985. Moreover, Heflin & Shaw (2000) investigate the 
impact of blockholders on market liquidity, measured by quoted, effective, adverse selection 
components of bid-ask spread and depth, in 260 US listed firms, over the period from 1988 to 
1989. They report a positive relationship between blockholders and, the quoted and effective bid-
ask spread, and adverse selection spread components. However, they report a negative relationship 
between blockholders and quoted depth.  
 
Nevertheless, Rubin (2007) examines the effect of blockholders on market liquidity using a sample 
of 1369 NYSE firms for the period 1993-2003. He documents a negative relationship between 
blockholders and dollar volume and a positive relationship between bid-ask spread and price 
impact ratio. Thus, it appears that blockholdings improve market liquidity. Furthermore, Brockman 
et al. (2009) examine the relationship between blockholders and market liquidity measured by real, 
information and total cost of market liquidity for 1225 NYSE and AMEX companies over the 
period from 2000 to 2006. They conclude that blockholders affect market liquidity through their 
adverse impact on real friction of market liquidity (i.e. trade size and number of trade). After 
controlling for this real friction effect, the relationship between bid-ask spread and blockholders is 
insignificantly negative. They suggest that blockholders are uninformed investors, which explains 
the negative relationship between market liquidity and blockholders. Moreover, they report a 
negative relationship between blockholders and turnover ratio and number of trades. However, they 
show that the relation between blockholders and average trade size is insignificant, suggesting that 
blockholders as a whole neither increase nor reduce average trade size.  
 
However, Brockman et al. (2009) focus only on NYSE and AMEX firms; as a result, Jacoby & 
Zheng (2010) test the relationship between blockholders and market liquidity and use 1071 NYSE, 
323 AMEX and 2182 NASDAQ firms for the year 1995. They use two dimensions of ownership 
concentration: number of shareholders and blockholders. They measure market liquidity by bid-ask 
spread, probability of informed trading (PIN), depth, and trading volume. For NYSE/AMEX, they 
report a positive relationship between blockholders and bid-ask spread and PIN, while there is a 
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negative relation between blockholders and quoted depth and dollar trading volume. With respect 
to the number of shareholders, they report an insignificant relationship between number of 
shareholders and adverse selection bid-ask spread and PIN. For NASDAQ stocks, Jacoby & Zheng 
(2010) document a positive relationship between blockholders and bid-ask spread. In contrast, they 
report a positive relationship between trading volume and blockholders. However, they conclude a 
positive relationship between number of shareholders and dollar volume and an insignificant 
relationship between PIN and quoted depth.  
 
Recent literature has documented that using the blockholders as a sole measure of ownership 
concentration causes bias in the results (Comerton-Forde & Rydge 2006; Jacoby & Zheng 2010; 
Rubin 2007). These studies used different proxies of ownership concentration in order to reduce 
any bias from the arbitrary cut-off point that has been used in order to measure the blockholders; 
moreover, the shareholder rights can differ significantly across countries and even across firms 
within the same country. For example, some countries’ corporate law prescribes discrete control 
thresholds that give a blocking veto power over major decisions. In the US, the cut-off point is 5% 
and more of the share capital (Brockman et al., 2009; Heflin & Shaw 2000). In the UK, the cut- off 
point is 3% and 5% and more of the share capital (Short & Keasey 1999). 
 
Consequently, findings of the existing literature regard large shareholders as the most influential 
owners of a firm, which can influence corporate decisions in such a way that increases a firm’s 
value (Claessens et al., 2000; La Porta et al., 1999). However, any active role of large shareholders 
also brings costs that reduce market liquidity. For example, Coffee (1991) was among the first to 
point out that active role of large shareholders and the liquidity of shares of their companies cannot 
go hand on hand. Moreover, Holmstrom & Tirole (1993, p. 701) document that “If the proportion 
of the firm held by insiders decreases, there are more outside equity holders and hence more 
liquidity traders.  Nevertheless, the empirical evidence about the impact of large shareholders and 
market liquidity is comprehensive (Attig et al., 2006; Ginglinger & Hamon 2007; Naes 2004; 
Rubin 2007). A number of studies have suggested that large shareholders have a negative impact on 
market liquidity (Attig et al., 2006; Ginglinger & Hamon 2007).  
 
For instance, Naes (2004) reports that there is a positive relationship between the aggregate top five 
large shareholders and quoted and effective bid-ask spread and adverse selection component of bid-
ask spread. However, he reports that there is no relationship between ownership concentration and 
depth. In France, Ginglinger & Hamon (2007) report a positive relationship between controlled 
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shareholder and bid-ask spread and they suggest that controlled shareholders are informed traders 
for 918 French listed firms from 1998 to 2003. Moreover, they find that the deviation of control 
from ownership has a positive relationship with bid-ask spread and adverse selection component of 
bid-ask spread and an insignificant negative relationship with depth. In contrast, they find that there 
is no impact for widely held and double voting rights on market liquidity. 
 
In Canada, Attig et al. (2006) examine the relationship between ultimate control ownership and 
market liquidity measured by quoted bid-ask spread and adverse selection component of bid-ask 
spread in a sample of 1031 Canadian listed firms. They reveal that there is a positive relationship 
between closely held firms and bid-ask spread and adverse selection component of bid-ask spread, 
whereas they conclude a negative relationship between widely held share and bid-ask spread. 
Furthermore, in Australia, Comerton-Forde & Rydge (2006) test the relationship between 
ownership concentration and illiquidity; different proxies of ownership concentration have been 
used such as the top twenty shareholders, large shareholders, retail shareholdings, number of 
shareholders and insider ownership. They report a positive relationship between concentration and 
bid-ask spread and a negative one with turnover ratio. However, they document a negative 
relationship between bid-ask spread and number of shareholders and a negative relationship 
between number of shareholders and turnover ratio. This is consistent with Amihud et al. (1999), 
who find that increasing shareholder numbers increases market liquidity. They apply a further 
check, which is the simultaneous Equation model; their findings provide no evidence to indicate 
that ownership variable is endogenous and therefore no simultaneous equation bias is present. 
 
In summary, the review of the empirical papers that examine the effect of ownership level and 
concentration on market liquidity reveals several important gaps in the literature. In the first place, 
the number of empirical studies in this area is clearly limited and this explains the few papers that 
were discussed in the empirical review. In addition, the review indicates the need for this study in 
the UK since most of the above-mentioned studies come from the US market (Chiang & Venkatesh 
1988; Dennis & Weston 2001; Kini & Mian 1995; Rubin 2007; Sarin et al., 2000; Zhou 2011), 
France (Ginglinger & Hamon 2007), Australia (Comerton-Forde & Rydge 2006), and Canada 
(Attig et al., 2006). However, as discussed in the first chapter, the differences in corporate 
governance arrangement, codes’ rules and regulations between countries justify the need for more 
country-specific studies. 
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Further, the discussion of the empirical papers indicates that the evidence from the ownership level 
is limited. With the exception of Rubin (2007), these papers mainly focus on ownership 
concentration only and ignore the other ownership structure variables (Heflin & Shaw 2000; 
Brockman et al., 2009; Jacoby & Zheng 2010). To the best of the author’s knowledge, this study is 
the first of its kind in the UK that investigates the effect of ownership level and concentration on 
market liquidity. The sample of this study includes FTSE All shares over the period between 2003 
and 2012. 
 
The ownership structure literature has documented that ownership variables are endogenously 
determined (Heflin & Shaw 2000; Comerton-Forde & Rydge 2006; Rubin 2007). Further, Poon et 
al. (2013) argue that endogeneity in the ownership structure-liquidity relationship arises from two 
sources, unobserved heterogeneity and simultaneity. The authors add that most of the empirical 
papers control for unobserved heterogeneity and simultaneity. Therefore, the estimation method 
used in examining the ownership structure on market liquidity is very important. The normal 
estimation methods such as OLS and fixed effect fail to control for all the endogeneity sources 
(Poon et al., 2013; Rubin 2007). Thus, part of the inconclusive results could be due to 
methodological issue in this area of research. For instance, the empirical review reveals that some 
studies do not control for the endogeneity problem at all (Chiang & Venkatesh 1988; Kini & Mian 
1995). Furthermore, none of the above studies employs a pooled OLS dummy year and industry as 
their estimation method. However, in a more recent study, Poon et al. (2013) employ pooled OLS 
year and industry dummies in their investigation of the effect of institutional trading on market 
liquidity. Keeping in mind this recent development in the literature, this study follows Poon et al. 
(2013), and employ pooled OLS year and industry dummies in the investigation of ownership 
structure and market liquidity relationship. 
 
From the above discussion, it is evident that researchers have empirically analysed the effect of 
different proxies of concentration ownership on market liquidity. The results reveal a complex 
relationship between ownership and market liquidity, requiring the researcher to take the identity of 
the respective owners into account, which will be discussed in the following section; before that, 
this study wants to shed some light on the ownership structure trend in the UK. 
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2.5 Ownership Structure Trends in the UK
5
 
 
In the UK, the level of ownership by individuals has decreased over the last thirty years, whilst 
ownership by institutional investors has increased. For instance, in 1963, individual investors 
owned 54% of public shares in the UK. Over the years, the proportion of shares owned by this 
group fell steadily, in particular, by 1989, it dropped to just below 21%, and in 2012 it further 
dropped to only 14%. In contrast, as compared to the individual investors’ level of share ownership, 
the ownership of shares by insurance companies and pension funds increased dramatically over the 
same period. For example, ownership by insurance companies increased from 10% in 1963 to 17% 
in 2012, whilst that of pension funds saw an increase to 16%. The large increase in pension funds’ 
investment is mainly attributable to the outcome of the increase in pension contributions in publicly 
listed companies in the UK. 
  
There is also been a notable increase in the level of ownership of overseas investments. In this 
regard, this is particularly noteworthy because the level of overseas investment increased from 7% 
in 1963 to 32% in 2012. It is also important to note that many of the overseas holdings are either 
the investors from the United States or the European Union. It is also well documented, that US 
investors are more proactive in corporate governance, which has influenced the behaviour of both 
institutional investors and companies’ management in the UK. Nevertheless, the influence of 
overseas investors on corporate governance in the UK companies is only shown by their level of 
equity ownership in those companies. 
 
From the corporate governance recommendations perspective, the Cadbury Committee (1992, p. 
49), state that ‘….we look to the institutions in particular to use their influence as owners to ensure 
that the companies in which they have invested comply with the Code’.  The committee regard that 
institutional investors have a special responsibility for ensuring their recommendations in their 
companies.  A similar view was expressed in the recommendations of the Greenbury Report (1995, 
p, 19), where one of the main action points was described as suggesting that ‘….institutional 
investors should use their power and influence to ensure the implementation of best practice as set 
out in the Code’. In the same spirit, the Hampel Report (1998, p. 40) state that ‘…..it is clear that a 
discussion of the role of shareholders in corporate governance will mainly concern the 
institutions’. The outcome of these arguments suggests, that three different committees on 
corporate governance in the UK have greatly emphasised on the role of institutional investors. It 
                                                          
5 ‘ONS (Office for National Statistics) report 2012’. 
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can thus be argued, that institutional investors’ potential to exert significant influence on companies 
has clear implications for corporate governance issues, especially in terms of the standards of 
corporate governance and issues concerned with enforcement. Furthermore, in relation to 
institutional shareholders, the Combined Code (2003) provides recommendations about principles 
of good governance. 
 
As in the US, the UK governance system is market-based, characterised by liquid markets and 
dispersion company ownership, compared to the relationship-based systems of Japan and Germany 
where ownership is concentrated and markets are relatively illiquid. However, there are a number 
of differences between the US and the UK institutional systems. Unlike the US, where individuals 
are the largest investor category (Brankato 1997), in the UK most shares are owned by financial 
institutions. Moreover, the UK financial institutions are also highly concentrated and they invest 
most of their assets in equities (Faccio & Lasfer 2000). Despite their size and holdings, UK 
financial institutions do not target companies and they rarely cast their vote at the annual general 
meetings (Mallin 1997). This passivity of institutional investors in the UK does not mean that UK 
companies are free from agency costs problems. Previous studies show that UK companies suffer 
from the same agency costs as their US counterparts (Lasfer 1997). In addition, some recent 
concerns about the ways in which remuneration packages have been determined, the collapse of a 
number of large companies and the fraudulent use of the pension fund in some companies have 
highlighted instances where directors do not act in the best interests of shareholders. In this regard, 
it has also been documented that, institutional investors do not monitor because the resources and 
time required to interfere with management decision-making are considerable and they become 
active only in events of real disasters where they try turn over their portfolio more often (Financial 
Times 2000). 
 
2.6 Owners’ Identity and Market Liquidity  
 
The previous discussion reviewed the theoretical and empirical papers on the relationship between 
ownership level, concentration and market liquidity. In this section, the discussion is related to the 
identity of owners, and how it influences market liquidity. Some studies in the existing literature 
has documented that the location of control rights can be a more important determinant of degree of 
control utilized by owners than ownership concentration in the aggregate form (Cubbin & Leech 
1983; Mayer 1992). For instance, banks and holding companies have been identified as insiders, 
while the shareholders of diffusely held firms (institutional investors such as pension funds) are 
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viewed as outsiders. Given an emotional commitment, insider investors may be strongly interested 
in the success of the firm than investors for which the firm is just a piece in their portfolios. In 
short, it is open to empirical testing whether the identity of owners really matter or not.  
Consequently, many studies have documented that the presence of identity affects market liquidity 
differently (Barabanov & McNamara 2002; Jennings et al., 2002; Fehle 2004; Naes 2004; Rubin 
2007; Choi et al., 2013).  
 
Most of the above mentioned studies have investigated the effect of outsider’ investors identity on 
market liquidity. For instance, Jennings et al. (2002) explore the relationship between institutional 
ownership and quoted bid-ask spread and the adverse selection component of bid-ask spread for 
NASDAQ firms Q1 of 1983 to Q3 of 1991. They report a strong positive relationship between 
independent advisor institution ownership and bid-ask spread and a weak positive relationship 
between investment companies ownership and bid-ask spread. Nevertheless, Barabanov & 
McNamara (2002) report a negative relationship between investment advisors institution ownership 
and bid-ask spread and an insignificant relationship between investment companies ownership and 
bid-ask spread. Moreover, Naes (2004) finds a negative relationship between state ownership and 
quoted depth and positive relationship between state ownership and bid-ask spread. Naes (2004) 
also reported a positive effect on bid-ask spread and a negative effect on the adverse selection 
component of bid-ask spread. With respect to foreign ownership, the results of Naes (2004) show a 
negative effect on bid-ask spread and positive effect on quoted depth.  
 
However, some studies have also examined the insiders’ identity effect on market liquidity. In the 
US, Heflin & Shaw (2000) investigate the impact of both insider manager and insider non-manager 
blockholders on market liquidity (measured by quoted, effective, and adverse selection components 
of bid-ask spread and depth), in 260 US listed firms, over the period from 1988 to 1989. They 
report a positive relationship between blockholders manager and non-manager and quoted and 
effective bid-ask spread, adverse selection component of bid-ask spread and smaller quoted depth. 
More recently, Brockman et al. (2009) examine the relationship between insider, outsider, and 
employee stock options (ESOP) and market liquidity (measured by real, information and total 
liquidity costs) for 1225 NYSE and AMEX companies over the period from 2000 to 2006. After 
controlling for the real friction effect, they find little evidence that insider; outsider and ESOP 
blockholders have a negative impact on the information friction. They also document a negative 
relationship between insider, outsider and ESOP blockholders and turnover and number of trades. 
They conclude that outsider blockholders has a negative and significant effects on turnover and 
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number of trades, whereas, ESOP has a negative and insignificant relationship with turnover and 
number of traders. With respect to trade size, they suggest that outsider blockholders have a 
positive effect on trade size, while insider and ESOP blockholders have a negative effect on trade 
size. Despite these findings, only a few studies have examined the role of both insider and 
outsider’s identities in determining market liquidity. The next section reviews the owners’ identity 
literature with market liquidity and pinpoints gaps in the existing literature in this area.     
 
2.6.1 The Separate Effects of Executive and Non-Executive Directors’ Ownership on Market 
Liquidity  
 
Klein et al. (2002, p.318) observe that, “in corporate finance, asymmetric information refers to the 
notion that firm’s insiders, typically the managers, have better information than do market 
participants on the value of their firm’s assets and investment opportunities”. Previously, this study 
has stated that there are two types of information asymmetry, moral hazard and adverse selection. 
From a moral hazard perspective, the divergence of interests among agents and principals imposes 
costs only to the extent that principals cannot write perfect contracts (Jensen & Meckling 1976; 
Miller 2002; Shleifer & Vishny 1997). Shareholders cannot write perfect contracts because of 
asymmetric information concerning the efforts and actions of agents. Agency costs occur because 
of the self-interested actions of the agents because the principals cannot directly monitor or 
measure the behaviour of agents (Haniffa & Hudaib 2006).  Similarly, other studies argue that the 
existence of the agency costs is known to the market; however, the extent of that costs is not known 
(Fama & Jensen 1983; Jensen & Meckling 1976; Rosser 2003). 
 
On the other hand, the adverse selection hypothesis postulates that those directors who are more 
familiar with the day-to-day operations of the company trade on more information that is valuable. 
This study’s dataset distinguishes between two categories of directors: executive directors (the 
percentage of ordinary shares owned by directors who are executive) and non-executives (the 
percentage of shares owned by non-executives).This study lists the categories of insider in 
decreasing order with respect to the degree of information superiority they are supposed to possess. 
On average, there are two director identities (i.e., executives and non-executives) on the board of 
UK firms. 
 
Furthermore, existing literature has revealed the importance of the information hierarchy 
hypothesis, which postulates that ‘the information content of the transactions depends on the type 
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of director who trades in capital market studies’ (Seyhun 1986, p.193). For instance, directors who 
are familiar with the day-to-day operations of the company trade on information that is more 
valuable. Moreover, Jeng et al. (1999, p. 32) question whether insiders can benefit from their 
information advantage: “Some insiders are more ‘inside’ than others’’. The chief executive, for 
example, is likely to have better information about the firm’s prospects than lesser officers are. 
Since the CEO’s trades are likely to be carefully examined, both by shareholders and by regulators, 
she/he may be more hesitant to trade on his/her informational advantage. Furthermore, the earlier 
support for the information hierarchy story by Seyhun (1986) and Lin & Howe (1990) may have 
been generated by transaction size. In these studies, CEOs’ trades are twice as large, on average, as 
those by other officers or directors, and larger transactions trigger stronger price reactions. 
 
To the best of the author’s knowledge, only three previous studies have investigated the effect of 
director’s type on market liquidity. In US data, Heflin & Shaw (2000) find that the aggregate 
managerial ownership has a negative impact on market liquidity. Moreover, they find that higher 
blockholders for both managers and non-managers leads to wider bid-ask spread, thinner depths, 
and higher adverse selection costs. They attribute these findings to informational frictions caused 
by differentially informed insiders (blockholders) and outside investors. Similar to that, in the 
Norwegian equity market Naes (2004) documents that the primary insider (board of directors and 
manager) has a negative impact on market liquidity. On the other hand, in ASE Comerton-Forde & 
Rydge (2006) find that the director ownership up to 10% increases market liquidity; they suggest 
that the monitoring benefits of insider ownership may be offset by entrenchment concerns at level 
of trading in the stock. In contrast, insider ownership greater than 10% has a negative impact on 
market liquidity.  
 
This study follows Fidrmuc et al. (2006) definition of UK insiders as the legal insiders, which 
refers to executive and non-executive directors, in contrast to the US definition, where executives 
are would normally mean officers and non-executives as directors. Specifically, in the United 
States, an insider is defined as officers, directors, other key employees whom own more than 10% 
shares of any equity class (Lakonishok & Lee 2001). However, the UK definition of an insider is 
more narrow, which only include members of the board of directors (both executives and non-
executives), and exclude other key employees and large shareholders. Most of the US studies only 
investigate the effect of the aggregate level of insider ownership on market liquidity (Chiang & 
Venkatesh 1988; Kini & Mian 1995; Sarin et al., 2000; Rubin 2007). However, outsider directors 
may have less inside information than insider directors. As a result, this study subdivides insider 
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ownership into executive and non-executive directors’ ownership and tests their effect on market 
liquidity.  
 
2.6.2 Financial Institutions’ Ownership  
 
Existing literature has suggested that, in contrast to other institutions, banks have a unique ability to 
trade against market-wide liquidity shocks because they experience funding flows and costs that 
correlate negatively with market liquidity (Gatev & Strahan 2006). This gives banks a unique 
ability to hedge against market-wide liquidity shocks. Therefore, ownership by banks could 
decrease the liquidity risk of stocks. In contrast to other institutional investors, commercial banks 
have funding flows that are negatively correlated with market liquidity. With regard to pension 
ownership, Coffee (1991) puts forward the notion of the ‘optimal corporate monitor’ and 
comments that pension funds are more likely to fulfil the requirements of this role than other 
institutions. However, there are drawbacks to the argument especially regarding externally 
managed pension funds and large pension funds with highly diversified portfolios composed of 
relatively small shares of firm’s capital, both of which serve to reduce the monitoring activity. 
 
Some institutional investors have long-term positions. They rely on a deep knowledge of 
companies and are more interested in timely information. One form of such investors is the pension 
fund that “a financial institution in charge of collecting, keeping and investing assets in order to 
pay future benefits to its members” (Gatev & Strahan 2006, p 872). Pension funds trade with huge 
amounts of money. These institutions invest large amounts in financial markets across the world. 
These investors have active behaviour (Agarwal 2009). Aragon (2007) suggests that restrictions on 
fund withdrawal allow pension funds to have long-term investment horizons and act as suppliers of 
capital during liquidity crises. Monks & Minow (1995) presume that pension funds are considered 
to be long-term investors and are then unable to sell their assets easily. As a consequence, they are 
highly motivated to defend their assets and have a strong influence on corporate governance code 
of practices. Useem et al. (1993) show that pension funds may employ pressure on managers by 
forcing company governance rules that aim at facilitating monitoring of companies. Bushee & Noe 
(2000) and Dennis & Strickland (2005) document strong evidence that pension funds are motivated 
to demand liquidity on days with large abnormal returns. 
  
Few studies have investigated the effect of outside blockholders’ identity on market liquidity (Fehle 
2004; Ginglinger & Hamon 2007; Naes 2004). In France, Ginglinger & Hamon (2007) find that 
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shareholders with double voting right shares prevent informed shareholders from trading on private 
information, as such trading would lead them to lose their double voting right; as a result 
information asymmetry is decreased as market liquidity is improved. In a US study, Fehle (2004) 
investigates the relationship between bid-ask spread, measured both as effective and posted spread 
and as institutional ownership, using a sample of 10107 NYSE stocks for 1980-1996. He finds that 
there is a negative relationship between institutional ownership and spread. In the subsequent 
analysis of the effect of different institutional blockholders’ identities, Fehle (2004) reports that the 
positive effect of institutional ownership only holds for mutual funds; however, there is a negative 
relationship between commercial banks and investment managers and market liquidity. For 
insurance companies and pension funds, the relationship is insignificant.   
  
Moreover, Fehle (2004) indicate that higher institutional ownership lowers the bid-ask spread, 
which is inconsistent with the idea that institutions drive up bid-ask spread due to the adverse 
selection costs. For both effective and posted bid-ask spread, the ownership share and total number 
of commercial banks and investment managers have a positive and significant relationship with 
effective and quoted bid- ask spread that is consistent with the notion that the presence of these 
institutions in the ownership structure increases the bid-ask spread. However, mutual funds and 
insurance companies’ ownership have a negative and significant relationship with effective and 
quoted bid- ask spread.  
 
Jennings et al. (2002) partition the institutional ownership into five institutional types and find a 
heterogeneous relationship between institutional ownership and market liquidity across the types. 
Specifically, they report a negative relationship between institutional ownership and bid-ask spread 
is strongest for commercial banks and insurance companies, while there is no relationship between 
bid-ask spread and pension, foundation, endowment and employee stock option (ESOPs). This 
heterogeneity is consistent with the notion that the impact on the informational environment of 
institutional ownership depends on the nature of the institution. Moreover, large blockholders have 
a positive and significant effect.   
 
2.6.3 Foreign Ownership and Market Liquidity 
 
Financial liberalisation simplifies the opening of domestic markets to international investors with 
the intent of providing diversification of benefits and lowering the required risk premium (Warther 
1995), and ultimately improving market liquidity (Levine 2001). Foreign capital has become an 
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important source of finance (Bekaert et al., 2002). Foreign investors show a preference for large 
firms with low insider ownership, stocks that are associated with lower information asymmetry 
(Bushee & Noe 2000; Ferreira & Matos 2008), liquidity and international presence (Dahlquist & 
Robertson 2001). Thus, foreign investors contribute to market liquidity. Nevertheless, since they 
are geographically away from the firm, they may seek more information about the firm (see, for 
example, Choe et al., 2005; Huang & Shiu 2005; Seasholes 2004). 
 
It is thus debated, that foreign institutional investors are less likely to have a positive impact on 
market liquidity. This is because foreign institutional investors are perceived to be better traders 
given that they are better informed (Grinblatt & Keloharju 2000; Seasholes 2004).   They may thus 
monitor corporate management better than local institutions (Khanna & Palepu 1999).  In addition, 
they would create more timely and accurate forecasts than local analysts (Bachmann & Bolliger 
2001). Another possible reason for a negative impact of foreign institutional investors’ participation 
is that a shift in the majority ownership to foreign institutions may weaken the informal information 
channels that exist between local governments and industries in the capital market. As a result, 
foreign ownership may have a negative impact on market liquidity as reported in (Rhee & Wang 
2009). 
 
In contrast, there is also evidence on the positive relationship between market liquidity and foreign 
institutional investors’ shareholding. In this regard, findings of some existing studies suggest that 
institutional trading is more likely information driven (Bushee & Goodman 2007; Ke & Petron 
2004). In addition, findings of other studies provide the evidence suggesting that foreign 
institutional investors are more experienced, better trained or even better informed and are 
therefore, regarded as better traders (Ginblatt & Keloharju 2000; Seasholes 2004).  These traders 
are also been regarded by other studies as those who can better monitor a firm’s corporate 
management than local institutions (see for example, Khanna & Palepu 1999). 
 
There is also evidence in the existing literature which document that foreign institutions will 
exercise pressure on firms to increase disclosure, which will reduce information asymmetries 
between buyers and sellers of shares and increase market liquidity (Diamond & Verrachia 1991, 
Heflin et al., 2005). Foreign blockholders have been linked to increase in firms’ investments 
(Cronqvist & Fahlenbrach 2009), and anticipation of earnings manipulation (Farber 2005), which 
will contribute to market liquidity. There is also evidence, which suggest that participation of large 
international financial institutions in companies ownership structure result in the production of 
42 
 
better information disclosure and more active trading which improve market liquidity (Stulz 1999). 
However, in the existing literature only a few studies directly address the issue of how participation 
of foreign institutions affects market liquidity (Bekaert et al., 2007). I would thus argue that 
inclusion of foreign institutional investors in companies’ capital structure increase (or decrease) 
market liquidity, which has direct implications for asset pricing, corporate governance and 
regulation. I therefore include foreign institutional ownership as one of the determinant of market 
liquidity in this research. 
 
2.6.4 Free Float Ownership and Market Liquidity  
The term free float is used interchangeably with diffused ownership by the existing literature. 
Ragazzi (1981, p. 262) defines the free float or diffused firm ownership as ‘the one where a firm’s 
shares are owned by several individuals who cannot take control of the firm or is not able get any 
benefits other than those available to other shareholders and whose top managers do not receive 
either direct or indirect benefits other than a market salary’. In this regard, existing literature show 
a negative relationship between ownership concentration and free float shares in the market (Bhide 
1993; Holmstrom & Tirole 1993; Bolton & Von Thadden 1998). Holmstrom & Tirole (1993) argue 
that dispersed shareholders have fewer incentives for information production if the float on a stock 
is smaller. Similarly, Bolton & Von Thadden (1998) document that the threat of takeovers is 
reduced when the float share is small. Moreover, Bhide (1993) explores that large holding by active 
stockholders will reduce the float of stock that is free to trade, which would result in less active and 
continuous trading, and as a result, the market maker will widen the bid-ask spread.  
 
The existing literature also documents that retail shareholders are unlikely to be informed, which is 
expected to increase market liquidity. For instance, Comerton-Forde & Rydge (2006) suggest that 
retail shareholders ownership has a positive relationship with turnover ratio and negative 
relationship with the bid-ask spread. However, the relationship is weak. This finding supports the 
view that when retail shareholders trade, they trade for liquidity reasons which would mean that 
they are uninformed investors. Moreover, previous literature has documented that the larger the 
market capitalisation of a stock, the greater its market liquidity and if the market participants are 
subjected to information asymmetry, then the number of investors willing to invest in a particular 
stock, in expectation of the potential gains from the trade (Bolten & Von Thadden 1998).  
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Nevertheless, when a firm has controlling shareholders, the number of shares available for trading 
reduces, which may reduce market liquidity. In other words, ownership concentration can cause a 
separation between free float and market capitalisation and as a result, when this happens, then 
fewer shares are traded in the market, which eventually reduces market liquidity. In addition, given 
the assumption that blockholders may have private information regarding the firm, a higher 
probability of informed trading will cause the bid-ask spread to widen. In line with these 
arguments, Ginglinger & Hamon (2012) examine the free float or trading hypothesis on a sample of 
918 firms traded on the French stock exchange for the period 1998-2003. They argue, that as there 
is a positive relationship between free float and market liquidity, their results suggest a significantly 
lower liquidity for firms with large insider blockholders ownership. 
 
The above-mentioned discussions suggest that existing evidence on the relationship between 
owners’ identity and market liquidity is limited and inconclusive, which specify gaps in the 
literature. In addition, the review indicates the need for this study in the UK since most of the 
above-mentioned studies are based on the US and other markets (Barabanov & McNamara 2002; 
Fehle 2004; Naes 2004; Ginglinger & Hamon 2012; Poon et al., 2013) with only Park (2009) 
covering the UK market. However, as discussed before, there are differences in corporate 
governance mechanisms, disclosure requirements and regulations, between countries, which would 
justify the need for more country-specific studies, in particular, in the context of the UK. 
 
Further, the discussion of the empirical papers indicates that the evidence from the insider owners’ 
identity is limited. With the exception of Heflin & Shaw (2000) most of the published studies in 
this area mainly focus on outsider owners’ identity only and ignore the insiders’ identity 
(Barabanov & McNamara 2002; Fehle 2004; Park 2009; Poon et al., 2013). I would thus argue that 
this study is the first of its kind in the UK that investigates the effect of owners’ identity for both 
insider and outsider market on market liquidity. 
 
The ownership structure literature has also documented that ownership variables are endogenously 
determined (Naes 2004; Poon et al., 2013; Rubin 2007). Further, Poon et al. (2013) argue that 
endogeneity in the ownership structure-liquidity relationship arises from two sources, unobserved 
heterogeneity and simultaneity. The authors add that most of the empirical papers control for 
unobserved heterogeneity and simultaneity. Therefore, the estimation method used in examining 
the ownership structure on market liquidity is very important. The normal estimation methods such 
as OLS and fixed effect fail to control for all the endogeneity sources (Poon et al., 2013). Thus, part 
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of the inconclusive results could be attributed to the methodological issue. For instance, the 
empirical review reveals that some papers do not control for the endogeneity problem at all (Chiang 
& Venkatesh 1988; Kini & Mian 1995). Furthermore, none of the above studies employs a pooled 
OLS dummy year and industry in the estimation method. Recently, however, Poon et al. (2013) did 
employ the pooled OLS dummy year and industry in their study. In this study, and following Poon 
et al. (2013), the analysis is performed using pooled OLS dummy year and industry.  
 
Few studies have linked the owners’ identity with market liquidity. Moreover, in the UK to the best 
of the author’s knowledge Park (2009) is the only study that examines the effect of outsider 
blockholders’ identities on market liquidity measured by quoted and relative bid-ask spread, and 
Amihud (2002) illiquidity ratio. In particular, he tests the effect of free float shares, foreign 
holding, investment companies, pension fund, government, employee, cross holding and other 
holding on the above-mentioned measures of market liquidity. Using a 156 FTSE 100 and 250 
from May 2002 to April 2009, he documents that there is a negative relationship between free float 
shares and quoted and relative bid-ask spread and Amihud (2002) illiquidity ratio. In contrast, he 
reports a negative relationship between foreign holding, investment companies, pension fund, 
government, employee, cross holding and other holding and quoted bid-ask spread, relative bid-ask 
spread, and Amihud (2002) illiquidity ratio. 
In addition, few papers examine the impact of free float on market liquidity (Jacoby & Zheng 
2010), while the rest of the papers focus on blockholders. The findings are mixed and inconclusive, 
which highlights the need for more work on this topic. Further, all the mentioned studies are 
conducted in the US, which implies the need for more investigation using a sample from the UK 
corporate boards. To the author’s knowledge, this is the first study in the UK that examines the 
effect of ownership level, concentration and owners’ identity on market liquidity. Accordingly, this 
study aims to extend this literature and provide evidence from the UK public listed firms. The 
sample of this study is more comprehensive as it includes all the small and large firms listed in the 
FTSE All-Share Index. 
 
2.7 Ownership Level, Concentration, Owners’ Identity and Market Liquidity during the 
Recent Financial Crisis   
 
The recent financial crisis serves as a wake-up call that requires quick corporate governance reform 
and intervention (Kirkpatrick 2009). The recent crisis of 2007-2009 has been described as the worst 
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global crisis since the Great Depression (Crotty 2009). The negative consequences of the crisis 
globally have affected most of the international capital markets, risk management and market 
liquidity (Garleanu & Pedersen 2007; Poon et al., 2013). Adams (2012) suggests that the current 
crisis hit emerging markets and this one initiated in the US economy. Strong corporate governance 
and legal system (Adams 2012) characterise the American economy. 
 
Many scholars agree that corporate governance mechanisms fail to perform their duties even in a 
developed economy such as the US. Existing literature states that institutional investors seem to 
adopt a passive stance towards monitoring and disciplining a firm’s management (Plender 1997; 
Maug 1998). Prior studies have suggested that institutional investors rarely take action in corporate 
monitoring because they view liquidity as more important than building up the concentrated 
ownership required to have an influence on corporate management (Bhide 1993; Coffee 1991). 
Moreover, institutional shareholders are blamed for their passivity and their focus on short-term 
rather long-term returns during the crisis (Chen & Poon 2007; Chu & Song 2010; Mitton 2002). 
Consequently, most corporate governance codes around the world emphasise the importance of 
institutional investors in corporate governance mechanisms. 
 
In the UK, the Walker Review (2009) recommended that the institutional Stewardship Code should 
be adopted as an official UK code of practice for institutional investors. As a result, the UK 
Stewardship Code (2010) has been established, which strongly focuses on enhancing the quality of 
engagement between institutional investors and companies to help improve long-term returns to 
shareholders and the efficient exercise of governance responsibilities. Likewise, the recent 
Stewardship Code (2012) seeks to inspire institutional shareholders to play a more active role in 
corporate governance. For instance, the main aim behind the Stewardship Code (2012) is to 
increase the accountability of institutional investors to their ultimate beneficiaries with respect to 
engagement activities. It will require institutional investors to publicly disclose their commitment 
to a stewardship obligation or to explain their alternative investment approach if they are unwilling 
to assume such a commitment. 
 
Several related studies have considered the effect of ownership structure during the recent financial 
crisis. However, the majority of these studies focus on firm performance while limited research 
evidence is available on market liquidity. Additionally, most of the empirical literature in this area 
that has studied the ownership structure during the recent crisis relies on data from the US. The 
findings of these papers in general are mixed and inconclusive. 
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Cao & Petrasek (2012) provide evidence from a US market sample of 1225 firms over the period 
between 1989 and 2009.  Their results suggest that stocks held by hedge funds as marginal 
investors are more sensitive to changes in aggregate liquidity than comparable stocks held by other 
types of institutions or by individuals; stocks held by hedge funds also experience significantly 
negative abnormal returns during the liquidity crisis. The empirical results support the hypothesis 
that institutional ownership affects the liquidity risk of stocks. Stocks in which hedge funds are 
marginal investors have returns that are more sensitive to changes in aggregate liquidity than stocks 
held by individuals. In contrast, stocks in which commercial banks are marginal investors tend to 
be less exposed to market liquidity fluctuations. 
  
In particular, they find a significant and positive relationship between hedge fund ownership and 
liquidity risk of stocks. Hedge fund ownership has a significantly larger effect on liquidity risk than 
mutual fund ownership by other identity of institutional investors. Furthermore, the effect of hedge 
fund ownership on liquidity risk is most pronounced during a liquidity crisis. They note that all 
institutional investors – whether US foreign, non-US foreign, or domestic – have significant effects 
on overall stock performance. We find a similar role for both foreign and domestic institutional 
investors in propagating the liquidity shock among stocks in their portfolios. These findings 
support the model of Brunnermeier & Pedersen (2009) in which adverse liquidity shocks force 
levered institutions such as hedge funds to reduce their leverage by selling off assets, leading to 
decline in asset prices and liquidity. 
 
In contrast, stocks held by commercial banks as marginal investors have a significantly lower 
liquidity risk than comparable stocks held by other types of institutional investors or by individual 
investors; also, bank ownership in the quarter preceding a liquidity crisis is positively associated 
with abnormal stock returns during the liquidity crisis. These results provide supporting evidence 
for the hypothesis of Gatev & Strahan (2006) that a bank has a unique ability to hedge against 
market-wide liquidity shocks. Similar to that, Brunnermeier & Pedersen (2009) propose a model 
that relates liquidity risk to ownership by levered speculators such as hedge funds. In their model, 
adverse funding shocks force hedge funds to liquidate their positions during liquidity crisis at 
depressed prices, thus increasing the covariance between asset returns and market liquidity. An 
implication of their model is that assets held by levered speculators such as hedge funds are more 
likely to be sold off following a decline in market liquidity. 
 
47 
 
Poon et al. (2013) examine how institutional trading and holding is related to market liquidity and 
liquidity risk pre and during the recent financial crisis, 2007-2008, in the US market. Market 
liquidity is measured as bid-ask spread and liquidity risk. They document that the number of 
institutional investors is positive and significant with quoted bid-ask spread both pre and during the 
crisis period. However, institutional holdings decrease quoted bid-ask spread pre and within the 
crisis period. With respect to owners’ identity, they conclude that there is a positive relationship 
between number of bank, insurance, independent advisors and university and endowment 
shareholder and bid-ask spread in the pre-crisis period and during the crisis period. Moreover, they 
report a negative relationship between ownership of bank, insurance, independent advisors and 
university and endowment and bid-ask spread in the pre-crisis period and during the crisis period. 
Nevertheless, regarding pension fund, Poon et al. (2013) document a negative relationship between 
number of pensions and bid-ask spread in the pre-crisis period and a positive one during the crisis 
period, and a negative relationship between ownership of pension fund during the crisis period. 
  
In summary, the evidence on how the ownership level, concentration and owners’ identity is related 
to the market liquidity during the recent financial crisis has been limited to large firms and uses 
only two periods, i.e., pre-crisis and crisis periods, and, more importantly, is inconclusive. This 
study divides the sample period into three sub-samples: pre-crisis, crisis and post-crisis periods, and 
then examines the effect of ownership level, concentration and owners’ identity on market liquidity 
during these periods for FTSE all share firms. 
 
2.8 Summary  
 
 
The first part of this chapter has reviewed the theoretical and empirical work on the ownership 
structure-liquidity relationship. In this regard, the review relies mainly on agency theory. The focus 
of this theory is on the agency problems that arise between the agent and the principal, due to the 
divergence of interest. However, adverse selection and trading hypothesis is the most popular 
theoretical background and receives much attention from researchers in the ownership-liquidity 
area. Further, trading theory offers a powerful tool for providing an insight into the ownership 
concentration-liquidity relationship. This study therefore takes these theories as the main theoretical 
framework in examining the ownership-liquidity relationship. Further, the empirical work on the 
ownership structure-liquidity relationship have also been reviewed where evidence of the existing 
literature indicates that the insider, institutional and ownership concentration is relevant to market 
liquidity. However, evidence from the exiting empirical literature is mixed and inconclusive. 
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Likewise, the review also examines the empirical papers on the ownership-liquidity relationship 
during the recent financial crisis. 
  
The second part of this chapter has reviewed the theoretical and empirical literature on owners’ 
identity and market liquidity. This part of the review relies on different theories, such as the adverse 
selection and trading hypothesis. In this regard, the existing academic literature provides support 
for the importance of the role of owners’ identity on market liquidity. Further, the empirical review 
of the owners’ identity-market liquidity relationship has provided mixed results. However, the 
empirical evidence indicates that different owner identities have different impacts on market 
liquidity. The next chapter explains the research methodology and the data collection process for 
this study. Table 2.1 is provided, at the end of this chapter, which presents a summary of 
representative studies on ownership structure and market liquidity to highlight the gaps in the 
existing literature.  
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Table 2.1 Key Studies on the Relationship between Ownership Level, Concentration, Owners’ Identity and Market Liquidity  
Study Sample 
Characteristics  
Dependent Variable(s)  Independent Variable(s) Estimation Method              Main Findings  
Chiang & 
Venkatesh 
(1988) 
63 NYSE Jan-Dec 
1973 
Insider and institutional 
ownership  
Quoted  bid-ask spread Cross-sectional 
regression 
1. Insider ownership has a positive impact on bid- 
ask spread. 
 
2. There is no relationship between institutional 
ownership and bid-ask spread.  
 
Kini & Mian 
(1995) 
1063 NYSE 1985 Insider ownership, insider 
trading, institutional 
ownership and 
blockholdings  
Quoted bid-ask spread OLS 1. There is a positive relationship blockholders 
and bid-ask spread.  
 
2. There is a negative relationship between insider 
trading and bid-ask spread.  
 
3. There is a positive relationship between insider 
ownership and bid-ask spread. 
 
4. There is no relationship between institutional 
ownership and bid-ask spread. 
 
Sarin et al. 
(2000) 
786 firms AMEX & 
NYSE, 1985 
Insiders and institutional 
ownership  
Relative bid-ask spread, 
daily weighted average bid-
ask spread 
OLS and 
simultaneous 
equations 
1. There is a positive relationship between insider 
ownership and adverse selection component of 
bid-ask spread.   
 
2. There is a positive relationship between 
institutional ownership and bid-ask spread.  
 
3. There is a negative relationship between 
institutional ownership and depth. 
 
Heflin & Shaw 
(2000) 
260 firms, 259 
NYSE/1 AMEX 
1988-1989 
 
Total blockholdings; 
insider manager 
blockholders, non- insider 
blockholders and 
managerial ownership.   
 
Total quoted depth, relative 
bid-ask spread, effective 
bid-ask spread  
 
Cross-sectional 
regression 
and simultaneous 
equation model 
1. There is a positive relationship between the 
aggregate level of blockholders and effective 
and relative bid-ask spread.  
 
2. There is a negative relationship between the 
aggregate level of blockholders and depth.  
 
3. There is a positive relationship between insider 
managers and non-manager blockholders and 
effective and relative bid-ask spread.  
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4. There is a negative relationship between insider 
managers and non-manager blockholders and 
depth.  
 
5. There is a positive relationship between 
managerial ownership and effective and 
relative bid-ask spread and a negative 
relationship with depth. 
Dennis & 
Weston (2001) 
5500 firms NYSE, 
AMEX, 
NASDAQ; Q4 
1997-Q4 1998 
 
Insiders and institutional 
ownership  
 
Quoted bid-ask spread, 
relative bid-ask spread, 
adverse selection 
component of bid-ask 
spread and price impact 
ratio and  probability of 
informed traders (PIN) 
 
Two stage least 
squares regression, 
and simultaneous 
equation model 
 
1. There is a positive relationship between insider 
ownership and adverse selection component of 
bid-ask spread.  
 
2. There is a positive relationship between 
institutional ownership and adverse selection 
component of bid-ask spread. 
 
3. There is a positive relationship between 
institutional ownership and bid-ask spread. 
 
Barabanov & 
McNamara 
(2002) 
NASDAQ (1983-
2000) 
Total institutional 
ownership, Herfindah 
Index, banks, insurance, 
investment companies, 
independent investment 
advisors and other 
(universities and 
foundations’ endowment).   
Bid-ask spread and relative 
bid-ask spread.  
OLS and 2SLS 1. There is a negative relationship between 
institutional ownership and bid-ask spread.  
 
2. There is a positive relationship between 
institutional concentration ownership and bid-
ask spread.  
 
3. There is a strongly negative relationship 
between independent investment advisors 
ownership and bid-ask spread in comparison 
with investment companies, banks and 
insurance companies and other institutions’ 
ownership that has a lower negative 
relationship with bid-ask spread.   
 
Naes (2004) 94 firms Norway, 
1999-2001 
 
Aggregate ownership and 
Herfindah Index of state, 
institutions, non- 
financial, individual, and 
foreign and primary 
insiders and five largest 
owners.   
Quoted bid-ask spread; 
effective bid-ask spread, 
relative bid-ask spread, 
adverse selection costs and 
quoted depth. 
 
Fixed effect panel 
regression, Granger 
causality 
 
1. There is no significant relationship between 
institutional ownership and quoted, effective, 
relative and adverse selection component of 
bid- ask spread.  
 
2. There is a negative relationship between state 
ownership and depth and a positive relationship 
with quoted, effective, relative and adverse 
selection component of bid-ask spread.  
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3. There is a positive relationship between non-
financial firms and bid-ask spread and negative 
effects on adverse selection component of bid- 
ask spread.  
 
4. There is a negative relationship between 
foreign ownership and bid-ask spread and a 
positive one with depth.  
Fehle (2004) 10107 stocks NYSE 
1980-1996 
 
Total institutions, banks, 
mutual funds, investment 
managers and pension 
funds  
 
Posted bid-ask spread and 
effective bid-ask spread.  
 
GLS 
 
 
1. There is a negative relationship between 
institutional ownership and quoted bid-ask 
spread. 
 
2. There is a positive relationship between mutual 
fund ownership and posted bid-ask spread and 
effective bid-ask spread.  
 
3. There is a negative relationship between 
commercial banks and investment managers 
and posted bid-ask spread and effective bid-ask 
spread.  
 
4. There is an insignificant relationship between 
insurance companies and pension funds and 
posted bid-ask spread and effective bid-ask 
spread.  
Attig et al. 
(2006) 
1031 Canada firms 
1996 
Ultimate ownership, 
control ownership and the 
differences between 
ultimate and control 
ownership  
Bid- ask spread, relative 
bid- ask spread and adverse 
selection component of bid-
ask spread.    
Cross-sectional 
regression 
 
1. There is a positive relationship between 
ultimate control ownership and bid-ask spread, 
relative bid-ask spread and adverse selection 
component of bid-ask spread. 
 
2. There is a positive relationship between closely 
held shares and bid-ask spread, relative bid-ask 
spread and adverse selection component of bid-
ask spread. 
 
3. There is a negative relationship between widely 
held shares and bid-ask spread, relative bid-ask 
spread and adverse selection component of bid-
ask spread. 
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Comerton-
Forde& Rydge 
(2006) 
ASE, 1998-2003  Ownership concentration, 
insider, institutional and 
retail ownership   
Amihud (2002), turnover 
ratio, and relative bid-ask 
spread.  
OLS+ simultaneous 
equation 
1. There is a positive relationship between 
ownership concentration and relative bid-ask 
spread and a negative relationship with 
turnover ratio.  
 
2. There is a positive relationship between insider 
ownership and relative bid-ask spread and a 
negative relationship with turnover ratio.  
 
3. There is a negative relationship between 
institutional ownership and relative bid-ask 
spread and a positive relationship with turnover 
ratio.  
 
4. There is a negative relationship between retail 
ownership and relative bid-ask spread and a 
positive relationship with turnover ratio. 
Ginglinger & 
Hamon (2007) 
1550 firm France, 
1998-2003 
 
Blockholders, pyramid 
structure, double voting 
rights 
 
Number of trades, turnover, 
depth, relative bid-ask 
spread.  
 
OLS 
 
 
1. There is a positive relationship between 
blockholders and relative bid-ask spread and a 
negative relationship with number of trades, 
turnover and depth.   
 
2. There is a positive relationship between 
pyramid structure and relative bid-ask spread 
and a negative relationship with number of 
trades, turnover and depth.   
 
 
3. There is a negative relationship between double 
voting right and relative bid-ask spread and a 
positive relationship with number of trades, 
turnover and depth.   
 
4. There is a negative relationship between 
blockholders and relative bid-ask spread and a 
negative relationship with number of trades, 
turnover and depth.   
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Rubin (2007) 1369 firms NYSE 
1993-2003 
 
Insider ownership, 
institutional ownership, 
blockholders and largest 
shareholders. 
 
Bid-ask spread, effective 
bid- ask spread, realised 
bid-ask spread, Amihud 
(2002) and dollar depth. 
 
OLS and 
simultaneous 
equations  
 
1. There is a positive relationship between 
institutional ownership and depth.  
 
2. There is a negative relationship between 
institutional ownership and quoted, relative 
bid-ask spread and Amihud (2002) illiquidity 
ratio.   
 
3. There is a negative relationship between 
institutional blockholders’ ownership and 
depth.  
 
4. There is a positive relationship between 
institutional blockholders’ ownership and 
quoted, relative bid-ask spread and Amihud 
(2002) illiquidity ratio.   
 
5. There is a negative relationship between large 
shareholders and depth.  
 
6. There is a positive relationship between large 
shareholders and quoted, relative bid-ask 
spread and Amihud (2002) illiquidity ratio.   
 
7. There is a negative relationship between insider 
ownership and depth.  
 
8. There is a positive relationship between insider 
ownership and quoted, relative bid-ask spread 
and Amihud (2002) illiquidity ratio.  
Park (2009) 156 FTSE 100 and 
250 from May 2002 
to April 2009 
Free float shares, foreign 
holding, investment 
companies, pension fund, 
government, employee, 
cross holding and other 
holding  
Quoted bid-ask spread, 
relative bid-ask spread, and 
Amihud (2002) illiquidity 
ratio. 
 1. There is a negative relationship between free 
float shares and quoted bid-ask spread, relative 
bid-ask spread, and Amihud (2002) illiquidity 
ratio. 
 
2. There is a negative relationship between 
foreign holding, investment companies, 
pension fund, government, employee, cross 
holding and other holding and quoted bid-ask 
spread, relative bid-ask spread, and Amihud 
(2002) illiquidity ratio. 
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Brockman et al. 
(2009) 
1225 NYSE, 
AMEX 1992-2001 
 
Blockholders, insider 
blockholders, outsider 
blockholders and 
employee stock option 
blockholders  
 
Relative bid-ask spread , 
quoted bid-ask spread, 
relative bid-ask  effective 
and depths, number of 
trades, trade size and 
turnover ratio 
 
Cross-sectional 
regression  
 
 
1. There is a positive relationship between 
blockholders and relative and quoted bid-ask 
spread, and Amihud (2002) illiquidity ratio.  
 
2. There is a positive relationship between insider 
blockholders and relative and quoted bid-ask 
spread, and Amihud (2002) illiquidity ratio. 
 
 
3. There is a positive relationship between 
outsider blockholders and relative and quoted 
bid-ask spread, and Amihud (2002) illiquidity 
ratio.  
 
 
4. There is a positive relationship between 
employee stock option blockholders and 
relative and quoted bid-ask spread, and Amihud 
(2002) illiquidity ratio.  
 
5. There is a negative relationship between 
blockholders and number of trades and 
turnover ratio. 
 
6. There is a negative relationship between insider 
blockholders and number of trades and 
turnover ratio. 
 
7. There is a negative relationship between 
outsider blockholders and number of trades and 
turnover ratio. 
 
8. There is a negative but insignificant 
relationship between employee stock option 
blockholders and number of trades and 
turnover ratio. 
 
9. With respect to the trade size, they suggest that 
outside blockholders have a positive effect on 
trade size, while inside and ESOP blockholders 
have a negative effect on trade size. 
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10. After they control for the trading activity 
measure of market liquidity they find that the 
relationship between blockholders, insider 
blockholders, outsider blockholders and 
employee stock option becomes negatively 
correlated with relative, quoted bid-ask spread 
and Amihud (2002) illiquidity ratio.   
Jacoby & Zheng 
(2010) 
1071 NYSE, 323 
AMEX, 2182 
NASDAQ/1995 
 
Number of shareholders 
and blockholders 
 
Bid-ask spread, PIN, depth, 
volume 
 
Cross-sectional 
regression  
 
1. There is a positive relationship between 
blockholders and bid-ask spread and 
probability of informed traders. 
 
2. There is a negative relationship between 
blockholders and trading volume and depth.  
 
3. There is a positive relationship between 
number of shareholders and bid-ask spread and 
probability of informed traders. 
 
4. There is a negative relationship between 
number of shareholders and trading volume and 
depth.  
Zhou (2011) NYSE 838 insider, 
1491 institutional  
 
insider and institutional 
ownership 
 
Bid-ask spread and depth 
 
Cross-sectional 
regression  
 
1. There is a positive relationship between insider 
ownership and bid-ask spread and a negative 
impact on depth.  
 
2. There is a negative relationship between insider 
ownership and bid-ask spread and a positive 
impact on depth.  
 
Blume & Keim 
(2012) 
 
 
US 1980-2010 institutional ownership 
(institutions and number 
of institutions that own 
the stock) 
 
 Price impact ratio Amihud 
(2002) 
Cross-sectional 
regression  
 
 
1. There is a negative relationship between 
institutional ownership and Amihud (2002) 
illiquidity ratio.  
 
2. They find that hedge funds prefer to invest in 
small firms rather than large ones.   
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Poon et al. 
(2013)  
S&P 1500 index 
2004 to 2008 
Number of shareholders 
and institutional 
ownership; banks, 
insurance companies, 
independent advisors, 
public pension fund, 
university and endowment 
foundations. 
Bid- ask spread and 
liquidity risk 
Pooled OLS 
industry and year 
dummy  
 
Change in 
variables’ 
regression  
1. There is a positive relationship between 
number of institutions and bid-ask spread in 
the pre-crisis and crisis periods.  
 
2. There is a negative relationship between 
institutional ownership and bid-ask spread in 
the pre-crisis and crisis periods. 
 
3. There is a positive relationship between 
number of banks, insurance, independent 
advisors and university and endowment 
shareholders and bid-ask spread in the pre-
crisis period and during the crisis period.  
 
4. There is a negative relationship between 
ownership of banks, insurance, independent 
advisors and university and endowment and 
bid-ask spread in the pre-crisis period and 
during the crisis period.  
 
5. There is a negative relationship between 
number of pension funds and bid-ask spread in 
the pre-crisis period and positive during the 
crisis period.  
 
6. There is a negative relationship between 
ownership of pension funds during the crisis 
period.  
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Chapter 3 
Research Methodology and Data 
3.1 Introduction 
 
The previous chapter provided a comprehensive discussion of the ownership structure-liquidity 
literature that is relevant to this study. The discussion reveals that there are two theoretical streams 
to investigate the relationship between ownership structure and market liquidity. On the one hand, 
there is the market microstructure literature, which states that, when informed shareholders possess 
superior information about a firm’s private information compared to outside shareholders, an 
information asymmetry arises, which reduces market liquidity (Easley & O'Hara 1987; Glosten & 
Milgrom 1985; Grossman & Stiglitz 1980; Kyle 1985). On the other hand, there is the liquidity 
trade-off perspective, which posits that large shareholders who reduce the agency problem create 
another problem in the market, the so-called adverse selection problem (Bhide 1993). Based on this 
theoretical background, this chapter explains the research methodology adopted in this thesis. 
 
The research methodology chapter in this thesis is of utmost importance, as it intends to confirm 
the robustness and validity of the empirical results. The chapter, therefore, provides a brief 
description of the research methodology and data. In the first place, the research philosophy 
adopted in this study has reported and explained. Further, this chapter provide details about the data 
collection process and the measurements and definition of variables. This chapter also describes 
and explain the models’ specifications and details of the estimation methods that have been adopted 
and used in the empirical chapters.  
 
The rest of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 3.2 discusses the research models 
development. Section 3.3 presents the definitions and measurements of variables. Section 3.4 
presents the data collection procedures, sources and the main criteria used for the sample 
construction. Section 3.5 provides details of the econometric issues. Furthermore, section 3.6 
explains the analytical strategies that this study adopts in dealing with different econometric 
problems. Section 3.7 describes the main estimation method used for the data analysis. Finally, 
section 3.8, concludes this chapter and generate links with the next chapter. 
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3.2 The Research Models Development   
 
The issue of market liquidity determinants has stimulated a lot of research in finance literature. 
Since the seminal theoretical work of Demsetz (1968), who concludes that trading volume (VO), 
number of trades (NT), volatility (VOL), firm size (MV), share price (P), and number of 
shareholders (NS) are the main determinants of market liquidity, many theoretical studies have been 
conducted which show the determinants of market liquidity. For instance, Tinic (1972), Tinic & 
West (1972) and Stoll (1978) explained the determinants of market liquidity from the specialist 
perspective and added two more determinants (number of dealers (ND) and the capital of dealers 
(CD)) to the work of Demsetz (1968). Based on the outcome of all the above-mentioned studies we 
assume a linear parametric form for all the explanatory variables of market liquidity and form the 
following model. 
LIQit=α0+β1MVit+β2VOit+β3  NTit +β4 Pit+β5VOLit+ β6 NSit+ β7 NDit +β8 CDit +εi……...………………… (3.1) 
However, empirically Benston & Hagerman (1974) investigate the determinants of bid-ask spread 
in over-the-counter markets for a randomly drawn sample of 314 stocks from 1963 to 1967. They 
argue that unsystematic risk captures the importance of firm-specific events for firm valuations and 
the potential gains by informed traders, mainly insider traders. They also show a positive 
relationship between the bid-ask spread and unsystematic risk. Later on, by following, Benston & 
Hagerman (1974) several studies have investigated the determinants of market liquidity from a 
trading perspective. In particular, at the beginning of the 1980s, the theoretical work has been 
devoted to show how the specialists (i.e., dealers) respond to potential informed traders (Copeland 
& Galai 1983; Easley & O’Hara 1987; Glosten & Milgrom 1985; Glosten & Harris 1988). These 
studies assume that the market maker cannot infer whether traders are information motivated or 
liquidity motivated. More specifically, most of these studies predict the bid-ask spread as an 
increasing function of the level of information asymmetry (IA), which is faced by the market 
maker. This would mean that an increase in insider holding gives a higher probability of informed 
trading. In light of these discussions, we include the level of information asymmetry as a 
determinant of market liquidity LIQi and form the following model.   
LIQit=α0+β1MVit+β2VOit+β3NTit+β4TZit+β5Pit+β6VOLit+β7IAit+ εi…....................................................... (3.2) 
Furthermore, as reported in previous literature, institutional investors turn over their portfolio more 
often, which reduces transaction costs and increases market liquidity (Demsetz 1968; Merton 1987; 
Schwartz & Shapiro 1992). Thus, to the extent that institutions as a group trade more often, 
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institutional ownership should reduce a market maker’s required inventory, which in turn may 
reduce the bid-ask spread (Gompers & Metrick 2001; Hamilton 1978; Schwartz & Shapiro 1992; 
Tinic 1972). More recently, other studies suggest that in contrast to other shareholder groups, 
insiders are subject to legal restrictions and in order to liquidate their holdings they are more likely 
to trade predominantly on the sell side (Bettis et al., 2000; Rubin 2007). However, an increase in 
institutional ownership, is also expected to lead to increase in trading volume, the number of trades, 
visibility, and analyst coverage (Schwartz & Shapiro 1992) 
 
Similarly, other empirical studies have highlighted the role of ownership structure on market 
liquidity (see for example, Chiang & Venkatesh 1988; Kini & Mian 1995; Rubin 2007). From an 
adverse selection perspective, Chiang & Venkatesh (1988) use the percentage of holdings by 
insiders (IO) and institutional investors (INSO) as a proxy of information asymmetry between 
insider and outsider’s investors and investigated their effect on market liquidity. They find evidence 
suggesting that a higher percentage of insider holdings lower market liquidity through widening the 
bid-ask spread. Other studies have also reported a positive relationship between insider holding and 
trading, suggesting that an increase the insider holding gives higher probabilities of informed 
trading (Comerton-Forde & Rydge 2006; Heflin & Shaw 2000; Kini & Mian 1995; Rubin 2007). 
However, institutional shareholders are not been considered informed investors (Brockman et al., 
2009; Chiang & Venkatesh 1988; Fehle 2004; Kini & Mian 1995; Rubin 2007). The findings of 
Rubin (2007) also suggest that as compared to other investors institutional investors trade more and 
and thus institutional holdings is positively correlated with market liquidity. As a result, this study 
incorporates both insider and institutional holdings as determinants of market liquidity to equation 
3.2, and form the following model: 
LIQit=α0+β1MVit+β2VOit+β3NTit+β4TZit+β5Pit+β6VOLit+β7IOit+ β8INSOit+ εi.………………….……..….. (3.3) 
Thereafter, in the 1990s many researchers stated that market liquidity could be affected by 
liquidity-control trade-off (Bhide 1993; Bolton & Von Thadden 1998; Coffee 1991; Demsetz & 
Lehn 1985). For instance, Bhide (1993, p. 31) states that, “active stockholders who reduce agency 
cost by providing internal monitoring also reduce market liquidity by creating adverse selection 
problems”. Moreover, Bolton & Von Thadden (1998) suggest that in a concentrated ownership 
structure the number of shareholders who can trade the stock is smaller and, thus, effective market 
capitalisation is lower, which in turn reduces market liquidity. As a result, a vast body of empirical 
studies have examined the relationship between ownership concentration (OC) and market liquidity 
(Brockman et al., 2009; Heflin & Shaw 2000; Jacoby & Zheng 2010; Naes 2004). As a result, we 
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add ownership concentration as another determinant of market liquidity to equation 3.3, and form 
the following model. 
 
LIQit = α0+β1IOit+ β2INSOit+ β3OCit +β4 MVit+ β5 VOit+ β6 NTit+ β7 TZit+ β8 Pit+ β9 VOLit 
+εi….…..………………………………………………………………………………………….……………….…...(3.4) 
 
However, in order to measure ownership concentration, different studies have used different 
proxies.  For example, some studies have used blockholders as the sole measure of ownership 
concentration (Brockman et al., 2009; Heflin & Shaw 2000; Jacoby & Zheng 2010; Kini & Mian 
1995). However, most of these studies have found find mixed results on the relationship between 
bockholders’ ownership and market liquidity relationship. As a consequence, other proxies have 
also been used as measures of ownership concentration besides blockholders in some recent 
studies. For example, Hartzell & Starks (2003) show that the top five large shareholders (LS) as a 
proxy of ownership concentration is related to the ability of management to monitor. Large 
shareholders (LS) measure has an advantage over blockholdings because it is not subject to the 
arbitrary inclusion cut-off point of 5% share ownership. Rubin (2007) argue that for following the 
ownership concentration level of a firm over time, LS is better measure of concentration. 
 
To allow for more potential variables in the ownership structure-market liquidity relationship, other 
studies have suggested the use of different proxies for ownership concentration (see for example, 
Naes 2004; Jacoby & Zheng 2010; Ginglinger & Hamon 2011). Jacoby & Zheng (2010) suggest 
that using blockholders as the sole measure of ownership concentration is misleading and leads to 
biased results and have employed both the number of shareholders and blockholders as the two 
measures of their definition of ownership concentration. However, it is worth mentioning that 
different countries have different disclosure requirements and cut-off points for large shareholders. 
This study therefore uses two different measures as proxies for ownership concentration. The first 
measure this study uses is blockholders who hold 3% and more of share capital whereas the second 
measure is the percentage ownership proportion of the top five large shareholders of the sample 
firms.  
 
According to adverse selection theory, market liquidity decreases when ownership concentration is 
large, and is dominated by insider holding (Easley & O'Hara 1987; Glosten & Milgrom 1985; 
Grossman & Stiglitz 1980; Kyle 1985). The majority of the previously published studies on 
ownership structure literature have linked ownership concentration with market liquidity (see for 
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example, Brockman et al., 2009; Chiang & Venkatesh 1988; Heflin & Shaw 2000). In addition, as 
highlighted by Rubin (2007) less attention has been paid to the impact of ownership level on 
market liquidity in the existing literature. There is also limited published research, which examine 
the effect of ownership level and concentration on market liquidity. In the existing literature, Heflin 
& Shaw (2000) and Brockman et al., (2009) focus on blockholders as the sole measure of 
ownership concentration, whereas, Jacoby & Zhang (2010) consider blockholders and number of 
shareholders as the two measures for ownership concentration. It can thus be argued, that with the 
exception of Rubin (2007), which investigates the effect of ownership level and concentration on 
market liquidity in the US, other previously published studies in this area have only focused on 
ownership concentration without considering ownership level in their investigations. This study 
therefore seeks to investigate the effect of both ownership level and concentration on market 
liquidity in the UK. With the inclusion of both ownership level and concentration to equation 3.4, 
the following model is formed, which is the benchmark model for the first part of this investigation.  
   
LIQit = α0+β1IOit+ β2INSOit+ β3BKOit+ β4LSit+ γ1MVit+ γ2Pit+ γ3VOLit + ∑ 𝐼𝑁𝐷
𝑛
𝑖=1  + ∑ 𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅
𝑛
𝑖=1 + 
εi…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………(3.5) 
 
LIQit     
 
Market liquidity variables: total liquidity costs (proportional bid-ask spread 
and price impact ratio) and real friction (number of trades, trade size, trading 
volume and turnover ratio) 
 
IOit 
 
Insider ownership 
 
INSOit   Institutional ownership 
 
BKO it                  Proportion of aggregate blocks of at least 3% of the firm’s outstanding shares 
held by all outside investors 
 
LS it                  Top five largest shareholders of firm’s capital 
 
MV it                     The natural logarithm of the market value of equity as a proxy for firm size 
  
P it                       Price per share 
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VOL it                  Stock price volatility as a proxy for firm risk 
 
IND       
 
A dummy variable for each industry sectors: oil & gas (IND0)… technology 
(IND9) 
 
YEAR A dummy variable for each year of the ten years from 2003-2012, 2003(y1), 
2004 (y2)… 2012 (y10) 
 
Ɛit                       Unobservable individual-specific effect 
 
At the second stage of its investigation, this study examines the effect of owners’ identity on 
market liquidity. On the one hand, a vast body of research in the insider holding-liquidity pricing 
literature investigates the information hierarchy hypothesis, which states that trades by insiders 
who have more information than other shareholders and investors, have a higher price impact ratio. 
For instance, Jeng et al. (1999) and Fidrmuc et al. (2006) find different markets reactions to the 
identities of insiders and argue that the trades of executive directors may convey more information 
than those of non-executive directors because the former are more closely associated with the firm's 
operations and strategies. In the US, Seyhun (1986) finds support for this hypothesis. However, 
Fidrmuc et al. (2006) did not find any support for this hypothesis in the UK. As a result, this study 
seeks to examine whether the executive directors’ ownership has a greater effect on market 
liquidity than that of non-executive director’s ownership in the UK capital market. Thus by 
considering inside ownership (IO) as a determinant of market liquidity, the following equation is 
formed.  
 
IOit= EOit +NEOit 
Where IOit represents the insider ownership, EOit represents executive director ownership and 
NEOit represents non-executive directors’ ownership. In line with previous literature in this area 
this study defines inside ownership as the sum of executive and non-executive directors’ ownership 
(see for example, Short & Keasey 1999; Weir et al., 2003; Peasnell et al., 2003; Crespi-Cladera & 
Renneboog 2003; Fidrmuc et al., 2006). 
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On the other hand, some recently published studies have examined the role of controlling 
shareholders’ identity on market liquidity.  For example, Fehle (2004) argues that the importance of 
ownership structure is not only in concentrated ownership, but also in its identities. In addition, 
from both theoretical and empirical perspectives, ownership identity can be categorised as 
individuals or family, domestic-corporation, foreign investors, financial and non-financial 
institutions. In this regard, Shleifer & Vishny (1997) argue that different categories of large 
shareholders may have different monitoring skills and even may have different objectives with 
respect to corporate strategic decisions. Shleifer & Vishny (1997) also report that although 
institutional investors play a role in monitoring management, not all institutions are equally willing 
or able to serve this function, however, monitoring by institutional investors is still considered as an 
important governance mechanism. Furthermore, both theory and empirical evidence suggest that 
institutional investors provide active monitoring role relative to smaller, more passive or less 
informed investors. However, as suggested by Coffee (1991) and Bhide (1993), the intensity of an 
institution’s monitoring can be limited because of its concerns about the liquidity of its portfolios. 
 
Therefore, most previously published studies in this area have studied blockholders’ identity on 
market liquidity by subdividing them into insider and outsider blockholders (see for example, 
Heflin & Shaw 2000; Rubin 2007; Brockman et al., 2009). The theoretical background of these 
studies is based on the theoretical work of Demsetz & Lehn (1985), Kole (1995), Morck et al. 
(1988), and Stulz (1988), which show that blockholders and insiders have access to more private 
information than outsiders blockholders. Thus in order to avoid the potential substitution problem 
that may exist between the ownership level and concentration and its identity this study follows 
previous literature and constructs a separate model for each set of the variables which has been 
examined in this study (see for example, Brockman et al., 2009; Poon et al., 2013). This separation 
also helped in making comparisons with the findings of previously published studies in this area 
(see for example, Brockman et al., 2009; Park 2009; Poon et al., 2013; Rubin 2007). This study 
therefore first interpret that the outsider ownership as follows. 
 
100%- IOit = OUOit 
Where IOit stands for insider ownership and OUOit stands for outsider ownership.  By following 
previous literature in this area, this study regard outsider ownership as the sum of controlling 
shareholders and free float shares available to ordinary shareholders (see for example, Park 2009). 
In functional form this relationship is interpreted as follows. 
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OUOit= NOSHFFit+NOSHSTit 
Where NOSHFFit stands for the percentage of total shares in issue available to ordinary 
shareholders, and NOSHSTit  represents the controlling shareholders. 
In addition, this study sub divided controlling shareholders into eight different identities as follows.  
  
NOSHSTit = NOSHICit+ NOSHOFit+ NOSHPFit+ NOSHGVit+NOSHEMit+NOSHCOit+ NOSHFRit+ 
NOSHOFit 
All the above-mentioned eight identities are explained below. 
 
In order to examine the impact of owners’ identity on market liquidity this study keeps all the 
above-mentioned identities in context and form the following model.  This is the second model 
used in this study. 
 
LIQit=α0+β1EOit+β2NEOit+β3NOHFFit+β4NOSHICit+β5NOSHOFit+β6NOSHPFit+β7NOSGVit+β8NOSHEMit
+β9NOSHCOit+β10NOSHFRit+γ1MVit+γ2Pit+γ3VOLit+∑ 𝐼𝑁𝐷
𝑛
𝑖=1 + ∑ 𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅
𝑛
𝑖=1 + εi............……..…………(3.6) 
 
LIQit     Market liquidity variables: total liquidity costs (proportional bid-ask spread 
and price impact ratio) and real friction (number of trades, trade size, trading 
volume and turnover ratio), 
 
EO it            
 
The percentage of ordinary shares outstanding that executive directors hold as 
recorded at the end of calendar year t, 
 
NEO it               The percentage of ordinary shares outstanding that non-executive directors 
hold as recorded at the end of calendar year t, 
 
NOSHFF it        The percentage of total shares in issue available to ordinary investors, 
 
NOSHIC it        The percentage of strategic holdings of 5% or more held as long-term 
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strategic holdings by investment banks or institutions seeking a long-term 
return, 
 
NOSHPF it          The percentage of strategic holdings of 5% or more held by pension funds or 
endowment funds, 
 
NOSHGV it      The percentage of strategic holdings of 5% or more held by government or 
government institution, 
 
NOSHEM it           The percentage of strategic holdings of 5% or more held by employees or 
those with a substantial position in a company that provides significant voting 
power at an annual general meeting (typically family members), 
 
NOSHCO it         The percentage of strategic holdings of 5% or more held by one company in 
another, 
 
NOSHFR it               The percentage of strategic holdings of 5% or more held by an institution 
domiciled in a country other than that of the issuer, 
 
NOSHOF it       The percentage of strategic holdings of 5% or more outside of the above 
strategic shareholder’s categories, 
 
MV it                     The natural logarithm of the market value of equity as a proxy for firm size, 
  
P it                      Price per share, 
 
VOL it                  Stock price volatility as a proxy for firm risk, 
 
IND       A dummy variable for each industry sector: oil & gas (IND0)… technology 
(IND9), 
 
YEAR A dummy variable for each year of the ten years from 2003-2012, 2003(y1), 
2004 (y2)…… 2012 (y10), 
 
Ɛit                      Unobservable individual-specific effect. 
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Lastly, in the aftermath of the recent financial crisis as ownership concentration was mentioned as 
one of the causes of the crisis, the importance of the ownership-liquidity relationship has become a 
heated debate in the literature (Chen & Poon 2007; Chu & Song 2010). In addition, market liquidity 
has been affected by many market crashes (Amihud et al., 1990). For instance, Amihud & 
Mendelson (1986) document that during a crisis period a drop in investors’ expectations about 
market liquidity lead to a decline in the stock prices. Recently, Poon et al. (2013) have investigated 
the effect of institutional trading on market liquidity using the institutional holdings as proxy of 
institutional trading in the US capital market during the 2007-2008 financial crisis. Their results 
suggest that the sell-side herding behaviour contributed to the increased trading costs and liquidity 
risk during the 2007-2008 financial crisis, and confirm the role of trading in exacerbating liquidity 
shortages during the crisis period. This study therefore, investigates the relationship between 
ownership level, concentration and owners’ identity during the 2007-2009 financial crises in the 
UK.  
 
3.3 Research Variables Definition and Measurement  
This section presents definitions of the dependent, independent and control variables used in this 
study. The discussion focuses on market liquidity variables, where the dependent variables include, 
total liquidity costs (proportional bid-ask spread and price impact ratio) and real friction (turnover 
ratio, number of trades, trading volume and trade size). In addition, it defines the ownership 
structure and control variables and provides information about the measurements of all the 
variables used in this study. 
 
3.3.1 Measurement of the Dependent Variables  
 
Market Liquidity 
 
The starting point of understanding market liquidity and its determinants is by analysing what 
market liquidity means. In the last two decades, academics and researchers alike have gained 
unwavering interest in the concept of market liquidity because the term “market liquidity” is a 
multidimensional concept. As a result, in this chapter the concept of market liquidity will be 
defined.  
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Liquidity Definition 
 
Keynes (1930, p. 67) defines liquidity as “an asset that is more certainly realisable at short notice 
without loss”. Although the term market liquidity is common in research and practice there is still 
no agreement on its measurement, as stated by Kyle (1985), Harris (1990), and Stoll (2000), 
because of the multidimensionality of the concept. Most of the existing literature gauging liquidity 
has focused on different dimensions of it. For instance, Kyle (1985) was among the first to identify 
the dimensions of market liquidity; he suggested three dimension, which are as follows: (1) 
Tightness: the cost of turning around a position over a short period. Generally, the narrower or the 
smaller the bid-ask spread the more liquid is the market, (2) Depth of the stock: is the volume 
needed to move the prices by a given amount. The larger the volume needed to move the prices, the 
more liquid is the market. (3) Resiliency: is the speed with which prices return to equilibrium or 
current level following a large trade.  
 
Later, Harris (1990) defined market liquidity as having four dimensions. The first one is width, 
referring to the bid-ask spread for a given number of shares, commissions, and fees to be paid per 
share. Secondly, a depth is the number of shares that can be traded at a given bid and ask prices. 
The third one, immediacy, refers to how quickly trades of a given size can be done at a given cost. 
The final aspect is resiliency. Recently, Stoll (2000) has stated that there are two primary 
mechanisms on how the level of information asymmetry between insider and outsider investors can 
affect market liquidity. The first mechanism is called the real friction whereas the second 
mechanism has been named as the informational friction. The real friction is defined as “the real 
resources used up” in the liquidity provision process. These order processing and inventory costs 
are highly sensitive to trading activity levels (Benston & Hagerman 1974; Demstez 1968; Tinic 
1972 1978a, b). However, informational friction reflects the potential losses of trading against 
informed traders. In this regard, previous studies have shown that market maker widen bid-ask 
spread and reduce depths in the presence of informed traders (see for example, Copeland & Galai 
1983; Kyle 1985; Glosten & Milgrom 1985). In light of the above discussions I would argue that 
while measuring market liquidity a number of measures must be taken into consideration because 
there is no single theoretically correct or universally accepted measure that could determine the 
degree of stock market liquidity in firms. Keeping all these points in mind this study follows Stoll 
(2000) and measures stock market liquidity by classifying it into real and information frictions. 
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Total Market Liquidity Measurement  
 
Proportional Bid-Ask Spread (PBAS) 
This measurement captures costs of trading stocks and information frictions in secondary markets; 
bid-ask spread is one of the most common and frequently used measures of market liquidity. For 
instance, Demsetz (1968) defines spread as “the cost of supplying immediacy”. This study uses the 
daily proportional quoted spread at firm-specific level to calculate the monthly average for each 
company. More specifically, the firm-specific proportional quoted spread (the quoted bid-ask 
spread divided by midpoint of quote) for stock i on day d in month t is given by: 
 
𝑃𝐵𝐴𝑆𝑖𝑑𝑡 =
𝐴𝑆𝐾𝑖𝑑𝑡 − 𝐵𝐼𝐷𝑖𝑑𝑡
(𝐴𝑆𝐾𝑖𝑑𝑡 − 𝐵𝐼𝐷𝑖𝑑𝑡)/2
 
 
𝐵𝐴𝑆𝑖𝑑𝑡 = 𝐴𝑆𝐾𝑖𝑑𝑡 − 𝐵𝐼𝐷𝑖𝑑𝑡 
 
Price Impact Ratio (PIMPACT) 
The price impact ratio is the impact of order flows on prices. For example, when buy or sell orders 
arrive at the market with specific quantities, any imbalance in orders will move prices up or down 
because such an imbalance could be the result of an information asymmetry, and the orders will be 
executed at a higher or a lower price. For instance, Kyle (1985) developed a model where market 
makers are unable to differentiate between informed and uninformed traders (i.e. liquidity traders) 
and therefore choose to set prices that are an increasing function of the probability of trading with 
informed traders. The price impact ratio (known as Kyle’s lambda) is used as a proxy for 
information asymmetry in order to capture the depth dimension of a stock’s market liquidity – the 
market’s ability to absorb and execute large orders with a lower price impact ratio. Therefore, this 
study uses the Amihud (2002) illiquidity ratio as a proxy for the price impact ratio. This measure is 
first calculated for each stock in the sample; that is, the price impact ratio for stock i at day t is 
given as follows:  
 
𝑃𝐼𝑀𝑃𝐴𝐶𝑇  𝑖𝑑𝑡 =
|𝑅𝑖| 𝑖𝑑𝑡
𝑇 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑖𝑑𝑡
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Where: 
 Rit is the return for stock i at day t and TValueit is the trading value for stock i at day t. 
 
Real Friction Measurement  
Trading Volume and Turnover Ratio 
Trading volume is traditionally used to measure the existence of numerous market participants and 
transactions. However, trading volume can be given more meaning by relating it to the outstanding 
volume that results in turnover rate. This study uses the turnover ratio for each stock in the study’s 
sample; turnover ratio is given as ratio of trading value to firm’s capitalisation. It is one of the 
trading activity measures that are frequently used as a proxy for real friction of market liquidity, as 
it is highly associated with bid-ask spread and other measures of liquidity. With regard to trading 
volume, previous studies have documented that high trading volume reflects a lack of compromise, 
which in turn increases the demand for information. In addition to that, firms with higher trading 
volume present market makers with more opportunities to manage their inventory and recapture 
losses to informed investors. In other words, the higher the trading volume in a stock, the higher 
would be the absorptive capacity of the market and the lower would be the impact cost (McInish & 
Wood 1992).  
 
More specifically, this study calculates the firm-specific turnover ratio as the ratio of trading values 
to a firm’s market capitalisation for stock i on day d in month t, which is given by: 
 
𝑇𝑅  𝑖𝑑𝑡 =
𝑉𝑂 𝑖𝑑𝑡
𝑀𝑉 𝑖𝑑𝑡
 
 
Where TR is the turnover ratio for stock i on day din month t, which is calculated as trading volume 
multiplied by the stock price, which is the market capitalisation for stock i on day d in month t. 
 
Trade Size and Number of Trades  
Stoll (2000) documents that the cross-sectional relationship between market liquidity and trading 
characteristics as initially suggested by Demsetz (1968), who provides a set of standard 
determinants of liquidity such as trade size and number of trades. From an inventory perspective, 
trading activity measured by trade size and number of trades should be positively related to market 
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liquidity, as an increase in trading activity allows the market maker to reduce his/her inventory risk. 
Along these lines, Tinic (1972) and Benston & Hagerman (1974) provide empirical evidence for 
the positive relationship between trading activity and market liquidity. Furthermore, from an 
information asymmetry perspective, these relationships will also hold. For instance, Copeland & 
Galai (1983) provide a theoretical foundation for the negative relationship between bid-ask spread 
and trading volume and McInish & Wood (1992) find that measures of trading activity (number of 
trades and trade size) are negatively related to quoted bid-ask spread.    
 
Moreover, Cao et al. (2004) distinguish between changes in the firm’s trading activity (i.e., volume, 
number of trades, and average trade size) and changes in the firm’s bid-ask spread. They show that 
lockup expirations are associated with a significant increase in the firm’s trading activity but little if 
any change in bid-ask spread. The implication is that any increase in the firm’s informational 
friction is offset by a decrease in the firm’s real friction. This study measures the firm-specific 
turnover ratio as the ratio of trading value to a firm’s market capitalisation for stock i on day d in 
month t, which is given by: 
 
𝑇𝑍  𝑖𝑑𝑡 =
𝑉𝑂  𝑖𝑑𝑡
𝑁𝑇 𝑖𝑑𝑡
 
 
Where the trade size is for stock i on day d in month t, which is calculated as trading volume for 
stock i on day d in month t divided by the number of trades for stock i on day d in month t. 
 
3.3.2 Key Explanatory Variables   
This study aims to examine the effect of ownership structure on market liquidity. In particular, the 
first objective of this study is to examine the effect of ownership level and concentration on market 
liquidity. The second objective of this study is to indicate the effect of owners’ identity on market 
liquidity. In other words, do different owners’ identities affect market liquidity differently? The 
definitions and measurements of these variables are provided in this section. 
 
Insider Ownership: This is measured as  the sum of executive and non-executive directors (De 
Cesari & Ozkan 2014; Korczak & Liu 2013; Ozkan 2007; Short & Keasey 1999). For example, 
Fidrmuc et al. (2006, p.3) define insiders as “member of board of directors of publicly traded 
corporations that usually possess more information about their company than do (small) outside 
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shareholders”. Therefore, this variable is extracted from the BoardEx database since this database 
provides the number of shares held by executive and non-executive directors on UK boards.  
 
Non-executive Ownership: This variable is measured as the number of shares held by non-
executive directors. The measurement of this variable is in line with recent UK studies (Davies et 
al., 2005; Florackis & Ozkan 2009). In the UK, non-executive directors are employed as part-time 
directors (Guest 2008). This definition is in line with the BoardEx database definition, which states, 
“the number of shares held directly by non-executive directors and multiplies by the stock price of 
the organisation at the Report Date selected”.  
  
Executive Ownership: This variable is measured as the number of shares held by executive 
directors. The measurement of this variable is in line with recent UK studies (Davies et al., 2005; 
Florackis & Ozkan 2009). In the UK, executive directors are employed as full-time directors. This 
definition is in line with the BoardEx database definition, which states, “the number of shares held 
directly by executive directors and multiplies by the stock price of the organisation at the Report 
Date selected”. 
   
Institutional Ownership: Evidence in the extant academic literature on institutional investment 
highlights the importance of the effect of institutional ownership on market liquidity (Agarwal 
2007; Cao & Petrasek 2012; Dennis & Weston 2001; Sarin et al., 2000). This study follows the 
extant literature in the UK and defines institutional ownership as the ratio of the number of shares 
held by institutional investors to the total number of shares outstanding (Fernandes et al., 2013; 
Ozkan 2007). 
 
Blockholders: Blockholders are measured as the sum of the stakes of a firm’s shareholders with 
equity ownership greater than 3% (Florackis & Ozkan 2009; Goergen & Renneboog 2008; 
Khurshed et al., 2011). For example, Khurshed et al. (2011) state that in the UK, only those 
investors who own at least 3% of the total shareholding are disclosed in their investee firm’s 
financial statements. 
 
Large Shareholders: This is measured as the top five large shareholders. Hartzell & Starks (2003) 
show that this measure is related to the ability of management to monitor. Even though institutional 
blockholdings are more commonly used, one advantage of the large shareholders measure is that it 
is not subject to the arbitrary inclusion cut-off point of 5%. Thus, the large shareholders measure is 
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a finer measure of concentration if one wants to follow the concentration level of a given firm over 
time (Ozkan 2007).  
 
However, by following Park (2009), this study measures the identity of controlled shareholders and 
ordinary investors as follows:  
 
Pension Fund Ownership is measured as pension owners who hold 5% and more of number of 
shares outstanding at the end of the fiscal year for stock i in year t over the number of shares 
outstanding (WC05301) in the same year.  
 
Employee Ownership is measured as employee blockholders for stock i in year t, which is 
calculated as employee owners who hold 5% and more of number of shares outstanding at the end 
of the fiscal year for stock i in year t over the number of shares outstanding (WC05301) in the same 
year. 
 
Cross-Holding Ownership is measured as cross blockholders for stock i in year t, which is 
calculated as cross owners who hold 5% and more of number of shares outstanding by one 
company in another at the end of the fiscal year for stock i in year t over the number of shares 
outstanding (WC05301) in the same year.  
 
Foreign Ownership is measured as foreign blockholders for stock i in year t, which is calculated as 
foreign owners who hold 5% and more of number of shares outstanding at the end of the fiscal year 
for stock i in year t over the number of shares outstanding (WC05301) in the same year.  
 
Investment Banks’ Ownership is measured as investment bank blockholders for stock i in year t, 
which is calculated as investment bank owners who hold 5% and more of number of shares 
outstanding at the end of the fiscal year for stock i in year t over the number of shares outstanding 
(WC05301) in the same year.  
 
Government Ownership is measured as government blockholders for stock i in year t, which is 
calculated as government owners who hold 5% and more of number of shares outstanding at the 
end of the fiscal year for stock i in year t over the number of shares outstanding (WC05301) in the 
same year. 
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Free Float Ownership is measured as free float ownership for stock i in year t, which is calculated 
as free float owners at the end of the fiscal year for stock i in year t over the number of shares 
outstanding (WC05301) in the same year. This study measures the free float ownership as: 
 
𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑡% =
𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 − 𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝
𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔
 
 
Control Variables 
The following section provides the definition and measurement of the control variables that are part 
of the estimations and are included in the empirical models. Each variable has been regarded as an 
an important determinant of market liquidity. In addition, the measurements and definition of 
variables used in this study are based on theoretical as well as empirical evidence available in this 
area of research. 
Price Volatility  
A considerable amount of the previous literature indicates a positive relationship between the 
volatility of share price and market liquidity (Benston & Hagerman 1974; Copeland & Galai 1983; 
Mclnish & Wood 1992; Stoll 1978; Tinic & West 1972). Moreover, Bhushan (1989) and Moyer et 
al. (1989) suggest that private information is more valuable for firms with higher price variability. 
The more volatile a firm’s price is, the more uncertain the market maker is of the short-term cost of 
holding the stock. To protect against price swings, the market maker will increase the spread. Prior 
studies have confirmed this idea with evidence of a positive relationship between price variance 
and the spread (Jegadeesh & Subrahmanyam 1993; Stoll 1978). In this study and consistent with 
previous studies, volatility of share price is measured as standard deviation of daily returns. 
Share Price  
The firm’s stock price is mechanically associated with percentage of bid-ask spread. In addition, 
stocks with low prices face higher than usual bid-ask spread because of discreteness in tick sizes 
(Jegadeesh & Subrahmanyam 1993; Welker 1995). Stoll (1978) suggests that the minimum 
allowable of bid-ask spread of £1/8 can cause low-priced stocks to have artificially high bid-ask 
spread. On the other hand, Brennan & Hughes (1991) state that the level of the stock price is related 
to a firm’s market liquidity, since it controls for price discreteness and also acts as a proxy for firm 
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risk; that is, low prices are associated with higher risk (Stoll 2000). Thus, this study measures the 
annual stock price using the average of the daily closing prices. 
Firm Size 
Firm size has been identified as an important measure in previous literature. In this regard, 
Anderson & Fraser (2000).suggest that due to their access to capital markets, larger firms are 
expected to have higher market liquidity. Additionally, larger firms, on average, release more 
information than smaller firms release and had more analyst following and are thus subject to more 
scrutiny by the investment community than smaller firms (Brennan & Subrahmanyam 1995).  By 
following previous literature, this study measures firm size by market capitalisation defined as the 
total number of shares outstanding multiplied by price at the end of each day (Brockman et al., 
2009; Chiang & Venkatesh 1988; Heflin & Shaw 2000; Jacoby & Zheng 2010; Kini & Mian 1995). 
3.4 Sample Selection and Data Collection Criteria 
 
The sample consists of all FTSE All-Share stocks traded on the London Stock Exchange (LSE) for 
the period from December 2002 until December 2012, obtained from the Datastream database. The 
sample includes both active and dead (delisted) stocks, avoiding any survivorship bias; actives 
stocks are those that were still being traded until December 2012, while the delisted stocks are 
those that happened to be traded sometime between 2003 and 2012 and then delisted. Moreover, 
this study excludes financial institutions, insurance companies, unit trusts and ADRs because their 
ownership structure and market liquidity measurement are fundamentally different and they are by 
no means comparable with the other firms. The final number of non-financial firms that is available 
for analysis before applying any more criteria is 547. However, this study imposes several 
screening criteria to our dataset before conducting our empirical tests, following other UK-based 
studies such as Crespi-Cladera & Renneboog (2003), Mura (2007) and Florackis & Ozkan (2009). 
This study excludes firms with market value less than £10 million. Moreover, this study excludes 
firms with missing data for either of the study’s major variables (market liquidity and ownership 
structure). Lastly, this study ignores observations of each variable that fall outside the 1
st
 and 99
th
 
percentile range.  
 
The analysis of this study is based on a dataset that combines information from different sources; 
specifically, our data include detailed information on ownership structure and market variables, 
such as bid and ask prices, market capitalisation, close prices, trading volume, number of trades, 
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number of shares outstanding, free float shares, and industry classification. In particular, market 
and accounting data are obtained from Thomson Datastream and Worldscope respectively. 
Ownership structure data has been extracted from different sources, for instance, insider ownership 
was extracted from the BoardEx database, whereas data regarding institutional ownership and the 
percentage of shares held by blockholders who hold 3% threshold are hand collected from UK 
firms annual reports provided by the Northcote website
6
. Finally, this study matches BoardEx and 
annual reports data with market and accounting data from Thomson Datastream and Worldscope. 
The study however, excludes observations where valid data was available from Datastream and 
Worldscope, but where the required matching data was not available from BoardEx database or 
where annual reports were not available from the Northcote website. 
 
Table 3.1 Sample Firm Industry Classification 
 
Main Industry Industry Code  Number of Firms Percentage from Final 
Sample 
Basic Material IN1 20 8.85% 
Consumer Goods IN2 26 11.50% 
Consumer Services  IN3 57 25.22% 
Health Care IN4 11 4.867% 
Industrials IN5 68 30.08% 
Oil and Gas IN6 14 6.194% 
Technology IN7 17 7.522% 
Telecommunication IN8 7 3.097% 
Utilities  IN9 6 2.654% 
Total   226 100% 
 
3.5 Econometric Issues 
  
3.5.1 Heteroscedasticity 
 
There is evidence in the existing literature, which highlights that panel data is useful for mitigating 
the heteroscedasticity problem (Baltagi 2005; Psillaki & Daskalakis 2009; Wooldridge 2002). 
However, panel data also poses several estimation problems; for example, it is a two-dimensional 
data, i.e., they have both cross-sectional and time series dimensions. Therefore, panel data may still 
                                                          
6 http://www.northcote.co.uk/. 
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suffer from problems such as heteroscedasticity and serial correlation. If these problems are not 
properly addressed in the analysis process then the conclusions drawn may be misleading because 
the presence of heteroscedasticity result in biased estimates of standard error and the resulting ‘t’ 
and ‘f’ statistics would be misleading (Gujarati 2003). The heteroscedasticity problems usually 
arise because the sample usually includes both sizes (small and large) of firms. As this study’s 
sample includes firms of different sizes, therefore, its estimation results may be biased because of a 
heteroscedasticity problem. Hence, an important question is how to mitigate this problem. 
 
There are several methods suggested in the literature for dealing with the heteroscedasticity 
problem. One commonly used method is deflation of data by some measure of size (Maddala 
1992). In this method, both dependent and independent variables are deflated by some measure 
(e.g., size, book value, market value, number of shares). The purpose of deflation is to control for 
the size or scale effect. Thus, both dependent and independent variables in this study are scaled by 
the market value of equity in order to control for the scale effect and to mitigate the 
heteroscedasticity problem (Brav 2009). Furthermore, the study also uses White’s (1980) 
heteroscedasticity-consistent variances and standard errors for mitigating the heteroscedasticity 
problem. 
 
3.5.2 Serial correlation  
 
As mentioned above, panel data may suffer from problems such as heteroscedasticity and serial 
correlation. Serial correlation is defined as “Correlation between members of series of observations 
ordered in time {as in time series data} or space {as in cross-sectional data}” (Gujarati 2003, p. 
442). The presence of serial correlation affects the estimation results. As a consequence, the results 
from estimation may be misleading (Wooldridge 2002). Moreover, in the presence of serial 
correlation the ‘t’, ‘f’, and ‘χ2’ statistics give incorrect results (Gujarati 2003). The problem of 
heteroscedasticity and serial correlation is common in ownership structure-liquidity studies (Heflin 
& Shaw 2000; Poon et al., 2013). In order to deal with this problem, this study computes standard 
error that is robust to both heteroscedasticity and serial correlation using the option “Robust” in 
STATA 11. 
 
3.5.3 Multicollinearity  
Multicollinearity is another important econometric issue that researchers need to tackle consider 
when estimating the multiple regression model. According to Gujarati (2003, p. 443), this problem 
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refers to “the existence of a ‘'perfect’’ or exact linear relationship among some or all explanatory 
variables of a regression models”. The existence of correlation makes it difficult to estimate the 
regression model precisely. To put it another way, if there is high correlation between independent 
variables, then interpretation of the regression coefficients would be very difficult. Other symptoms 
of multicollinearity are the larger value of standard error, low value of t-statistics and the very high 
value of goodness of fit, R
2
, etc. Furthermore, it is crucial to take into account this problem while 
analysing data. When multicollinearity exists, it means that there is intercorrelation among the 
predictors of the model, which makes the coefficient unreliable, and results in the impossibility of 
determining the relative importance of the independent variables because of inflation in the 
standard errors. 
  
As a consequence, two well-known techniques are employed in order to detect the problem of 
multicollinearity in this study. First, there is the variance inflation factors (VIF) test, where the 
tolerance factor and variance inflation factor of each ownership level, concentration and owners’ 
identity and control variables are computed. The existence of multicollinearity in the model can be 
become evident in circumstances when the tolerance factor is close to zero and value of the 
variance inflation factor is more than 10. Second, there is the Spearman rank correlation, which 
requires that for showing that there is no problem of multicollinearity in data all the correlations 
between pairs of variables should be less than 0.80. As a result, both the VIF test and the Spearman 
rank correlation tests were performed which confirm that no intercorrelation among the study’s 
independent variables, in investigating the relationship between ownership level, concentration, 
owners’ identity and market liquidity, explained in Chapter 4 and 5.  
 
3.5.4 Missing Data 
 
With regard to missing data, due to a few cases of missing the insider ownership data and poor 
disclosure and  practices in other ownership variables (i.e. blockholders), the data used in this study 
contain some missing values. In order to mitigate this problem, other data sources were utilised to 
fill the gaps.  However, it was decided not to delete or impute the observations that contained 
missing values, for the following reasons: firstly, the missing data removal strategy would 
negatively affect the population by decreasing the sample size and might cause a change in the 
content of the information. Secondly, it was chosen to retain the missing values, as STATA 11 
software used for analysing the data, would drop them automatically. Nevertheless, researchers 
should be concerned about the retention of missing data, which can lead to unbalanced data. 
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However, the problem of the unbalanced nature of panel data can be overcome by using appropriate 
estimation methods that also deal with the problem of heteroscedasticity (e.g., random-effects or 
fixed-effects regression and robust regressions such as cluster standard error and Huber-White 
sandwich). I would thus, argue that the choice of estimation method, controlling the problem of 
missing data and tackling of other econometric issues, are the important elements in this 
examination, which has helped in the provision of robust and consistent conclusions.   
 
3.5.5 Outliers  
The issue of dealing with with outliers, typically known as extreme values, is another econometric 
problem that may lead to a bias in the estimation parameters and reduce the significance of the 
statistical model (Gujarati 2004). The existing literature indicates different ways to deal with this 
issue. For example, one of the common procedures is removal. However, this solution may increase 
the missing data and therefore affect the results of the regression analysis. Another common way to 
deal with outliers is Winsorisation. In this treatment all the values above and below a certain point 
are substituted with a value calculated according to the upper and lower percentiles. Consistent 
with previous UK studies in this area (such as De Cesari & Ozkan 2013; Florackis & Ozkan 2009; 
Ozkan 2007), this study removes the top and bottom 1% of all variables to mitigate the influence of 
outliers. 
 
3.5.6 Endogeneity 
In the existing literature on the ownership structure and market liquidity relationship different 
studies regard  the endogeneity issue as the most important concern (see for example, Poon et al., 
2013; Rubin 2007). However, most of the existing literature in the ownership structure area fails to 
deal with this problem properly (Chiang & Venkatesh 1988; Kini & Mian 1995; Sarin et al., 2000; 
Heflin & Shaw 2000; Brockman et al., 2009; Jacoby & Zheng 2010). As highlighted by Poon et al., 
(2013) and Rubin (2007) the endogeneity problem mainly arises from two sources: simultaneity 
and unobservable heterogeneity. On the one hand, simultaneity arises when the dependent variable 
and one or more of the explanatory ones are determined in equilibrium; in this case, the first 
variable causes the other(s), and the reverse is true (Roberts & Whited 2012). According to Gujarati 
(2004, p. 753-754), “simultaneity problem arises because some of the regressor are endogenous 
and are therefore likely to be correlated with the disturbance, or error term”. 
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On the other hand, unobservable heterogeneity, also known as omitted variables, occurs when the 
relationship between two or more variables in the regression model is influenced by another 
variable but is unobservable (Poon et al., 2013). The problem here is that these omitted variables 
appear in the error term in the regression model instead of being with the independent variables. If 
there is a correlation between these omitted variables and other variables in the model, in this case 
we are dealing with an endogeneity problem in our regression model as stated by  Hsiao (2003). In 
the ownership structure-liquidity relationship, firm-specific characteristics – also known as firm-
fixed effects – could influence ownership structure variables, but are unobservable and difficult to 
measure. As mentioned previously, the choice of estimation method and controlling the problem of 
endogeneity are the two most important elements in this examination, which has helped in the 
provision of robust and more accurate conclusions.   
 
3.6 Analytical Procedures  
 
This section presents the analytical strategies that will be used in Chapter 4, 5 and 6. In the first 
place, this section introduces the nature of data employed in the study, i.e., panel data. Additionally, 
the pros and cons of using panel data are also discussed and explained. More importantly, this 
section provides a detailed explanation of the panel data. The unique characteristics and features of 
this estimation method are also highlighted. However, to deliver a clear picture of the estimation 
method it is important to explain the endogeneity problem since it is the main concern in this study 
as mentioned in the above section. 
 
The statistical methods utilised in this study are mentioned in this section. Generally, these methods 
are classified into two main categories, parametric and non-parametric estimations, and the decision 
as to which method should be employed depends on the nature and characteristics of the data. 
According to Gujarati (2003) there are four assumptions that should be met before using parametric 
tests, namely: the assumptions of normality, linearity, homoscedasticity and independence of error 
terms. Generally, parametric tests are more proper and can generate estimates that are more 
accurate if all these assumption are met, and when all variables that are used in the analysis are 
measured on at least an interval scale (see for example, Judge et al., 1985).  
 
Nevertheless, if one or more of these assumptions is violated or is inaccurate, parametric methods 
can be a misleading approach and using non-parametric tests may be more effective (Balian 1982; 
Greene 2008). These assumptions are explained as follows: (1) Normality, this conjecture requires 
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that the sample data must be normally distributed. Two common tests or checks are used to 
examine the normality of the variables of this study, namely: skewness and kurtosis. According to 
Haniffa & Hudaib (2006), statistically, data is considered to be normally distributed if the skewness 
value is ±1.96 and the kurtosis value is within ± 3. (2) Linearity, this conjecture entails that the 
model should have linear parameters. In other words, the relationship between the explanatory 
variables (X) and the dependent variable (Y) should be linear. In circumstances where this 
assumption is violated the using parameter methods will result in biased estimates (Ayyangar 
2007). (3) Homoscedasticity, under this conjecture, the standard deviation or the variance of the 
dependent variable within the groups is needed to be equal or homogenous. If not, the problem of 
heteroscedasticity will occur, which leads to biased standard errors and inefficient estimates. (4) 
Independence of error terms, this conjecture comprises that the error terms must be independent 
from each other, and thus no serial correlation must exist. In other words, parameter models 
demand that the error terms are uncorrelated and thus the observations are uncorrelated. If not, 
there is an autocorrelation. 
 
As this study’s sample includes firms of different sizes, therefore, its estimation results may be 
because of a heteroscedasticity problem. Hence, an important question is how to mitigate these 
issues. There are several methods suggested in the literature for treating the heteroscedasticity 
problem. One commonly used one is deflation of data by some measure of size (Maddala 1992). In 
this method both dependent and independent variables are deflated by size. The purpose of 
deflation is to control for the size or scale effect. All variables used in this study are scaled by 
market capitalisation in order to control for the scale effect and to mitigate the heteroscedasticity 
problem (Brav 2009; Carpenter et al., 1994). The various checks that were discussed above were 
made to examine the data of this study against the assumptions of the OLS regression model. 
However, the results of the tests illustrate that the data do meet the required criteria or conditions 
for the parametric tests, and show that using parametric methods is an acceptable approach with 
regard to estimating the models created in this study due to the nature and characteristics of the 
data. The results for skewness and kurtosis (as will be demonstrated in the fourth and fifth chapters) 
indicate that most of the variables are normally distributed.  
 
However, other checks have been applied to confirm these findings. Although the Shapiro-Wilk 
test provides some evidence that the data are normally distributed (i.e. values are significantly less 
than 1), the Kolmogorv-Smirnov test and the Quantiles plot confirm that the assumption of 
normality is not met. With respect to the assumption of homoscedasticity, the widely used Breusch-
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Pagan and White tests were employed to detect the problem of heteroscedasticity. The findings of 
both tests illustrate that the problem of heteroscedasticity exists. Finally, the Durbin-Watson test 
was used in this study since it is the most common technique that is employed to detect the problem 
of autocorrelation. The results of this test showed that the assumption of independence of the error 
terms was not met. 
 
Along with other assumptions, the normality of error terms is demanded for the statistical tests to 
be valid (Ayyangar 2007). In particular, OLS estimators become inefficient if the normality of the 
model is violated (Greene 2008). Hence, the estimated standard errors will be biased and 
inconsistent (Baltagi 2001; Greene 2008). It is suggested that two alternative statistical solutions 
can be used to overcome the problem of non-normality: firstly, transforming the data to adjust to 
parametric procedures by normalising it artificially or, secondly, employing other estimation 
methods that are robust and deal with the non-normality of variables (Dinga 2011).  
 
Statistically, it is suggested that data transformation helps in overcoming the problem of non-
normality and outliers by artificially making the data normally distributed. Although this technique 
could affect the output of the analysis by changing the fundamental nature of the information that 
results in complicating any interpretation (Osborne 2005), it has been found that using this 
technique for improving the normality of data is a valuable statistical method. Therefore, consistent 
with previous studies in ownership-liquidity relationship (Brockman et al., 2009; Heflin & Shaw 
2000), this study uses the natural logarithm of all the study’s variables. Moreover, in order to check 
the consistency of the results, it was decided to utilise some appropriate estimation methods for 
non-normally distributed variables (e.g. robust regressions; cluster and Huber-White sandwich). 
 
The most common of these alternative robust estimators is the Huber-White sandwich estimation, 
which was developed by Huber (1967), Eicker (1967) and White (1980). This robust approach 
produces robust standard errors that can deal with some violations of identity of variances, and thus 
standard errors that are attained by this approach are consistent, even if the residuals are not 
homogenous. Arellano (1987) expanded the Huber-White work and projected a cluster-robust 
estimator to diminish the conjecture of independently distributed residuals and therefore control for 
autocorrelation together with dealing with the problem of heteroscedasticity (Hoechle 2007). 
Clustering robust estimation is a robust approach that allows for the violation of independent errors 
or residual assumptions. This approach creates consistent standard errors if the residuals are 
correlated within the groups (Greene 2007; Hoechle 2007). Furthermore, in panel analyses, where 
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cross-section individuals are followed over time, the cluster robust estimation is appropriate since it 
corrects for the heteroscedasticity problem in the cross section and other general forms of serial 
correlation over time (Vogelsang 2008). As a consequences, clustering robust estimation is used in 
the primary analysis of this study since it accounts for the problems of autocorrelation and 
heteroscedasticity. 
 
3.7 Methods of Estimation  
 
The previous section discussed the main econometric problems that may arise in the dataset. 
However, controlling for endogeneity in the empirical model is considered to be the main challenge 
in this study. The traditional estimation methods fail to control for the two types of endogeneity 
problems were discussed in previous sections. Before explaining how this study controls for these 
issues, the limitations of the most popular estimation techniques in the literature, i.e., OLS and the 
use of Fixed Effects Models, which are discussed below.  
 
Standard OLS Regression  
 
The OLS method of estimation is very popular and common in linking cause and effect in a 
regression model. However, in order for the OLS to be the best choice in the estimation, the errors 
in the model should have the same variance, or what is technically called homoscedasticity, and 
also be independent from each other (Podesta 2002). The situation in most of the dataset is not the 
case; when OLS is related to panel data, in most cases it provides biased and inconsistent results. 
For instance, Hicks (1994, p. 171-174) states, “the errors from the pooled data regression tend to 
be complicated and therefore violate the general assumption of OLS”.  
 
As stated by Hicks (1994), the violations of the OLS assumptions may result from the following 
reasons. First, errors might be serially correlated, in which they are not independent from one 
period to another. This may happen because of the interdependence of the observations that 
illustrate them across time. Therefore, the errors from pooled regressions are labelled as 
autocorrelated. Second, errors tend to be heteroscedastic, which means they may have differing 
variance across ranges or subsets of nations (Hicks 1994, p. 172). Third, errors might be non-
random across spatial and/or temporal units, because parameters are heterogonous across subsets of 
units (Hicks 1994). As consequences, and because of the mentioned complexity in the errors from 
the standard OLS data, I can say that applying OLS is not a valid method in this study.  
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Fixed-Effect vs. Random-Effect Regression  
 
The fixed-effect model is a technique that estimates the fixed effect of predictors on the dependent 
variables by controlling for the constant variations arising from the omitted variables and for 
unobserved heterogeneity between groups over time. The assumption of this approach is that the 
individual-specific effect is related to the regressors. The fixed-effect approach works by removing 
much of the error variance that arises due to the misrepresentations resulting from the individual 
differences between groups that come from the omitted variables or the unobserved heterogeneity 
that is correlated with the regressors. Nevertheless, this approach permits for correlations between 
the unobserved individual effects with the model’s variables (Greene 2008). That is, problems of 
autocorrelation or heteroscedasticity that affect estimation arise from time or group-specific 
variations and cannot be handled using the fixed- effect model.  
 
However, random-effect models assume no individual or fixed effects, and thus consider the 
individual-specific constant terms as being randomly distributed within or between the cross-
sectional groups (Greene 2003). Judge et al. (1985) propose that the statistical assumption is 
dependent on the observed cross-sectional units in the sample. For instance, when there are a large 
number of cross-sectional units and the amount of time series data is small, random-effect models 
have been recommended. Moreover, Greene (2003) documents that the fixed-effect models cannot 
be generalised outside the sample under consideration, and it may only be fitting to use this 
technique in cross-sectional examinations. Moreover, he anticipated that the individual-specific 
constant terms must be seen as randomly distributed across cross-sectional firms if the sample is 
collected from a large population. Thus, as this study is drawn from a relatively large population, 
the FTSE All-Share Index, and has a large number of cross-sectional units and covers ten years of 
time series, this means that the above viewpoints may utilise and thus it is likely to be more 
accurate to use the random-effect approach. Nevertheless, in order to justify this choice statistically, 
research in economics usually employs the Hausman test (McKnight & Weir 2009). 
 
As a consequence, the Hausman test (1978) is used to statistically make the choice between fixed- 
and random-effect models. The main aim of this common test is to check for severe exogeneity, and 
it works by simplifying the differentiation between these two techniques by investigating for 
correlations between the independent variables and the individual random effects. The results of 
this test can be interpreted as follows. If the correlation between X variables and εi is found to be: 
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1) Significant or less than 0.05, then the fixed-effect approach is selected. 
2) Insignificant or more than 0.05, then the random-effect approach is selected. 
 
Therefore, under the Hausman model specification test, the assumptions for the choice of (1) the 
fixed-effect approach is that the X variables must be significantly correlated, to the unobserved 
heterogeneity, and (2) the random-effect approach is that the X variables must be insignificantly 
correlated to the unobserved heterogeneity. The Hausman (1978) test results for examining the 
effect of ownership level and concentration on market liquidity and the effect of owners’ identity 
on market liquidity, are respectively as follows; prob<chi2= 0.8587 and prob<chi2= 0.7458. As a 
result, this study employs fixed effect models over and above the random effects models of 
estimation. 
 
Pooled OLS regression with year and industry Dummies  
 
The pooled OLS regression is also called pooled time-series and cross-sectional regression. In this 
regression all the cross-section data are pooled into one large cross-section data, which is called 
panel data, and the standard OLS regression is used to estimate this pooled data. One reason to pool 
data is to increase the sample size. However, using pooled OLS does not solve the omitted 
variables problem. Omitted variables are variables that are not in a model or an analysis that 
influences both the cause and effect and so may cause bias (Shadish et al., 2002). Because of the 
time series dimension, a different time intercept is allowed. Using time dummy variables can allow 
the intercept to differ across periods. Dummy variables are variables that take on the value 0 or 1 to 
indicate the absence or presence of some categorical effect that may be expected to shift the 
outcome (Wooldridge 2002, p. 225).   
 
Furthermore, following most of the prior ownership structure studies, 10 dummies are included to 
control for years in this study (Poon et al., 2013). Given the possibility that the variables of this 
study may change over the period of the study, therefore including year dummies will control for 
the trends of ownership structure variables (Poon et al., 2013). In addition, the time span of the 
study covers the recent financial crisis. To capture this effect, this study includes a dummy variable 
for each year in the study’s period. These dummies take a value of between 1 and 10 for each year 
from 2003 to 2012. (For example, Y1 stands for the year 2003; Y2 stands for the year 2004, etc. up 
to Y10). 
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Moreover, industry dummies are included to stand for industry-specific factors that affect the 
determinants of market liquidity (Poon et al., 2013). The level of ownership concentration may 
differ across industries (Bebchuk & Roe 1999; Chu & Song 2010). For instance, Chu & Song 
(2010) state that highly concentrated industries have a higher information asymmetry between 
insiders and outsiders, which leads to a decrease in market liquidity. Moreover, a highly 
concentrated industry can increase costs of transaction (Bebchuk & Roe 1999). Using the Industry 
Classification (ICB) (FTSE Factsheet 2008), this study classifies non-financial sectors into different 
industries. For instance, this study employs nine dummies for the non-financial sector as follows: 
IN1 relates to “Oil & Gas”, IN2 “Basic Material”, IN3 “Industrials”, IN4 “Consumer Goods”, IN5 
“Health Care”, IN6 “Consumer Services”, IN7 “Telecommunication”, IN8 “Utilities”, and IN9 
“Technology”. More importantly, Poon et al. (2013) argue that controlling for industry-fixed effect 
mitigates the endogeneity concern. 
  
In summary, this study employs pooled OLS regression with year and industry dummies as the 
main estimation method for the empirical models. The limitations in the traditional analysis 
technique especially in dealing with the endogeneity concern justify using OLS dummies to 
provide valid and consistent results. Further, the software package that is used in data analysis is 
“STATA 11”, which is considered to be an advanced statistical program that provides a variety of 
analysis test options to check and analyse the data. 
 
3.8 Summary 
 
This chapter has described the data and research methods used in this research. The data for this 
study was collected from different sources; for example, market and accounting data was extracted 
from Datastream and Worldscope databases, whereas ownership data was collected from the 
BoardEx database and the annual reports of UK companies. The criteria for constructing the study 
sample is also explained for non-financial FTSE All-Share Index. The sample covers all publicly 
listed companies in the FTSE All-Share Index, over the period 2003-2012. Moreover, complete 
descriptions for the variable measurements used in the empirical models have been identified and 
explained. Further, this chapter has provided descriptions of two models where the first model 
estimate the effect of ownership level, concentration and market liquidity and the second model, 
measures the effect of owners’ identity on market liquidity. The chapter also contains detailed 
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discussions on the chosen research methodology and related econometric issues. The next chapter 
investigates the relationship between ownership level and concentration on market liquidity. 
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Table 3.2 Ownership Level, Concentration, Owners’ Identity and Market Liquidity, Control 
Variables and their Description 
 
Variable name  (code) Descriptions                                  Source of data 
Stock Market Liquidity: Dependent Variable (LIQ) 
Bid (PB) The highest price for a stock in a particular day at which the 
market maker (i.e. dealer) is willing to buy 
Datastream 
Ask (PA) The lowest price for a stock in a particular day at which the 
market maker (i.e. dealer) is willing to sell 
Datastream 
Proportional Bid-Ask Spread 
(PBAS) 
(PA-PB)/ (PA+PB)/2 Own 
calculation  
Trading Volume (VO) The total value of shares traded for a stock on a particular day 
in pounds sterling adjusted for capital action (stock split) 
Datastream 
Turnover Ratio (TR) The number of times that shares are traded for a stock on a 
particular day, calculated by dividing stock trading volume 
(VO) by the number of shares outstanding (WC05301) 
Own 
calculation 
Price Impact Ratio (Pimpact) Absolute (RI) divided by the trading volume (VO) Own 
calculation 
Number of Trades (NT)  This is the total number of transactions that were traded for a 
specific stock in a particular day 
Datastream 
Trade Size (TZ) The average number of shares traded in a single transaction 
for  a stock on a particular day, calculated by dividing stock 
trading volume (VO) by the number of trades (NT) 
Own 
calculation 
Independent Variables:  Ownership Structure (OS) 
Insider  ownership (IO) 
 
 
The sum of shares held by executives and non-executives as a 
percentage from the number of shares outstanding 
BoardEx 
Institutional ownership (INSO) The percentage of total shares in an issue available to ordinary 
investors 
Annual report  
Blockholders (BOK) The proportional of aggregate blocks of at least 3% of the 
firm’s outstanding shares held by all institutional investors 
BoardEx 
Large shareholder (LS) Top five largest shareholders  Annual report 
Executive ownership (EO) The percentage of ordinary shares outstanding that executive 
directors hold as recorded at the end of calendar year t 
BoardEx 
Non-Executive ownership 
(NEO) 
The percentage of ordinary shares outstanding that non-
executive directors hold as recorded at the end of calendar 
year t 
BoardEx 
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Government ownership 
(NOSHGV) 
The percentage of strategic holding of 5% or more held by 
government or government institution 
Datastream 
 
Cross ownership (NOSHCO) The percentage of strategic holding of 5% or more held by one 
company in another 
Datastream 
 
Pension fund ownership 
(NOSHPF) 
The percentage of strategic holdings of 5% or more held by 
pension funds or endowment funds 
Datastream 
Investment Company ownership 
(NOSHIC) 
The percentage of strategic holding of 5% or more held as 
long-term strategic holdings by investment banks or 
institutions seeking a long-term return 
Datastream 
 
Employee ownership 
(NOSHEM) 
The percentage of strategic holding of 5% or more held by 
employees or those with a substantial position in a company 
that provides significant voting power at an annual general 
meeting (typically family members) 
Datastream 
 
Other ownership (NOSHOF) The percentage of strategic holdings of 5% or more outside of 
the above categories 
Datastream 
 
Foreign ownership 
(NOSHFR) 
The percentage of strategic holding of 5% or more held by an 
institution domiciled in a country other than that of the issuer 
Datastream 
 
Control Variables 
Rate of Return (RI) This shows a theoretical growth in value of a share-holding 
over a specified period, assuming that dividends are re-
invested to purchase additional units of equity 
Datastream 
Market Value of Equity (MV) Is measured as the share price on a specific date multiplied by 
the number of ordinary shares in an issue adjusted for capital 
action changes (stock split and dividend) (P * WC05301) 
Datastream 
Share Price (P) Represents the official closing price expressed in pence Datastream 
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Chapter 4 
Ownership Level and Concentration and Its Impact on Market Liquidity 
 
 
4.1 Introduction  
 
The last two decades have witnessed considerable attention has been paid by academics, 
practitioners and regulatory bodies to the market liquidity-ownership relationship.  The ownership 
structure is considered to be one of the most important determinants of market liquidity. For 
instance, a large body of literature indicates that ownership structure in terms of insider ownership 
effect market liquidity (Chiang & Venkatesh 1988; Comerton-Forde & Rydge 2006; Dennis & 
Weston 2001; Kini & Mian 1995; Rubin 2007 ; Sarin et al., 2000; Zhou 2011). Other studies 
document a relationship between institutional ownership and market liquidity (Barabanov & 
McNamara 2002; Blume & Keim 2012; Fehle 2004). Similary, there is also evidence which 
suggests that ownership concentration influences market liquidity (Attig et al., 2006; Brockman et 
al., 2009; Ginglinger & Hamon 2007; Heflin & Shaw 2000; Jacoby & Zheng 2010; Naes 2004) 
Nevertheless, the majority of ownership structure-liquidity studies link ownership concentration 
with market liquidity (Brockman et al., 2009; Heflin & Shaw 2000; Jacoby & Zheng 2010). In 
contrast, few studies have investigated the impact of ownership level on market liquidity. As a 
result, this chapter focuses on both ownership level and concentration on market liquidity. More 
specifically, it looks at how the insider, institutional and ownership concentration influence market 
liquidity. This chapter employs a dataset from the UK public listed companies over the period 
2003-2012.     
 
This chapter’s results support both the trading and adverse selection hypotheses; however, this 
chapter finds that most of the market liquidity-ownership relationship is driven by institutional 
ownership rather than by insider ownership. Moreover, the study finds that institutional ownership 
is positively correlated with market liquidity, suggesting that institutional investors trade more 
often that other investors. Ownership concentration in terms of largest shareholder and blockholder 
is negatively correlated with market liquidity, suggesting that institutional blockholders are 
perceived by market makers to have private information about the firm. This relationship is held 
across all market liquidity measures. Moreover, this chapter finds evidence that insider ownership 
is negatively correlated with real friction (i.e., trading activity measure) of market liquidity, but is 
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positively correlated with total liquidity measures such as proportional bid-ask spread and price 
impact ratio Amihud (2002). This indicates that insiders are perceived to be among those 
shareholders that trade on private information.  
 
Finally, the study’s results hold in many different specifications including the firm size effect, 
including other control variables such as financial leverage, research and development expenses 
and firm age and simultaneous equation specification, in which ownership level, ownership 
concentration, and liquidity are determined jointly. The main contribution to the financial literature 
is to provide an extensive empirical analysis on the ownership structure-market liquidity 
relationship over a ten-year period. This study explores this relationship taking into account the 
multidimensional concept of market liquidity. The construction of the high-resolution ownership 
data, together with the recent availability of the BoardEx and annual reports data, allows us to 
achieve this task. 
 
The rest of this chapter proceeds as follows. Section 4.2 introduces the main hypotheses of the 
study. Section 4.3 reports the descriptive statistics for the research variables. The empirical results 
of the relationship between ownership level, concentration and market liquidity are provided in 
section 4.4. In section 4.5, the study conducts additional tests to confirm the robustness of the 
results. The final section concludes and summarises the chapter.  
      
4.2 Hypothesis Development 
 
This section provides a detailed discussion on the formulation of the study hypotheses. These 
testable hypotheses were developed in order to carry out the investigation of ownership level, 
concentration and market liquidity in the UK market. The development of the research hypotheses 
is theoretically based on the trading and adverse selection hypotheses.      
 
4.2.1 Insider Ownership and Market Liquidity 
 
  
The existing literature has documented that insider ownership is negatively related to market 
liquidity (Chiang & Venkatesh 1988; Dennis & Weston 2001; Kini & Mian 1995; Sarin et al., 
2000). This negative effect can be explained as insiders have access to firm-specific information in 
comparison with institutional investors. For instance, a vast body of literature has documented that 
greater insider ownership has been associated with a higher degree of information asymmetry 
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between the firm and market, which leads to lower market liquidity (Copeland & Galai 1983; 
Glosten & Milgrom 1985; Kyle 1985).  
 
An extant body of empirical studies have concluded that there is a negative relationship between 
insider ownership and market liquidity. For instance, Chiang & Venkatesh (1988) report a positive 
relationship between bid-ask spread and insider ownership and they document that insider are 
informed investors about the firm’s private information. In the same spirit, Brennan & 
Subrahmanyam (1996) argue that higher insider ownership may increase the probability of 
informed trading, which leads to lower market liquidity. Moreover, Sarin et al. (2000) as well as 
Dennis & Weston (2001) conclude that insiders are better informed about the firm’s private 
information than outsider investors (i.e., institutional investors), and therefore, this leads to a wider 
bid-ask spread and lower market liquidity.   
 
The empirical evidence regarding the relationship between insider ownership and market liquidity 
is inconsistent. Some studies have reported a positive relationship between the two variables; others 
have found a negative relationship. This evidence has been supported by Sarin et al. (2000) who 
use a sample of 786 for AMEX and NYSE for the year 1985 and conclude that the relative and 
quoted bid-ask spread were found to be positively significantly associated with insider ownership, 
whereas there is a negative relationship between insider ownership and quoted depth. They suggest 
that higher adverse selection costs in firms with higher factional insider ownership are 
consequences of the increased probability of insider trade. Moreover, their result indicates that, 
after controlling for insider trading, they observe an insignificant relationship between information 
asymmetry and insider ownership. This suggests that the higher level of information asymmetry in 
the firms with larger insider ownership is a result of higher probabilities of insider trading. Dennis 
& Weston (2001) provide further support in the US for this perspective; they test the relationship 
between  insider ownership and the quoted bid-ask spread, for 5500 NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ 
firms and report that firms with higher proportions of insider ownership have a higher quoted bid-
ask spread.  
 
Furthermore, the existing literature has suggested that insider ownership affects both the real and 
information friction of market liquidity (Comerton-Forde & Rydge 2006; Rubin 2007). These 
studies document that insiders are informed traders about the firm’s private information and tend to 
turn over their portfolio less often than other investors do, which increases the bid-ask spread and 
leads to a decrease in market liquidity. For the US market, Rubin (2007) examines the effect of 
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insider ownership on market liquidity using a sample of 1369 NYSE firms for the period 1993-
2003. He reports a positive and significant relationship between insider ownership and quoted, 
realised and effective bid-ask spreads and Amihud (2002) illiquidity ratio. In contrast, he concludes 
that there is a negative relationship between insider ownership and trading volume. In Australia, 
Comerton-Forde & Rydge (2006) investigate the effect of insider ownership on illiquidity. Using 
667 ASE listed firms from 1998 to 2003, their findings show a statistically significant positive 
relationship between insider ownership and market liquidity between 0% to 5% insider holdings; 
then a more statistically significant and positive relationship between 5% to 10%; and finally a 
statistically significant and negative impact at 10% and more. They suggest that at a low level of 
insider ownership, there is a positive and significant relationship between insider ownership and 
market liquidity. 
 
 Further, Zhou (2011) tests the relationship between ownership structure and liquidity and trade 
informativeness, using a sample of NYSE firms for the period July to September 2000. He finds 
that there is a negative relationship between insider ownership and market liquidity. Zhou (2011) 
implies that insider investors are informed investors about the firm’s private information regarding 
the firm’s prospects. In particular, he implies that there is a strong positive relationship between 
insider ownership and bid-ask spread, and insider ownership has a negative statistical significance. 
In addition, there is a positive and statistically significant relationship between insider ownership 
and trade informativeness. Based on the above discussions, the following hypothesis is proposed:  
 
Hypothesis 1: There is a negative relationship between insider ownership and market liquidity. 
 
 
4.2.2 Institutional Ownership and Market Liquidity  
 
The existing literature has attempted to examine the relationship between institutional ownership 
and market liquidity, and has reported inconsistent conclusions. Two streams of literature have 
emerged to investigate the above-mentioned relationship. From the adverse selection perspective, 
institutional investors are less informed about the firm’s private information than insider investors 
(Brockman et al., 2009; Chiang & Venkatesh 1988; Kini & Mian 1995; Rubin 2007). Using 63 
NYSE firms in 1973, Chiang & Venkatesh (1988) find no effect of institutional ownership on the 
quoted bid-ask spread and they conclude that market makers do not regard institutions as informed 
traders. In the US, Kini & Mian (1995) report a significantly negative relationship between 
institutional ownership and bid-ask spread for 1063 NYSE listed firms for 1985. They suggest that 
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institutional ownership increases market liquidity. In contrast, Sarin et al. (2000) use a sample of 
786 for AMEX and NYSE for year 1985 and find a positive relationship between institutional 
ownership and bid-ask spread wheras they report a negative impact of institutional ownership on 
the quoted depth. 
  
They document that this positive relationship is due to the effect of institutional on the real friction 
of the market liquidity (i.e. the inventory and the order processing cost of bid-ask spread) 
positively. Moreover, Dennis & Weston (2001) investigate the impact of institutional ownership on 
quoted and adverse component of bid-ask spread in 5500 NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ firms, 
over the period from Q4 of 1997 to Q4 of 1998. They find that institutional ownership is positively 
and significantly related to quoted and adverse selection component of bid-ask spread and suggest 
that institutional investors are better informed about the firm’s prospect information than individual 
investors. However, Fehle (2004) investigates the impact of institutional ownership on market 
liquidity, measured by quoted and effective bid-ask spread, in 10,107 NYSE listed firms, over the 
period from 1980 to 1996. He concludes that there is a negative relationship between institutional 
ownership, quoted and effective bid-ask spread, and suggests that institutional are uninformed 
investors regarding the firm’s private information. 
 
Nevertheless, another stream of theoretical studies has suggested that institutional ownership can 
affect market liquidity from a trading perspective. For instance, institutional investors as a group 
trade more often, which increases market liquidity (Gompers & Metrick 2001; Hamilton 1978; 
Schwartz & Shapiro 1992; Tinic 1972). Consequently, recent literature has suggested the use of 
different proxies of market liquidity in order to capture the multidimensional nature of market 
liquidity (Stoll 2000). For instance, in the US Rubin (2007) examines the effect of institutional 
ownership on market liquidity using a sample of 1369 NYSE firms for the period 1993-2003. He 
finds that there is a positive relationship between institutional ownership and market liquidity. In 
particular, he documents that institutional ownership is positively related trading volume and 
quoted depth; however it is negatively related to quoted and effective bid-ask spread and price 
impact ratio.  Based on the above discussion, the following hypothesis is proposed: 
 
Hypothesis 2: There is a positive relationship between institutional ownership and market liquidity.  
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4.2.3 Blockholders and Market Liquidity  
 
The existing literature has attempted to examine the relationship between blockholders and market 
liquidity, and has reported that they have access to valuable private firm’s information, which leads 
to a lower market liquidity (Brockman et al., 2009; Heflin & Shaw 2000; Jacoby & Zheng 2010; 
Naes 2004). For example, Heflin & Shaw (2000) examine the effect of blockholders on market 
liquidity for a sample of 260 US firms for the period 1988 through 1989. They find a positive and 
significant relationship between blockholders and relative and quoted bid-ask spread and informed 
trading component of the effective spread. In the line with this, Naes (2004) investigates the 
relationship between ownership concentration and market liquidity in the Norwegian equity market 
and finds a positive relationship between the bid-ask spread and blockholders.  
 
Nevertheless, the empirical studies that have examined the impact of blockholders on market 
liquidity have been inconsistent (Brockman et al., 2009; Heflin & Shaw 2000; Jacoby & Zheng 
2010). In the US, Heflin & Shaw (2000) investigate the impact of both insider manager and non-
manger blockholders on market liquidity, measured by quoted, effective, and adverse selection 
components of bid-ask spread and depth, in 260 US listed firms, over the period from 1988 to 1989. 
They report that there is a positive relationship between blockholders either by managers or 
external entities and quoted and effective bid-ask spread and adverse selection spread components 
and smaller quoted depth. In the same spirit, Rubin (2007) finds that there is a positive relationship 
between blockholders and bid-ask spread and price impact illiquidity ratio. Moreover, he concludes 
that blockholders reduce market liquidity.  
 
Similarly, Brockman et al. (2009) test the relationship between blockholders and market liquidity 
measured by real, information and total liquidity costs for 1225 NYSE and AMEX companies over 
the period from 2000 to 2006. They find that blockholders have a negative impact on market 
liquidity.  In particular, after controlling for the real friction effect, they find little evidence that 
blockholders have a negative impact on information friction of market liquidity (i.e., adverse 
selection component of bid-ask spread). Their findings suggest that the relative lack of trading, and 
not the threat of informed trading, explains the negative relationship between blockholders and 
market liquidity. Moreover, they report a negative relationship between blockholders and real 
friction of market liquidity (number of trades and turnover ratio). Similar to this, Jacoby & Zheng 
(2010) revisit the relationship between ownership concentration and market liquidity and use 1071 
NYSE, 323 AMEX and 2182 NASDAQ firms for the year 1995. They use two dimensions of 
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ownership concentration both number of shareholders and blockholders and measure market 
liquidity by bid-ask spread, probability of informed trading (PIN), depth, and trading volume. For 
NYSE/AMEX, they report a positive relationship between blockholders and bid-ask spread and 
PIN, whereas is they document a negative relationship between blockholders and quoted depth and 
dollar trading volume. With respect to the number of shareholders, Jacoby & Zheng (2010) report a 
positive relationship between the number of shareholders and quoted and effective bid-ask spread. 
However, they report that there is no relationship between the number of shareholders and adverse 
selection bid-ask spread and PIN.  For NASDAQ stocks, they document a positive relationship 
between blockholders and PIN and bid-ask spread and a negative relationship with trading volume. 
Nevertheless, they report that the relationship between blockholders and quoted depth is not 
significant.  Regarding the number of shareholders, they conclude a positive relationship between 
the number of shareholders and dollar trading volume. However, they report that the relationship 
between number of shareholders and PIN and quoted depth is not significant. Based on the above 
discussion and from an adverse selection theory perspective, the following hypothesis is proposed: 
 
Hypothesis 3: There is a negative relationship between blockholders and market liquidity.  
 
 
4.2.4 Large Shareholders and Market Liquidity  
 
Recent literature has documented that using the blockholder as a sole measure of ownership 
concentration causes bias in the previous research’s results (Comerton-Forde & Rydge 2006; 
Jacoby & Zheng 2010; Rubin 2007). These studies used different proxies of ownership 
concentration in order to reduce any bias from the arbitrary cut-off point. The existing literature has 
suggested that large shareholders are among the most influential shareholders of a firm (Claessens 
et al., 2000; La Porta et al., 1999). If they become actively involved in the management of the firm, 
they can influence corporate decisions in such a way that the value of the firm increases. However, 
any active role of large shareholders also brings adverse selection costs that reduce market liquidity 
For example, Coffee (1991) was among the first to point out that active role of large shareholders 
and the liquidity of shares of their companies cannot go hand on hand. Moreover, large 
shareholders are in a better position to extract some private information about the firm’s prospects 
than outside investors (Demsetz 1983; Fama & Jensen 1983; Stein 1988, 1989). 
 
Nevertheless, the empirical evidence about the impact of large shareholders and market liquidity is 
comprehensive (Attig et al., 2006; Ginglinger & Hamon 2007; Naes 2004; Rubin 2007). A number 
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of studies have suggested that large shareholders have a negative impact on market liquidity (Attig 
et al. 2006; Ginglinger & Hamon 2007). For instance, Naes (2004) reports that there is a positive 
relationship between the aggregate top five large shareholders and quoted and effective bid-ask 
spread and adverse selection component of bid-ask spread. However, he records that there is no 
relationship between ownership concentration and depth. In France, Ginglinger & Hamon (2007) 
report a positive relationship between controlling shareholder and bid-ask spread and they suggest 
that controlling shareholders are informed traders for 918 French listed firms from 1998 to 2003. 
Moreover, they find that the deviation of control from ownership has a positive relationship with 
bid-ask spread and adverse selection component of bid-ask spread and an insignificant negative 
relationship with depth. In contrast, they find that there is no impact for widely held shares and 
double voting rights on market liquidity. 
 
In Canada, Attig et al. (2006) examine the relationship between ultimate control and ownership and 
market liquidity measured by quoted and adverse selection component of bid-ask spread in a 
sample of 1031 Canadian listed firms. Their findings reveal that there is a positive relationship 
between closely held firms and bid-ask spread and adverse selection component of bid-ask spread, 
whereas the widely held firms have a positive impact on market liquidity. Furthermore, in 
Australia, Comerton-Forde & Rydge (2006) test the relationship between ownership concentration 
and illiquidity; different proxies of ownership concentration have been used such as the top twenty 
shareholders, large shareholders measured by Herfindahl index of concentration, retail 
shareholdings, number of shareholders, and insider ownership. They report a positive relationship 
between ownership concentrations and bid-ask spread and a negative relationship between 
ownership concentration and turnover ratio. However, the number of shareholders has a positive 
impact on turnover ratio and a negative impact on bid-ask spread. They apply a further check, 
which is the simultaneous equation bias; their findings provide no evidence to indicate ownership is 
endogenous and therefore no simultaneous equation bias is present. Overall, this study hypothesises 
that: 
 
Hypothesis 4: There is a negative relationship between large shareholder and market liquidity.  
 
 
4.3 Descriptive Statistics  
 
This section presents the descriptive statistics for dependent, independent and control variables. 
Table 4.1 uses mean, median, standard deviation, maximum, minimum, percentiles, skewness and 
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kurtosis values to describe the data over the period 2003-2012. In addition, Tables 4.2 and 4.3 
present the breakdown of ownership structure and market liquidity variables respectively according 
to the industry. The mean is provided for nine industries within the FTSE All-Share Index. In the 
last part in this section, Table 4.4 reports the mean and median differences for the ownership and 
market liquidity variables in large and small firms.  According to Table 4.1, the average of insider 
ownership (IO) is 10.35% with a standard deviation of 18.7%. In addition, Table 4.1 indicates that 
the average (standard deviation) for blockholder ownership (BKO) is 18.8% (18.15%) respectively. 
Moreover, the values for BKO range from zero to a maximum value of 48.8%. Furthermore, Table 
4.1 reports that the average (standard deviation) for largest shareholders (LS) is 23% (21%) 
respectively. Table 4.1 also indicates that the average value of institutional ownership (INSO) in 
the UK is 72%. These figures are consistent with recent UK studies (Florackis & Ozkan 2009; 
Geiler & Renneboog 2014; Khurshed et al., 2011; Ozkan 2007). 
 
Table 4.1 also presents the descriptive statistics for market liquidity variables. Table 4.1 reports that 
the proportional bid-ask spread (PBAS) is 1.6%. The value for PBAS ranges from zero to a 
maximum value of 25.4%. In addition, the average value of trading volume is 2442 in thousands. 
These figures are consistent with prior UK studies (Menyah & Paudyal 1996). With respect to the 
number of trades (NT), the average value of the number of trades is 671.0; this figure is similar to 
the finding of (Menyah & Paudyal 1996). The last part of Table 4.1 describes the control variables. 
The average market value of equity (MV) is 2562 million with a maximum value of 43,239.9 
million. This is consistent with the results reported by Menyah & Paudyal (1996). The share price 
(P), which is expressed in pence, has an average of 287.08 and ranges from a minimum value of 
0.03 to a maximum value of 3084.39 in the UK firms. Finally, according to Table 4.1 the average 
total risk (VOL) in the UK firms is 18.2% with a standard deviation of 22.8%.  
 
The descriptive statistics in Table 4.1 show that the skewness and kurtosis figures reveal that most 
of the variables are not normally distributed. For instance, the data are considered to be normally 
distributed if the skewness value is ±1.96 and the kurtosis value is within ±3 (Haniffa & Hudaib 
2006). In order to overcome this problem this study transforms all the study’s variables by using 
the natural logarithm following the previous studies (Brockman et al., 2009; Heflin & Shaw 2000).  
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Table 4.1 Descriptive Statistics of the whole Sample 
Table 4.1 presents the time series average of cross-sectional means, medians, standard deviations, maximum, 
minimum, percentiles, skewness and kurtosis during the sample period from December 2002 to December 2012 for UK 
companies. Insider ownership (IO), institutional ownership (INSO), blockholders (BKO), largest shareholder (LS), 
proportional bid-ask spread (PBAS), turnover ratio (TR), price impact ratio (Pimpact), trade size (TZ), trading volume 
(VO), number of trades (NT), firm size (MV), share price (P) and  return volatility (VOL). See Table 3.2 for variables’ 
definition and measurements. 
 
Figure 4.1 shows the means of insider, institutional, and ownership concentration (i.e., blockholders 
and largest shareholders) according to the industry breakdown. Moreover, Table 4.2 shows that 
higher insider ownership is in basic materials and telecommunication with an average of 17% and 
16% respectively. However, the lower insider ownership appears in the utilities companies with an 
average of 1%. With respect to ownership concentration, as shown in Table 4.2 utilities companies 
have the lowest large shareholder and blockholders with an average of 4%. In contrast, basic 
materials and technological firms have the largest shareholder with an average of 29% and 27% 
respectively. Moreover, basic materials firms have the highest blockholders with an average of 
23%. Regarding institutional ownership, utilities companies have the highest institutional 
ownership with an average of 83%. In contrast, basic materials firms have the lowest institutional 
ownership with an average of 66%. In conclusion, utilities firms have the lowest insider and 
ownership concentration, whereas basis materials firms have the highest insider and ownership 
concentration. As a result, this study expects that utilities firms will have highest market liquidity in 
comparison with other industries mainly the basic materials firms.  
 
Regarding market liquidity, Figures 4.2, 4.3, 4.4, and 4.5 and Table 4.3 report the mean for market 
liquidity variables according to the industry breakdown. As shown in Table 4.3, health care and 
 Mean Median Stdev Max Min 25 p 75 p Skewnes Kurtosis 
VOL 0.1823 0.0769 0.2282 0.9933 0.0001 0.0575 0.2092 1.91      5.59 
MV in millions £ 2562.31 432.7 7501.12 43239.9 0.0523 69.4 927.95 4.59 23.86  
VO in thousand  2442.76 496.01 5790.39 36070.97 0.3007 78.73 2439.02 4.37 23.41 
PBAS in pence 0.0167 0.0056 0.0235 0.2547 0.0001 0.0028 0.0247 2.00 7.30 
P  287.08 204.89 376.95 3084.39 0.0386 43.63 424.12 3.52 21.35 
NT  671.02 220.65 1298.00 6947.7 0.0055 30.44 630.08 12.47 3.05  
TR  0.0071 0.0046 0.0114 0.0986 0.0000 0.0029 0.0068 30.88 4.98  
TZ  6.263 2.900 14.31 432.28 0.0001 0.6947 6.0580 14.48 389.20 
Pimpact  0.0002 0.0000 0.0005 0.0085 0,0000 0.0000 0.0001 8.95 103.90 
IO 0.1035 0.0096 0.1877 0.7504 0.0001 0.0039 0.0723 2.03 5.82 
LS 0.2296 0.2345 0.2073 0.5373 0.0020 0.009 0.4299 0.23 1.46 
BKO 0.1880 0.0888 0.1815 0.4888 0.0033 0.0093 0.3634 0.44 1.57 
INSO 0.7224 0.7683 0.1844 0.9443 0.4079 0.5558 0.8866 -0.41 1.75 
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industrials companies have the highest proportional bid-ask spread (PBAS), 1.88% and 1.85% 
respectively. In contrast, utilities companies have the lowest PBAS with an average of 0.55%. 
Regarding price impact ratio (Pimpact), utilities and oil & gas companies have the lowest price 
impact ratio with 0.0000 and 0.0000 respectively. Nevertheless, health care, telecommunication and 
technology have the highest Pimpact ratio with an average of 0.02%. Table 4.3 also shows that 
technological firms have the lowest number of trades (NT) and trading volume (VO) with an 
average of 338.21 and 994.8 respectively. In contrast, the telecommunication companies have the 
higher number of trades and trading volume, 1317.74 and 13114.12 respectively. Regarding 
turnover ratio (TR), technological firms have the highest turnover ratio average of 0.94%. In 
contrast, telecommunication companies have the lowest average of 0.41%. With respect to the trade 
size (Tsize), utilities firms have the lowest Tsize with an average 3.00. Nevertheless, health care 
companies have the highest Tsize with an average of 11.09.      
 
Taken together, this study finds that utilities companies have the highest market liquidity in 
comparison with other industries, mainly the telecommunication and technological firms. 
Consequently, from the above results this study strongly recommends to control for the industry 
effect following recent studies in this area such as Poon et al. (2013).    
 
 
Figure 4.1 Ownership Variables Accounting for Differences in Industry Sectors. 
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Table 4.2 Means of Ownership Structure Accounting for Differences in Industry Sectors and Pool Sample of 
2003-2012 
Table 4.2 presents the average of ownership structure variables according to the industry classification for the years 
2003 to 2012. For ownership structure, this study uses insider and institutional ownership and ownership concentration 
(i.e. blockholders and large shareholders). 
 
 
 
Figure 4.2 Proportional Bid-ask Spread and Turnover Ratio Accounting for Differences in Industry Sectors 
 
Industry Insider Ownership Large Shareholder Blockholders Institutional Ownership 
Oil & Gas 0.11 0.21 0.18 0.74 
Basic Materials 0.17 0.29 0.23 0.66 
Industrials 0.07 0.20 0.16 0.74 
Consumer Goods 0.11 0.24 0.18 0.71 
Health Care 0.05 0.26 0.21 0.77 
Consumer Services 0.11 0.25 0.21 0.68 
Telecommunication 0.16 0.21 0.18 0.71 
Utilities 0.01 0.04 0.04 0.83 
Technology 0.10 0.27 0.21 0.70 
Pool 0.10 0.22 0.18 0.73 
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Figure 4.3 Price Impact Ratio Accounting for Differences in Industry Sectors 
 
Figure 4.4 Number of Trades and Trading Volume Accounting for Differences in Industry Sectors 
 
Figure 4.5 Trade Size Accounting for Differences in Industry Sectors 
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Table 4.3 Means of Market Liquidity Accounting for Differences in Industry Sectors and Pool Sample of 2003-
2012 
Table 4.3 presents the average of market liquidity measures according to the industry classification for the years 2003 
to 2012. For market liquidity this study uses proportional bid-ask spread (PBAS), turnover ratio (TR), price impact 
ratio (Pimpact), trade size (TSIZE), trading volume (VO) and number of trades (NT). 
 
Firm Size Effect  
To study the effect of the firm size on the ownership structure and market liquidity variables, this 
study stratifies UK firms into two size groups. The large (small) firm group includes firms with size 
above (below) the median of the market value of equity (MV) of the UK sample firms. The means, 
median and standard deviation for ownership structure and market liquidity variables are reported 
in Table 4.4. This study implies both parametric and non-parametric test in order to test the 
differences in means and median of the above-mentioned variables between small and large UK 
firms; both the t-statistics and Wilcoxon signed-rank test are used to test the mean and median 
differences respectively. Table 4.4 reports that on average small UK firms have a lower number of 
trades, trade size, turnover ratio, and sterling pound trading volume relative to the UK large firms. 
 
Nevertheless, it is noticeable from Table 4.4 that small UK firms have the higher proportional bid-
ask spread (PBAS) and price impact ratio Amihud (2002) illiquidity ratio (Pimpact) in comparison 
with the large UK firms. All the figures are significant at (1% level). With respect to ownership 
structure variables, small UK firms have higher ownership concentration (i.e., blockholdings and 
largest shareholders) and insider ownership whereas they have less institutional ownership in 
comparison with large UK firms. These finding are in line with the previous studies (Jacoby & 
Industry PBAS NT TR TSIZE Pimpact VO 
Oil & Gas 0.0133 1142.52 0.0072 7.29 0.0000 3812.22 
Basic Materials  0.0165 1297.06 0.0050 6.42 0.0001 1847.23 
Industrials  0.0185 357.29 0.0068 6.30 0.0001 1386.80 
Consumer Goods  0.0145 766.05 0.0071 3.54 0.0001 2045.73 
Health Care 0.0188 1048.67 0.0044 11.09 0.0002 2189.92 
Consumer Services  0.0143 556.95 0.0087 6.38 0.0001 2665.13 
Telecommunication  0.0163 1317.74 0.0041 6.73 0.0002 13114.12 
Utilities  0.0055 1273.58 0.0055 3.00 0.0000 4592.39 
Technology  0.0257 338.21 0.0094 6.90 0.0002 994.84 
Pool 0.0159 899.79 0.0065       6.41       0.0001      3627.60 
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Zheng 2010; Kini & Mian 1995; Williams 1986). These studies document that small firms have 
more information asymmetry between firms and market than large firms. Existing literature has 
documented that the relationship between blockholders and insider ownership and quoted bid-ask 
spread is more significant and stronger for small firms. Specifically, smaller firms often have a 
smaller number of insiders, which gives them more ability to access private information about the 
firm’s prospect than outside investors (i.e., institutional investors), which leads to lower market 
liquidity (Jacoby & Zheng 2010; Kini & Mian 1995). 
Nevertheless, as shown in Table 4.4, larger UK firms have more institutional ownership (INSO) 
than small firms. This is in line with previous studies (Chiang & Venkatesh 1988; Jacoby & Zheng 
2010; Kini & Mian 1995; Tinic 1972). These studies have stated that larger firms are more 
dispersed; in other words, they have more number of shareholders. In particular, these studies 
conclude that, when the ownership is held by outsider shareholders, this will increase the 
probability that more investors will participate in the trading operation in the capital market, which 
leads to an increase in the market liquidity. Overall, this study notices from Table 4.4 that small 
firms have more insider and ownership concentration, which leads to more total liquidity costs (i.e., 
proportional bid-ask spread and price impact ratio) and lower real friction of market liquidity (i.e., 
turnover ratio, number of trades, trade size and trading volume) in comparison with large firms.    
Moreover, recent studies have suggested using the firm’s size effect as a robustness and 
consistency test to detect if the firm’s size has an effect on the relationship between ownership 
structure and market liquidity (see Jacoby & Zheng 2010; Kini & Mian 1995). This study notices 
from Table 4.4 that the firm’s size has a strong and significant effect (at 1% significant level) on 
both market liquidity and ownership variables. Consequently, the study investigates the effect of 
the firm’s size on the relationship between ownership level, concentration and market liquidity as a 
further test to check the consistency of the results of firm’s size effect with the main results, as we 
will see later in this chapter.    
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Table 4.4 Descriptive Statistics for Large and Small Firms  
Table 4.4 presents the mean and median differences of insider ownership (IO), institutional ownership (INSO), 
blockholders (BKO), largest shareholder (LS), proportional bid-ask spread (PBAS), turnover ratio (TR), price impact 
ratio (Pimpact), trade size (TZ), trading volume (VO), and number of trades (NT). Firms are sorted according to the 
market value: firms above the median of market value are classified as large and those below the median are classified 
as small. See Table 3.2 for variables’ definition and measurements.  
Correlation Matrix 
This section presents and discusses the Pairwise correlations among the insider, institutional, and 
concentration ownership (i.e. blockholder and largest shareholders), market liquidity and control 
variables. The correlation coefficients are tested in order to check if there is a high collinearity 
among independent variables. The term collinearity indicates that two predictors have a near 
perfect linear relationship. The importance of detecting such a problem is that the regression model 
estimates of the coefficients become unstable as the level of multicollinearity increases. 
Statistically, it has been suggested that multicollinearity may damage or threaten the regression 
analysis if the degree of correlation exceeds 80% (Gujarati 2003; Hair et al., 1998). Therefore, this 
percentage is adopted as the threshold in this study to detect the presence of the problem of 
multicollinearilty in the residuals.  
 
As shown from Table 4.5 this study notices that most of the correlation coefficients between the 
study’s variables are low but there are still some relatively high correlations between some of those 
variables. It is noticeable from Table 4.5 that the highest correlation, compared with other 
variables, is found between the large shareholders (LS) and blockholders (BKO) (75%) which is in 
line with prior UK studies (Florackis & Ozkan 2009; Ozkan 2007b). Consequently, this relatively 
high correlation is expected. In addition, Table 4.5 reports that proportional bid-ask spread (PBAS) 
and price impact ratio (Pimpact) is highly negatively correlated with number of trades (NT) and 
trading volume (VO). Our results are in the line with previous US studies (Rubin 2007). 
Statistically, Brooks (2008) states that when the correlation coefficient between the variables is 
Large Firms             Small Firms Differences 
Variables Mean 
 
Median Standard 
deviation  
Mean 
 
Median Standard 
deviation  
t-statistics Wilcoxon 
signed-rank 
test 
 
VO 3899.48 793.09 7376.39 988.88 255.65 2912.67 12.04***  16.352*** 
PBAS 0.0072 0.0037 0.0147 0.0263 0.0208 0.0265   -20.31*** -19.536*** 
NT 1090.49 444.98 1640.31 252.37 45.68 575.69 15.69***  17.751*** 
TR 0.0080 0.0050 0.0125 0.0063 0.0039 0.0102    3.52***  7.220*** 
TZ 3.962 2.336 7.221 8.55 3.84 18.63   -7.33*** -10.044*** 
PIMPACT 0.0001 0,0000 0.0002 0.0003 0.0001 0.0007    -9.83*** -18.646*** 
IO 0.0871 0.0077 0.1789 0.1198 0.0285 0.1948   -4.12*** -5.906*** 
LS 0.1852 0.0677 0.2054 0.2739 0.2853 0.1997 -10.04*** -10.573*** 
BKO 0.1589 0.0595 0.1784 0.2171 0.2282 0.1799  -7.13*** -7.445*** 
INSO 0.7544 0.825 0.1831 0.6905 0.7066 0.1801    7.94***  7.555*** 
***,**,* represent significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.  
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high, it could indicate near multicollinearity that will make the standard error of the variables high, 
which will make those variables insignificant. Moreover, he documents that when the 
multicollinearity exists the regression model will become very sensitive to any changes in the 
independent variables and adding or removing any variable will affect the model sharply. As a 
result, Brooks (2008) suggests a number of solutions to this problem. 
 
First, is to ignore it, especially if the variables’ coefficients have the correct sign and magnitude 
value. Second, is to drop one of the collinear variables; unfortunately, sometimes the variables with 
high correlations are important for explaining the dependent variable, so we cannot drop any of 
them. Third, is to transform the highly correlated variables into a ratio; this may be unacceptable, 
especially if the theory suggests that the relationship should be a certain nature that does not 
include the variable as a ratio. However, a well-known technique is employed in order to detect the 
problem of multicollinearity in our models. In particular, this study calculates the variance inflation 
factor (VIF) test, where the variance factors of each variable are computed. The existence of 
multicollinearity in the model can be discovered if the value of the variance inflation factors is 
more than 10. Both the VIF test and the pairwise rank correlation confirm that there is no 
intercorrelation among the study’s independent variables in our model. This study ran the VIF 
command after each model to detect if there is multicollinearity in the regression, as we will see 
later in the main analysis section.  Moreover, this study estimates robust standard error to control 
for serial correlation and heteroscedasticity using the option “Robust” in STATA 11.
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 Table 4.5 Correlation Matrix for the Research Variables 
Table 4.5 presents the correlation between the variables used in the study. Insider ownership (IO) is the total percentage of shares owned by all directors (executive and 
non-executive directors), institutional ownership (INSO) is the total percentage of shares held in positions by institutional investors, blockholders (BKO) is the total 
percentage of shares held in positions of greater than 3% owned by external investors, largest shareholders (LS) the top 5 non-insider institutional investors, proportional 
bid-ask spread (PBAS) is calculated by dividing the quoted bid-ask spread over the mid-point of quoted bid-ask spread, turnover ratio (TR) is the trading value divided by 
market capitalisation, price impact ratio (Pimpact) is the ratio of absolute returns divided by trading value, trade size (TZ) is the share trading volume divided by the number 
of trades, trading volume (VO) as the total number of shares volume traded during the month, firm size (MV) represents the market capitalisation expressed in millions, 
share price (P) is the stock price at the end of the month and return volatility (VOL) is measured as the standard deviation of the squared stock return.  
 PBAS  PIMPACT  VO  TR TZ  NT  IO BKO LS INSO MV  VOL P 
PBAS 1.0000             
Pimpact 0.4871* 1.0000            
VO -0.4018* -0.6415* 1.0000           
TR -0.1670* -0.3534* 0.3411* 1.0000          
TZ 0.4331* -0.0410 0.0540 0.0638* 1.0000         
NT -0.6304* -0.5376* 0.4781* 0.2457* -0.3830* 1.0000        
IO 0.1661* 0.3846* -0.3319* -0.1338* -0.1550* -0.2068* 1.0000       
BKO 0.2700* 0.2153* 0.1808* -0.0617* 0.1387* -0.2711* 0.1820* 1.0000      
LS 0.3176* 0.2912* -0.2617* -0.1264* 0.1402* -0.3194* 0.2521* 0.7553* 1.0000     
INSO -0.3724* -0.2085* 0.1808* 0.0401 -0.2871* 0.3556* -0.2009* -0.4042* -0.4775* 1.0000    
MV -0.5057* -0.5341* 0.4503* 0.1654* -0.2171* 0.5235* -0.1510* -0.2122* -0.2823* 0.2432* 1.0000   
VOL 0.2323* 0.2463* -0.1494* 0.0306 0.0575* -0.1642* 0.0571* 0.2092* 0.2372* -0.1457* -0.3019* 1.0000  
P -0.2878* -0.0546* 0.0222 0.0468* -0.4110* 0.2754* 0.1467* -0.1044* -0.1510* 0.1379* 0.2830* -0.2210* 1.0000 
   *indicates significance at 5% level or better. 
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4.4 Results and Analysis  
 
This section presents and discusses the results of both univariate and multivariate analyses. The 
results are outlined first for univariate analysis, which is based on constructing portfolios based on 
ownership level and concentration. Following that, this study reports the results of pooled ordinary 
least squares (OLS) year and industry dummies that examine the relationship between ownership 
level, concentration and market liquidity, which is measured by proportional bid-ask spread, price 
impact ratio (Amihud’s 2002 illiquidity ratio), turnover ratio, number of trades, trade size, and  
trading volume. 
 
4.4.1 Univariate Analysis 
This section starts with the issue of examining the prediction that stocks with higher insider 
ownership and ownership concentration (i.e., blockholders and largest shareholders) have lower 
market liquidity relative to the stocks with higher institutional ownership. Table 4.6 reports market 
liquidity proxies for the portfolio constructed based on stocks that have been ranked in ascending 
order according to insider, institutional, blockholders and largest shareholders as a measure of 
ownership variables. In particular, stocks have been sorted into two equally weighted portfolios 
which are above and below the median value according to the ranking variables. The means for 
ownership structure and market liquidity variables are reported in Table 4.6. This study implies 
both parametric and non-parametric test in order to test the differences in means of market liquidity 
proxies according to the two portfolios; both the t-statistics and Wilcoxon signed-rank test are used 
to test the mean and median differences respectively. 
The results in Table 4.6 Panel A reveal that, in most cases, average portfolio market liquidity as 
measured by proportional bid-ask spread and price impact ratio increase monotonically with block 
ownership. For example, the proportional bid-ask spread (price impact ratio) is 2.2% (0.02%) for 
firms with higher blockholders, which is significantly higher than stocks with lower blockholders, 
which is 1.1% (0.00%). In contrast, regarding the trading activity measure of market liquidity, 
number of trades and trading volume are larger for lower blockholders than higher blockholders. 
Overall, this may imply that blockholders are informed investors and have the ability to access the 
firm’s private information. With respect to the trade size, Table 4.6 shows that it is lower for firms 
with lower numbers of blockholders than firms with higher numbers of blockholders. 
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Moreover, Table 4.6 Panel B reports that stocks with higher insider ownership have statistically 
higher proportional and price impact ratio than stock with lower insider ownership. Specifically, 
the proportional bid-ask spread (price impact ratio) is 1.9% (0.02%) for firms with higher insider 
ownership is significantly higher for stock with lower insider ownership, which is 1.3% (0.00%). In 
contrast, regarding the trading activity measure of market liquidity, the turnover ratio shows a 
monotonic decrease with insider ownership. For instance, firms with higher insider ownership have 
a significantly lower turnover ratio of 0.6% relative to stock with lower insider ownership where 
the the turover ratio is 0.7%. Furthermore, number of trades and trading volume are larger for lower 
insider ownership than higher insider ownership. Overall, this may imply that insider investors are 
informed about the firm’s private information. With the respect to the trade size, Table 4.6 shows 
that the trade size is larger for firms with lower insider ownership than firms with higher insider 
ownership.  
Regarding large shareholder, Table 4.6 Panel C provides evidence that is consistent with that 
reported in Panels A and B with regard to the figures of the proportional bid-ask spread and price 
impact ratio measures. That is, the results also confirm that stocks with large shareholders have 
statistically significant higher proportional bid-ask spread and price impact ratio than stocks with 
fewer large shareholders. In particular, the proportional bid-ask spread (price impact ratio) is 2.1% 
(0.02%) for firms with high largest shareholders, that is significantly higher than stocks with lower 
shareholders which is 1.1% (0.00%). Nevertheless, regarding the trading activity measure of market 
liquidity, number of trades and trading volume are higher for firms with fewer large shareholders 
than firms with a higher number of large shareholders. Overall, this may imply that large 
shareholders are informed investors and have the ability to access the firm’s private information.   
With respect to trade size, Table 4.6 shows that it is lower for firms with fewer large shareholders 
than firms with a higher number of large shareholders. The last measure for ownership is 
institutional ownership where stocks with a higher institutional ownership are those with higher 
market liquidity. In contrast with what has been stated in Panels A, B and C, the figures reported in 
Table 4.6 Panel D reveal the opposite direction regarding the proportional bid-ask spread and price 
impact ratio, which is 1% (0.00%) for firms with higher institutional ownership, which is 
significantly higher than stocks with lower institutional ownership, 2.2% (0.00%). Nevertheless, 
regarding the trading activity measure of market liquidity, number of trades, turnover ratio and 
trading volume are larger for firms with higher institutional ownership than those where the 
proporotion of institutional ownership is lower. Overall, this may imply that institutional investors 
are uninformed investors who turn their portfolio and trade more often than insider investors. With 
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respect to the trade size, Table 4.6 shows that it is lower for firms with higher institutional 
ownership than firms where the proportion of institutional ownership is lower.  
Table 4.6 Univariate Analysis for Ownership Variables and Market Liquidity 
Table 4.6 presents the relationship between ownership level, concentration and market liquidity by using a univariate 
portfolio approach. Stocks with insider, institutional, large shareholders and blockholders are grouped together in 
separate portfolios.  The sample stocks are divided into two portfolios above and below the mean and median values of 
insider, institutional, large shareholders and blockhoders. The mean and median differences are tested through the 
applicatiuon of t-test and Z-values respectively. ***,**,* represent significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels 
respectively. 
 
A brief description of the market liquidity variables is given below. Proportional bid-ask spread (PBAS), number of 
trades (NT), turnover ratio (TR), trade size (TZ), Price impact ratio (Pimpact), and trading volume (VO). See Table 3.2 
for variables’ definitions and measurements. 
 
Variable  Mean for Firms Above 
the Median 
 t-test     Z-values Mean for Firms Below the 
Median 
Panel A Firms Above and Below the Median of  Blockholder 
Proportional Bid -Ask Spread  0.022 10.85***   11.22*** 0.011 
Number of Trades (million) 462.99 -7.57***   -10.23*** 879.33 
Turnover Ratio 0.0072 0.27   -0.91 0.0071 
Trade Size  7.96 5.39***  7.51*** 4.57 
Price Impact Ratio 0.0002 5.73***   6.93*** 0.00009 
Trading volume 1870.45 -4.54***  -6.23*** 3026.88 
Panel B Firms Above and Below the Median of  Insider Ownership 
Proportional Bid- Ask Spread  0.019             6.32***    7.16*** 0.013 
Number of Trades (million)                 454.95 -7.63***  -8.77*** 885.49 
Turnover Ratio 0.006 -2.55**  -4.40*** 0.007 
Trade Size  5.87 -1.26     -5.15*** 6.67 
Price Impact Ratio 0.0002 7.73***    14.3***        0.0000 
Trading Volume 1213.02 -9.95***   -12.6***    3672.33 
Panel C Firms Above and Below the Median of Largest Shareholder 
Proportional Bid- Ask Spread  0.021 10.62***  11.81*** 0.011 
Number of Trades (million) 422.78 -9.10***   -11.14*** 922.36 
Turnover Ratio 0.00718 0.018     -3.13*** 0.00717 
Trade Size  7.81 5.00***   7.44*** 4.69 
Price Impact Ratio 0.0002 6.39***    10.01*** 0.0000 
Trading volume 1647.67 -6.47***   -7.83*** 3257.48 
Panel D Firms Above and Below the Median of Institutional Ownership 
Proportional Bid- Ask Spread  0.010 -12.36***  -13.83*** 0.022 
Number of Trades (million) 993.75 11.83*** 13.35*** 351.37 
Turnover Ratio 0.007 1.35        1.37  0.006 
Trade Size  3.66 -8.32***  -12.50*** 8.84 
Price Impact Ratio 0.0000 -5.91***    -8.68*** 0.00002 
Trading Volume 2924.89 3.76***     6.97*** 1980.71 
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4.4.2 The Effect of Ownership Level and Concentration on Market Liquidity 
This section investigates how the ownership level and concentration are related to the market 
liquidity. Following Poon et al. (2013), the study uses a pooled OLS year and industry dummy to 
control for the endogeneity that was explained in Chapter 3. In addition, this model includes the 
lagged ownership variables as explanatory variables in the right hand side of the equation (4.1) in 
order to control for endogeneity problems in line with the previous work of Brockman et al. (2009) 
and Heflin & Shaw (2000). Furthermore, the diagnostic analyses of this study discussed in Chapter 
3, show that the pooled ordinary least squares (OLS) assumptions are met. Due to the nature of this 
study’s data, a parametric test has been employed. The assumptions or the conditions of OLS 
estimates were investigated in the methodology chapter and OLS regression was methodologically 
and statistically found to be particularly relevant with regard to accomplishing this study’s analysis.  
 
In the existing literature, some studies have used non-parametric tests in investigating the 
relationship between ownership structure and market liquidity literature (Ben Ali et al., 2013; Fehle 
2004),  However, a large number of related previous studies have also used parametric tests and 
multivariate regressions (Attig et al., 2006; Blume & Keim 2012; Brockman et al., 2009; Chiang & 
Venkatesh 1988; Dennis & Weston 2001; Ginglinger & Hamon 2007; Heflin & Shaw 2000; Jacoby 
& Zheng 2010; Kini & Mian 1995; Rubin 2007; Sarin et al., 2000; Zhou 2011). Consequently, this 
study conducts several methods of estimation in order to measure the relationship between 
ownership level, concentration and market liquidity, such as untabulated results of fixed and 
random regression. Unlike other previous studies, this study follows Poon et al. (2013), and 
employs pooled OLS dummy industry and year in order to control for endogenity and time 
invariant problems. The following model is used to examine the above-mentioned relationship: 
LIQit = α0+β1IOit+ β2INSOit+ β3BKOit+ β4LSit+ γ1MVit+ γ2Pit+ γ3VOLit+ + ∑ 𝑰𝑵𝑫
𝒏
𝒊=𝟏 i+ ∑ 𝒀𝑬𝑨𝑹
𝒏
𝒊=𝟏 + 
εi……………………………………………..………...………………………………………………...…(4.1) 
 
Where LIQ is market liquidity, IO is the insider ownership, INSO is the institutional ownership, 
BKO is the blockholder, LS is large shareholder, MV is market value, P is shares price, VOL is 
volatility, IND and YEAR is the industry and year dummies respectively.   
This study reports the main results using pooled OLS year and industry dummy. Table 4.7 reports 
the results using market liquidity as a dependent variable. Pooled OLS estimate in Table 4.7 
suggests a significant relationship between insider ownership and market liquidity. This results 
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indicates that, after controlling for the share price, firms’ size and return volatility, insider 
ownership has an impact of market liquidity under both total liquidity and real friction (i.e.. trading 
activity) measures of market liquidity. In particular, Table 4.7 records a significantly negative 
relationship between insider ownership and market liquidity. Prior studies that apply OLS report 
similar results (Chiang & Venkatesh 1988; Comerton-Forde & Rydge 2006; Heflin & Shaw 2000; 
Rubin 2007). As explained in the previous chapters, the interest of this study is in the 
multidimensional concept of market liquidity (i.e., real and information friction). In light of these 
findings, hypothesis H1 is accepted for FTSE All-Share companies; which states that is a negative 
relationship between market liquidity and insider ownership. The negative association is in line 
with the adverse selection hypothesis.  These finding is in accord with previous research findings in 
this area (see for example, Chiang & Venkatesh 1988; Glosten & Milgrom 1985; Copeland & Galai 
1983).  
 
Nevertheless, analysis of the market liquidity produces interesting findings. Insider ownership 
significantly increase the proportional bid-ask spread and price impact ratio at 1% levels. More 
importantly, this study finds, that after controlling for trading activity through the use of a liquidity 
measure that is highly correlated with trading, insider ownership still maintained a positive and 
significant impact on both the proportional bid-ask spread and price impact ratio. In particular, after 
controlling the effects of trading activity (i.e., number of trades and trade size), the adverse effect of 
insider ownership on the bid-ask spread and price impact ratio becomes lower, but a positive and 
significant relationship still existed between insider ownership and bid-ask spread and price impact 
ratio.   
 
The results of this study thus provide strong support to the adverse selection hypothesis that insider 
ownership increases the proportional bid-ask spread and price impact ratio even after controlling 
trading activity measures. These results support that insider ownership increases liquidity costs 
because of their ‘access to private, value-relevant information’. Existing literature has stated that 
firms with higher insider ownership cause market makers to charge higher bid-ask spread because 
they hold private information about the firm’s prospects; however, they trade less in comparison 
with outside investors (see for example, Chiang & Venkatesh 1988; Dennis & Weston 2001; Kini 
& Mian 1995; Rubin 2007; Sarin et al., 2000; Zhou 2011, for more details). With respect to the 
trading activity measures, this study uses number of trades, trade size, turnover ratio and trading 
volume; the study’s findings are consistent with trading activity hypotheses which suggests that 
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insider ownership reduces the firm’s trading activity and that insider owners trade less than 
institutional investors (see for example, Comerton-Forde & Rydge 2006; Rubin 2007).  
 
Taken together, our trading activity findings in Table 4.7 paint a coherent picture regarding the real 
friction effects of insider ownership. Specifically, insider ownership reduces the firm’s turnover, 
number of trades, trading volume and average trade size. This is somewhat in line with the 
theoretical work of Demsetz (1986), who documents that uninformed investors in firms with higher 
insider ownership tend to adopt a buy-and-hold strategy as they realise that they are relatively 
uninformed. This leads to lower market liquidity, as the market maker understands that most 
transactions involve informed investors. According to these results, it appears that insider trades 
less than outsider investors. To sum up, this study shows that that insider ownership increases the 
total liquidity costs (real and information friction) through increasing both the firm’s proportional 
bid-ask spread and price impact ratio. After this study controls for the trading activity (i.e. number 
of trades and trade size), this study’s results suggest that the adverse liquidity effect of insider 
ownership is due to its impact on informational friction costs.  
 
Table 4.7 reports a positive and significant relationship between institutional ownership and market 
liquidity under the pooled OLS year and industry dummies estimate. This positive result provides 
support for the trading hypothesis that assumes that institutional investors trade more often than 
other investors (i.e., insiders). Accordingly, H2 assumes that institutional ownership is an 
increasing function of market liquidity. It is noticeable from Table 4.7 that institutional ownership 
has a negative relationship with total costs of market liquidity including proportional bid-ask spread 
and price impact ratio. However, after controlling for the trading activity measures (i.e., number of 
trades and trade size), the results show that institutional ownership has a positive and significant 
effect on the price impact ratio and insignificant effect on the proportional bid-ask spread. Thus the 
outcome of these findings does not regard institutional investors as informed investors. This finding 
is in accord with previous research findings (see for example, Fehle 2004; Sarin et al., 2000). 
 
Hence, consistent with some of the previous empirical evidence, it is found that the institutional 
shareholders in UK firms are passive and ineffective when it comes to monitoring (Coffee 1991; 
Cosh & Hughes 1997; Franks et al., 2001; Goergen & Renneboog 2001; Maug 1998; Pound 1988).  
These studies argued that the ineffectiveness and the weak monitoring on the part of institutional 
investors might be caused by the potential liquidity costs, free rider problems, conflicts of interest, 
and strategy alignment. That is, institutions rarely behave or take decisions in terms of corporate 
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monitoring since they pay more attention to liquidity than building up long-term investment, which 
requires exerting influence over corporate management (Bhide 1994; Coffee 1991; Maug 1998; 
Ozkan 2007). Nevertheless, with respect to the trading activity measure of market liquidity, Table 
4.7 reports that there is an insignificantly positive relationship between institutional ownership and 
number of trades and trade size and a significantly positive relationship between institutional 
ownership and trading volume and turnover ratio. These results are in line with previous literature 
in this rea (see for example, Brockman et al., 2009; Rubin 2007).   
 
Regarding ownership concentration, Table 4.7 reports that ownership concentration (i.e., large 
shareholder and blockholders) has an effect on market liquidity. In contrast with other previous 
results that use blockholders as the sole measure of ownership concentration (Brockman et al., 
2009; Heflin & Shaw 2000; Kini & Mian 1995), this study uses two dimensions of ownership 
concentration: blockholders and largest shareholders (top five large shareholders). Following the 
recent literature in the UK, this study uses blockholders who hold 3% and more of the share capital 
according to the disclosure requirements of the London Stock Exchange. Furthermore, this study 
uses another measure of ownership concentration; that is, the top five largest shareholders, in line 
with previous studies in this area (Naes 2004; Rubin 2007).      
 
Under pooled OLS estimation method, the coefficients on blockholders are negative and significant 
with market liquidity. Relative to other prior studies, the study’s result concerning blockholders 
provides strong evidence for the adverse selection hypothesis. In particular, Table 4.7 shows that 
the relationship between the blockholders and proportional bid-ask spread and price impact ratio is 
positive and significant at 10% and 1% significance respectively. In terms of information friction 
effect, this study finds that blockholders still have a positive and significant impact on both the 
proportional bid-ask spread and price impact ratio, once this study controls for trading activity by 
employing a liquidity measure that is highly correlated with trading. Specifically, after this study 
controls for the impact of trading activity (i.e., number of trades and trade size), the adverse effect 
of blockholders on the spread and price impact ratio become lower, but there is still a positive and 
significant relationship between blockholders and bid-ask spread and price impact ratio.  
 
Accordingly, the results support the adverse selection hypothesis, which suggests that blockholders 
play a significant role in motivating the chair of the board of directors to monitor management and 
eventually reduce agency costs. However, existing literature documents that there is a trade-off 
between market liquidity and control (Bhide 1993; Coffee 1991; Maug 1998). Moreover, with 
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respect to the real friction of market liquidity, blockholders with greater ownership reduce the 
firm’s trading activity and have a negative impact on trading volume, number of trades, trade size 
and turnover ratio. Consequently, consistent with trading hypothesis, blockholders are assumed to 
trade less than outsider shareholders (i.e., institutional investors).  
 
Since there are no previous studies, to the best of the author’s knowledge, that have examined the 
impact of blockholders on market liquidity in the UK capital market, as a result, the findings of the 
studies have been compared with other US studies. For instance, unlike Brockman et al. (2009), 
who conclude that, after controlling for this real friction effect, they find no evidence that 
blockholders have an informational friction effect. In other words, blockholders do not adversely 
affect bid-ask spread, depths, adverse selection components, or price impact ratio after controlling 
for the reduction in trading activity. Regarding the real friction of market liquidity, this study 
reports an insignificantly negative relationship between blockholders and trading volume and 
turnover ratio. This finding leads us to accept H3, for the FTSE All-Share Index; H3 states that 
there is a negative relationship between blockholders and market liquidity. This negative effect has 
also been reported by prior US studies (Brockman et al., 2009; Rubin 2007).  
 
Moreover, this study uses the largest shareholders as another proxy of ownership concentration. 
This study found that large shareholding is positively correlated with the proportional bid-ask 
spread and price impact ratio. Furthermore, the findings show a significantly positive relationship 
between large shareholders and the proportional bid-ask spread. With respect to the price impact 
ratio, the results suggest an insignificantly positive relationship between large shareholders and 
price impact ratio. In terms of the information friction effect, the findings suggest that large 
shareholders have a positive and significant impact on the proportional bid-ask spread but 
insignificant impact on the price impact ratio. In this regard, it is also evident from the results, that 
after controlling for the impact of trading activity (i.e., number of trades and trade size), the adverse 
effect of large shareholders on the bid-ask spread and price impact ratio decreased, but there is still 
a positive and significant relationship between large shareholders and the bid-ask spread, and 
insignificant relationship with the price impact ratio. Nevertheless, with respect to real fiction of 
market liquidity, this study reports insignificantly negative relationship between large shareholders 
and trade size and turnover ratio. These findings lead us to accept hypothesis H4, for the FTSE All-
Share Index; which states that there is a negative relationship between large shareholders and 
market liquidity. Similar, negative effect is also been reported by prior studies in this area (for 
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example, Naes 2004; Rubin 2007). In addition, these findings are also consistent with the adverse 
selection hypothesis.  
 
Table 4.7 Pooled OLS Analysis for measuring the effect of ownership level and concentration on 
market liquidity for UK firms  
Table 4.7 presents results of the effect of ownership level and concentration on market liquidity. The table contains 
coefficient values and t-statistics obtained from the estimation of the following model. Figures reported in parentheses 
represent t-statistics which are based on robust standard errors, where ***,**,* mean significance at the 1%, 5% and 
10% levels respectively. 
LIQit = α0+β1IOit+ β2INSOit+ β3BKOit+ β4LSit+ γ1MVit+ γ2Pit+ γ3VOLit+ ∑ 𝐼𝑁𝐷
𝑛
𝑖=1  +∑ 𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅
𝑛
𝑖=1 + εi…………..(1a and 2a) 
LIQit = α0+β1IOit+ β2INSOit+ β3BKOit+ β4LSit+ γ1MVit+ γ2Pit+ γ3VOLit + γ4TZit + γ5NTit + ∑ 𝐼𝑁𝐷
𝑛
𝑖=1 + ∑ 𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅
𝑛
𝑖=1 + 
εi………………..(1b and 2b) 
A brief description of the ownership structure, market liquidity and control variables is given below. Insider ownership 
(IO), institutional ownership (INSO), blockholders (BKO), largest shareholder (LS), proportional bid-ask spread 
(PBAS), turnover ratio (TR), price impact ratio (Pimpact), trade size (TZ), trading volume (VO), number of trades 
(NT), firm size (MV), share price (P), return volatility (VOL), industry (IND) and year (YEAR)  Dummies. See Table 
3.2 for variables’ definitions and measurements. 
 
Regarding control variables, this study find a positive and significant relationship between 
volatility and information friction measures (proportional bid-ask spread and price impact ratio). In 
particular, this positive relationship is common in the literature, where firms with higher volatility 
are exposed to higher uncertainty and information asymmetry (Black 1986; French & Roll 1986). 
However, there is a negative and significant relationship between volatility and real friction 
 PBAS 
(1a) 
PBAS 
(1b) 
Pimpact 
(2a) 
Pimpact 
(2b) 
NT TZ VO  TR 
Insider 
Ownership  
0.04 
(2.56)** 
0.03 
(2.33)** 
0.30 
(8.13)*** 
0.23 
(7.16)*** 
-0.09 
(-3.46)*** 
-0.10 
(-4.42)*** 
-0.22 
(-6.42)*** 
-0.03 
(-2.40)** 
Institutional 
Ownership 
-0.13 
(-2.84)*** 
-0.05 
(-0.41) 
-0.56 
(-1.98)** 
-0.40 
(-1.82)* 
0.35 
(1.34) 
0.01 
(0.08) 
0.47 
(1.65)* 
0.38 
(2.33)** 
Large 
Shareholder 
0.06 
(2.94)*** 
0.04 
(1.91)* 
0.03 
(0.81) 
0.01 
(0.04) 
-0.08 
(-2.33)** 
0.03 
(1.26) 
-0.07 
(-1.81)* 
-0.02 
(-0.71) 
Blockholder 0.05 
(2.53)** 
0.04 
(1.86)* 
0.09 
(2.21)** 
0.05 
(1.72)* 
-0.08 
(-1.94)* 
0.01 
(0.43) 
-0.05 
(-1.14) 
-0.01 
(-0.35) 
Market 
Value  
-0.22 
(-14.13)*** 
-0.12 
(-9.45)*** 
-0.47 
(-15.21)*** 
-0.32 
(-10.90)*** 
0.38 
(13.23)*** 
0.07 
(4.49)*** 
0.35 
(12.32)*** 
0.05 
(5.05)*** 
Volatility 0.13 
(4.86)*** 
0.12 
(5.07)*** 
0.11 
(1.95)* 
0.13 
(2.37)** 
-0.02 
(-0.56) 
-0.11 
(-3.07)*** 
-0.04 
(-0.84) 
-0.13 
(-4.61)*** 
Share Price -0.10 
(-5.34)*** 
-0.03 
(-2.40)** 
-0.09 
(-2.47)** 
-0.11 
(-3.48)*** 
0.17 
(5.50)*** 
0.25 
(11.12)*** 
0.09 
(2.51)** 
0.01 
(0.66) 
Trade Size - 0.10 
(5.76)*** 
- -0.21 
(-5.08)*** 
- - - - 
Number of 
Trades 
- -0.24 
(16.07)*** 
- -0.43 
(-14.96)*** 
- - - - 
Constant -1.04 
(-10.92)*** 
-0.99 
(-13.91)*** 
-2.42 
(-14.53)*** 
-2.04 
(-15.10)*** 
0.49 
(2.95)*** 
0.74 
(5.97)*** 
1.08 
(5.75)*** 
-2.68 
(-33.67)*** 
Industry  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.47 0.58 0.42 0.51 0.41 0.38 0.32 0.17 
Number of 
Observations 
2025 2025 2025 2025 2025 2025 2025 2025 
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measures (trading volume, trade size, number of trades and turnover ratio). Our results are in line 
with previous studies (see Poon et al., 2013; Rubin 2007). The coefficient of firm size is negative 
and significant with information friction of market liquidity (proportional bid-ask spread and price 
impact ratio). This negative relationship confirms that larger firms have lower information 
asymmetry and higher market liquidity because they are more able to diversify risk and have quick 
and greater access to the capital market. Moreover, large firms can deal with unpredicted liquidity 
problems in a more effective and flexible way than smaller firms can (Konishi & Yasuda 2004). 
This result is in line with previous studies that have documented similar correlations between firm 
size and market liquidity (Heflin & Shaw 2000; Kini & Mian 1995). Moreover, Table 4.7 indicates 
that the share price has a significant effect on market liquidity. Under the OLS estimation, the 
positive relationship is consistent with the trading hypothesis. For instance, Stoll (2000) reports a 
positive and significant relationship between share price and market liquidity.  
 
One of the most common tests used to check for the multicollinearity problem is called the variance 
inflation factor (VIF), which is calculated as follows:  
 
𝑽𝑰𝑭 =
𝟏
𝒕𝒐𝒍𝒆𝒓𝒂𝒏𝒄𝒆
…………………………….…………………………………….…………………….. (4.2) 
   
Where: 
Tolerance = 1-R
2
 
R
2
 is the coefficient of determination  
It has been suggested that, if the VIF exceeds 10, which means that R
2
 exceeds 90%, this indicates 
a multicollinearity problem for those variables in the model using market liquidity as the main 
dependent variables. 
The results of VIF tests indicate that multicollinearity is not a problem in our dataset. From Table 
4.8 it is clear that all values are less than 10. Moreover, the average VIF is 1.64 without controlling 
for the trading activity measures (i.e., number of trades and trade size) and 1.67 when we controlled 
them. Consequently, these values confirm that our dataset is free from multicollinearity problems. 
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Table 4.8 Variance Inflation Factors (VIFs) Test  
Table 4.8 presents an overview of the maximum variance inflation factors (VIFs) test for all independent variables 
reported in Table 4.7. The reported VIFs are the maximum VIFs obtained from the regression analyses in STATA 11.  
 
4.5 Further Analysis and Robustness Checks  
This section provides a robustness test to confirm the previous results in the main analysis and to 
address any potential concerns about our model. To check the robustness of our results, this study 
first examines the firm size effect on the relationship between ownership level, concentration and 
market liquidity. Second, this study tests the relationship between ownership level, concentration 
and market liquidity by adding other control variables such as research and development expenses, 
firm age and financial leverage, and finally this study applies simultaneous equations – 3SLS – to 
account for the reverse causality relationship between ownership and market liquidity. 
Small Firm versus Large Firm Sample Results 
This study divides the data into small and large firms based on their market value of equity and re-
examines the relationship between ownership level, concentration and market liquidity. In fact, this 
check allows us to determine whether the nature of the relationship between market liquidity and 
ownership level and concentration is different between small and large firms. Small (large) firms 
are defined as firms that have a market value of equity smaller (equal to or greater) than the median 
market value of equity for the entire sample of 226 firms. In Table 4.9 Panels A and B, the study 
reports the pooled OLS year and industry dummies results for large and small firms respectively. 
With respect to insider ownership, Table 4.8 Panel B reveals that the effect of insider ownership on 
proportional bid-ask spread (PBAS) and price impact ratio (Pimpact) is stronger and significant for 
small firms than larger firms. Moreover, insider ownership has a more negative and significant 
effect on trade size (TZ), turnover ratio (TR) and trading volume (VO). As shown in Table 4.9, 
Panel A institutional ownership appears to have a positive insignificant relationship on PBAS for 
                                   Variance Inflation Factors  (VIF) Test  
Insider Ownership 1.14 1.20 1.14 1.20 1.14 1.14 1.14 1.14 
Institutional Ownership 1.22 1.28 1.22 1.28 1.22 1.22 1.22 1.22 
Large Shareholder 3.24 3.25 3.24 3.25 3.24 3.24 3.24 3.24 
Blockholders 2.96 2.96 2.96 2.96 2.96 2.96 2.96 2.96 
Market Value  1.24 1.51 1.24 1.51 1.24 1.24 1.24 1.24 
Share Price  1.16 1.29 1.16 1.29 1.16 1.16 1.16 1.16 
Volatility  1.13 1.14 1.13 1.14 1.13 1.13 1.13 1.13 
Number of Trades  - 1.67 - 1.67 - - - - 
Trade Size - 1.36 - 1.36 - - - - 
Mean VIF 1.64 1.67 1.64 1.67 1.64 1.64 1.64 1.64 
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large firms. However, Table 4.9 Panel B reports a negative and significant relationship between 
institutional ownership and price impact ratio but insignificantly positive relationship with 
proportional bid-ask spread. Moreover, small firms have a stronger and more significant effect on 
trade size (TZ), turnover ratio (TR), trading volume (VO) and number of trades (NT) in comparison 
with large firms. Our findings are in line with Arbel & Strebel (1982), Barry & Brown (1986), 
Chiang & Venkatesh (1988) and Williams (1986). Regarding blockholders and large shareholders, 
Table 4.9 Panel A, reveals that for large firms’ blockholders and large shareholders have an 
insignificantly positive relationship with PBAS, in comparison with small firms. Moreover, in case 
of large firms, blockholders and large shareholders have a negative and insignificant relationship 
with trade size (TZ) and turnover ratio (TR) in comparison with small firms. In contrast, for small 
firms Table 4.9 Panel B reveals that blockholders and large shareholders have a positive and 
significant relationship with proportional bid-ask spread in comparison with large firms. 
Furthermore, blockholders and large shareholders have a negative and significant relationship with 
turnover ratio in comparison with large firms. These results are thus in line with previous literature 
in this area (Kini & Mian 1995; Jacoby & Zheng 2010). 
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Table 4.9 Pooled OLS Analysis for measuring the effect of firm size on the relationship between 
market liquidity and ownership level and concentration for UK firms 
Table 4.9 presents results the effect of the firm size on the relationship between market liquidity and ownership level 
and concentration for UK firms.  The table contains coefficient values and t-statistics obtained from the estimation of 
the following model. Figures reported in parentheses represent t-statistics which are based on robust standard errors, 
where ***,**,* mean significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
LIQit = α0+β1IOit+ β2INSOit+ β3BKOit+ β4LSit+ γ1MVit+ γ2Pit+ γ3VOLit+ ∑ 𝐼𝑁𝐷
𝑛
𝑖=1  +∑ 𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅
𝑛
𝑖=1 + εi 
A brief description of the ownership structure, liquidity and control variables is given below. Insider ownership (IO), 
institutional ownership (INSO), blockholders (BKO), largest shareholder (LS), proportional bid-ask spread (PBAS), 
turnover ratio (TR), price impact ratio (Pimpact), trade size (TZ), trading volume (VO), number of trades (NT), firm 
size (MV), share price (P), return volatility (VOL), industry (IND) and year (YEAR) dummies.  See Table 3.2 for 
variables’ definitions and measurements. 
 
Taken together, Table 4.9 shows that the relationship between ownership level, concentration and 
market liquidity is stronger and more significant for small firms than larger firms. Existing 
literature has stated that small firms have more information asymmetry between insider and 
outsider investors, which leads to lower market liquidity (Chiang & Venkatesh 1988; Jacoby & 
Zheng 2010; Kini & Mian 1995; Williams 1986). In contrast, large firms have a large number of 
shareholders; as a result, more investors will participate in trading. Consequently, this may dilute 
the relationship between ownership concentration and market liquidity (Amihud & Mendelson 
1986; Jacoby & Zheng 2010). 
Model  
 
Intercept IO 
 
INSO LS BKO VOL MV  P Adj.R2 
Panel A Market value of equity> 432.7 million                        number of observation 1018 
NT 
 
0.76 
(3.18)*** 
-0.10 
(-4.01)*** 
0.34 
(1.35) 
-0.05 
(-1.23) 
0.01 
(0.08) 
0.08 
(1.29) 
0.52 
(10.13)*** 
0.10 
(2.96)*** 
0.35 
PBAS 
 
-1.42 
(-10.90)*** 
0.03 
(2.18)** 
0.01 
(0.06) 
0.03 
(1.40) 
0.02 
(0.84) 
0.10 
(2.73)*** 
-0.27 
(-8.97)*** 
-0.02 
(-0.87) 
0.42 
Pimpact 
 
-1.98 
(-6.79)*** 
0.27 
(5.43)*** 
-0.69 
(-2.02)** 
-0.02 
(-0.62) 
0.07 
(1.40) 
-0.07 
(-0.92) 
-0.76 
(-11.12)*** 
0.15 
(3.44)*** 
0.42 
TZ 
 
0.01 
(0.06) 
-0.06 
(-2.09)** 
0.09 
(0.39) 
-0.05 
(-1.50) 
-0.05 
(-1.16) 
0.14 
(2.48)** 
0.02 
(0.52) 
-0.16 
(-6.11)*** 
0.37 
TR 
 
-2.37 
(-20.21)*** 
-0.01 
(-0.70) 
0.39 
(2.19)** 
-0.01 
(-0.14) 
-0.01 
-(0.18) 
0.17 
(5.04)*** 
0.01 
(0.13) 
-0.01 
(-0.78) 
0.25 
VO 0.85 
(2.78)*** 
-0.18 
(-4.73)*** 
0.51 
(1.44) 
0.03 
(0.56) 
-0.09 
(-1.44) 
0.08 
(1.20) 
0.52 
(8.78)*** 
-0.14 
(-3.31)*** 
0.30 
 
Panel B Market value of equity< 432.7 million                         number of observation 1007 
NT 
 
0.55 
(2.36)** 
-0.05 
(-1.46) 
0.42 
(1.17) 
-0.15 
(-2.42)** 
-0.15 
(-2.46)** 
-0.03 
(-0.62) 
0.15 
(3.21)*** 
0.20 
(4.76)*** 
0.27 
PBAS 
 
-0.99 
(-7.45)*** 
0.04 
(1.67)* 
-0.26 
(-1.23) 
0.10 
(3.13)*** 
0.08 
(2.57)** 
0.13 
(3.38)*** 
-0.07 
(-2.93)*** 
-0.16 
(-5.60)*** 
0.33 
Pimpact 
 
-2.80 
(-12.00)*** 
0.27 
(6.63)*** 
-0.62 
(-1.89)* 
0.08 
(1.48) 
0.10 
(1.71)* 
0.15 
(1.98)* 
-0.20 
(-4.02)*** 
0.05 
(1.09) 
0.22 
TZ 
 
0.97 
(6.07)*** 
-0.12 
(-5.19)*** 
0.05 
(0.27) 
-0.03 
(-0.83) 
-0.07 
(-1.76)* 
0.09 
(1.98)** 
-0.02 
(-1.05) 
-0.30 
(-9.34)*** 
0.39 
TR 
 
-2.73 
(-26.50)*** 
-0.05 
(-2.85)*** 
0.41 
(1.97)** 
-0.04 
(-1.24) 
-0.02 
(-0.73) 
0.11 
(2.75)*** 
0.03 
(1.63) 
0.03 
(1.43) 
0.12 
VO 
 
1.06 
(4.30)*** 
-0.22 
(-5.52)*** 
0.32 
(0.91) 
-0.22 
(-5.52)*** 
-0.23 
(-4.19)*** 
0.07 
(0.96) 
0.21 
(4.84)*** 
-0.04 
(-0.88) 
0.21 
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Inclusion of Additional Control Variables 
In the last test, this study controls for more additional variables that may affect market liquidity. 
The first variable is the research and development expenditures. This study uses a dummy variable 
to control for the existence of high technology firms where the dummy variable takes a value of 
one if the firm is from the high technology industry (has spending on research and development 
expenditures) and zero otherwise. Existing literature has documented that the research and 
development expenses can be used as a proxy of information asymmetry (Aboody & Lev 2000; 
Zeckhouser & Pound 1990). In particular, these studies state that firms that have research and 
development expenses suffer from more information asymmetry and the probability of insider 
trading from these firms is high. As a result, the study expects to have a positive relationship 
between the high technology firms and proportional bid-ask spread and Amihud (2002) illiquidity 
ratio. Moreover, this study controls for the firm age. Theoretically, firms whose stocks have been 
traded for a long time in the stock market would be more liquid as they have lower information 
asymmetry between inside and outside investors. Following Sarin et al. (2000), this study measures 
the firm age as the natural logarithm of the number of years since the firm was founded. Finally, 
this study controls for financial leverage measured as the percentage of total debt to total capital.  
 
Table 4.10 reports the results after including these variables. The results in Table 4.10 are similar to 
and consistent with the results obtained in Table 4.7. Nevertheless, it is noticeable that high 
technology firms are insignificantly positively related with proportional bid-ask spread and price 
impact illiquidity ratio. In contrast, high technology firms have a significantly negative relationship 
with the real friction of market liquidity (i.e. number of trades, trade size, turnover ratio and trading 
volume). These results are in line with previous studies in this area (Aboody & Lev 2000; 
Zeckhouser & Pound 1990). Regarding the financial leverage, as expected it is positively and 
significantly related to trading activity measures (i.e., turnover ratio, number of trades, trade size 
and trading volume) and negatively with proportional bid-ask spread and price impact ratio. This 
positive effect on market liquidity is consistent with prior empirical papers (Rubin 2007; Sarin et 
al., 2000). However, financial leverage has a negative and significant impact on proportional bid-
ask spread and price impact ratio. This negative relationship may support the argument that debt 
holders may substitute as a monitoring device (Jensen 1986; Williamson 1988). As can be seen in 
the results reported in Table 4.10, on average FTSE All-Share firms with more history in the 
market have an insignificantly negative impact on proportional bid-ask spread and price impact 
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ratio but an insignificantly positive impact on trading activity in the market (i.e. number of trades , 
trade size, turnover ratio and trading volume).  
 
Overall, it is noticeable from the results reported in Table 4.10 regarding the effect of insider and 
institutional ownership and ownership concentration on market liquidity are consistent with the 
main results reported in Table 4.7. Accordingly, this test confirms that our main results do not 
suffer from multicollinearity problems. Statistically, Brooks (2008) states that, when 
multicollinearity exists, the regression model will become very sensitive to any changes in the 
independent variables and adding or removing any variable will affect the model sharply.
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Table 4.10 Pooled OLS analysis on the relationship between ownership level and concentration and Market 
Liquidity (inclusion of other control variables- Leverage, High technology, and Firm age)  
Table 4.10 presents results of the effect of ownership level and concentration on market liquidity. The table contains 
coefficient values and t-statistics obtained from the estimation of the following model. Figures reported in parentheses 
represent t-statistics which are based on robust standard errors, where ***,**,* mean significance at the 1%, 5% and 
10% levels respectively. 
LIQit = α0+β1IOit+ β2INSOit+ β3BKOit+ β4LSit+ γ1MVit+ γ2Pit+ γ3VOLit+ γ4Levit  + γ5HTechit +  γ6FAgeit +  ∑ 𝐼𝑁𝐷
𝑛
𝑖=1  
+∑ 𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅𝑛𝑖=1 + εi……………………..(1a and 2a) 
LIQit = α0+β1IOit+ β2INSOit+ β3BKOit+ β4LSit+ γ1MVit+ γ2Pit+ γ3VOLit+ + γ4TZit + γ5NTit γ6Levit  + γ7HTechit +  γ8FAgeit + 
 ∑ 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑛𝑖=1  +∑ 𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅
𝑛
𝑖=1 + εi……………………..………………..(1b and 2b) 
A brief description of the ownership structure, market liquidity and control variables is given below. Insider ownership 
(IO), institutional ownership (INSO), blockholders (BKO), largest shareholder (LS), proportional bid-ask spread 
(PBAS), turnover ratio (TR), price impact ratio (Pimpact), trade size (TZ), trading volume (VO), number of trades 
(NT), firm size (MV), share price (P), return volatility (VOL), leverage (Lev), high technology firms (HTech), firm age 
(FAge), industry (IND) and year (YEAR)  dummies. See Table 3.2 for variables’ definitions and measurements. 
 
 
 
 PBAS 
(1a) 
PBAS 
(1b) 
Pimpact 
(2a) 
Pimpact 
(2b) 
NT TZ VO  TR 
Insider 
Ownership  
0.05 
(4.61)*** 
0.03 
(3.50)*** 
0.30 
(14.44)*** 
0.23 
(11.93)*** 
-0.10 
(-5.63)*** 
-0.09 
(-7.22)*** 
-0.23 
(-11.38)*** 
-0.03 
(-3.87)*** 
Institutional 
Ownership 
-0.10 
(-1.36) 
-0.04 
(-0.67) 
-0.35 
(-2.46)** 
-0.24 
(-1.84)* 
0.23 
(1.88)* 
0.01 
(0.18) 
0.36 
(2.67)*** 
0.21 
(3.31)*** 
Large 
Shareholder 
0.21 
(2.97)*** 
0.13 
(2.06)** 
0.27 
(2.06)** 
0.16 
(1.29) 
-0.30 
(-2.47)** 
0.06 
(0.81) 
-0.25 
(-1.96)** 
-0.16 
(-2.77)*** 
Blockholders 0.26 
(3.46)*** 
0.14 
(2.03)** 
0.20 
(1.42) 
0.04 
(0.31) 
-0.45 
(-3.45)*** 
0.15 
(1.66)* 
-0.31 
(-2.30)** 
-0.08 
(-1.34) 
Market Value  -0.22 
(-19.83)*** 
-0.12 
(-11.16)*** 
-0.48 
(-21.69)*** 
-0.32 
(-14.42)*** 
0.39 
(19.91)*** 
-0.07 
(-5.10)*** 
0.36 
(2.67)*** 
0.05 
(5.65)*** 
Volatility 0.13 
(5.35)*** 
0.12 
(5.21)*** 
0.12 
(2.41)** 
0.13 
(2.89)*** 
-0.02 
(-0.58) 
0.11 
(3.54)*** 
0.04 
(0.95) 
0.13 
(6.20)*** 
Share Price -0.10 
(-7.06)*** 
-0.03 
(-2.72)*** 
0.09 
(3.21)*** 
0.11 
(4.10)*** 
0.16 
(6.63)*** 
-0.24 
(-13.78)*** 
-0.09 
(-3.38)*** 
0.01 
(0.70) 
Lev -0.23 
(-5.03)*** 
-0.11 
(-2.90)*** 
-0.41 
(-4.76)*** 
-0.22 
(-2.77)*** 
0.44 
(5.70)*** 
0.02 
(0.44) 
0.30 
(3.64)*** 
0.21 
(5.41)*** 
FAge -0.02 
(-0.02) 
-0.01 
(-0.70) 
-0.01 
(-0.18) 
-0.01 
(-0.01) 
0.03 
(0.99) 
0.03 
(1.49) 
0.01 
(0.39) 
0.02 
(1.53) 
HTech 0.03 
(1.63) 
0.01 
(0.75) 
0.02 
(0.66) 
0.01 
(0.07) 
-0.06 
(-1.93)* 
-0.03 
(-1.25) 
-0.09 
(-2.61)*** 
-0.04 
(-2.87)*** 
Trade Size - 0.10 
(6.33)*** 
- -0.21 
(-6.52)*** 
- - - - 
Number of 
Trades 
- -0.24 
(-20.60)*** 
- -0.44 
(-18.95)*** 
- - - - 
Constant -1.13 
(-12.89)*** 
-1.06 
(-13.43)*** 
-2.31 
(-13.74)*** 
-1.92 
(-12.22)*** 
0.56 
(3.73)*** 
0.67 
(6.30)*** 
1.02 
(6.41)*** 
-2.75 
(-36.26)*** 
Industry  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.46 0.57 0.41 0.51 0.41 0.37 0.32 0.17 
Number of 
Observations 
2025 2025 2025 2025 2025 2025 2025 2025 
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Simultaneous Equations Estimation – 3SLS  
The ownership structure literature has documented that ownership variable is endogenously 
determined (Comerton-Forde & Rydge 2006; Heflin & Shaw 2000; Rubin 2007). Although this 
study follows Poon et al. (2013) and uses pooled OLS year and industry dummies in order to 
control for both heterogeneity and simultaneity, it runs the simultaneous equations (3SLS) 
following Rubin (2007). In particular, this study examines the reverse relationship between market 
liquidity, blockholders and institutional ownership. For instance, Falkenstein (1996) documents that 
institutions select large and liquid stock. Hence, market liquidity and institutional ownership may 
be simultaneously determined; that is, an institutional investor’s decision to become a shareholder 
or a blockholder may depend on the firm’s market liquidity. To deal with this concern, this study 
relies upon the work of Rubin (2007) and adds the following explanatory variables as instruments: 
volatility, leverage (long-term debt divided by market value of equity), firm age (number of years 
since the firm first appears on Datastream), and industry classification (ICBIN level 2 code). 
  
Table 4.11 presents the simultaneous equation estimation of the three-step least squares; the two-
step procedure yields similar results. To facilitate comparison with other studies, this study presents 
the most commonly used measures of liquidity, namely, the proportional bid-ask spread, price 
impact Amihud (2002) illiquidity ratio and trading volume (VO). From Table 4.11 it is noticeable 
that this study finds that institutional ownership is affected by market liquidity. As can be seen in 
specifications (2a) and (2b), there is a negative and significant relationship between the bid-ask 
spread and institutional ownership and insiginificant relationship between institutional ownership 
and price impact ratio.  Nevertheless, the opposite is true with regard to blockholders in 
specification (3a): the proportional bid-ask spread has a positive and significant effect on 
blockholdings; in addition to that, specification (3b) shows that institutional blockholdings are 
positively correlated with the price impact ratio. The rest of the results are consistent in both 
specifications: institutional ownership has a positive effect on liquidity; institutional blockholdings 
have a negative effect on market liquidity. The results are in line with the previous US studies 
(Heflin & Shaw 2000; Rubin 2007). 
   
Furthermore, this study uses the trading volume as a measure for the real friction of market 
liquidity following Jacoby & Zheng (2010) and Rubin (2007). From specifications (2c) and (3c) it 
is noticeable that trading volume is affecting institutional ownership positively. However, there is 
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an insignificantly positive relationship between trading volume and institutional ownership and 
trading volume. In contrast, there is a negative relationship between trading volume and 
blockholder. However, insiders’ holdings have a positive effect on proportional bid-ask spread and 
price impact ratio and a negative effect on trading volume. These estimates show that both 
institutional ownership level and institutional concentration have an effect on market liquidity 
(Demsetz & Lehn 1985; Denis & Sarin 1999; Gompers & Metrick 2001; Helfin & Shaw 2000). 
Overall, this study concludes that there is a simultaneous relationship between institutional 
ownership and blockholder and market liquidity (i.e., price impact ratio, bid-ask spread and trading 
volume). 
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Table 4.11 Simultaneous Equation Estimation — 3SLS  
Table 4.11 contains coefficient values and t-statistics obtained from the Simultaneous Equation Estimation of the following 
equations. Figures reported in parentheses represent t-statistics which are based on robust standard errors, where ***,**,* mean 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
 
PBASit = α0+β1IOit+ β2BKOit+ β3INSOit+ γ1MVit + γ2VOLit + γ3Pit……………………………………………………………………..…1a 
INSOit= α0+β1PBASit+ β2IOit +β3BKOit+ γ1MVit + γ2VOLit + γ3Pit……………………………………………….………………………………………………………………2a 
BKOit= α0+β1PBASit+ β2INSOit+ γ1MVit + γ2VOLit + γ3Levit+ γ4FAgeit + ∑ 𝐼𝑁𝐷
𝑛
𝑖=1 ………………………………………….…..………3a 
 
Pimpactit = α0+β1IOit+ β2BKOit+ β3INSOit+ γ1MVit + γ2VOLit + γ3Pit....................................................................................................................................................1b 
INSOit= α0+β1 Pimpactit + β2IOit +β3BKOit+ γ1MVit + γ2VOLit + γ3Pit……………………………………………………………………...2b 
BKOit= α0+β1 Pimpactit + β2INSOit+ γ1MVit + γ2VOLit + γ3Levit+ γ4FAgeit + ∑ 𝐼𝑁𝐷
𝑛
𝑖=1 ……………………………………………..…..3b 
 
VOit = α0+β1IOit+ β2BKOit+ β3INSOit+ γ1MVit + γ2VOLit + γ3Pit……………………………………..……………………………………...1c 
INSOit= α0+β1 VOit + β2IOit +β3BKOit+ γ1MVit + γ2VOLit + γ3Pit…………………………………..……………………,,,,,,,,,,,,,,.………..2c 
BKOit= α0+β1 VOit + β2INSOit+ γ1MVit + γ2VOLit + γ3Levit+ γ4FAgeit + ∑ 𝐼𝑁𝐷
𝑛
𝑖=1 ………………………………………………….…....3c 
 
A brief description of the ownership structure, market liquidity and control variables is given below. Insider ownership (IO), 
institutional ownership (INSO), blockholders (BKO), proportional bid-ask spread (PBAS), price impact ratio (Pimpact), trading 
volume (VO),  firm size (MV), share price (P), return volatility (VOL), leverage (Lev), firm age (FAge), and industry (IND) dummy. 
See Table 3.2 for variables’ definitions and measurements. 
 
 
4.6 Summary  
Ownership structure of firms has been regarded as one of the most important determinants of 
market liquidity. The academic literature indicates that insider, institutional and ownership 
concentration is highly related to market liquidity (Chiang & Venkatesh 1988; Kini & Mian 1995; 
Rubin 2007). Consequently, this study conducts an extensive investigation on the effect of the 
ownership level, concentration and market liquidity in the UK over the period 2003-2012. To 
conduct this analysis, this study employs a pooled OLS year and industry dummy analysis. 
Throughout the analysis, the study provides empirical evidence that ownership variables are 
.Dependent  PBAS 
(1a) 
    INSO 
      (2a) 
   BKO 
    (3a) 
Pimpact 
(1b) 
INSO 
(2b) 
BKO 
(3b) 
VO 
(1c) 
INSO 
(2c) 
BKO 
(3c) 
PBAS  - -0.07 
(-15.27)*** 
0.34 
(10.45)*** 
- - - - - - 
Pimpact  - - - - -0.01 
(-0.46) 
0.15 
(8.66)*** 
- - - 
VO - - - - - - - 0.01 
(0.67) 
-0.15 
(-8.34)*** 
IO  0.02 
(1.86)* 
-0.01 
(-3.65)*** 
- 0.31 
(14.59)*** 
-0.01 
(-3.87)*** 
- -0.23 
(-11.44)*** 
-0.01 
(-4.10)*** 
- 
BKO 0.15 
(10.63)*** 
-0.07 
(-21.91)*** 
- 0.21 
(8.07)*** 
-0.08 
(-26.83)*** 
- -0.19 
(-7.76)*** 
-0.08 
(-26.84)*** 
- 
INSO  -1.36 
(-15.19)*** 
- -2.92 
(-21.95)*** 
-0.03 
(-0.18) 
- -3.42 
(-26.44)*** 
0.07 
(0.48) 
- -3.43 
(-26.56)*** 
Market value  -0.22 
(-18.44)*** 
-0.02 
(-3.34)*** 
0.02 
(1.48) 
-0.50 
(-22.56)*** 
0.01 
(2.27)** 
0.02 
(1.13) 
0.39 
(18.82)*** 
0.01 
(2.26)** 
0.01 
(0.41) 
Volatility  0.03 
(1.30) 
0.01 
(2.14)** 
0.17 
(4.51)*** 
0.16 
(3.40)*** 
0.01 
(1.81)* 
0.18 
(4.69)*** 
0.05 
(1.35) 
0.01 
(1.76)* 
0.21 
(5.52)*** 
Share Price  -0.12 
(-7.72)*** 
-0.01 
(-1.45) 
- 0.09 
(3.40)*** 
0.01 
(2.21)** 
- -0.09 
(-3.48)*** 
0.01 
(2.22)** 
- 
Lev - - -0.15 
(-2.39)** 
- - -0.14 
(-2.20)** 
- - -0.15 
(-2.39)** 
FAge - - -0.09 
(-3.04)*** 
- - -0.11 
(-3.36)*** 
- - -0.11 
(-3.37)*** 
Industry 
dummy  
NO NO YES NO NO YES NO NO YES 
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endogenously determined. The choice of this estimation method, i.e., pooled OLS year and industry 
dummy, was to alleviate concerns about endogeneity and spurious inferences. Following Poon et al. 
(2013), this study includes industry fixed effects to control for time-invariant omitted industry-level 
factors that affect market liquidity. Moreover, this study also includes year effects to control for 
cross-sectional dependence; that is, market-wide factors that affect market liquidity. Furthermore, 
this study clusters the errors at the firm level in order to control for time-series dependence. 
Overall, this study concludes that applying these techniques controls for simultaneity and 
unobserved heterogeneity as well.  
 
In the main analysis, the result suggests that there is a two-sided relationship between institutional 
ownership and market liquidity. On the one hand, there is a positive relationship between 
institutional ownership and market liquidity. On the other hand, the study result concludes that 
there is a negative relationship between market liquidity and institutional concentration. Moreover, 
this study reports a negative relationship between insider ownership and market liquidity. Our 
results are in line with previous studies (Chiang & Venktaesh 1988; Comerton-Forde & Rydge 
2006; Rubin 2007). 
 
While previous studies document mixed results regarding the relationship between blockholders 
and market liquidity, it is not clear how much of the negative correlation between blockholders and 
market liquidity is due to the adverse selection effect. For instance, after this study controls for the 
real friction effect of market liquidity (i.e., trading activity), it finds that there is still a positive 
relationship between blockholders and market liquidity. Our results are not in line with the finding 
of Brockman et al. (2009), who finds that the relationship between blockholders and bid-ask spread 
becomes negative after controlling the real friction of market liquidity.  Unlike Heflin & Shaw 
(2000), Kini & Mian (1995), Brockman et al. (2009) and Jacoby & Zheng (2010) who use the ratio 
of shares held by blockholdings as the sole dimension of ownership concentration, this study uses 
also the largest shareholder (top five institutional shareholder) to measure the ownership 
concentration along with blockholders. With respect to large shareholders, this study finds that 
there is a negative relationship between them and market liquidity. Moreover, after this study 
controls for the real friction effect of market liquidity (i.e., trading activity), it finds that there is 
still a positive relationship between large shareholders and market liquidity. These results are 
robust after controlling for the firm’s size effect and adding other control variables such as research 
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and development expenses, leverage and firm age and applying different sensitivity specification 
tests. The next chapter investigates the relationship between owners’ identity and market liquidity. 
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Chapter 5 
The Impact of the Owners’ Identity on Market Liquidity  
5.1 Introduction  
 
The last two decades have witnessed that large institutional investors are perceived to be important 
players in listed ﬁrms. A vast body of research has documented that large institutional investors 
prefer to invest in ﬁrms with superior past ﬁnancial performance, lower return volatility, higher 
market liquidity, larger firms’ size, and longer listing history (e.g. Badrinath et al., 1989; 
Falkenstein 1996; Lakonishok et al., 1992). For instance, Ferreira & Matos (2008) ﬁnd that 
institutional investors prefer large and liquid stocks with good corporate governance practice, 
especially in countries where country-level investor protection and quality of institutions are weak. 
For example, in the UK Hussain (2000) ﬁnds that institutional blockholders prefer smaller ﬁrms 
and ﬁrms with lower ownership concentration.  
 
In the existing literature, several studies have concentrated on the relationship between institutional 
blockholders and market liquidity (Barabanov & McNamara 2002; Naes 2004; Poon et al., 2013). 
However, most of these studies have largely ignored the effect of the identity of institutional 
blockholders on market liquidity.  Given the rise in the size of institutional equity positions around 
the world the relationship between the identity institutional blockholders and market liquidity is a 
widely debated issue. For example, the Office of National Statistics (2012) reports that the average 
equity position owned by UK institutional investors increased from 29% in 1963 to 56.2% in 2012. 
Some scholars argue that different identities of shareholders, specifically institutional investors may 
have different incentives and costs associated with monitoring in comparison with non-institutional 
owners (Barabanov & McNamara 2002; Naes 2004). However, the results of these studies on the 
direction of causality of the relationship between the identity of institutional blockholders and 
market liquidity are mixed and inconclusive. For example, in the US Barabanov & McNamara 
(2002) conclude that independent investment advisors, investment companies and bank’s investors 
have stronger positive impact on bid-ask spread relative to insurance companies’ investors. 
However, Naes (2004) documents a negative relationship between non-financial company owners 
and bid-ask spread for a sample of companies from the Norwegian Stock Market.  
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However, some other recent studies have focused on investigating the effect of foreign ownership 
on market liquidity. For instance, Rhee & Wang (2009) find a negative relationship between 
foreign ownership and market liquidity in Indonesia. In contrast, Choi et al. (2013) find that foreign 
investors have a significant and positive impact on bid-ask spread in China. Keeping in mind, these 
contrasting results about two different countries and other gaps in relevant literature this study 
investigate this issue in the context of the UK. Therefore, in chapter 4 this study tested the impact 
of institutional blockholder on market liquidity. In chapter 5 here, it tests the effect of the identity 
of institutional blockholders and non-institutional blockholders separately on market liquidity in the 
UK. 
 
The second important issue that this study addresses is whether the identity of directors’ ownership 
affects market liquidity. In recent years, regulators have increasingly emphasised the importance of 
disclosing the ownership held by non-executive as well as executive directors. In this regard, the 
Higgs Report (2003) recommended the inclusion of more independent non-executive directors in 
companies’ boards in the UK. Previous studies test the relationship between the managerial 
ownership and market liquidity (Comerton-Forde & Rydge 2006; Heflin & Shaw 2000; Naes 
2004). Nevertheless, few studies have questioned the insiders’ identity impact on market liquidity 
and have increasingly emphasised on the importance of subdividing the directors’ ownership into 
internal and external directors or insider manager and non-manager (Fidrmuc et al., 2006; Heflin & 
Shaw 2000). Theoretically, Seyhun (1986) states that directors who are familiar with the day-to-day 
operations of the company trade on the basis of more valuable information. Therefore, this study 
first tested the relationship between market liquidity and the total directors’ ownership, in chapter 
4. Then, in chapter 5 here, this study divides the board of director’s ownership into executive and 
non-executive to assess whether a relationship exists for each group separately.  
 
This chapter thus aims to provide empirical evidence on the relationship between the owners’ 
identity and market liquidity in UK public firms. The motivation for this investigation is based 
upon the information hierarchy hypothesis’s which document that different investors have different 
ability to access the firm’s private information, which affects market liquidity. The rest of the 
chapter proceeds as follows. Section 5.2 provides information about hypothesis development. The 
descriptive statistics on owners’ identity are presented in section 5.3. Section 5.4 provides results of 
the empirical analysis for UK public firms. Section 5.5 provides information about the robustness 
check of the main results. Finally, section 5.6 concludes the chapter and provides a brief summary 
of the overall content of the chapter.    
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5.2 Hypothesis Development  
 
This section provides a detailed discussion on the formulation of the study hypotheses relevant to 
issues raised this chapter. In order to investigate the effect of owners’ identity and market liquidity 
in the UK market all these testable hypotheses have been developed and explained. The 
development of the research hypotheses are theoretically based on the trading and adverse selection 
hypotheses.    
   
5.2.1 The Separate Effects of Executive and Non-Executive directors’ Ownership on Market 
Liquidity  
 
While examining the the effect of directors’ identity on market liquidity, most studies refer to the 
information hierarchy hypothesis, which states that “those directors who are more familiar with the 
day-to-day operations of the company trade on more information that is valuable” (Fidrmuc et al., 
2006, p. 9). This study differentiates between two categories of director’s ownership: executive 
directors (the percentage of ordinary shares owned by directors who are executive), and non-
executives (the percentage of shares owned by non-executives). This study lists the insider’s 
identity in decreasing order with respect to the degree of information superiority they are assumed 
to acquire. On average, there are two types of directors of a UK firm: executive and non-executive 
directors. This study tests the information hierarchy hypothesis with market liquidity. 
 
In particular, Seyhun (1986) reveals that there is an information hierarchy hypothesis, which 
postulates that the information content of the transactions depends on the identity of the director 
who trades. According to this hypothesis, directors who are familiar with the day-to-day operations 
of the company trade on information that is more valuable. Moreover, Jeng et al. (1999 p. 32) 
question whether insiders can benefit from their information advantage: “Some insiders are more 
‘inside’ than others”.  For instance, executive directors are likely to have better information about 
the firm’s prospects than non-executive directors are. Specifically, the earlier support of the 
information hierarchy hypothesis by Seyhun (1986) and Lin & Howe (1990) may have been 
generated by transaction size. In these studies, CEOs’ trades are twice as large, on average, as those 
by other officers or directors, and larger transactions trigger stronger price reactions. 
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To the best of the author’s knowledge, only three previous studies have investigated the effect of 
directors’ identity on market liquidity. In US data, Heflin & Shaw (2000) find that the managerial 
ownership has a negative impact on market liquidity. In the same spirit, from the Norwegian equity 
market Naes (2004) documents that primary insider (board of directors and manager) has a negative 
impact on market liquidity. On the other hand, in ASE Comerton-Forde & Rydge (2006) find that 
the director holding up to 10% enhances market liquidity; they suggest that the monitoring benefits 
of inside holdings may be offset by entrenchment concerns at level of trading in the stock. Insider 
holdings greater than 10% have a negative impact on market liquidity. As a result, this study 
proposes that: 
 
Hypothesis 1a: There is a negative relationship between executive ownership and market liquidity.  
Hypothesis 1b: There is a negative relationship between non-executive ownership and market 
liquidity. 
5.2.2 Outsider Owners’ Identity and Market Liquidity 
A vast body of literature has documented that pension funds have a strong motivations to involve  
in monitoring processes (Cremers & Nair 2005; Dittmar & Mahrt-Smith 2007; Officer 2007). In 
particular, these studies document that pension fund’s shareholders utilise their strength of 
shareholder monitoring as internal corporate governance mechanism. Existing literature implies 
that firms with larger public pension fund ownership are more likely to be monitored by them, 
leading to superior performance in the future; however, this may lead to a reduction in market 
liquidity (Barber 2006; Romano 1993). 
 
Moreover, a vast body of literature has documented that pension fund ownership may have strong 
motivations to create value for their shareholders and actively monitor management (La Porta et al. 
2000). However, monitoring may come at a cost such as the extraction of private benefits. As the 
largest owner, pension companies may operate the extent of disclosure to maximise private benefits 
such as changes in the market value of shares (Makhija & Patton 2004). As blockholdings have 
been linked to higher information asymmetries, which reduces market liquidity (Ginglinger & 
Hamon 2012; Sarin et al., 2000), in the same spirit, pension fund ownership may reduce market 
liquidity. This study proposes that:  
Hypothesis 2: There is a negative relationship between the proportion of shares owned by pension 
fund companies and the market liquidity.  
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Furthermore, extant literature has documented that foreign investors have a positive impact on 
market liquidity. This is due to the fact that foreign institutional investors are perceived to be better 
traders given that they are better informed (Grinblatt & Keloharju 2004 ; Seasholes 2004); they 
monitor corporate management better than local institutions (Khanna & Palepu 2000) and  they 
produce more timely and accurate forecasts than local analysts (Bacmann & Bolliger 2001). 
Moreover, foreign investors show a preference for large firms with low insider ownership, stocks 
that are associated with lower information asymmetry (Bushee & Noe 2000; Ferreira & Matos 
2008), liquidity and international presence (Dahlquist & Robertson 2001). Therefore, foreign 
investors contribute to market liquidity. However, since they are geographically separated from the 
firm, foreign investors may get more information, interfere with the firm’s operations/business, and 
collect private information and may decrease market liquidity (Choe et al., 2005; Huang & Shiu 
2005; Seasholes 2004).  
 
However, some studies have stated that there is a positive relationship between foreign ownership 
and market liquidity (Seasholes 2004). Foreign institutions will exert pressure on firms to increase 
disclosure. Increased disclosure reduces information asymmetries between insider and outsider 
investors and increases market liquidity (Diamond & Verrachia 1991, Heflin et al., 2005). Foreign 
blockholders are linked to increase in firm investment (Cronqvist & Fahlenbrach 2008), and 
prevent earnings manipulation (Farber 2005). As a result, the actions of foreign holding companies 
will donate to a liquid market. This study proposes that: 
 
Hypothesis 3a: There is a positive relationship between the proportion of shares owned by foreign 
companies and the market liquidity.  
Hypothesis 3b: There is a negative relationship between the proportion of shares owned by foreign 
companies and the market liquidity.  
With respect to bank ownership, existing literature has stated that bank’s investors have a 
comparative advantage in access to inside information about the firm (Fama 1985; James 1987). 
Moreover, bank ownership can reduce agency costs and let investors to monitor management more 
effectively (Hoshi et al., 1990; Prowse 1990). Due to their closer participation in the day-to-day 
activities of the firm, commercial banks may have cheaper and better access than other institutional 
investors to information for monitoring the firm’s investment policy. Moreover, Gatev & Strahan 
(2006) argue that, in contrast to other institutions, banks have a unique ability to trade against 
market-wide liquidity shocks because they experience funding flows and costs that are negatively 
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related with market liquidity. This gives banks a unique ability to hedge against market-wide 
liquidity shocks. Therefore, ownership by banks could decrease the liquidity risk of stocks. In 
contrast to other institutional investors, commercial banks have funding flows that are negatively 
correlated with market liquidity. This study proposes that: 
 
Hypothesis 4: There is a negative relationship between the proportion of shares owned by 
investment banks and the market liquidity.  
Regarding government ownership, existing literature has stated that agency costs are likely to be 
high in government firms as there are no active shareholders acting as monitors. Moreover, the 
owners (citizens) have little or no corporate governance mechanisms to influence how managers 
run the firm. This suggests that the information environment of government-owned firms is more 
opaque and liquidity is thus expected to be lower (Brockman & Chung 2003). In some countries, 
the state may be a significant corporate stockholder. When the state is a major owner, it is 
especially important for the board of directors to appear to be legitimate and accountable to the 
public. This can be achieved by adding more outside directors to the board. This study proposes 
that: 
  
Hypothesis 5: There is a negative relationship between the proportion of shares owned by 
government and the market liquidity.  
With respect to free float shares, many studies have documented that there is a negative relation 
between ownership concentration and free float shares in the market. For instance, Demsetz (1968) 
states that there is a positive relationship between number of shareholders and market liquidity. 
Moreover, Holmstrom & Tirole (1993) argue that dispersed shareholders have fewer incentives for 
information production if the float on a stock is smaller. Furthermore, Bhide (1993) argues that 
large holdings by active stockholders will reduce the float of stock that is free to trade. Ginglinger 
& Hamon (2007) conclude that there is a positive relationship between free float and market 
liquidity. This study proposes that:  
 
Hypothesis 6: There is a positive relationship between the proportion of shares owned by free float 
shareholders and market liquidity.  
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With respect to employee ownership, cross- holding and other holding relationship with market 
liquidity, to the best of the author’s knowledge only a limited number of studies test this 
relationship with market liquidity (see Park 2009, for more details). However, based on the work of 
Park (2009) this study expects to find a negative relationship between  employee ownership, cross- 
holding and other holding and market liquidity.  
 
5.3. Descriptive Analysis  
 
This section presents the descriptive statistics for owners’ identity variables. Table 5.1 uses mean, 
median, standard deviation, maximum, minimum, percentiles, skewness and kurtosis values to 
describe the data over the period 2003-2012. In addition, Table 5.2 presents the breakdown of 
ownership identity variables according to the industry. The mean is provided for nine industries 
within the FTSE All-Share Index. In the last part in this section, Table 5.3 reports the mean and 
median differences for owners’ identity and market liquidity variables in large and small firms. It is 
noticeable from Table 5.1 that executive director’s ownership (EO) ranges between a minimum of 
zero to a maximum of 59.6% with an average of 7.6% and a standard deviation of 16.21% for the 
whole sample over the period. With respect to non-executive director’s ownership (NEO) the 
average of non-executive director’s ownership within the same period of study is 3.09% with a 
standard deviation of 8.9%. Our results are in line with previous UK studies (see Florackis & 
Ozkan 2009; Geiler & Renneboog 2014; Khurshed et al. 2011; Ozkan 2007 for more details).  
 
As shown in Table 5.1, after winsorisation of ownership’s identity variables, this study notices  that 
foreign ownership (NOSHFR) ranges between a minimum of zero to a maximum of 77% with an 
average of 7.5 % for the whole sample over the period. In addition, investment company ownership 
(NOSHIC) has an average of 24%, and other holding (NOSHOF) has an average of 0.83% with 
ranges between zero and 68%. With respect to pension fund holding (NOSHPF), Table 5.1 shows 
that NOSHPF has an average of 1.71% with a range of zero and 70%. However, government 
ownership (NOSHGV) has an average of 0.1% and range between zero and 26%. Regarding 
employee ownership (NOSHEM) it has an average of 12.5% and a range between zero and 99%. It 
is noticeable from Table 5.1 that cross- holding (NOSHCO) has an average of 8.6% and ranges 
between 96% and zero. These findings are consistent with the results of prior UK ownership- 
liquidity studies (Park 2009) and the cross- country studies (Ng et al. 2011). Nevertheless, to the 
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best of the author’s knowledge only two studies investigate the effect of institutional identity on 
market liquidity.  
 
Our results matched the findings of Park (2009) in UK. In contrast, Poon et al. (2013) document 
that the composition of institutional ownership in the US is different than the UK. For example, the 
investment companies hold 14% whereas in the UK 24%, other holding hold in the US 0.1% 
relative to 0.8% in the UK. These figures are in the line with the findings of (Short & Keasey 
1999). Furthermore, the descriptive statistics in Table 5.1 shows that the skewness and kurtosis’s 
figures reveal that most of the variables are not normally distributed. For instance, the data is 
considered to be normally distributed if the skewness value is ±1.96 and the kurtosis value is within 
±3 (Haniffa & Hudaib 2006). In order to overcome this problem this study transforms all the 
study’s variables by using the natural logarithm following the previous studies (Park 2009; Poon et 
al., 2013).  
 
Table 5.1 Descriptive Statistics of the whole Sample 
Table 5.1 presents the time series average of cross-sectional means, medians, standard deviations, maximum, 
minimum, percentiles, skewness and kurtosis during the sample periods from December 2002 to December 2012 for 
FTSE ALL SHARE companies.  
 
A brief description of the variables is given below.  Executive ownership (EO), non-executive ownership (NEO), free 
float holding (NOSHFF), foreign holding (NOSHFR), investment companies holding (NOSHIC), pension fund holding 
(NOSHPF), government holding (NOSHGV), employee holding (NOSHEM), cross-holding (NOSHCO) and other 
holding (NOSHOF). See Table 3.2 for variables’ definition and measurements. 
 
 
The results from the pool sample for all firm years discussed above. However, it is interesting to 
investigate the differences in owners’ identity with different characteristics among the different 
industries. Table 5.2 represents the mean of owners’ identity variables accounting for differences in 
 MEAN MEDIAN STDEV MAX MIN 25 p  75 p  Skewness Kurtosis 
EO 0.0763 0.0066 0.1621 0.596 0.0002 0.0025 0.0479 2.45 7.58 
NEO 0.0309 0.0025 0.0893 0.3976 0.0000 0.0005 0.0079 3.65 14.98 
NOSHCO 0.0866 0.01 0.1684 0.9666 0.0000 0.0025 0.0666 2.69 10.17 
NOSHEM 0.1259 0.0266 0.2063 0.9966 0.0000 0.0066 0.0966 2.01 6.48 
NOSHGV 0.0011 0.0000 0.0113 0.26 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 18.54 402.19 
NOSHIC 0.2400 0.2233 0.2264 0.9966 0.0000 0.0533 0.3500 1.14 3.84 
NOSHPF 0.0171 0.0066 0.0326 0.7050 0.0000 0.0050 0.0266 11.94 231.33 
NOSHFF 0.7195 0.7658 0.1846 0.9443 0.2529 0.55 0.885 -0.40 1.75 
NOSHOF 0.0083 0.0000 0.0604 0.6800 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 8.91 87.54 
NOSHFR 0.0754 0.0000 0.1263 0.7700 0.0000 0.0000 0.1000 2.57 10.53 
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industry sectors for all firms in the sample. In terms of executive ownership (EO), the oil and gas 
firms seem to have the largest percentage of holding (i.e. 15%) compared with those in different 
sectors (in comparison only 1% of utilities firms are found to hold executive ownership). However, 
industrial, consumer services, and telecommunication companies have similar means (i.e., 8%) and 
are close to the average of the pool sample. On the other hand, for non-executive ownership 
telecommunication firms are found the largest percentage of holding that is, around 7 % of 
telecommunication firms hold by non- executive directors, whereas 0% of the utility firms hold by 
non-executive ownership. For instance, utilities firms are found to be less compliant with the 
regulatory requirement in terms of the appointment process associated with non-executive 
ownership according to Higgs review (2003). 
 
With respect to the investment company holding (NOSHCO), Table 5.2 shows that 14% of basic 
materials firms hold by NOSHCO. In contrast, the utilities sector seems to be the least holder of 
NOSHCO with an average of 0%. It is noticeable from Table 5.2 that in terms of employee 
ownership (NOSHEM) oil and gas companies has the highest percentage of holding that is 17%. 
Whereas, the utilities firms have the lowest percentage of 1%, with respect to government 
ownership (NOSHGV), as shown in Table 5.2 all the industry has the same percentage of holding 
with an average of 0%. Regarding investment companies (NOSHIC), technology companies have 
the highest investment company ownership with an average of 32%. In contrast, utility’s firms have 
the lowest investment company ownership with an average of 15%. Finally, with respect to free 
float shares (NOSHFF), utilities firms have the higher percentage of holding with an average of 
83%.  
 
Regarding pension fund ownership (NOSHPF), consumer goods and telecommunication companies 
have the lowest pension fund ownership with an average of 0%. In contrast, all the remaining 
sectors hold 1% of pension funds. Furthermore, Table 5.2 shows that in terms of foreign ownership 
(NOSHFR) basic materials companies have the highest percentage of 13%. In contrast, the lowest 
percentage is in utilities firms with an average of 1%. Regarding other holding (NOSHOF), 
consumer goods have the highest percentage with an average percentage portion of 3% whereas 
basic materials firms holds a percentage portion of 1%.  In contrast, other remaining sectors have 
an average percentage portion of 0%.  
 
To sum up, this study finds that utilities companies have the lowest percentage of holding for EO, 
NEO, NOSHCO, NOSHCO, NOSHEM, NOSHIC, NOSHPF, NOSHFR, whereas utilities 
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companies have the higher NOSHFF in comparison with other industries, mainly the 
telecommunication, technology, basic materials and oil and gas firms. Recalling our findings from 
Chapter 4 Table 4.2, utilities companies have the lowest proportional bid-ask spread and price 
impact ratio. Nevertheless, telecommunication and technology companies have the highest Pimpact 
ratio. Moreover, technological firms have the lowest number of trades and trading volume. 
Consequently, from the above results this study strongly recommends controlling for the industry 
effect following recent studies in this area such as Poon et al. (2013). 
   
 
Figure 5.1 Insider Ownership Identities Accounting for Differences in Industry Sectors 
 
Figure 5.2 Outsider Ownership Identities Accounting for Differences in Industry Sector
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Table 5.2 Means of the owners’ identities accounting for Differences in Industry Sectors and Pool Sample of 
2003- 2012 
Table 5.2 presents the average of ownership structure variables according to the industry classification for the years 
2003 to 2012. For ownership structure, this study uses executive ownership (EO), non-executive ownership (NEO), 
free float holding (NOSHFF), foreign holding (NOSHFR), investment companies holding (NOSHIC), pension fund 
holding (NOSHPF), government holding (NOSHGV), employee holding (NOSHEM), cross-holding (NOSHCO) and 
other holding (NOSHOF). 
  
Firm Size Effect  
To study the effect of the firm size on the owners’ identity and market liquidity variables, this study 
stratifies UK firms into two size groups. The large (small) firm group includes firms with size 
above (below) the median of the market value of equity (MV) of the UK sample firms. The means, 
median and standard deviation for owners’ identity and market liquidity variables are reported in 
Table 5.3. This study implies both parametric and non-parametric test in order to test the 
differences in means and median of the above-mentioned variables between small and large UK 
firms; both the t-statistics and Wilcoxon signed-rank test are used to test the mean and median 
differences respectively. Table 5.3 reports that on average small UK firms have a lower number of 
trades, trade size, turnover ratio, and sterling pound trading volume relative to the large UK firms. 
Nevertheless, it is noticeable from Table 5.3 that small UK firms have the higher proportional bid- 
ask spread (PBAS) and price impact Amihud (2002) illiquidity ratio (Pimpact) in comparison with 
the large UK firms. All the figures are significant at (1% level). With respect to the owners’ 
identity variables, small UK firms have higher executive and non-executive ownership in 
comparison with large UK firms. These finding are in line with previous studies (Jacoby & Zheng 
2010; Kini & Mian 1995; Williams 1986). These studies document that small firms have more 
information asymmetry between firms and market than large firms. Existing literature has 
documented that the relationship between insider ownership (executive and non-executive 
Industry EO NEO NOSHCO NOSHEM NOSHIC NOSHPF NOSHFF NOSHFR NOSHGV NOSHOF 
Basic Materials 0.13 0.03 0.14 0.15 0.16 0.01 0.66 0.13 0.00 0.01 
Consumer Goods 0.07 0.01 0.10 0.09 0.23 0.01 0.71 0.05 0.00 0.03 
Consumer Services 0.08 0.04  0.05 0.15 0.20 0.00 0.70 0.08 0.00 0.00 
Health Care  0.05 0.01 0.13 0.09 0.27 0.01 0.77 0.06 0.00 0.00 
Industrial  0.08 0.02 0.10 0.12 0.24 0.01 0.77 0.06 0.00 0.00 
Oil & Gas  0.15 0.02 0.12 0.17 0.21 0.01 0.71 0.08 0.00 0.00 
Technology  0.03 0.04 0.07 0.16 0.32 0.01 0.71 0.07 0.00 0.00 
Telecommunication 0.08 0.07 0.06 0.16 0.22 0.00 0.71 0.08 0.00 0.00 
Utilities  0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.15 0.01 0.83 0.01 0.00 0.00 
pool  0.07 0.03 0.07 0.11 0.24 0.01 0.71 0.07 0.00 0.00 
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ownership) and quoted bid-ask spread is more significant and stronger than for large firms. 
Specifically, smaller firms have  a smaller number of insiders, which gives them more ability to 
access private information about a firm’s prospect than outside investors (i.e., institutional 
investors), which leads to lower market liquidity (Jacoby & Zheng 2010; Kini & Mian 1995). 
Nevertheless, as shown in Table 5.3, larger UK firms have more float shares (NOSHFF) than small 
firms. This is in line with previous studies (Chiang & Venkatesh 1988; Jacoby & Zheng 2010; Kini 
& Mian 1995; Tinic 1972). These studies have stated that larger firms are more dispersed; in other 
words, they have more shareholders. In particular, these studies conclude that, when the ownership 
is held by outsider shareholders, this will increase the probability that more investors will 
participate in the trading operation in the capital market; this leads to an increase in the market 
liquidity. However, with respect to the identity of institutional investors, it is noticeable from Table 
5.3 that small firms have more cross-holding (NOSHCO), employee holding (NOSHEM), 
investment company holding (NOSHIC), and pension fund holding (NOSHPF). In contrast, larger 
firms have more government ownership (NOSHGV), foreign companies (NOSHFR), and other 
holdings (i.e., endowment and education institutions) (NOSHOF) relative to small firms. As a 
result, Table 5.3 shows that the government ownership and foreign investors prefer to invest in 
larger firms that have lower information asymmetry and higher market liquidity. Our  results are in 
line with previous UK studies (Park 2009)  
Overall, this study notices from Table 5.3 that small firms have more executive and non-executive 
ownership, which leads to more total liquidity costs (i.e., proportional bid-ask spread and price 
impact ratio) and lower real friction of market liquidity (i.e., turnover ratio, number of trades, trade 
size and trading volume) in comparison with large firms. Moreover, recent studies have suggested 
the firm’s size effect as a robustness and consistency test to detect if the firm’s size has an effect on 
the relationship between ownership structure and market liquidity (see Jacoby & Zheng 2010; Kini 
& Mian 1995). This study notices from Table 5.3 that the firm’s size has on average a strong and 
significant effect (at 1% significant level) on both market liquidity and owners’ identity variables.  
Consequently, the study tests the effect of firm size on the relationship between owners’ identity 
and market liquidity as a further test to check the consistency of the results of firm’s size effect 
with the main results, as we will see later in this chapter.      
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Table 5.3 Descriptive Statistics of Large and Small Firms 
 
Table 5.3 presents the mean and median differences of executive ownership (EO), non-executive ownership (NEO), 
free float holding (NOSHFF), foreign holding (NOSHFR), investment company holding (NOSHIC), pension fund 
holding (NOSHPF), government holding (NOSHGV), employee holding (NOSHEM), cross-holding (NOSHCO), other 
holding (NOSHOF), proportional bid-ask spread (PBAS), turnover ratio (TR), price impact ratio (Pimpact), trade size 
(TZ), trading volume (VO), and number of trades (NT). Firms are sorted according to the market value: firms above the 
median of market value are classified as large and those below the median are classified as small. See Table 3.2 for 
variables’ definition and measurements. 
***,**,* represent significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
Correlation Matrix 
This section presents and discusses the Pairwise correlations among the owners’ identity, market 
liquidity proxies and control variables. The correlation coefficients are tested for the existence of 
high collinearity among independent variables. The term collinearity indicates that two predictors 
have a near perfect linear relationship. The importance of detecting such a problem is that the 
regression model estimates of the coefficients become unstable as the level of multicollinearity 
increases. Statistically, it is suggested that multicollinearity may damage or threaten the regression 
analysis if the degree of correlation exceeds 80% (Gujarati 2003; Hair et al., 1998). Therefore, this 
percentage is adopted as the threshold in this study to detect the presence of the problem of 
multicollinearity in the residuals.  
 
It is noticeable from Table 5.4 that most of the correlation coefficients between the study’s 
variables are low but there are still some relatively high correlations between some of those 
                                                    Large Firms                                           Small Firms 
Variables   
Mean 
 
 
Median  
 
Standard 
deviation  
 
Mean 
 
Median 
 
Standard 
deviation  
 
t-statistics 
 
Wilcoxon 
signed-
rank test 
VO 3899.48 793.09 7376.39 988.88 255.65 2912.67 12.04*** 16.35*** 
PBAS  0.0072 0.0037 0.0147 0.0263 0.0208 0.0265 -20.31*** -19.53*** 
NT 1090.49 444.98 1640.31 252.37 45.68 575.69 15.69*** 17.75*** 
TR 0.0080 0.0050 0.0125 0.0063 0.0039 0.0102 3.52*** 7.22*** 
TZ 3.962 2.336 7.221 8.55 3.84 18.63 -7.33*** -10.04*** 
PIMPACT 0.0001 5.74e-06 0.0002 0.0003 0.0001 0.0007 -9.83*** -18.64*** 
EO 0.0649 0.0059 0.1525 0.0868 0.0076 0.1689 -3.09*** -3.70*** 
NEO 0.0262 0.0020 0.0848 0.0356 0.0034 0.0939 -2.70*** -5.75*** 
NOSHCO 0.0782 0.0096 0.1499 0.0956 0.02 0.1853 -2.76*** -2.75*** 
NOSHEM 0.1032 0.02 0.1803 0.1467 0.0333 0.2264 -4.99*** -3.83*** 
NOSHGV 0.0015 0.0000 0.0149 0.0001 0.0000 0.0060 1.52 -4.10*** 
NOSHIC 0.2202 0.0946 0.2289 0.2600 0.2435 0.2233 -4.17*** -4.46*** 
NOSHPF 0.0142 0.0058 0.0186 0.0203 0.0075 0.0428 -2.46** 0.57 
NOSHFF 0.7514 0.8229 0.1843 0.6892 0.7062 0.1798 7.53*** 7.31*** 
NOSHFR 0.0756 0.0100 0.1226 0.0752 0.0000 0.1301 0.12 1.33 
NOSHOF 0.0097 0.0000 0.0634 0.0069 0.0000 0.0574 1.06 2.02** 
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variables. The correlation coefficient can be explained as follows. From Table 5.4 it is noticeable 
that the highest correlation, compared with other variables, is found between the proportional bid-
ask spread (PBAS) and number of trades (NT), which is (-0.63), PBAS and market value (MV) is (-
0.50), price impact ratio (PIMPACT) and NT is (-0.53), PIMPACT and MV is (-0.53) and NT and 
MV is (0.52). However, our models do not suffer from multicollinearity. According to Brooks 
(2008), when the correlation coefficient between the variables is high, it could indicate near 
multicollinearity. This near multicollinearity will make the standard error of the variables high, 
which will make those variables insignificant. Another problem with multicollinearity is that the 
regression model will become very sensitive to any changes in the independent variables and 
adding or removing any variable will affect the model sharply. So, the coefficient and the 
significance of the other variable will be changed if we add or drop any variable to or from the 
model. That will make the parameter estimates very wide and lead to inappropriate conclusions. 
However, Brooks (2008) suggests a number of solutions to the problem; the first solution is to 
ignore it, especially if the variables’ coefficients have the correct sign and magnitude value. The 
second solution is to drop one of the collinear variables; unfortunately, sometimes the variables 
with high correlations are important for explaining the dependent variable, so this study cannot 
drop any of them. The third solution is to transform the highly correlated variables into a ratio; this 
may be unacceptable, especially as the theory suggests that the relationship should be a certain 
nature that does not include the variable as a ratio.  
 
Nevertheless, in order to detect the problem of multicollinearity in the esimations this study 
calculates the variance inflation factor (VIF) test, where the variance factors of each variable is 
calculated. Under the guidelines of this test, the existence of multicollinearity can be confirmed 
only in circumstances where the value of the variance inflation factor is more than 10. Both the VIF 
test and the pairwise rank correlation confirm that there is no intercorrelation among the study’s 
independent variables in our models.  Moreover, this study also estimates robust standard error to 
control for serial correlation and heteroscedasticity using the option “Robust” in STATA 11. 
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Table 5.4 Correlation Matrix for the Research Variables 
This 5.4 presents correlations between the variables used in the study. A brief description of all the variables is given below. Executive ownership (EO), non-executive ownership 
(NEO), free float holding (NOSHFF), foreign holding (NOSHFR), investment company holding (NOSHIC), pension fund holding (NOSHPF), government holding (NOSHGV), 
employee holding (NOSHEM), cross-holding (NOSHCO), other holding (NOSHOF), proportional bid-ask spread (PBAS), turnover ratio (TR), price impact ratio (Pimpact), trade 
size (TZ), trading volume (VO), and number of trades (NT). See Table 3.2 for variables’ definitions and measurements. 
 
*Represent significance at 5% level or better. 
 NOSHCO NOSHEM NOSHGV NOSHIC NOSHPF NOSHFF NOSHFR NOSHOF EO NEO PBAS PIMPACT NT TR TZ VO MV VOL p 
NOSHCO 1.00                   
NOSHEM 0.22* 1.00                  
NOSHGV 0.02 -0.05* 1.00                 
NOSHIC -0.06* -0.08* 0.02 1.00                
NOSHPF 0.02 -0.02 0.09* 0.22* 1.00               
NOSHFF -0.17* -0.29* 0.05* -0.17* 0.03* 1.00              
NOSHFR 0.14* 0.03* 0.05* 0.06* 0.05* -0.14* 1.00             
NOSHOF 0.08* 0.06* 0.01 -0.09* 0.02 -0.15* 0.09* 1.00            
EO -0.01 0.15* -0.04* -0.01 -0.06* -0.10* -0.03 0.05* 1.00           
NEO 0.02 0.11* -0.12* 0.01 -0.06* -0.09* 0.00 0.05* 0.30* 1.00          
PBAS 0.04 0.13* -0.16* 0.16* -0.01* -0.35* -0.04* 0.04 0.05* 0.21* 1.00         
Pimpact  0.04* 0.14* -0.14* 0.07* -0.01* -0.20* -0.02 -0.02 0.28* 0.35* 0.48* 1.00        
NT -0.05* -0.14* 0.15* -0.16* 0.01 0.34* -0.05* 0.03 -0.12* -0.21* -0.63* -0.53* 1.00       
TR -0.07* -0.07* 0.09* 0.04* -0.02 0.03* -0.03* -0.02 -0.09* -0.14* -0.17* -0.35* 0.25* 1.00      
TZ 0.05* 0.06* -0.05* 0.11* -0.00 -0.27* -0.03* -0.02 -0.18* -0.09* 0.42* -0.03* -0.38* 0.06* 1.00     
VO -0.03 -0.10* 0.09* -0.08* -0.01 0.18* 0.01 0.06* -0.21* -0.30* -0.40* -0.64* 0.48* 0.34* 0.05* 1.00    
MV -0.05 -0.13* 0.09* -0.13* 0.05* 0.23* 0.01 0.06* -0.06* -0.16* -0.50* -0.53* 0.52* 0.16* -0.22* 0.45* 1.00   
VOL 0.09* 0.12* -0.05* 0.02 -0.08* -0.13* 0.06* -0.05* -0.02 0.07* 0.22* 0.24* -0.16* 0.03 0.05* -0.15* -0.30* 1.00  
P -0.06* -0.08* -0.00 -0.07* -0.00 0.13* -0.01 0.05* 0.16* 0.10* -0.28* -0.05* 0.27* 0.04* -0.41* 0.01 0.28* -0.21* 1.00 
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5.4 Empirical Results and Analysis 
The Effect of the Owners’ Identity on Market Liquidity  
This study conducts several method of estimation in order to measure the relationship between 
owners’ identity and market liquidity such as untabulated results of fixed and random regression. 
Unlike other previous studies, this study follows Poon et al. (2013), and employs pooled OLS 
dummy industry and year in order to control for endogeneity and time invariant problems. The 
following model is used to examine this relationship: 
LIQit=α0+β1EOit+β2NEOit+β3NOHFFit+β4NOSHICit+β5NOSHOFit+β6NOSHPFit+β7NOSGVit+β8NOSHEMit
+β9NOSHCOit+β10NOSHFRit+γ1MVit+γ2Pit+γ3VOLit+∑ 𝐼𝑁𝐷
𝑛
𝑖=1 + ∑ 𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅
𝑛
𝑖=1 + εi...……..………………..(5.1) 
Where LIQ is market liquidity, EO is the executive ownership, NEO is the non-executive 
ownership, NOSHFF is free float shares, NOSHIC investment company ownership, NOSHPF 
pension fund ownership, NOSHGV government ownership, NOSHEM employee ownership, 
NOSHCO cross-holding ownership, NOSHFR foreign ownership, NOSHOF other holding, MV is 
market value, P is shares price, VOL is volatility, and IND and YEAR is the industry and year 
dummies respectively.   
Table 5.5 presents our pooled ordinary least squares (OLS) regression results on the relationship 
between market liquidity and owners’ identity. To alleviate concerns about endogeneity and 
spurious inferences, this study includes in all pooled-sample regressions the control variables that 
the literature identifies as important determinants of market liquidity. All model specifications 
include industry and time-fixed effects to control for time-invariant omitted industry-level factors 
that affect market liquidity following Poon et al. (2013). The pooled OLS regression analysis 
includes several regression models, each with different market liquidity measures as a dependent 
variable, and the identity ownership variables and the control variables as independent variables. 
All regression models are estimated with pooled OLS.  
 
The study finds evidence that the proportion of shares owned by the executive board of directors 
(EO) affects the level of market liquidity. This is consistent with H1a, which predicts that EO is 
negatively related to the level of market liquidity. In contrast, the analysis of total costs and real 
friction of market liquidity produces interesting findings. EO ownership is found to significantly 
increase the proportional bid-ask spread (PBAS) and price impact ratio (PIMPACT) at 1% 
significance levels. More importantly, this study finds that EO with greater ownership in their firms 
 144 
 
have private information that affects the market liquidity inversely, after this study controls for the 
well-known trading activity measures such as number of trades and trade size, which implies that 
EOs influence the information friction of market liquidity positively. As a result, the results provide 
strong support to the adverse selection hypothesis that EO ownership increases the bid-ask spread 
and price impact ratio, which inversely affect the market liquidity (Heflin & Shaw 2000). On the 
other hand, one can interpret this result under the trading hypothesis, which argues that EOs trade 
less in contrast with outside investors (i.e., institutional). That is, an increase in EO ownership leads 
to a decrease in his/her motivation, which enhances the firm’s value, which leads to a decrease in 
market liquidity. Our findings are in line with Coffee (1991), Comerton-Forde & Rydge (2006), 
Heflin & Shaw (2000) and Rubin (2007). 
 
With respect to real friction of market liquidity (i.e. trading activity measures), the findings are 
consistent with the trading hypothesis which suggests that EO owners trade less in their private 
information. In addition, it is consistent with the perspective that argues that EO negatively affects 
the trading activity of the firms and as a result decreases market liquidity. Specifically, EO reduces 
the number of trades, trade size, trading volume and turnover ratio (trading activity measures) at 
1% significance level. Our findings are in line with prior studies (Heflin & Shaw 2000; Rubin 
2007; Sarin et al., 2000). 
 
The results for non-executive ownership (NEO) provide strong evidence to H1b, which states that 
the NEO has a negative impact on market liquidity. This study finds that NEO is significantly 
positively related to PBAS and PIMPACT at 1% significance level. Furthermore, the findings show 
that the relationship between the NEO and real friction of market liquidity (i.e., trading activity 
measures) is negative and significant at 1% level. Accordingly, the results support the adverse 
selection hypothesis which suggests that NEO plays a significant role in motivating the chairman of 
the board of directors to monitor management and eventually reduce agency costs (Shivdasani 
1993; Vafeas 2003b). That is, NEO with a higher proportion of the firm’s outstanding shares is 
found to effectively represent shareholders and thus monitor management to protect and maximise 
their own wealth. Moreover, with respect to real friction of market liquidity, NEO with greater 
ownership reduces the trading activity that reduced market liquidity. Therefore, consistent with the 
trading hypothesis, NEO is assumed to mitigate the agency problem through aligning the 
supervisory board’s interests with those of shareholders and controlling the management; however, 
this leads to lower market liquidity.  
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Consequently, firms that are chaired by non-executive directors are suggested to reduce the conflict 
of interest between managers and shareholders by providing their firms with higher levels of 
monitoring and governance quality but this will reduce the level of liquidity in the market. Our 
results are in line with Heflin & Shaw (2000). 
 
With respect to the outsider ownership identities, consistent with hypothesis H2, which states that 
there is a negative relationship between pension fund ownership (NOSHPF) and market liquidity, it 
is found that the NOSHPF is positively and significantly associated with PBAS and PIMPACT. 
These results indicate that the NOSHPF has an adverse impact on market liquidity. These findings 
imply that large pension fund ownership plays a stronger role in monitoring management through 
decreasing market liquidity. Moreover, this study finds evidence that NOSHPF decreases real 
friction of market liquidity through decreasing trading activity measures (i.e. number of trades, 
trade size, turnover ratio and trading volume). Our results are in line with existing literature that has 
documented that pension fund has a strong incentive to engage in investor activism (Cremers & 
Nair 2005; Dittmar & Mahrt-Smith 2007; Officer 2007). These studies suggest that public pension 
fund activism destroys firm value because of the agency problems between fund managers and 
members that leads to lower market liquidity.  
 
According to the adverse selection and trading hypothesis, this study hypothesised that the foreign 
ownership decreases market liquidity. The results of the analysis are consistent with this argument. 
More interestingly, this study finds that foreign ownership increases proportional bid-ask spread 
and price impact ratio, while the foreign ownership has a negative impact on real friction of market 
liquidity such as number of trades, trade size, turnover ratio and trading volume, which leads us to 
accept H3b; that there is a negative relationship between foreign ownership and market liquidity. 
Thus, these findings are consistent with the adverse selection hypothesis that foreign institutions are 
less likely to have a positive impact on market liquidity. This is due to the fact that foreign 
institutional investors are perceived to be better traders given that they are better informed 
(Grinblatt & Keloharju 2000 ; Seasholes 2004); they monitor corporate management better than 
local institutions (Khanna & Palepu 2000); and  they produce more timely and accurate forecasts 
than local analysts (Bacmann & Bolliger 2001).  
 
With respect to investment banks (NOSHIC), this study’s results show that there is a negative and 
significant relationship between investment banks’ ownership and market liquidity; this leads us to 
accept H4,which states that there is a negative relationship between investment banks’ ownership 
 146 
 
and market liquidity. In particular, this study finds that there is a positive relationship between 
NOSHIC and PIMPACT and PBAS and a negative relationship between NOSHIC and real friction 
of market liquidity (i.e., trading volume, number of trades, trade size, and turnover ratio). Our 
results are in line with previous studies (Barabanov & McNamara 2002; Fehle 2004; Syamala et al., 
2014). Regarding government ownership (NOSHGV), our results find that there is a positive 
impact between NOSHGV and proportional bid-ask spread and price impact ratio and negative 
impact of real friction of market liquidity (i.e., trading activity measures). However, with respect to 
trading volume, this study reports an insignificantly positive relationship between government 
ownership and trading volume.  This leads me to accept hypothesis H5. These findings are findings 
are in line with Brockman & Chung (2003).                                                                           
 
Finally, with respect to the free float shares, to the author’ knowledge few studies in the ownership-
liquidity relationship take into consideration the free float as one of the determinants of market 
liquidity. Our results in Table 5.5 reveal that there is a positive relationship between market 
liquidity and free float shares (NOSHFF). More specifically, the results suggest there is a negative 
relationship between PBAS and PIMPACT and positive impact of NOSHFF on real friction of 
market liquidity. However, with respect to trading volume, this study reports an insignificantly 
positive relationship between free float shares and trading volume. This finding leads us to accept 
hypothesis H6, which states there is a positive relationship between free float share and market 
liquidity. This is again in line with Amihud et al. (1999), Bhide (1993), Holmstrom & Tirole (1993) 
and Zheng & Li (2008).      
 
Regarding cross-holdings and other holdings this study reports insignificantly positive relationship 
between cross-holdings and other holdings and the proportional bid-ask spread. Moreover, Table 
5.5 shows an insignificantly negative relationship between cross-holdings and number of trades and 
trade size. With respect to employee ownership, the results show an insignificantly positive 
relationship with proportional bid-ask spread and price impact ratio and insignificantly negative 
relationship with number of trades and trading volume. This study thus reports a marginally 
negative relationship between cross-holdings, other holdings and employee ownership and market 
liquidity.  These results are thus inconsistent with the result reported in Park (2009). The 
differences in findings of the two studies may be due to differences in the time-periods, sample size 
and market environment of this study, as compared to that of Park (2009). 
. 
 147 
 
 
Regarding control variables, this study finds a positive and significant relationship between 
volatility and information friction measures (proportional bid-ask spread and price impact ratio). 
This positive relationship is common in the literature, where firms with higher volatility are 
exposed to higher uncertainty and information asymmetry (Black 1986; French & Roll 1986). The 
results also suggest a negative and insignificant relationship between volatility and real friction 
measures (trading volume, trade size, number of trades and turnover ratio). These results are in line 
with previous literature (Poon et al., 2013; Rubin 2007). 
 
The coefficient of firm size is negative and significant with information friction of market liquidity 
(proportional bid-ask spread and price impact ratio) in the FTSE All-Share sample. The negative 
relationship confirms that larger firms have lower information asymmetry and higher liquidity 
because they are more able to diversify risk and have quick and greater access to the capital market. 
Moreover, those large firms can deal with unpredicted liquidity problems in a more effective and 
flexible way than smaller firms can (Konishi & Yasuda 2004). This result is in line with previous 
studies that have documented similar correlations between firm size and market liquidity (Heflin & 
Shaw 2000; Kini & Mian 1995). Moreover, Table 4.7 indicates that the share price has a significant 
effect on market liquidity. Under the pooled OLS estimation the positive relationship is consistent 
with the trading hypothesis. For instance, Adams et al. (2005) report a positive and significant 
relationship between share price and market liquidity.  
 
One of the most common tests used to check for the multicollinearity problem is called the variance 
inflation factor (VIF), which is calculated as follows:  
 
𝑽𝑰𝑭 =
𝟏
𝒕𝒐𝒍𝒆𝒓𝒂𝒏𝒄𝒆
………………………………………………………………..…………….………….. (5.2)   
Where: 
Tolerance = 1-R
2
 
R
2
 = is the coefficient of determination  
The results of VIF tests indicate the multicollinearity is not a problem in our dataset. From Table 
5.6 it is clear that all values are less than 10. Moreover, the average VIF is 1.15 without controlling 
for the trading activity measures (i.e., number of trades and trade size) and 1.23 when we controlled 
them. Consequently, these values confirm that our dataset is free from multicollinearity problems.
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Table 5.5 Pooled OLS Analysis for the Effect of Owners’ Identity on Market Liquidity  
Table 5.5 presents results of the effect of ownership level and concentration on market liquidity. The table contains 
coefficient values and t-statistics obtained from the estimation of the following model. Figures reported in parentheses 
represent t-statistics which are based on robust standard errors, where ***,**,* mean significance at the 1%, 5% and 
10% levels respectively. 
LIQit=α0+β1EOit+β2NEOit+β3NOHFFit+β4NOSHICit+β5NOSHOFit+β6NOSHPFit+β7NOSGVit+β8NOSHEMit+β9NOSH
COit+β10NOSHFRit+γ1MVit+γ2Pit+γ3VOLit +  ∑ 𝐼𝑁𝐷
𝑛
𝑖=1  +∑ 𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅
𝑛
𝑖=1 + εi………………………………………………(1a and 2a) 
LIQit=α0+β1EOit+β2NEOit+β3NOHFFit+β4NOSHICit+β5NOSHOFit+β6NOSHPFit+β7NOSGVit+β8NOSHEMit+β9NOSH
COit+β10NOSHFRit+γ1MVit+γ2Pit+γ3VOLit + γ4TZit + + γ5NTit +  ∑ 𝐼𝑁𝐷
𝑛
𝑖=1  +∑ 𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅
𝑛
𝑖=1 + εi……………(1band 2b) 
A brief description of the ownership structure, market liquidity and control variables is given below. Executive 
ownership (EO), non-executive ownership (NEO), free float holding (NOSHFF), foreign holding (NOSHFR), 
investment company holding (NOSHIC), pension fund holding (NOSHPF), government holding (NOSHGV), 
employee holding (NOSHEM), cross-holding (NOSHCO), other holding (NOSHOF), proportional bid-ask spread 
(PBAS), turnover ratio (TR), price impact ratio (Pimpact), trade size (TZ), trading volume (VO), number of trades 
(NT), firm size (MV), share price (P), return volatility (VOL), Industry (IND) and Year (YEAR) dummies. The t-
statistics are reported in parentheses. See Table 3.2 for variables’ definitions and measurements. 
 
 
 PBAS 
(1a) 
PBAS 
(1b) 
Pimpact 
(2a) 
Pimpact 
(2b) 
NT TZ VO  TR 
EO 0.04 
(3.91)*** 
0.03 
(3.01)*** 
0.30 
(14.75)*** 
0.22 
(11.47)*** 
-0.07 
(-4.14)*** 
-0.12 
(-10.18)*** 
-0.15 
(-8.11)*** 
-0.10 
(-8.90)*** 
NEO 0.11 
(10.79)*** 
0.09 
(10.09)*** 
0.30 
(14.78)*** 
0.23 
(12.22)*** 
-0.08 
(-4.71)*** 
-0.08 
(-6.96)*** 
-0.21 
(-11.52)*** 
-0.07 
(-6.30)*** 
NOSHCO 0.01 
(0.02) 
0.01 
(0.03) 
0.07 
(3.41)*** 
0.06 
(3.46)*** 
-0.01 
(-0.04) 
-0.01 
(-1.02) 
-0.05 
(-2.85)*** 
-0.05 
(-4.37)*** 
NOSHEM 0.01 
(0.16) 
0.01 
(0.99) 
0.02 
(1.06) 
0.02 
(0.91) 
-0.02 
(-1.25) 
-0.04 
(-2.99)*** 
-0.01 
(-0.29) 
-0.03 
(-3.11)*** 
NOSHGV 0.04 
(4.08)*** 
0.02 
(2.33)** 
0.06 
(3.78)*** 
0.04 
(2.82)*** 
-0.06 
(-4.35)*** 
-0.02 
(-1.98)** 
-0.05 
(-1.25) 
-0.02 
(-2.18)** 
NOSHIC 0.07 
(3.48)*** 
0.04 
(2.44)** 
0.16 
(4.10)*** 
0.08 
(2.31)** 
-0.11 
(-3.40)*** 
-0.06 
(-2.90)*** 
-0.09 
(-2.58)*** 
-0.14 
(-6.81)*** 
NOSHPF 0.06 
(4.27)*** 
0.03 
(2.29)** 
0.07 
(2.64)*** 
0.04 
(1.86)* 
-0.10 
(-4.62)*** 
-0.06 
(-3.57)*** 
-0.07 
(-3.15)*** 
-0.06 
(-4.09)*** 
NOSHFR 0.09 
(3.88)*** 
0.08 
(4.26)*** 
0.21 
(4.90)*** 
0.15 
(3.79)*** 
-0.03 
(-1.81)* 
-0.12 
(-4.80)*** 
-0.09 
(-2.28)** 
-0.27 
(-11.43)*** 
NOSHOF 0.02 
(0.46) 
0.01 
(0.37) 
0.10 
(1.28) 
0.07 
(1.03) 
-0.10 
(-1.65)* 
-0.05 
(-1.25) 
-0.16 
(-2.29)** 
-0.03 
(-0.89) 
NOSHFF -0.03 
(-1.37) 
-0.24 
(-3.13)*** 
-0.67 
(-3.98)*** 
-0.74 
(-4.70)*** 
0.88 
(6.26)*** 
0.87 
(8.53)*** 
0.18 
(1.18) 
1.90 
(20.42)*** 
Market 
Value  
-0.24 
(-21.98)*** 
-0.14 
(-12.98)*** 
-0.55 
(-24.31)*** 
-0.38 
(-17.00)*** 
0.39 
(21.07)*** 
-0.04 
(-3.09)*** 
0.40 
(19.68)*** 
0.01 
(0.61) 
Volatility 0.21 
(8.66)*** 
0.20 
(9.26)*** 
0.34 
(6.92)*** 
0.34 
(7.48)*** 
-0.03 
(-0.74) 
0.02 
(0.79) 
-0.06 
(-1.36) 
-0.34 
(-12.57)*** 
Share Price -0.18 
(-13.62)*** 
-0.12 
(9.65)*** 
-0.12 
(-4.30)*** 
-0.09 
(-3.61)*** 
0.21 
(9.14)*** 
-0.18 
(-11.17)*** 
0.01 
(0.39) 
0.15 
(10.50)*** 
Trade Size - 0.05 
(3.29)*** 
- -0.38 
(-11.92)*** 
- - - - 
Number of 
Trades 
- -0.25 
(-22.27)*** 
- -0.46 
(-19.46)*** 
- - - - 
Constant -0.26 
(-5.73)*** 
-0.17 
(-4.20)*** 
-0.08 
(-0.95) 
-0.02 
(-0.20) 
0.30 
(4.05)*** 
-0.18 
(-3.32)*** 
0.05 
(0.73) 
-0.35 
(-1.23) 
Industry  Yes yes Yes yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year  Yes yes Yes yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.74 0.79 0.75 0.79 0.58 0.35 0.58 0.65 
Number of 
Observations  
2260 2260 2260 2260 2260 2260 2260 2260 
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Table 5.6 Variance Inflation Factors (VIFs) Test  
Table 5.6 presents an overview of the maximum variance inflation factors (VIFs) test for all independent variables 
reported in Table 5.5. The reported VIFs are the maximum VIFs obtained from the regression analyses in STATA 11.  
 
5.5 Further Analysis and Robustness Checks  
Small Firm versus Large Firm Sample Results   
 
By examining the impact of the owners’ identity and firm size on market liquidity, our analysis can 
also shed some light on the widely documented firm-size anomaly in the literature. This study 
divides the data into small and large firms based on their market value of equity and re-examine the 
relationship between owners’ identity and market liquidity. In fact, this check allows us to 
determine whether the nature of the relationship between market liquidity and owners’ identity is 
different between small and large firms. Small (large) firms are defined as firms that have a market 
value of equity smaller (equal to or greater) than the median market value of equity of million for 
the entire sample of 226 firms. In Table 5.7 Panels A and B, this study reports the pooled OLS year 
and industry dummies results for large and small firms respectively. 
   
With respect to insider ownership identity, Table 5.7 Panels A and B reveals that the effect of 
executive and non-executive ownership on proportional bid-ask spread (PBAS) and price impact 
ratio (Pimpact) is stronger and significant for small firms than larger firms. For instance, executive 
ownership (EO) has a stronger negative and significant effect on trade size (TZ) and trading 
volume (VO) in comparison with large firms. As shown in Table 5.7 Panels A and B, non-
executive ownership (NEO) appears to have a positive and significant effect on PBAS for small 
                                         Variance Inflation Factors  (VIF) Test  
EO 1.18 1.22 1.18 1.22 1.22 1.22 1.22 1.22 
NEO 1.16 1.18 1.16 1.18 1.18 1.18 1.18 1.18 
NOSHCO 1.12 1.12 1.12 1.12 1.12 1.12 1.12 1.12 
NOSHEM 1.14 1.15 1.14 1.15 1.15 1.15 1.15 1.15 
NOSHGV 1.09 1.10 1.09 1.10 1.10 1.10 1.10 1.10 
NOSHIC 1.07 1.08 1.07 1.08 1.08 1.08 1.08 1.08 
NOSHPF 1.28 1.28 1.28 1.28 1.28 1.28 1.28 1.28 
NOSHFR 1.16 1.16 1.16 1.16 1.16 1.16 1.16 1.16 
NOSHOF 1.10 1.11 1.10 1.11 1.11 1.11 1.11 1.11 
NOSHFF 1.14 1.23 1.14 1.23 1.23 1.23 1.23 1.23 
Market Value  1.26 1.49 1.26 1.49 1.49 1.49 1.49 1.49 
Share Price  1.16 1.14 1.16 1.14 1.14 1.14 1.14 1.14 
Volatility  1.14 1.29 1.14 1.29 1.29 1.29 1.29 1.29 
Number of Trades  - 1.37 - 1.37 1.37 1.37 1.37 1.37 
Trade Size - 1.71 - 1.71 1.71 1.71 1.71 1.71 
Mean VIF 1.15 1.23 1.15 1.23 1.23 1.23 1.23 1.23 
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firms. Moreover, Table 5.7 Panels A and B report a stronger negative and significant relationship 
between NEO and trade size (TZ), turnover ratio (TR), trading volume (VO) and number of trades 
(NT) relative to large firms. 
  
Regarding cross holding (NOSHCO), Table 5.7 Panels A and B reveal that NOSHCO has a 
stronger positive and significant relationship with PBAS and Pimpact for small firms than large 
firms. Moreover, NOSHCO has a stronger negative and significant relationship with trading 
volume (VO) and number of trades (NT) in comparison with large firms. In contrast, for large firms 
Table 5.7 Panel A reveals that investment company holding (NOSHIC) has a positive and 
insignificant relationship with real friction measures (i.e., TZ and VO), whereas it has a negative 
and insignificant impact on PBAS and Pimpact. In the same spirit, other holding (NOSHOF) has a 
positive and insignificant relationship with real friction measures (i.e., TZ), whereas it has a 
positive and insignificant impact on PBAS and Pimpact. 
 
It is noticeable from Table 5.7 Panels A and B that employee holding (NOSHEM) has a stronger 
and more positive effect on proportional bid-ask spread (PBAS) for small firms. Furthermore, 
NOSHEM has a stronger negative and significant relationship with number of trades (NT) in 
comparison with large firms. With respect to government ownership (NOSHGV), pension fund 
ownership (NOSHPF) and foreign ownership (NOSHFR) have a stronger positive and significant 
effect on Pimpact and a negative and significant effect on trade size (TZ). As shown in Table 5.7 
Panels A and B that the free float shares (NOSHFF) there is a positive relationship between market 
liquidity and free float shares. Specifically, there is a negative relationship between proportional 
bid-ask spread and price impact ratio and positive impact of real friction of market liquidity.Our 
findings are in line with Amihud et al. (1999), Bhide (1993), Holmstrom & Tirole (1993) and 
Zheng & Li (2008).      
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Table 5.7 The Firm’s Size Effect on the Relationship between the Owners’ Identity and Market Liquidity 
Table 5.7 presents results of the effect of ownership level and concentration on market liquidity. The table contains 
coefficient values and t-statistics obtained from the estimation of the following model. Figures reported in parentheses 
represent t-statistics which are based on robust standard errors, where ***,**,* mean significance at the 1%, 5% and 
10% levels respectively. 
LIQit=α0+β1EOit+β2NEOit+β3NOHFFit+β4NOSHICit+β5NOSHOFit+β6NOSHPFit+β7NOSGVit+β8NOSHEMit+β9NOSH
COit+β10NOSHFRit+γ1MVit+γ2Pit+γ3VOLit +  ∑ 𝐼𝑁𝐷
𝑛
𝑖=1  + ∑ 𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅
𝑛
𝑖=1 + 
εi………………………………………………………………………………………………………………(1a and 2a) 
LIQit=α0+β1EOit+β2NEOit+β3NOHFFit+β4NOSHICit+β5NOSHOFit+β6NOSHPFit+β7NOSGVit+β8NOSHEMit+β9NOSH
COit+β10NOSHFRit+γ1MVit+γ2Pit+γ3VOLit + γ4TZit + + γ5NTit +  ∑ 𝐼𝑁𝐷
𝑛
𝑖=1  + ∑ 𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅
𝑛
𝑖=1 + 
εi,…………………………………(1band 2b) 
A brief description of the ownership structure, market liquidity and control variables is given below. Executive 
ownership (EO), non-executive ownership (NEO), free float holding (NOSHFF), foreign holding (NOSHFR), 
investment company holding (NOSHIC), pension fund holding (NOSHPF), government holding (NOSHGV), 
employee holding (NOSHEM), cross-holding (NOSHCO), other holding (NOSHOF), proportional bid-ask spread 
(PBAS), turnover ratio (TR), price impact ratio (Pimpact), trade size (TZ), trading volume (VO), and number of trades 
(NT), firm size (MV), share price (P), return volatility (VOL), Industry (IND) and Year (YEAR) dummies. The t-
statistics are reported in parentheses. See Table 3.2 for variables’ definitions and measurements. 
 
Panel A Large Firms’ Market value of equity> 432.7 million 
         
 PBAS 
(1a) 
PBAS 
(1b) 
Pimpact 
(2a) 
  Pimpact  
(2b)   
NT TZ VO  TR 
EO 0.02 
(1.13) 
0.01 
(0.57) 
0.16 
(5.63)*** 
0.12 
(4.23)*** 
-0.10 
(-4.08)*** 
-0.07 
(-3.72)*** 
-0.11 
(-3.67)*** 
-0.02 
(-1.61) 
NEO 0.04 
(2.82)** 
0.03 
(2.59)*** 
0.21 
(7.43)*** 
0.19 
(6.86)*** 
-0.05 
(-2.08)** 
-0.03 
(-1.96)** 
-0.12 
(-4.39)*** 
-0.02 
(-1.69)* 
NOSHCO 0.03 
(2.35)** 
0.02 
(2.26)** 
0.03 
(1.25) 
0.04 
(1.62) 
-0.02 
(-0.96) 
0.01 
(0.74) 
-0.01 
(-0.43) 
-0.01 
(-0.19) 
NOSHEM 0.02 
(0.14) 
0.03 
(-0.13) 
0.03 
(1.14) 
0.04 
(1.51) 
-0.03 
(-1.40) 
-0.03 
(-0.16) 
-0.05 
(-1.78)* 
-0.04 
(-0.18) 
NOSHGV 0.01 
(0.57) 
0.01 
(0.24) 
0.04 
(2.16)** 
0.03 
(1.72)* 
-0.03 
(-1.87)* 
-0.01 
(-0.54) 
-0.02 
(-1.17) 
-0.01 
(-1.99)** 
NOSHIC -0.03 
(-1.30) 
-0.03 
(-1.60) 
-0.01 
(-0.16) 
-0.03 
(-0.77) 
0.07 
(1.80)* 
0.04 
(1.24) 
0.01 
(0.05) 
0.07 
(3.44)*** 
NOSHPF 0.07 
(4.15)*** 
0.06 
(3.57)*** 
0.07 
(1.82)* 
0.05 
(1.47) 
-0.09 
(-2.79)*** 
-0.03 
(-1.21) 
-0.04 
(-1.06) 
-0.04 
(-2.66)*** 
NOSHFR 0.02 
(0.79) 
0.01 
(0.85) 
0.11 
(2.38)** 
0.11 
(2.47)** 
-0.01 
(-0.13) 
-0.01 
(-0.19) 
-0.07 
(-1.47) 
-0.05 
(-2.66)*** 
NOSHOF 7.25e-06 
(0.00) 
0.03 
(0.41) 
0.16 
(0.90) 
0.10 
(0.58) 
-0.29 
(-1.89)* 
-0.05 
(-0.42) 
-0.32 
(-1.70)* 
-0.15 
(-1.91)* 
NOSHFF -0.20 
(-1.61)*** 
-0.14 
(-1.17)*** 
-0.68 
(-2.58)*** 
-0.57 
(-2.25)** 
0.48 
(2.19)** 
0.05 
(0.33) 
0.66 
(2.50)** 
0.38 
(3.46)*** 
Market Value  -0.27 
(-11.17)*** 
-0.21 
(-8.66)*** 
-0.73 
(-14.36)*** 
-0.61 
(-11.72)*** 
0.47 
(11.05)*** 
0.00 
(0.02) 
0.50 
(9.78)*** 
0.01 
(0.24) 
Volatility 0.09 
(2.70)*** 
0.10 
(2.96)*** 
0.07 
(1.03) 
0.01 
(0.15) 
-0.12 
(-1.99)** 
-0.13 
(-2.79)*** 
-0.10 
(-1.40) 
-0.18 
(-5.95)*** 
Share Price -0.02 
(-1.15) 
0.00 
(0.03) 
0.13 
(3.52)*** 
0.12 
(3.18)*** 
0.11 
(3.58)*** 
-0.17 
(-6.80)*** 
-0.13 
(-3.57)*** 
-0.01 
(-0.66) 
Trade Size - 0.04 
(2.20)** 
- -0.25 
(-5.38)*** 
- - - - 
Number of 
Trades 
- -0.11 
(-6.42)*** 
- -0.25 
(-6.89)*** 
- - - - 
Constant -1.46 
(-12.07)*** 
-1.38 
(-11.64)*** 
-1.48 
(-5.77)*** 
-1.32 
(-5.28)*** 
0.68 
(3.14)*** 
-0.02 
(-0.13) 
0.64 
(2.49)** 
-2.46 
(-22.85)*** 
Industry  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes yes yes yes 
Year  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes yes yes yes 
Adjusted R2 0.41 0.44 0.43 0.47 0.34 0.36 0.29 0.26 
Number of 
Observations  
1026 1026 1026 1026 1026 1026 1026 1026 
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 Inclusions of Additional Control Variables 
In the last test, this study controls for more additional variables that may affect market liquidity. 
The first variable is the research and development expenses. This study uses a dummy variable to 
control for the existence of high technology firms. This dummy variable takes one if the firm is in a 
high technology industry (has a research and development expenses) and zero otherwise. The data 
on the research and development expenses was extracted from the Worldscope databases. Existing 
literature has documented that the research and development expenses can be used as a proxy of 
information asymmetry (Aboody & Lev 2000; Zeckhouser & Pound 1990). In particular, these 
studies state that firms that have research and development expenses suffer from more information 
asymmetry and the probability of insider trading from these firms is high. As a result, the study 
expects to have a positive relationship between the high technology firms and proportional bid-ask 
spread and Amihud (2002) illiquidity ratio. Moreover, this study controls for the firm’s age. 
Theoretically, firms whose stocks have been traded for a long time in the stock market would be 
Panel B Small Firms’ Market value of equity< 432.7 million 
         
 PBAS 
(1a) 
PBAS 
(1b) 
Pimpact 
(2a) 
Pimpact 
(2b) 
NT TZ VO  TR 
EO 0.04 
(5.58)*** 
0.02 
(4.02)*** 
0.15 
(5.28)*** 
0.13 
(4.93)*** 
-0.01 
(-0.50) 
-0.08 
(-4.49)*** 
-0.07 
(-2.54)** 
-0.03 
(-2.16)** 
NEO 0.10 
(6.70)*** 
0.08 
(6.10)*** 
0.18 
(6.26)*** 
0.12 
(4.63)*** 
-0.10 
(-3.80)*** 
-0.04 
(-2.37)** 
-0.19 
(-7.11)*** 
-0.04 
(-3.25)*** 
NOSHCO 0.01 
(0.83) 
0.02 
(0.30) 
0.03 
(1.16) 
0.02 
(0.13) 
-0.06 
(-2.22)** 
-0.03 
(-0.15) 
-0.08 
(-2.82)*** 
-0.01 
(-0.47) 
NOSHEM 0.02 
(1.29) 
0.04 
(0.24) 
0.02 
(0.55) 
0.02 
(0.56) 
-0.07 
(-2.63)*** 
-0.02 
(-1.26) 
-0.07 
(-2.71)*** 
-0.03 
(-1.71)* 
NOSHGV 0.07 
(4.60)*** 
0.03 
(2.95)*** 
0.07 
(2.75)*** 
0.04 
(1.41) 
-0.10 
(-3.72)*** 
-0.03 
(-1.86)* 
-0.01 
(-0.45) 
-0.03 
(-0.26) 
NOSHIC 0.08 
(2.65)*** 
0.04 
(1.66)* 
0.10 
(1.75)* 
0.03 
(0.61) 
-0.14 
(-2.57)** 
-0.01 
(-0.07) 
-0.08 
(-1.57) 
-0.02 
(-0.60) 
NOSHPF 0.07 
(3.72)*** 
0.02 
(1.12) 
0.08 
(2.37)** 
0.02 
(0.78) 
-0.15 
(-4.58)*** 
-0.07 
(-3.44)*** 
-0.10 
(-3.29)*** 
-0.05 
(-2.74)*** 
NOSHFR 0.03 
(1.09) 
0.03 
(1.27) 
0.23 
(4.30)*** 
0.22 
(4.54)*** 
-0.02 
(-0.29) 
-0.02 
(-0.77) 
-0.14 
(-2.85)*** 
-0.05 
(-2.07)** 
NOSHOF 0.01 
(0.06) 
0.04 
(0.39) 
0.02 
(0.11) 
0.04 
(0.19) 
-0.02 
(-0.07) 
-0.35 
(-2.36)** 
-0.30 
(-1.35) 
-0.01 
(-0.06) 
NOSHFF -0.67 
(-4.66)*** 
-0.38 
(-3.15)*** 
-1.10 
(-4.27)*** 
-0.69 
(-2.96)*** 
0.92 
(3.75)*** 
0.16 
(1.00) 
0.96 
(3.92)*** 
0.53 
(4.14)*** 
Market 
Value  
-0.06 
(-3.00)*** 
-0.02 
(-1.26) 
-0.19 
(-4.67)*** 
-0.12 
(-3.44)*** 
0.14 
(3.66)*** 
-0.02 
(-0.89) 
0.20 
(5.16)*** 
0.03 
(1.49) 
Volatility 0.14 
(4.11)*** 
0.12 
(3.94)*** 
0.18 
(2.83)*** 
0.17 
(2.98)*** 
-0.06 
(-0.97) 
0.09 
(2.19)** 
0.04 
(0.74) 
0.11 
(3.62)*** 
Share Price -0.17 
(-8.08)*** 
-0.07 
(-3.78)*** 
0.03 
(1.01) 
0.08 
(2.26)** 
0.22 
(5.90)*** 
-0.30 
(-11.91)*** 
-0.04 
(-1.20) 
0.04 
(2.11)** 
Trade Size - 0.12 
(5.41)*** 
- -0.20 
(-4.53)*** 
- - - - 
Number of 
Trades 
- -0.28 
(-18.13)*** 
- -0.48 
(-15.90)*** 
- - - - 
Constant -0.94 
(-7.78)*** 
-0.91 
(-8.73)*** 
-2.44 
(-11.15)*** 
-2.05 
(-10.25)*** 
0.47 
(2.28)** 
0.78 
(5.54)*** 
0.91 
(4.37)*** 
-2.85 
(-26.37)*** 
Industry  Yes Yes Yes yes Yes Yes yes yes 
Year  Yes Yes Yes yes Yes Yes yes yes 
Adjusted R2 0.32 0.53 0.21 0.36 0.25 0.36 0.17 0.11 
Number  of 
Observations  
1026 1026 1026 1026 1026 1026 1026 1026 
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more liquid as they have lower information asymmetry between inside and outside investors. 
Following Sarin et al. (2000), this study measures the firm age as the natural logarithm of the 
number of years since the firm was founded. Finally, this study controls for financial leverage 
measured as the percentage of total debt to total capital.  
 
Table 5.8 reports the results after including these variables. The results in Table 5.8 are similar to 
and consistent with the results obtained in the previous section. Nevertheless, it is noticeable that 
high technology firms have a positive but insignificant relationship with proportional bid-ask 
spread and price impact illiquidity ratio. However, high technology firms have a significant and 
negative relationship with the real friction of market liquidity (i.e. number of trades, trade size, 
turnover ratio and trading volume). These results are in line with previous studies (Aboody & Lev 
2000; Zeckhouser & Pound 1990). Regarding the financial leverage, as expected, financial leverage 
is positively and significantly related to trading activity measures (i.e., turnover ratio, number of 
trades, trade size and trading volume) and negatively with proportional bid-ask spread and price 
impact ratio. This positive effect is consistent with prior empirical papers (Rubin 2007; Sarin et al., 
2000). However, financial leverage has a negative and significant impact on proportional bid-ask 
spread and price impact ratio. This negative relationship may support the argument that debt 
holders may substitute as a monitoring device (Jensen 1986; Williamson 1988). As can be seen in 
the results reported in Table 5.8, on average FTSE All-Share firms with more history in the market 
have insignificant negative relationship with proportional bid-ask spread and price impact 
illiquidity ratio; in contrast  they have insignificant positive relationship with trading activity 
measures (i.e. number of trades, trade size, turnover ratio and trading volume).  
 
It is noticeable from Table 5.8 that the results regarding the effect of insider and outsider identity 
on market liquidity are consistent with the main results that were obtained in Table 5.5. 
Accordingly, this test confirms that our main results do not suffer from multicollinearity problems. 
Statistically, Brooks (2008) states that when multicollinearity exists the regression model will 
become very sensitive to any changes in the independent variables and adding or removing any 
variable will affect the model sharply.  
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Table 5.8 Pooled OLS analysis on the relationship between ownership Identity and Market Liquidity (inclusion of other 
control variables- Leverage, High technology, and Firm age)  
Table 5.8 presents results of the effect of owners identity on market liquidity. The table contains coefficient values and t-
statistics obtained from the estimation of the following model. Figures reported in parentheses represent t-statistics which are 
based on robust standard errors, where ***,**,* mean significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
LIQit=α0+β1EOit+β2NEOit+β3NOHFFit+β4NOSHICit+β5NOSHOFit+β6NOSHPFit+β7NOSGVit+β8NOSHEMit+β9NOSHCOit+
β10NOSHFRit+γ1MVit+γ2Pit+γ3VOLit +γ4Levit  + γ5HTechit +  γ6FAgeit +  ∑ 𝐼𝑁𝐷
𝑛
𝑖=1  +∑ 𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅
𝑛
𝑖=1 + εi……………………………………(1a and 2a) 
LIQit=α0+β1EOit+β2NEOit+β3NOHFFit+β4NOSHICit+β5NOSHOFit+β6NOSHPFit+β7NOSGVit+β8NOSHEMit+β9NOSHCOit+
β10NOSHFRit+γ1MVit+γ2Pit+γ3VOLit + γ4TZit + + γ5NTit +     γ6 Levit  + γ7HTechit +  γ8FAgeit +  ∑ 𝐼𝑁𝐷
𝑛
𝑖=1  +∑ 𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅
𝑛
𝑖=1 + 
εi……………(1band 2b) 
A brief description of the ownership structure, market liquidity and control variables is given below. Executive ownership 
(EO), non-executive ownership (NEO), free float holding (NOSHFF), foreign holding (NOSHFR), investment company 
holding (NOSHIC), pension fund holding (NOSHPF), government holding (NOSHGV), employee holding (NOSHEM), 
cross-holding (NOSHCO), other holding (NOSHOF), proportional bid-ask spread (PBAS), turnover ratio (TR), price impact 
ratio (Pimpact), trade size (TZ), trading volume (VO), number of trades (NT), firm size (MV), share price (P), return 
volatility (VOL), leverage (Lev), high technology firms (HTech), firm age (FAge), Industry (IND) and Year (YEAR)  
dummies. See Table 3.2 for variables’ definitions and measurements. 
 PBAS 
(1a) 
PBAS 
(1b) 
Pimpact 
(2a) 
Pimpact 
(2b) 
NT TZ VO  TR 
EO 0.04 
(3.91)*** 
0.03 
(3.01)*** 
0.30 
(14.75)*** 
0.22 
(11.47)*** 
-0.07 
(-4.14)*** 
-0.12 
(-10.18)*** 
-0.15 
(-8.11)*** 
-0.10 
(-8.90)*** 
NEO 0.11 
(10.79)*** 
0.09 
(10.09)*** 
0.30 
(14.78)*** 
0.23 
(12.22)*** 
-0.08 
(-4.71)*** 
-0.08 
(-6.96)*** 
-0.21 
(-11.52)*** 
-0.07 
(-6.30)*** 
NOSHCO 0.01 
(0.02) 
0.01 
(0.03) 
0.07 
(3.41)*** 
0.06 
(3.46)*** 
-0.01 
(-0.04) 
-0.01 
(-1.02) 
-0.05 
(-2.85)*** 
-0.05 
(-4.37)*** 
NOSHEM 0.01 
(0.16) 
0.01 
(0.99) 
0.02 
(1.06) 
0.02 
(0.91) 
-0.02 
(-1.25) 
-0.04 
(-2.99)*** 
-0.01 
(-0.29) 
-0.03 
(-3.11)*** 
NOSHGV 0.04 
(4.08)*** 
0.02 
(2.33)** 
0.06 
(3.78)*** 
0.04 
(2.82)*** 
-0.06 
(-4.35)*** 
-0.02 
(-1.98)** 
-0.01 
(-0.25) 
-0.02 
(-2.18)** 
NOSHIC 0.07 
(3.48)*** 
0.04 
(2.44)** 
0.16 
(4.10)*** 
0.08 
(2.31)** 
-0.11 
(-3.40)*** 
-0.06 
(-2.90)*** 
-0.09 
(-2.58)*** 
-0.14 
(-6.81)*** 
NOSHPF 0.06 
(4.27)*** 
0.03 
(2.29)** 
0.07 
(2.64)*** 
0.04 
(1.86)* 
-0.10 
(-4.62)*** 
-0.06 
(-3.57)*** 
-0.07 
(-3.15)*** 
-0.06 
(-4.09)*** 
NOSHFR 0.09 
(3.88)*** 
0.08 
(4.26)*** 
0.21 
(4.90)*** 
0.15 
(3.79)*** 
-0.03 
(-0.81) 
-0.12 
(-4.80)*** 
-0.09 
(-2.28)** 
-0.27 
(-11.43)*** 
NOSHOF 0.02 
(0.46) 
0.01 
(0.37) 
0.10 
(1.28) 
0.07 
(1.03) 
-0.10 
(-1.65)* 
-0.05 
(-1.25) 
-0.16 
(-2.29)** 
-0.03 
(-0.89) 
NOSHFF -0.03 
(-0.37) 
-0.24 
(-3.13)*** 
-0.67 
(-3.98)*** 
-0.74 
(-4.70)*** 
0.88 
(6.26)*** 
0.87 
(8.53)*** 
0.18 
(1.18) 
1.90 
(20.42)*** 
Market 
Value  
-0.24 
(-21.98)*** 
-0.14 
(-12.98)*** 
-0.55 
(-24.31)*** 
-0.38 
(-17.00)*** 
0.39 
(21.07)*** 
-0.04 
(-3.09)*** 
0.40 
(19.68)*** 
0.01 
(0.61) 
Volatility 0.21 
(8.66)*** 
0.20 
(9.26)*** 
0.34 
(6.92)*** 
0.34 
(7.48)*** 
-0.03 
(-0.74) 
0.02 
(0.79) 
-0.06 
(-1.36) 
-0.34 
(-12.57)*** 
Share Price -0.18 
(-13.62)*** 
-0.12 
(9.65)*** 
-0.12 
(-4.30)*** 
-0.09 
(-3.61)*** 
0.21 
(9.14)*** 
-0.18 
(-11.17)*** 
0.01 
(0.39) 
0.15 
(10.50)*** 
Trade Size - 0.05 
(3.29)*** 
- -0.38 
(-11.92)*** 
- - - - 
Number of 
Trades 
- -0.25 
(-22.27)*** 
- -0.46 
(-19.46)*** 
- - - - 
Lev  -0.23 
(-5.03)*** 
-0.11 
(-2.90)*** 
-0.41 
(-4.76)*** 
-0.22 
(-2.77)*** 
0.44 
(5.70)*** 
0.02 
(0.44) 
0.30 
(3.64)*** 
0.21 
(5.41)*** 
FAge -0.02 
(-1.22) 
-0.01 
(-0.70) 
-0.01 
(-0.18) 
-0.01 
(-0.01) 
0.03 
(0.99) 
0.03 
(1.49) 
0.01 
(0.39) 
0.02 
(1.53) 
HTech 0.03 
(1.63) 
0.01 
(0.75) 
0.02 
(0.66) 
0.01 
(0.07) 
-0.06 
(-1.93)* 
-0.03 
(-1.25) 
-0.09 
(-2.61)*** 
-0.04 
(-2.87)*** 
Constant -0.26 
(-5.73)*** 
-0.17 
(-4.20)*** 
-0.08 
(-0.95) 
-0.02 
(-0.20) 
0.30 
(4.05)*** 
-0.18 
(-3.32)*** 
0.05 
(0.73) 
-0.35 
(-1.23) 
Industry  yes yes Yes yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year  yes yes Yes yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.74 0.79 0.75 0.79 0.58 0.35 0.58 0.65 
Number of 
Observations  
2260 2260 2260 2260 2260 2260 2260 2260 
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5.6 Summary  
This chapter has provided important empirical evidence on the role of owners’ identity on market 
liquidity in the UK. This study investigates how insider and outsider ownership identity are related 
to market liquidity. This study covers all the publicly listed firms on the London Stock Exchange in 
the FTSE All-Share Index. The sample of the current study is constructed from non-financial 
sectors. The study covers a 10-year time period from 2003-2012. This study advances our 
understanding of the role of owners’ identity in influencing market liquidity. The academic 
literature provides support for the importance of studying the type of ownership as some owners 
typically have direct access to management, and experience and expertise in gleaning insights from 
financial information. For instance, larger institutional owners have greater ability, and greater 
incentives in the form of potentially higher trading profits, to acquire value-relevant information, 
relative to smaller institutional owners; this results in a higher bid-ask spread and lower market 
liquidity (Fehle 2004; Neas 2004).  
This study provides evidence that executive and non-executive directors’ ownership is negatively 
related to the level of market liquidity. In particular, executive and non-executive directors’ 
ownership are found to significantly increase the proportional bid-ask spread (PBAS) and price 
impact ratio (PIMPACT). More importantly, after this study controls for the well-known trading 
activity measures such as number of trades and trade size, still there is a positive relationship 
between executive and non-executive directors’ ownership  and proportional bid-ask spread and 
price impact ratio, which implies that executive and non-executive directors’ ownership influence 
the information friction of market liquidity positively. As a result, the results provide strong support 
for the adverse selection hypothesis that executive and non-executive directors’ ownership increase 
the bid-ask spread and price impact ratio, which inversely affects the market liquidity (Heflin & 
Shaw 2000). On the other hand, one can interpret this result under the trading hypothesis, which 
argues that executive and non-executive directors trade less in contrast with outside investors (i.e., 
institutional). That is, an increase in executive directors’ ownership leads to a decrease in his/her 
motivation, which enhances the firm’s value, which leads to a decrease in market liquidity. Our 
findings are in line with Coffee (1991), Comerton-Forde & Rydge (2006), Heflin & Shaw (2000) 
and Rubin (2007). 
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With respect to the outsider ownership identities, this study finds that for all controlled 
shareholders (investment companies, foreign, government, and pension fund) there is a negative 
relationship between these controlled shareholders and market liquidity. In particular, after this 
study controls for the well-known trading activity measures such as number of trades and trade 
size, still there is a positive relationship between controlled shareholders’ ownership and 
proportional bid-ask spread and price impact ratio. As a result, the results provide strong support 
for the adverse selection hypothesis that controlled shareholders increase the bid-ask spread and 
price impact ratio, which inversely affects the market liquidity. Moreover, with respect to the real 
friction of market liquidity (i.e., number of trades, trade size, trading volume, turnover ratio), this 
study reports a negative relationship between controlled shareholders and real friction of market 
liquidity and this holds for executive and non-executive directors’ ownership.  
 
With respect to cross-holdings and other holdings this study reports insignificantly positive 
relationship between cross-holdings and other holdings and the proportional bid-ask spread. The 
findings also show an insignificantly negative relationship between cross-holdings and number of 
trades and trade size. Regarding employee ownership, the findings show an insignificantly positive 
relationship with price impact ratio. This study therefore notices a marginally negative relationship 
between cross-holdings, other holdings and employee ownership and market liquidity.  The 
findings of this study are thus inconsistent with the result reported in Park (2009). This may be due 
to differences in the time-periods, sample size and market environment of this study as compared to 
that of Park (2009). 
 
Nevertheless, with respect to the free float shares, to the author’s’ knowledge few studies in the 
ownership- liquidity relationship take into consideration the free float as one of the determinants of 
market liquidity (Ginglinger & Hamon 2007; Park 2009). Our results reveal that there is positive 
relationship between market liquidity and free float shares. Specifically, there is a negative 
relationship between proportional bid-ask spread and price impact illiquidity ratio and positive 
impact on the real friction of market liquidity. Our findings are in line Amihud et al. (1999), Bhide 
(1993), Holmstrom & Tirole (1993) and Zheng & Li (2008). These results are robust after 
controlling for the firm’s size effect and adding other control variables such as research and 
development expenses, leverage, firm age and applying different sensitivity specification tests. The 
next chapter investigates the relationship between ownership level, concentration, owners’ identity 
and market liquidity during the recent financial crisis. 
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Chapter 6 
The Effect of Ownership level, concentration and Owners’ Identity on Market Liquidity:  
Evidence from the Recent Financial Crisis   
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
According to Bhide (1993), since the Great Depression, “US regulation has promoted market 
liquidity of the efficient governance of firms. The liquidity prompted by the US policies has obvious 
benefits: investors can en-cash their assets quickly and diversify cheaply. The same policies, 
however, impair governance by encouraging diffuse stockholding and discouraging active 
investing”. In addition, more research has been conducted which test how the behaviour of 
investors changes during the market downturn (Brunnermeier & Pedersen 2009; Garleanu & 
Pedersen 2007; Huang & Wang 2009; Kyle & Xiong 2001; Xiong 2001). These studies suggest that 
institutional ownership declined during the financial crisis, which led to a lower bid-ask spread. 
However, in the aftermath of the recent financial crisis, governments of developed countries had to 
defend their investors. For instance, the recent financial crisis of 2007-2009, which has been 
described as the worst since the Great Depression, revealed the weakness in corporate governance 
mechanisms regarding institutional shareholder engagement in the monitoring process. 
 
 In the light of the recent crisis, the Walker Review (2009) recommended that the institutional 
Stewardship Code should be adopted as an official UK code of practice for institutional investors. 
As a result, the UK Stewardship Code (2010) was established which strongly focuses on enhancing 
the level of engagement between institutional investors and companies to help improve long-term 
returns to shareholders and the efficient exercise of governance responsibilities. Moreover, the 
consequences of the recent financial crisis also led the British government to bail out many large 
financial institutions. For example, Northern Rock, Bradford and Bingley, Alliances and Leicester 
all suffered from substantial defaults during the recent financial crisis in the UK (Akbar et al., 
2013). Northern Rock was supported by an emergency loan from the Bank of England at the onset 
of the crisis; however, by February 2008 Northern Rock had gone into state ownership (Hall 2009).  
To further understand the institutional holding patterns; during the recent financial crisis, this study 
classifies institutional blockholder ownership into groups according to their identity. In this regard, 
Sias (2004) illustrates that different investor identities have different effects on market liquidity 
during the market downturn.  
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As a consequences, this study classifies institutional and non-institutional blockholders according 
to the Datastream filings into government companies (NOSHGV), investment companies 
(NOSHIC), public pension funds (NOSHPF) and cross companies (NOSHOF). Furthermore, this 
study uses the BoardEx database to group insider investors into executive (EO), and non-executive 
(NEO) owners. As a result, the aim of this chapter, therefore, is to provide empirical evidence from 
the recent financial crisis. In particular, this chapter examines the effect of ownership level, 
concentration and the owners’ identity on market liquidity in three different sub-periods. These 
periods are pre-crisis, crisis and post-crisis. 
 
The rest of this chapter proceeds as follows: section 6.2 provides the hypothesis development in 
this chapter. The descriptive statistics on the ownership and market liquidity measures in the pre-
crisis, during and post-crisis periods are presented in section 6.3. Section 6.4 presents the results 
from the main regression model. Section 6.5 provides additional sensitivity tests using the change 
in variables. Finally, section 6.6 presents a short summary of the chapter and generate links with 
the next chapter.    
 
6.2 Hypothesis Development 
 
The discussion in Chapter 2 on the role of the ownership structure during the recent financial crisis 
has revealed a limited number of empirical papers that examine the relationship between ownership 
level, concentration, owners’ identity and market liquidity in the crisis period. Further, the findings 
on the above-mentioned relationship seem to be inconsistent. For instance, Poon et al. (2013) report 
that the institutional ownership has a positive impact on bid-ask spread before and during the crisis 
periods. Nevertheless, the effect of owners’ identity was discussed in the previous chapter. 
Moreover, the recent financial crisis of 2007-2009, which was described as the worst since the 
Great Depression, also revealed the weakness in corporate governance mechanisms regarding the 
institutional shareholders’ engagement in the monitoring process. In the light of the recent crisis, 
the Walker Review (2009) recommended that the institutional Stewardship Code should be adopted 
as an official UK code of practice for institutional investors. As a result, the UK Stewardship Code 
(2010) was established which strongly focuses on enhancing the level of engagement between 
institutional investors and companies to help improve long-term returns to shareholders and the 
efficient exercise of governance responsibilities.  
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Furthermore, existing literature states that institutional investors seem to adopt a passive role 
towards monitoring and disciplining firm’s management (Maug 1998; Plender 1997). Prior studies 
have suggested that institutional investors rarely take action in corporate monitoring because they 
regard liquidity as more important than playing an active role in monitoring the firm’s management 
(Bhide 1993; Coffee 1991). Moreover, institutional shareholders are blamed for their passivity and 
their focus on short-term rather than long-term returns during the crisis period (Chen & Poon 2007; 
Chu & Song 2010; Mitton 2002). Consequently, most corporate governance codes around the 
world emphasise the importance of institutional investors as one of the corporate governance 
mechanisms.      
In the UK, the recent 2012 Stewardship Code aims to encourage institutional shareholders to play 
an active role in corporate governance mechanisms. In particular, the main aim behind the 
Stewardship Code (2012) is to increase the engagement activities of institutional investors, which 
require them to publicly disclose their commitment to a stewardship obligation or to explain their 
alternative investment approach if they are unwilling to assume such a commitment. Moreover, this 
code has emphasised that some institutional investors such as pension funds must take a more 
active role in the monitoring process. Prior literature did not provide a clear link on how the 
owners’ identity affects market outcomes and particularly market liquidity (Poon et al., 2013). In 
addition, none of these studies examines the effect of owners’ identity on market liquidity in the 
crisis period. 
 
The liquidity effect of foreign ownership during a financial crisis seems inherently interesting for 
two reasons. First, during the financial crisis, it has been argued that foreign investors tend to 
liquidate their positions in local stocks and flee to their home countries, thereby spreading one 
country’s financial crisis to others (Boyer et al., 2006; Calomiris et al., 2010). When faced with 
sudden liquidity dry-up and capital constraints during market turmoil, one would expect foreign 
investors to play a different role in local stock liquidity, especially for foreign non-block investors 
who own relatively small stakes in firms and are less committed to business monitoring. Second, if 
foreign block investors introduce the informational barrier to local investors and heighten the 
information uncertainty of local firms, its adverse liquidity effect could become more pronounced 
during the crisis period when market participants tend to be more risk averse to uncertainty 
(Brunnermeier & Pedersen 2009; Lang & Maffet 2011; Vayanos 2004). 
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Taken together, it is clear that more investigation is required in addressing how the effect of 
ownership level, concentration and the owners’ identity is related to market liquidity during the 
crisis period. The limited empirical work and the mixed results also reveal the need for more 
empirical evidence. This chapter relies on the same theoretical literature used in Chapters 4 and 5 to 
develop the hypotheses on ownership structure variables and owners’ identity on market liquidity. 
Nevertheless, to consider the effect of the recent financial crisis these hypotheses are tested in three 
different sub-periods. Following previous literature (see for example, Akbar et al., 2013; 
Kontonikas et al., 2013; Florackis et al., 2014), the pre-crisis period is chosen as 2004-2006, the 
crisis period is chosen as, 2007-2009, and the post-crisis period is chosen as 2010-2012. To avoid 
repetition, the study directly proposes the following hypotheses:  
 
Hypothesis 1a: There is a negative relationship between insider ownership and market liquidity in 
the pre-crisis period.   
   
Hypothesis 1b: There is a negative relationship between insider ownership and market liquidity in 
the crisis period.    
  
Hypothesis 1c: There is a negative relationship between insider ownership and market liquidity in 
the post-crisis period.   
   
Hypothesis 2a: There is a negative relationship between ownership concentration and market 
liquidity in the pre-crisis period.   
   
Hypothesis 2b: There is a negative relationship between ownership concentration and market 
liquidity in the crisis period.   
   
Hypothesis 2c: There is a negative relationship between ownership concentration and market 
liquidity in the post-crisis period.   
   
Hypothesis 3a: There is a positive relationship between institutional ownership and market 
liquidity in the pre-crisis period.    
  
Hypothesis 3b: There is a positive relationship between institutional ownership and market 
liquidity in the crisis period.     
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Hypothesis 3c: There is a positive relationship between institutional ownership and market 
liquidity in the post-crisis period. 
     
Hypothesis 4a: There is a negative relationship between executive and non-executive director’s 
ownership and market liquidity in the pre-crisis period.    
  
Hypothesis 4b: There is a negative relationship between executive and non-executive director’s 
ownership and market liquidity in the crisis period.     
 
Hypothesis 4c: There is a negative relationship between executive and non-executive director’s 
ownership and market liquidity in the post-crisis period.     
 
Hypothesis 5a: There is a negative relationship between controlled shareholders (government, 
employee, pension fund, foreign, cross- holding, investment banks and other holding) and market 
liquidity in the pre-crisis period.    
  
Hypothesis 5b: There is a negative relationship between controlled shareholders (government, 
employee, pension fund, foreign, cross holding, investment banks and other holding) and market 
liquidity in the crisis period.     
 
Hypothesis 5c: There is a negative relationship between controlled shareholders (government, 
employee, pension fund, foreign, cross holding, investment banks and other holding) and market 
liquidity in the post-crisis period.    
 
Hypothesis 6a: There is a positive relationship between free float shares and market liquidity in the 
pre-crisis period.    
  
Hypothesis 6b: There is a positive relationship between free float shares and market liquidity in the 
crisis period.     
 
Hypothesis 6c: There is a positive relationship between free float shares and market liquidity in the 
post-crisis period.     
 
 162 
 
6.3. Descriptive Statistics  
 
 
Table 6.1 presents the average and median differences level of ownership level, concentration, 
owners’ identity, and market liquidity variables for FTSE All-Share companies in the three 
different sub-periods. As discussed above, following previous literature (see for example, Akbar et 
al., 2013; Kontonikas et al., 2013; Florackis et al., 2014), the pre-crisis period is chosen as 2004-
2006, the crisis period is chosen as, 2007-2009, and the post-crisis period is chosen as 2010-2012. 
The study starts the pre-crisis period from 2004 instated of 2003 to offer a balanced period around 
the crisis event as, by doing this, both the pre and post periods will cover three years. In addition, 
balanced periods around the crisis event mitigate the issue of skewness in the degrees of freedom in 
the pre and post periods; see Poon et al. (2013) for a similar approach.   
 
Table 6.1 Panel (A) shows that the average insider ownership (IO) increased significantly from 9% 
in the pre-crisis period to 11% in the crisis period. A similar pattern applies to institutional 
ownership (INSO) with a mean value that increased significantly from 59% in the pre-crisis period 
to 76% in the crisis period. With respect to large shareholders (LS), they significantly decreased 
from 25% in the pre-crisis period to 24% in the crisis period. Regarding market liquidity, Table 6.1 
Panel (A) shows that proportional bid-ask spread decreased from 2.4% in the pre-crisis period to 
1.5% in the crisis period. Moreover, turnover ratio (TR) decreased from 2.4% in the pre-crisis 
period to 1.5% in the crisis period. Likewise, trade size (TZ) decreased significantly from 11.33 in 
the pre-crisis period to 5.17 in the crisis period. Regarding trading volume (VO), as shown in Table 
6.1 Panel (A), it increased significantly from 2903.3 in the pre-crisis period to 3111.3 in the crisis 
period. Our results are in line with previous studies (Poon et al., 2013; Sias 2000).     
 
With respect to owners’ identity, Table 6.1 Panel (A) shows that no significant changes are 
observed for the executive director’s ownership (EO) and non-executive’s director’s ownership 
between the pre-crisis and crisis periods. Likewise, for cross-holding (NOSHCO) and other holding 
(NOSHOF) no significant changes are observed between the pre-crisis and crisis periods. With 
respect to the employee holding (NOSHEM), this increased insignificantly from 9% in the pre-
crisis period to 11% in the crisis period. Furthermore, government ownership (NOSHGV) increased 
from in the pre-crisis period, when it was 0.1%, to 0.2% in the crisis period. Nevertheless, 
investment company holding (NOSHIC) decreased from the pre-crisis period 29% to 24% in the 
crisis period. In addition, pension fund holding (NOSHPF) decreased significantly from the pre-
crisis period, when it was 2%, to 0.9% in the crisis period 
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For the pre-crisis and post-crisis differences, Table 6.1 Panel (B) shows that the average insider 
ownership (IO) increased significantly from 9% in the pre-crisis period to 10% in the crisis period. 
A similar pattern applies to institutional ownership (INSO) with a mean value that increased 
significantly from 59% in the pre-crisis period to 78% in the post-crisis period. With respect to 
large shareholders (LS), they decreased significantly from 25% in the pre-crisis period to 21% in 
the post-crisis period. Similar to that, blockholders (BKO) decreased significantly from 20% in the 
pre-crisis period to 17% in the post-crisis period. Regarding market liquidity, Table 6.1 Panel (B) 
shows that proportional bid-ask spread decreased significantly from 2.4% in the pre-crisis period to 
1.1% in the post-crisis period. Moreover, price impact ratio (Pimpact) decreased insignificantly 
from 0% in the pre-crisis period to 9.64E-04% in the post-crisis period. Nevertheless, number of 
trades (NT) increased significantly from 280.7 in the pre-crisis period to 933.67 in the post-crisis 
period. However, turnover ratio (TR) decreased significantly from 0.80% in the pre-crisis period to 
0.4% in the post-crisis period. Likewise, trade size (TZ) decreased significantly from 11.33 in the 
pre-crisis period to 2.93 in the post-crisis period. With respect to trading volume (VO), it decreased 
significantly from 2903.3 in the pre-crisis period to 1714.89 in the post-crisis period. Our results 
are in line with previous studies (Poon et al., 2013; Sias 2000).     
 
With respect to owners’ identity, Table 6.1 Panel (B) shows the average executive directors’ 
ownership (EO) increased significantly from 6% in the pre-crisis period to 7% in the post-crisis 
period. However, non-executive ownership (NEO) decreased insignificantly from 3% in the pre- 
crisis period to 2% in the post-crisis period. However, for other holding (NOSHOF) no significant 
changes are observed between the pre-crisis and post-crisis periods. With respect to the employee 
holding (NOSHEM), it increased significantly from 9% in the pre-crisis period to 12% in the crisis 
period. Furthermore, government ownership (NOSHGV) increased significantly from 0.1% in the 
pre-crisis period to 0.3% in the crisis period. Nevertheless, pension fund holding (NOSHPF) 
decreased significantly from the pre-crisis period, when it was 2%, to 1% in the post-crisis period. 
Moreover, foreign ownership (NOSHFR) increased significantly from 6% in the pre-crisis period to 
10% in the crisis period. Investment Company holding (NOSHIC) decreased significantly from the 
pre-crisis period, when it was 29%, to 19% in the post-crisis period. 
 
 
 164 
 
Table 6.1 Mean and Median Differences of Ownership Structure and Market Liquidity Variables during the 
pre, within and post crisis periods 
Table 6.1 presents the mean and median differences of insider ownership (IO), institutional ownership (INSO), 
blockholders (BKO), largest shareholder (LS), executive ownership (EO), non-executive ownership (NEO), free float 
holding (NOSHFF), foreign holding (NOSHFR), investment company holding (NOSHIC), pension fund (NOSHPF), 
government holding (NOSHGV), employee holding (NOSHEM), cross holding (NOSHCO), other holding (NOSHOF), 
proportional bid-ask spread (PBAS), turnover ratio (TR), price impact ratio (Pimpact), trade Size (TZ), trading volume 
(VO), number of trades (NT) in the pre-, during and post-crisis periods. The pre-crisis period includes years 2004-2006, 
crisis period includes years 2007-2009, and post-crisis period includes years 2010-2012 for FTSE All-Share non- 
financial companies. See Table 3.2 for variables’ definitions and measurements. ***,**,* represent significance at the 
1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
 
Panel (A) Mean (Median) Differences Pre- and During Crisis Periods 
 Mean  Median Mean  Median t-test Wilcoxon rank -sum 
IO 0.09 0.01 0.11 0.02 -1.91* -2.34** 
LS 0.25 0.26 0.24 0.25 2.70*** 2.68*** 
BKO 0.20 0.22 0.20 0.22 0.92 0.27 
INSO 0.59 0.55 0.76 0.80 -24.70*** -17.67*** 
EO 0.06 0.001 0.08 0.006 -0.63 -1.62 
NEO 0.03 0.002 0.03 0.002 -0.65 -0.83 
NOSHCO 0.07 0.001 0.07 0.007 0.26 3.16*** 
NOSHEM 0.09 0.001 0.11 0.02 -0.88 1.04 
NOSHGV 0.001 0.00 0.002 0.000 -1.39 -1.66* 
NOSHIC 0.29 0.26 0.24 0.200 3.40*** 5.01*** 
NOSHPF 0.02 0.007 0.009 0.005 5.83*** 10.44*** 
NOSHFR 0.06 0.01 0.06 0.00 1.06 5.32*** 
NOSHFF 0.59 0.55 0.76 0.80 -24.70*** -17.67*** 
NOSHOF 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 -0.33 0.86 
PBAS 0.024 0.009 0.015 0.001 8.94*** 9.70*** 
PIMPACT 0.000 0.000 0.000 9.64E-06 0.08 5.17*** 
NT 280.74 54.88 769.87 280.08 -10.33*** -13.06*** 
TR 0.008 0.004 0.001 0.001 0.76 4.08*** 
TZ 11.33 5.97 5.17 2.95 6.97*** 14.50*** 
VO 2903.34 524.58 3111.3 640.74 -1.69* -3.80*** 
Panel (B) Mean (Median) Differences Pre- and Post-Crisis Periods 
IO 0.09 0.01 0.10 0.01 2.59*** 1.48 
LS 0.25 0.26 0.21 0.09 4.25*** 2.99*** 
BKO 0.20 0.22 0.17 0.07 4.74*** 4.00*** 
INSO 0.59 0.55 0.78 0.85 -7.12*** -8.01*** 
EO 0.06 0.001 0.07 0.007 1.80* -0.61 
NEO 0.03 0.002 0.02 0.002 1.62 1.57 
NOSHCO 0.07 0.001 0.08 0.01 -1.01 -2.31** 
NOSHEM 0.09 0.001 0.12 0.02 -0.87 -1.65* 
NOSHGV 0.001 0.00 0.003 0.000 -2.59*** -5.02*** 
NOSHIC 0.29 0.26 0.19 0.08 4.73*** 5.03*** 
NOSHPF 0.02 0.007 0.01 0.001 -10.95*** -11.25*** 
NOSHFR 0.06 0.01 0.10 0.06 -6.74*** -8.77*** 
NOSHFF 0.59 0.55 0.78 0.85 -7.12*** -8.01*** 
NOSHOF 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 2.06** 2.07** 
PBAS 0.024 0.009 0.011 0.003 5.83*** 8.42*** 
PIMPACT 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.19 -6.87*** 
NT 280.74 54.88 933.67 343.44 -3.48*** -3.67*** 
TR 0.008 0.004 0.004 0.003 8.44*** 12.51*** 
TZ 11.33 5.97 2.93 0.84 3.10*** 12.24*** 
VO 2903.34 524.58 1714.89 437.18 6.75*** 7.30*** 
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Time Series Analysis 
 
The mean, median and standard deviation of ownership level, concentration and owners’ identity 
and market liquidity variables accounting for differences between years (i.e. year-to-year 
descriptive statistics) of the variables are used to examine the changes and directions of these 
variables during the study’s period along with the mean of the pooled sample. In order to enable 
comparison between years means, together with the mean of the pooled sample, and to capture the 
changes in ownership percentage of holding, Table 6.2 presents the evolutions and trends of the 
averages of ownership level, concentration and owners’ identity and market liquidity variables 
during the period of the study (i.e. 2003-2012).  
 
As demonstrated in Table 6.2 and Figure 6.1, blockholders had gradually increased during the 
period of the study from 10.13% in 2003 to 14.09% in 2012, while blockholders reached their peak 
in 2007 and increased by 20.8% from 10.13 % to 20.58% by the end of 2007. However, they fell by 
around 21.5% in the following year. In addition, the largest shareholders increased from 20.91% in 
2003 to 23.52 in 2007 and the institutional ownership increased gradually from 75.51% in 2003 to 
80% in 2012 and insider ownership increased from 10.49% in 2003 to 12.25% in 2007. This 
increase might be related to the global financial and economic crisis in 2007 and due to compliance 
with the requirements of the UK Corporate Governance Code of 2006 and the Higgs review of 
2003. With respect to owners’ identity, Table 6.2 and Figures 6.2 and 6.3 show that the executive 
ownership increased from 7.8% in 2003 to 8.5% in 2007 and the non-executive ownership 
increased from 2.9% in 2003 to 3.6% in 2012. In contrast, pension find decreased from 2.39% in 
2003 to 0.99% in 2007. Moreover, employee (NOSHEM), government (NOSHGV), and 
investment company (NOSHIC) decreased, whereas the free float shares increased during 2003-
2012.  
 
In order to enable comparison between years means, together with the mean of the pooled sample, 
and to capture the changes in the identity of ownership, Table 5.3 presents the evolutions and trends 
of the averages of the identity of ownership variables during the period of the study (i.e. 2003-
2012). It is noticeable that executive ownership has gradually increased from 7.8% in 2003 to 8.3% 
in 2012, suggesting that more firms tend to hold more executive ownership. Conversely, the non-
executive ownership reached a peak in 2007 then decreased slightly thereafter. A noticeable change 
has occurred during the period of the study in the firms’ tendency to hold foreign ownership. In 
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2003, around 6.41% of firms in the sample hold foreign ownership. However, this average had 
increased from 6.42 to 12.23% by 2012. Finally, while no significant change was detected in the 
average of firms that hold government ownership during the period 2003-2012, this average had 
slightly increased during the years 2003-2012, from 0.19% to 0.39% in 2012. As shown in Table 
6.2, in 2003 around 75% of firms were held by free float investors. However, this percentage 
dramatically increased to around 79.7% in 2012, suggesting that many firms tended to be held by 
ordinary investors. More interestingly, following a sustained period from 2004-2007 where 
disclosure quality seems to have been being improved, a significant sharp reversal in the disclosure 
quality occurred in 2008. This change in disclosure quality might be an epiphenomenal effect of the 
pressure that followed the year of the worst global financial crisis in living memory. 
 
 
 
Figure 6.1 The Trends of the Ownership Level and Concentration Means during the Period 2003-2012 
 
Figure 6.2 The Trends of the Insider’s Identities of Ownership Means during the Period 2003-2012 
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Figure 6.3 The Trends of the Outsider’s Identities of Ownership Means during the Period 2003-2012 
 
Additionally, proportional bid-ask spread (PBAS) shows some significant changes during the 
period under review. As shown in Table 6.2 it reached its peak in 2004 and decreased by 54% from 
1.81% to 0.83%. Moreover, from Table 6.2 it can be seen that number of trades (NT) peaked in 
2009 then dropped thereafter, whereas trading volume (VO) reached its highest value in 2007. 
Proportional bid-ask spread and price impact ratio have been stable in the last few years as an 
information friction of stock’s market liquidity. However, the real friction of stock’s market 
liquidity (e.g. turnover ratio, trading volume, trade size, and number of trades) decreased in the last 
few years. 
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Table 6.2 Descriptive Statistics Year by Year  
Table 6.2 presents the time series average of cross-sectional means and standard deviations during the sample periods from December 2003 to December 2012 for UK companies. 
A brief description of the variables is given below. Insider ownership (IO), institutional ownership (INSO), blockholders (BKO), largest shareholder (LS), executive ownership 
(EO), non-executive ownership (NEO), free float holding (NOSHFF), foreign holding (NOSHFR), investment company holding (NOSHIC), pension fund (NOSHPF), 
government holding (NOSHGV), employee holding (NOSHEM), cross holding (NOSHCO), other holding (NOSHOF), proportional bid-ask spread (PBAS), turnover ratio (TR), 
price impact ratio (Pimpact), trade Size (TZ), trading volume (VO), and number of trades (NT). See Table 3.2 for variables’ definitions and measurements. 
 
Variables  2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 Pooled 
 
VO 
 
948.41 
{2676.63} 
 
2938.72 
{7116.74} 
 
2943.46 
{6857.14} 
 
2831.31 
{6541.28} 
 
3362.49 
{6876.85} 
 
3361.47 
{6748.08} 
 
2634.68 
{5814.15} 
 
2183.07 
{5228.62} 
 
1551.22 
{3515.11} 
 
1410.38 
{3686.19} 
 
2446.33 
{5791.14} 
PBAS 0.0181 
{0.0238} 
0.0301 
{0.0260} 
0.0233 
{0.0267} 
0.0199 
{0.0229} 
0.0169 
{0.0242} 
 
0.0154 
{0.0211} 
0.0134 
{0.0212} 
0.0134 
{0.0200} 
0.0106 
{0.0195} 
0.0083 
{0.0158} 
0.0166 
{0.0229} 
NT  603.26 
{1190.12} 
 
236.06 
{592.77} 
268.19 
{566.91} 
335.08 
{621.91} 
448.96 
{861.98} 
668.16 
{1215.61} 
1170.66 
{1804.17} 
926.72 
{1599.76} 
787.66 
{1421.60} 
1086.64 
{1670.94} 
670.80 
{1298.07} 
TZ  5.81 
{13.15} 
16.79 
{19.54} 
9.41 
{11.40} 
8.00 
{10.33} 
5.55 
{6.54} 
4.85 
{5.84} 
5.12 
{29.51} 
3.37 
{7.86} 
2.92 
{6.54} 
2.50 
{6.88} 
6.26 
{14.31} 
 
PIMPACT  
 
0.0003 
{0.0009} 
 
0.0002 
{0.0004} 
 
0.0001 
{0.0001} 
 
0.0001 
{0.0002} 
 
0.0001 
{0.0005} 
 
0.0001 
{0.0006} 
 
0.0002 
{0.0006} 
 
0.0002 
{0.0006} 
 
0.0001 
{0.0003} 
 
0.0001 
{0.0004} 
 
0.0001 
{0.0005} 
 
IO 
 
0.1049 
{0.1887} 
 
0.0888 
{0.1754} 
0.0879 
{0.1683} 
0.1014 
{0.1776} 
0.1225 
{0.2006} 
0.1241 
{0.2072} 
0.0974 
{0.1837} 
0.0963 
{0.1807} 
0.1063 
{0.1968} 
0.1040 
{0.1935} 
0.1035 
{0.1879} 
 
LS 0.2091 
{0.2103} 
 
0.2526 
{0.2129} 
0.2530 
{0.2055} 
0.2537 
{0.2030} 
0.2352 
{0.2088} 
0.2423 
{0.2080} 
0.2449 
{0.2099} 
0.2412 
{0.2079} 
0.2284 
{0.2070} 
0.1737 
{0.1994} 
0.2336 
{0.2081} 
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Variables  2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 Pooled 
 
BKO 0.1013 
{0.1537} 
0.2041 
{0.1873} 
0.2118 
{0.1829} 
0.2055 
{0.1801} 
0.2058 
{0.1854} 
0.2076 
{0.1792} 
0.2068 
{0.1815} 
0.1996 
{0.1820} 
0.1727 
{0.1782} 
0.1409 
{0.1712} 
0.1880 
{0.1815} 
 
EO 0.0788 
{0.1675} 
0.0656 
{0.1530} 
0.0690 
{0.1543} 
0.0696 
{0.1443} 
0.0851 
{0.1648} 
0.0791 
{0.1630} 
0.0775 
{0.1658} 
0.0760 
{0.1649} 
0.0770 
{0.1677} 
0.0832 
{0.1701} 
0.0762 
{0.1616} 
 
NEO 0.0294 
{0.0805} 
0.0304 
{0.0828} 
0.0331 
{0.0925} 
0.0314 
{0.0897} 
0.0369 
{0.0977} 
0.0332 
{0.0911} 
0.0309 
{0.0911} 
0.0279 
{0.0865} 
0.0292 
{0.0892} 
0.0269 
{0.0872} 
0.0309 
{0.0891} 
 
NOSHEM 0.1300 
{0.2245} 
0.0948 
{0.1825} 
0.1041 
{0.1963} 
0.0992 
{0.1818} 
0.1043 
{0.1889} 
0.1120 
{0.2059} 
0.1156 
{0.1984} 
0.1061 
{0.1875} 
0.1374 
{0.2151} 
0.1276 
{0.2096} 
0.1130 
 
{0.1990} 
 
NOSHGV 0.0019 
{0.0079} 
0.0019 
{0.0078} 
0.0015 
{0.0063} 
0.0015 
{0.0063} 
0.0016 
{0.0064} 
0.0020 
{0.0085} 
0.0029 
{0.0184} 
0.0033 
{0.0191} 
0.0035 
{0.0192} 
0.0039 
{0.0191} 
0.0025 
{0.0136} 
 
NOSHIC 0.3402 
{0.2037} 
0.3681 
{0.1900} 
0.2710 
{0.1919} 
0.2293 
{0.2195} 
0.2623 
{0.2600} 
0.2528 
{0.2454} 
0.2250 
{0.2383} 
0.1809 
{0.2051} 
0.1874 
{0.2091} 
0.2061 
{0.1881} 
0.2473 
{0.2238} 
 
NOSHPF 0.0339 
{0.0261} 
0.0316 
{0.0508} 
0.0117 
{0.0507} 
0.0099 
{0.0205} 
0.0099 
{0.0206} 
0.0096 
{0.0203} 
0.0091 
{0.0198} 
0.0092 
{0.0201} 
0.0205 
{0.0260} 
0.0204 
{0.0255} 
0.0159 
{0.0311} 
 
NOSHFF 0.7500 
{0.1878} 
0.5476 
{0.1129} 
0.5118 
{0.1170} 
0.7146 
{0.1417} 
0.7702 
{0.1572} 
0.7583 
{0.1649} 
0.7563 
{0.1686} 
0.7716 
{0.1686} 
0.7899 
{0.1714} 
0.7971 
{0.1732} 
0.7196 
{0.1842} 
 
NOSHFR 0.0641 
{0.0765} 
0.0891 
{0.1033} 
0.0450 
{0.0956} 
0.0530 
{0.1032} 
0.0636 
{0.1237} 
0.0659 
{0.1394} 
0.0616 
{0.1360} 
0.0549 
{0.1281} 
0.1252 
{0.1495} 
0.1223 
{0.1391} 
0.0754 
{0.1263} 
 
NOSHOF 
 
0.0000 
{0.0000} 
 
0.0072 
{0.0547} 
0.0118 
{0.0602} 
0.0088 
{0.0526} 
0.0142 
{0.0763} 
0.0104 
{0.0741} 
0.0085 
{0.0670} 
0.0084 
{0.0663} 
0.0058 
{0.0533} 
0.0057 
{0.0534} 
0.0083 
{0.0604} 
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6.4. Empirical Results  
 
This section provides the empirical results on the relationship between ownership level, 
concentration and owners’ identity and market liquidity pre, during and posts the recent financial 
crisis 2007-2009. The first part presents the main regression analysis on the effect of ownership 
level and concentration on market liquidity pre, within and post crisis. The second part presents the 
main regression analysis on the effect of owners’ identity on market liquidity within these sub-
periods.  
 
As indicated previously, the period of the study is divided into three sub-periods, pre-crisis (2004-
2006), crisis period (2007-2009) and post-crisis period (2010-2012). Following Poon et al. (2013), 
this study runs the pooled OLS industry and year dummies in the main analysis. Poon et al. (2013) 
argue that this method controls for the endogeneity problem. Therefore, and to control for the effect 
of endogeneity, the empirical strategy includes several steps to minimise the effect of such an issue 
in the estimation. First, following Brockman et al. (2009), this study controls for simultaneity by 
introducing the “lagged values” of the ownership variables. Second, to control for unobservable 
heterogeneity, this study follows Poon et al. (2013) and includes year and industry fixed effects by 
introducing dummies for each year and each industry within the non- financial sectors. Finally, this 
study estimates robust the standard errors to control for serial correlation and heteroscedasticity 
using the option “Robust” in STATA 11.   
 
Table 6.3 Panel A and B present our pooled OLS clustered regression results on the relationship 
between ownership level, concentration and market liquidity. To alleviate concerns about 
endogeneity and spurious inferences, this study includes in all pooled-sample regressions the 
control variables that the literature identifies as important determinants of market liquidity. All 
model specifications include industry fixed effects to control for time-invariant omitted industry-
level factors that affect liquidity. The study also includes year effects to control for cross-sectional 
dependence; that is, market-wide factors that affect a stock's market liquidity. The study reported t-
statistics values are based on heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors, clustered at the firm level. 
Clustering the errors at the firm level allows us to control for time-series dependence.  
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Table 6.3 presents the main results using the pooled OLS industry and year dummies. Panel (A) 
reports the results for the effect of ownership level, concentration on market liquidity using 
proportional bid-ask spread (PBAS) and price impact ratio (Pimpact) as dependent variables, while 
Panel (B) reports the results for the real friction of market liquidity (i.e., trading activity). The 
findings reveal a significantly negative relationship between insider ownership and market liquidity 
during the 2007-2009 financial crisis. However, insignificantly negative relationship is also 
observed between insider ownership and trade size (TZ) in the pre-crisis and insignificantly 
negative relationship between insider ownership and number of trades (NT) and turnover ratio (TR) 
in post-crisis period. The findings for total liquidity costs and real friction of market liquidity 
suggest that insider ownership is marginally negative in both the pre-crisis and post-crisis periods. 
Accordingly, H1a, and H1c are rejected, whereas H1b is accepted. The results with respect to the 
2007-2009 financial crisis periods in this chapter are consistent with the results reported in Chapter 
4.  
 
Regarding ownership concentration, Table 6.3 shows that the relationship between blockholders 
and proportional bid-ask spread and price impact ratio is insignificantly negative. This 
insignificantly negative relationship is found in the pre-crisis, crisis and post-crisis periods. These 
results are inconsistent with our findings in Chapter 4 for UK firms specifically: an increase in 
blockholders neither decreases or increase market liquidity in the three sub-periods. The same 
patterns hold for larger shareholders. Moreover, Table 6.3 shows that the relationship between large 
shareholders and market liquidity is insignificantly negative. These findings are inconsistent with 
the adverse selection hypothesis (Brockman et al., 2009; Rubin 2007). This leads us to reject H2a, 
H2b and H2c, which state that there is negative relationship between ownership concentration and 
market liquidity in the three sub-periods.  
 
However, with respect to institutional ownership Table 6.3 shows that it has an insignificant 
positive impact on market liquidity that is inconsistent with the trading hypothesis (Rubin 2007). 
According to this hypothesis, institutional investors trade more often than other investors (i.e., 
insiders). Taken together, the findings from Table 6.3 in both Panels reject H3a, H3b and H3c, which 
state that there is a positive relationship between institutional ownership and market liquidity. To 
the best of the author’s knowledge, no empirical papers can be found with which to compare our 
results, i.e. examine the impact of ownership level and concentration on market liquidity. However, 
the insignificantly positive relationship between institutional ownership and market liquidity is 
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consistent with Poon et al. (2013) who document that in order to en-cash their position institutional 
investors herd when the market is down.   
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Table 6.3a Pooled OLS Regression Results on the Relationship between Ownership Level and Concentration and Total Market Liquidity 
Table 6.3a presents results of the effect of ownership level and concentration on market liquidity in the pre-crisis (2004-2006), crisis (2007-2009) and post crisis (2010-2012) periods. The table contains 
coefficient values and t-statistics obtained from the estimation of the following model. Figures reported in parentheses represent t-statistics which are based on robust standard errors, where ***,**,* mean 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
LIQit = α0+β1IOit+ β2INSOit+ β3BKOit+ β4LSit+ γ1MVit+ γ2Pit+ γ3VOLit+ ∑ 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑛𝑖=1  +∑ 𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅
𝑛
𝑖=1 + εi………………………………………………...(1a and 1a) 
LIQit = α0+β1IOit+ β2INSOit+ β3BKOit+ β4LSit+ γ1MVit+ γ2Pit+ γ3VOLit + γ4TZit + γ5NTit + ∑ 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑛𝑖=1 + ∑ 𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅
𝑛
𝑖=1 + εi………………..(1b and 2b) 
A brief description of the ownership structure, market liquidity and control variables is given below. Insider ownership (IO), institutional ownership (INSO), blockholders (BKO), largest shareholder (LS), 
proportional bid-ask spread (PBAS), Price impact ratio (Pimpact), trade size (TZ), number of trades (NT), firm size (MV), share price (P), return volatility (VOL), Industry (IND) and Year (YEAR)  Dummies. 
See Table 3.2 for variables’ definitions and measurements. 
Panel A The Effect of Ownership Level and Concentration on Total Cost of  Market Liquidity 
 
                       Pre-Crisis                                                    Within Crisis             Post-Crisis 
 PBAS 
(1a) 
PBAS 
(1b) 
Pimpact 
(2a) 
Pimpact 
(2b) 
PBAS 
(1a) 
PBAS 
(1b) 
Pimpact 
(2a) 
Pimpact 
(2b) 
PBAS 
(1a) 
PBAS 
(1b) 
Pimpact 
(2a) 
Pimpact 
(2b) 
Insider ownership  0.07 
(3.15)*** 
0.03 
(1.57) 
0.33 
(5.92)*** 
0.23 
(4.71)*** 
0.03 
(1.66)* 
0.03 
(1.84)* 
0.27 
(5.59)*** 
0.21 
(4.73)*** 
0.03 
(1.19) 
0.04 
(2.04)** 
0.28 
(6.06)*** 
0.23 
(5.61)*** 
Large 
Shareholders  
0.11 
(2.96)*** 
0.10 
(3.24)*** 
0.00 
(0.01) 
0.01 
(0.17) 
0.03 
(1.06) 
0.01 
(0.27) 
0.02 
(0.34) 
0.02 
(0.38) 
0.10 
(2.44)** 
0.07 
(1.98)** 
0.02 
(0.37) 
0.01 
(0.18) 
Blockholders  0.01 
(0.14) 
0.01 
(0.53) 
0.09 
(1.04) 
0.04 
(0.54) 
0.02 
(0.69) 
0.02 
(0.74) 
0.06 
(0.90) 
0.05 
(0.85) 
0.08 
(1.90)* 
0.04 
(1.17) 
0.13 
(1.94)* 
0.10 
(1.64) 
Institutional 
Ownership  
-0.07 
(-0.38) 
-0.03 
(-0.20) 
-0.12 
(-0.28) 
-0.04 
(-0.14) 
-0.26 
(-1.08) 
-0.12 
(-0.64) 
-0.67 
(-1.37) 
-0.46 
(-1.14) 
-0.02 
(-0.10) 
-0.03 
(-0.18) 
-1.03 
(-2.60)*** 
-0.77 
(-2.34)** 
Market Value  -0.20 
(-9.09)*** 
-0.11 
(-5.52)*** 
-0.52 
(-9.70)*** 
-0.33 
(-5.99)*** 
-0.20 
(-8.68)*** 
-0.12 
(-5.61)*** 
-0.50 
(-11.65)*** 
-0.37 
(-9.51)*** 
-0.22 
(-8.35)*** 
-0.10 
(-4.99)*** 
-0.38 
(-7.67)*** 
-0.25 
(-5.18)*** 
Volatility  0.15 
(3.09)*** 
0.18 
(4.25)*** 
0.04 
(0.40) 
0.12 
(1.37) 
0.04 
(0.89) 
0.04 
(1.03) 
0.16 
(1.46) 
0.15 
(1.49) 
0.15 
(3.18)*** 
0.06 
(1.78)* 
0.16 
(1.92)* 
0.14 
(1.75)* 
Share price  -0.07 
(-2.47)** 
-0.04 
(-1.50) 
0.14 
(2.02)** 
0.20 
(3.17)*** 
-0.06 
(-2.28)** 
-0.02 
(-3.38)*** 
0.08 
(1.75)* 
0.08 
(1.79)* 
-0.14 
(-4.34)*** 
-0.03 
(-1.33) 
0.02 
(0.32) 
0.01 
(0.23) 
Trade Size - 0.02 
(0.84) 
- -0.10 
(-1.53) 
- 0.07 
(2.58)*** 
- -0.26 
(-3.71)*** 
- 0.18 
(5.94)*** 
- -0.26 
(-4.02)*** 
Number of Trades  - -0.20 
(-9.12)*** 
- -0.49 
(-9.37)*** 
- -0.22 
(-8.53)*** 
- -0.39 
(-7.87)*** 
- -0.26 
(-12.00)*** 
- -0.39 
(-8.68)*** 
Constant -0.65 
(-5.77)*** 
-0.72 
(-7.45)*** 
-2.56 
(-8.67)*** 
-2.51 
(-9.74)*** 
-1.17 
(-9.71)*** 
-1.11 
(-10.01)*** 
-3.01 
(-12.56)*** 
-2.55 
(-11.68)*** 
-0.99 
(-6.56)*** 
-0.98 
(-8.21)*** 
-2.75 
(-11.00)*** 
-2.19 
(-9.13)*** 
Adjusted R2 0.42 0.51 0.44 0.55 0.37 0.49 0.43 0.50 0.46 0.61 0.41 0.49 
Number of 
Observations   
588 588 588 588 588 588 588 588 588 588 588 588 
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Table 6.3b Pooled OLS Regression Results on the Relationship between Ownership Level and Concentration and Real Friction of Market Liquidity 
Table 6.3b presents results of the effect of ownership level and concentration on market liquidity in the pre-crisis (2004-2006), crisis (2007-2009) and post crisis (2010-2012) periods. The table 
contains coefficient values and t-statistics obtained from the estimation of the following model. Figures reported in parentheses represent t-statistics which are based on robust standard errors, where 
***,**,* mean significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
LIQit = α0+β1IOit+ β2INSOit+ β3BKOit+ β4LSit+ γ1MVit+ γ2Pit+ γ3VOLit+ ∑ 𝐼𝑁𝐷
𝑛
𝑖=1  +∑ 𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅
𝑛
𝑖=1 + εi 
A brief description of the ownership structure, market liquidity and control variables is given below. Insider ownership (IO), institutional ownership (INSO), blockholders (BKO), largest shareholder 
(LS), trade size (TZ), number of trades (NT), trading volume (VO) and turnover ratio (TR), firm size (MV), share price (P), return volatility (VOL), Industry (IND) and Year (YEAR)  Dummies. See 
Table 3.2 for variables’ definitions and measurements. 
Panel B  The Effect of Ownership Level and Concentration on Real Friction of  Market Liquidity 
 
 Pre-Crisis Within Crisis Post-Crisis 
 NT TSIZE TR VO NT TSIZE TR VO NT TSIZE TR VO 
Insider 
Ownership  
-0.20 
(-4.42)*** 
-0.01 
(-0.46) 
-0.05 
(-2.47)** 
-0.28 
(-5.39)*** 
-0.06 
(-1.48) 
-0.14 
(-4.14)*** 
-0.05 
(-2.76)*** 
-0.18 
(-3.69)*** 
-0.03 
(-0.88) 
-0.12 
(-3.57)*** 
-0.01 
(-0.80) 
-0.19 
(-4.60)*** 
Large 
Shareholder  
-0.03 
(-0.45) 
-0.02 
(-0.52) 
-0.01 
(-0.13) 
-0.12 
(-1.65)* 
-0.16 
(-2.18)** 
-0.06 
(-1.54) 
-0.02 
(-0.37) 
-0.05 
(-0.65) 
-0.05 
(-0.91) 
-0.03 
(-0.80) 
-0.02 
(-0.98) 
-0.01 
(-0.16) 
Blockholders -0.11 
(-1.49) 
-0.01 
(-0.04) 
-0.02 
(-0.57) 
-0.01 
(-0.10) 
-0.01 
(-0.14) 
-0.02 
(-0.55) 
-0.01 
(-0.19) 
-0.07 
(-0.88) 
-0.10 
(-1.52) 
-0.04 
(-0.78) 
-0.02 
(-0.57) 
-0.15 
(-1.87)* 
Institutional 
Ownership  
0.18 
(0.43) 
0.10 
(0.36) 
0.25 
(0.98) 
0.11 
(0.23) 
0.58 
(1.26) 
0.08 
(0.28) 
0.48 
(1.91)* 
0.54 
(1.18) 
0.44 
(1.11) 
0.32 
(1.11) 
0.80 
(3.47)*** 
0.97 
(2.37)** 
Market Value  0.39 
(8.54)*** 
-0.02 
(-0.98) 
0.07 
(4.20)*** 
0.41 
(9.93)*** 
0.35 
(8.21)*** 
-0.06 
(-2.96)*** 
0.08 
(4.05)*** 
0.40 
(8.58)*** 
0.37 
(8.31)*** 
-0.07 
(-2.62)*** 
0.02 
(1.01) 
0.26 
(6.11)*** 
Volatility  0.14 
(1.73)* 
0.05 
(0.62) 
0.19 
(4.02)*** 
0.10 
(1.06) 
0.01 
(0.04) 
-0.01 
(-0.28) 
0.10 
(1.82)* 
0.11 
(1.40) 
-0.17 
(-2.11)** 
0.19 
(3.90)*** 
0.11 
(3.09)*** 
-0.07 
(-0.83) 
Share Price  0.15 
(2.63)*** 
-0.19 
(-5.46)*** 
0.01 
(0.08) 
-0.14 
(-2.19)** 
0.13 
(2.94)*** 
-0.21 
(-5.90)*** 
0.01 
(0.01) 
-0.11 
(-1.95)* 
0.20 
(4.03)*** 
-0.31 
(-8.80)*** 
0.01 
(0.23) 
-0.03 
(-0.67) 
Constant  -0.18 
(-0.76) 
1.38 
(8.39)*** 
-2.76 
(-22.71)*** 
1.12 
(4.50)*** 
0.58 
(2.23)** 
0.88 
(4.72)*** 
-2.45 
(-19.90)*** 
1.81 
(6.92)*** 
0.73 
(2.84)*** 
1.00 
(5.53)*** 
-2.25 
(-19.37)*** 
1.65 
(7.23)*** 
Adjusted R2 0.36 0.10 0.18 0.34 0.39 0.28 0.13 0.35 0.39 0.34 0.12 0.30 
Number of 
Observations  
588 588 588 588 588 588 588 588 588 588 588 588 
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Table 6.4 presents the main results using the pooled OLS industry and year dummies. Panel (A) 
reports the results for the effect of owners’ identity on market liquidity using proportional bid-ask 
spread (PBAS) and price impact ratio (Pimpact) as dependent variables, while Panel (B) reports the 
results for the real friction of market liquidity (i.e., trading activity). The findings for both total 
liquidity costs and real friction of market liquidity suggest that the executive and non-executive 
director’s ownership are insignificantly correlated with market liquidity in the pre-crisis, crisis and 
post-crisis periods. Nevertheless, Table 6.4 Panel A reveals an insignificantly positive relationship 
between executive and non-executive directors’ ownership and the proportional bid-ask spread 
during the crisis period. Moreover, Table 6.4 Panel B shows insignificantly negative relationship 
between executive and non-executive directors’ ownership and trade size (TZ) and turnover ratio 
(TR) in the pre-crisis period. This would mean that in the pre-crisis and crisis periods the executive 
and non-executive directors’ ownership have a marginally negative impact on market liquidity. 
Accordingly, H4a and H4b are rejected whereas H4c is accepted. It is therefore, noted that the post-
crisis period’s results reported in this chapter are consistent with the results reported in Chapter 5.  
 
With respect to the outsider ownership identities, Table 6.4 Panel A reveals an insignificantly 
positive relationship between pension fund ownership (NOSHPF) and price impact ratio in the 
crisis and post-crisis periods. Moreover, Table 6.4 Panel A shows an insignificantly positive 
relationship between NOSHPF and price impact ratio during the crisis and post-crisis periods. This 
means that during the pre-crisis and crisis periods the pension fund ownership has a marginally 
positive impact on the total cost of market liquidity. Moreover, Table 6.4 Panel B reveals an 
insignificantly negative relationship between NOSHPF and trade size (TZ) in the pre-crisis, within 
crisis and post crisis periods. Regarding foreign ownership (NOSHFR), Table 6.4 Panel A reveals, 
an insignificantly positive relationship between NOSHFR and the proportional bid-ask spread 
(PBAS) in the pre-crisis, within crisis and post-crisis periods. Moreover, Table 6.4 Panel B shows 
an insignificantly negative relationship between NOSHFR and trade size (TZ), number of trade 
(NT) and turnover ratio in the pre, within and post-crisis periods. This means that in the pre, within 
and post-crisis foreign ownership has a marginally negative impact on market liquidity. 
Accordingly, H4a,  H4b and H4c are accepted.  
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With respect to investment banks ownership (NOSHIC), Table 6.4 Panel A reveals an 
insignificantly positive relationship between NOSHIC and the proportional bid-ask spread (PBAS) 
and price impact ratio (Pimpact) in the pre-crisis, within crisis and post-crisis periods. Moreover, 
Table 6.4 Panel B shows an insignificantly negative relationship between NOSHIC and trade size 
(TZ), trading volume (VO) and turnover ratio in the pre-crisis and within crisis period. This means 
that investment banks’ ownership has a marginally negative impact on market liquidity. Regarding 
government ownership (NOSHGV), Table 6.4 Panel A reveals an insignificantly positive 
relationship between NOSHGV and the proportional bid-ask spread (PBAS) in the pre and post-
crisis periods. Moreover, Table 6.4 Panel B shows an insignificantly negative relationship between 
NOSHGV and trade size (TZ) and trading volume (VO) in the pre and post-crisis periods. This 
means that government ownership has a marginally negative impact on market liquidity in the pre 
and post-crisis period. 
 
With respect to cross-holding ownership (NOSHCO), Table 6.4 Panel A reveals an insignificantly 
positive relationship between NOSHCO and the proportional bid-ask spread (PBAS) and price 
impact ratio (Pimpact) in the pre-crisis, within crisis and post-crisis periods. Moreover, Table 6.4 
Panel B shows an insignificantly negative relationship between NOSHCO and trade size (TZ), 
trading volume (VO), number of trade (NT) and turnover ratio (TR) in the pre-crisis and post-crisis 
periods. However, Table 6.4 Panel B shows that in both the pre-crisis and post crisis periods, there 
is an insignificantly negative relationship between NOSHCO and trading volume. This means that 
cross-holdings ownership has a marginally negative impact on market liquidity. With respect to 
employee ownership (NOSHEM), Table 6.4 Panel A reports an insignificantly positive relationship 
between employee ownership and proportional bid-ask spread and price impact ratio in the pre-
crisis and within the crisis periods. Moreover, Table 6.4 Panel B reports insignificant negative 
relationship between employee ownership and real friction of market liquidity (i.e. trade size, 
number of trade, turnover ratio and trading volume) in the pre-crisis, within crisis and post crisis 
periods. Regarding other holdings (NOSHOF) Table 6.4 Panel A and B reveal an insignificantly 
positive relationship between NOSHOF and proportional bid-ask spread (PBAS) and price impact 
ratio (Pimact) in the pre-crisis period, and insignificantly negative relationship between NOSHOF  
and number of trades (NT), trading volume (VO) and turnover ratio (TR) in the pre-crisis, within 
crisis and post crisis periods.  
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Finally, with respect to the free float shares to the author’s knowledge few studies in the 
ownership-liquidity relationship take into consideration the free float as one of the determinants of 
market liquidity. The results in Table 6.4 reveal show an insignificantly positive relationship 
between market liquidity and free float shares (NOSHFF). Specifically, Table 6.4 Panel A shows 
an insignificantly negative relationship between NOSHFF and proportional bid-ask spread (PBAS) 
in the post-crisis period. Table 6.4 Panel B also show an insignificantly positive relationship 
between NOSHFF and the turnover ratio in the both pre-crisis and crisis periods. Moreover, this 
study reports a insignificantly positive relationship between free floats and number of trades (NT) 
in crisis and post crisis periods The sub-samples results presented in this chapter are inconsistent 
with the results reported in Chapter 5, which specifies the impact of the recent financial crisis on 
the sample firms, included in this research. 
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Table 6.4a Pooled OLS Regression Results on the Relationship between Owners’ Identity and Total Market Liquidity 
Table 6.4a presents results of the effect of owners identity on market liquidity in the pre-crisis (2004-2006), crisis (2007-2009) and post crisis (2010-2012) periods. The table contains coefficient values and t-statistics obtained from the estimation of the 
following model. Figures reported in parentheses represent t-statistics which are based on robust standard errors, where ***,**,* mean significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
LIQit=α0+β1EOit+β2NEOit+β3NOSHFFit+β4NOSHICit+β5NOSHOFit+β6NOSHPFit+β7NOSGVit+β8NOSHEMit+β9NOSHCOit+β10NOSHFRit+γ1MVit+γ2Pit+γ3VOLit+∑ 𝐼𝑁𝐷
𝑛
𝑖=1 + ∑ 𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅
𝑛
𝑖=1 + εi ……….……………………………….………..(1a and 2a) 
LIQit=α0+β1EOit+β2NEOit+β3NOSHFFit+β4NOSHICit+β5NOSHOFit+β6NOSHPFit+β7NOSGVit+β8NOSHEMit+β9NOSHCOit+β10NOSHFRit+γ1MVit+γ2Pit+γ3VOLit + γ4TZit + γ5NTit + ∑ 𝐼𝑁𝐷
𝑛
𝑖=1 + ∑ 𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅
𝑛
𝑖=1 + εi ……………..(1b and 2b) 
A brief description of the ownership structure, market liquidity and control variables is given below. Executive ownership (EO), non-executive ownership (NEO), free float holding (NOSHFF), foreign holding (NOSHFR), investment company holding 
(NOSHIC), pension fund holding (NOSHPF), government holding (NOSHGV), employee holding (NOSHEM), cross-holding (NOSHCO), other holding (NOSHOF), proportional bid-ask spread (PBAS), price impact ratio (Pimpact), trade size (TZ), 
number of trades (NT), firm size (MV), share price (P), return volatility (VOL), Industry (IND) and Year (YEAR) dummies. The t-statistics are reported in parentheses. See Table 3.2 for variables’ definitions. 
Panel A The Relationship between Owners’ Identity and Total Liquidity Costs  
 Pre-Crisis Within Crisis Post Crisis 
 PBAS  
(1a) 
PBAS 
 (2a) 
Pimpact 
(1b) 
Pimpact 
(2b) 
PBAS 
 (1a) 
PBAS 
(2a) 
Pimpact 
(1b) 
Pimpact 
(2b) 
PBAS 
(1a) 
PBAS 
(2a) 
Pimpact 
(1b) 
Pimpact 
(2b) 
EO  0.05 
(3.08)*** 
0.02 
(1.32) 
0.23 
(6.18)*** 
0.16 
(4.52)*** 
0.02 
(0.67) 
0.04 
(1.52) 
0.06 
(2.09)** 
0.01 
(0.06) 
0.08 
(3.04)*** 
0.07 
(2.71)*** 
0.11 
(3.78)*** 
0.06 
(2.00)** 
NEO 0.08 
(4.29)*** 
0.05 
(3.17)*** 
0.18 
(4.81)*** 
0.13 
(3.79)*** 
0.03 
(1.11) 
0.05 
(1.76)* 
0.16 
(5.32)*** 
0.11 
(3.76)*** 
0.10 
(3.92)*** 
0.10 
(3.78)*** 
0.19 
(5.87)*** 
0.13 
(4.17)*** 
NOSHCO 0.01 
(0.09) 
0.01 
(0.44) 
0.02 
(0.66) 
0.01 
(0.42) 
0.01 
(0.19) 
0.03 
(1.14) 
0.08 
(2.84)*** 
0.07 
(2.44)** 
0.01 
(0.47) 
0.01 
(0.56) 
0.04 
(1.33) 
0.02 
(0.76) 
NOSHEM 0.01 
(0.08) 
0.01 
(0.05) 
0.01 
(0.12) 
0.01 
(0.20) 
0.01 
(0.25) 
0.01 
(0.26) 
0.02 
(0.48) 
0.02 
(0.61) 
0.05 
(2.16)** 
0.05 
(2.03)** 
0.01 
(0.31) 
0.01 
(0.35) 
NOSHGV 0.02 
(1.17) 
0.01 
(0.50) 
0.08 
(2.51)** 
0.03 
(0.88) 
0.05 
(2.16)** 
0.04 
(1.79)* 
0.06 
(2.26)** 
0.08 
(3.03)*** 
0.02 
(1.02) 
0.02 
(0.91) 
0.02 
(0.87) 
0.01 
(0.34) 
NOSHIC 0.08 
(1.97)** 
0.11 
(2.75)*** 
-0.05 
(-1.53) 
0.09 
(1.22) 
0.02 
(0.42) 
0.03 
(0.76) 
0.05 
(1.09) 
0.05 
(0.99) 
0.04 
(0.94) 
0.06 
(1.44) 
0.01 
(0.19) 
0.02 
(0.33) 
NOSHPF 0.07 
(2.30)** 
0.03 
(1.24) 
0.23 
(3.80)*** 
0.15 
(2.82)*** 
0.07 
(2.01)** 
0.06 
(1.76)* 
0.01 
(0.05) 
0.01 
(0.24) 
0.07 
(2.29)** 
0.07 
(2.35)** 
0.01 
(0.46) 
0.01 
(0.17) 
NOSHFR 0.04 
(1.08) 
0.03 
(1.10) 
0.16 
(2.53)** 
0.16 
(2.70)*** 
0.09 
(0.42) 
0.03 
(0.18) 
0.30 
(1.33) 
0.35 
(1.67)* 
0.33 
(0.89) 
0.28 
(0.75) 
0.13 
(2.27)** 
0.04 
(0.09) 
NOSHOF 0.13 
(1.34) 
0.09 
(0.99) 
0.32 
(1.55) 
0.25 
(1.34) 
0.11 
(3.13)*** 
0.11 
(3.22)*** 
0.23 
(6.14)*** 
0.13 
(3.58)*** 
0.09 
(2.99)*** 
0.09 
(3.00)*** 
0.11 
(2.96)*** 
0.06 
(1.76)* 
NOSHFF -0.58 
(-2.97)*** 
-0.43 
(-2.40)** 
-0.89 
(-2.23)** 
-0.62 
(-1.69)* 
0.11 
(1.99)** 
0.10 
(1.82)* 
-0.10 
(-1.74)* 
-0.02 
(-0.25) 
-0.03 
(-0.55) 
-0.03 
(-0.64) 
-0.13 
(-2.27)** 
-0.09 
(-1.59) 
Market value  -0.19 
(-9.43)*** 
-0.12 
(-5.93)*** 
-0.47 
(-11.39)*** 
-0.32 
(-7.88)*** 
-0.31 
(-4.51)*** 
-0.20 
(-2.92)*** 
0.08 
(1.12) 
0.13 
(1.95)* 
-0.23 
(-3.83)*** 
-0.19 
(-3.19)*** 
0.01 
(0.19) 
0.01 
(0.14) 
Volatility 0.21 
(4.24)*** 
0.21 
(4.77)*** 
0.14 
(1.42) 
0.17 
(1.85)* 
-0.37 
(-5.67)*** 
-0.28 
(-4.14)*** 
-0.39 
(-5.71)*** 
-0.16 
(-2.37)** 
-0.30 
(-5.03)*** 
-0.31 
(-5.15)*** 
-0.28 
(-4.04)*** 
-0.15 
(-2.14)** 
Share Price -0.09 
(-3.50)*** 
-0.05 
(-1.98)** 
0.13 
(2.53)** 
0.18 
(3.81)*** 
0.06 
(1.68)* 
0.13 
(3.49)*** 
0.24 
(5.89)*** 
0.16 
(3.98)*** 
0.04 
(1.35) 
0.07 
(2.06)** 
0.26 
(6.03)*** 
0.20 
(4.66)*** 
Trade Size - 0.03 
(1.08) 
- -0.09 
(-1.63) 
- 0.01 
(0.40) 
- -0.33 
(-10.06)*** 
- 0.03 
(1.21) 
- -0.24 
(-6.61)*** 
Number of 
trades 
- -0.21 
(-9.87)*** 
- -0.44 
(-10.35)*** 
- -0.33 
(-6.85)*** 
- 0.12 
(2.42)** 
- -0.21 
(-3.92)*** 
- 0.10 
(1.61) 
Constant  -0.56 
(-4.59)*** 
-0.73 
(-6.09)*** 
-2.06 
(-8.18)*** 
-2.20 
(-8.99)*** 
0.61 
(4.81)*** 
0.27 
(2.03)** 
0.30 
(2.24)** 
0.26 
(1.91)* 
1.57 
(10.88)*** 
1.14 
(6.18)*** 
0.24 
(1.43) 
0.28 
(1.32) 
Industry  Yes yes Yes Yes yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes yes Yes 
Year  Yes yes Yes Yes yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.41 0.50 0.47 0.63 0.33 0.37 0.57 0.55 0.27 0.28 0.40 0.44 
Number of 
Observations  
592 592 592 592 592 592 592 592 592 592 592 592 
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Table 6.4b Pooled OLS Regression Results on the Relationship between Owners’ Identity and Real Friction of Market Liquidity 
Table 6.4b presents results of the effect of owners identity on market liquidity in the pre-crisis (2004-2006), crisis (2007-2009) and post crisis (2010-2012) periods. The table contains coefficient 
values and t-statistics obtained from the estimation of the following model. Figures reported in parentheses represent t-statistics which are based on robust standard errors, where ***,**,* mean 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
LIQit=α0+β1EOit+β2NEOit+β3NOHFFit+β4NOSHICit+β5NOSHOFit+β6NOSHPFit+β7NOSGVit+β8NOSHEMit+β9NOSHCOit+β10NOSHFRit+γ1MVit+γ2Pit+γ3VOLit+∑ 𝐼𝑁𝐷
𝑛
𝑖=1 + ∑ 𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅
𝑛
𝑖=1 + εi  
 
A brief description of the ownership structure, market liquidity and control variables is given below. Executive ownership (EO), non-executive ownership (NEO), free float holding (NOSHFF), 
foreign holding (NOSHFR), investment company holding (NOSHIC), pension fund holding (NOSHPF), government holding (NOSHGV), employee holding (NOSHEM), cross-holding (NOSHCO), 
other holding (NOSHOF), turnover ratio (TR), trade size (TZ), trading volume (VO), and number of trades (NT), firm size (MV), share price (P), return volatility (VOL), Industry (IND) and Year 
(YEAR) dummies. The t-statistics are reported in parentheses. See Table 3.2 for variables’ definitions. 
 
Panel B  The Relationship between Owners’ Identity and Real Friction of Market Liquidity 
                                        Pre- Crisis                                          Within Crisis                                           Post- Crisis 
 NT TSIZE VO TR NT TSIZE VO TR NT TSIZE VO TR 
EO -0.16 
(-4.79)*** 
-0.01 
(-0.17) 
-0.20 
(-5.48)*** 
-0.02 
(-1.10) 
-0.08 
(-3.70)*** 
-0.21 
(-6.44)*** 
-0.13 
(-4.48)*** 
-0.14 
(-6.39)*** 
-0.27 
(-2.61)*** 
-0.23 
(-7.23)*** 
-0.14 
(-4.42)*** 
-0.14 
(-6.98)*** 
NEO -0.11 
(-3.37)*** 
-0.02 
(-0.91) 
-0.13 
(-3.41)*** 
-0.04 
(-2.79)*** 
-0.06 
(-2.78)*** 
-0.18 
(-5.39)*** 
-0.04 
(-1.48) 
-0.11 
(-5.21)*** 
-0.03 
(-2.01)** 
-0.23 
(-7.13)*** 
-0.02 
(-1.63) 
-0.12 
(-5.87)*** 
NOSHCO -0.03 
(-0.77) 
-0.01 
(-0.49) 
-0.02 
(-0.65) 
-0.01 
(-0.89) 
-0.08 
(-3.71)*** 
-0.07 
(-2.36)** 
-0.01 
(-0.36) 
-0.04 
(-2.15)** 
-0.02 
(-1.41) 
-0.08 
(-2.68)*** 
-0.01 
(-0.26) 
-0.01 
(-0.42) 
NOSHEM -0.01 
(-0.12) 
-0.01 
(-0.28) 
-0.04 
(-1.23) 
-0.01 
(-0.82) 
-0.01 
(-0.01) 
-0.01 
(-0.26) 
-0.01 
(-0.36) 
-0.02 
(-1.12) 
-0.02 
(-1.10) 
-0.01 
(-0.40) 
-0.02 
(-0.62) 
-0.03 
(-1.58) 
NOSHGV -0.13 
(-4.23)*** 
-0.01 
(-0.27) 
-0.01 
(-0.14) 
-0.03 
(-2.15)** 
-0.03 
(-1.55) 
-0.04 
(-1.16) 
-0.05 
(-1.79)* 
-0.02 
(-0.79) 
-0.04 
(-1.08) 
-0.05 
(-2.12)** 
-0.07 
(-2.51)** 
-0.03 
(-1.69)* 
NOSHIC -0.12 
(-1.48) 
-0.01 
(-0.01) 
-0.02 
(-0.20) 
-0.04 
(-1.04) 
-0.18 
(-4.56)*** 
-0.09 
(-1.51) 
-0.03 
(-1.62) 
-0.05 
(-1.35) 
-0.11 
(-3.71)*** 
-0.07 
(-1.45) 
-0.17 
(-3.02)*** 
-0.09 
(-2.66)*** 
NOSHPF -0.16 
(-2.97)*** 
-0.01 
(-0.08) 
-0.21 
(-3.57)*** 
-0.06 
(-2.49)** 
-0.03 
(-1.16) 
-0.01 
(-0.20) 
-0.04 
(-1.21) 
-0.09 
(-3.65)*** 
-0.04 
(-1.67)* 
-0.05 
(-1.33) 
-0.04 
(-1.10) 
-0.04 
(-1.82)* 
NOSHFR -0.01 
(-0.14) 
-0.01 
(-0.19) 
-0.08 
(-1.28) 
-0.05 
(-1.94)* 
-0.15 
(-0.95) 
-0.09 
(-0.38) 
-0.09 
(-0.44) 
-0.14 
(-0.92) 
-0.34 
(-1.31) 
-0.48 
(-1.07) 
-0.49 
(-1.04) 
-0.24 
(-1.30) 
NOSHOF -0.18 
(-0.98) 
-0.17 
(-1.20) 
-0.52 
(-2.56)** 
-0.14 
(-1.62) 
-0.01 
(-0.02) 
-0.30 
(-7.33)*** 
-0.13 
(-0.52) 
-0.03 
(-1.18) 
-0.03 
(-1.37) 
-0.20 
(-5.18)*** 
-0.03 
(-0.87) 
-0.02 
(-0.79) 
NOSHFF 0.66 
(1.83)* 
0.27 
(1.00) 
0.81 
(2.07)** 
0.04 
(0.23) 
0.27 
(1.59) 
0.26 
(3.96)*** 
0.15 
(2.48)** 
0.05 
(1.14) 
0.01 
(0.37) 
0.18 
(2.99)*** 
0.05 
(0.86) 
0.01 
(0.16) 
Market value  0.34 
(9.18)*** 
-0.03 
(-1.02) 
0.39 
(9.59)*** 
0.06 
(3.64)*** 
0.33 
(6.27)*** 
0.28 
(3.61)*** 
0.04 
(0.62) 
-0.06 
(-1.25) 
0.18 
(4.34)*** 
0.06 
(0.83) 
-0.17 
(-2.20)** 
0.18 
(3.70)*** 
Volatility 0.04 
(0.53) 
0.07 
(1.06) 
0.03 
(0.27) 
0.18 
(4.13)*** 
0.28 
(5.52)*** 
0.77 
(10.33)*** 
-0.07 
(-1.07) 
0.05 
(1.16) 
0.02 
(0.45) 
0.55 
(7.63)*** 
-0.13 
(-1.86)* 
0.31 
(6.64)*** 
Share Price 0.16 
(3.57)*** 
-0.19 
(-5.57)*** 
-0.12 
(-2.55)** 
0.02 
(0.68) 
0.21 
(6.89)*** 
-0.17 
(-3.87)*** 
0.08 
(2.09)** 
-0.09 
(-3.33)*** 
0.08 
(3.37)*** 
-0.21 
(-4.77)*** 
0.02 
(0.55) 
-0.05 
(-1.96)** 
Constant -0.59 
(-2.59)*** 
1.36 
(7.91)*** 
0.70 
(2.82)*** 
-2.89 
(-26.15)*** 
-1.05 
(-10.49)*** 
-0.49 
(-3.37)*** 
-0.95 
(-7.10)*** 
0.18 
(1.88)* 
-2.08 
(-20.72)*** 
-0.71 
(-4.13)*** 
-1.07 
(-5.93)*** 
0.31 
(2.80)*** 
Industry  Yes yes yes Yes yes Yes Yes yes yes yes yes Yes 
Year  Yes yes yes Yes yes Yes Yes yes yes yes yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.38 0.07 0.33 0.18 0.31 0.05 0.13 0.24 0.05 0.57 0.11 0.32 
Number of 
Observations  
592 592 592 592 592 592 592 592 592 592 592 592 
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6.5. Further Robustness Checks 
 
Regression Results Using Changes in the Variables 
 
 
In the previous section, this study examines the effect of ownership level, concentration and 
owners’ identity. In this section, the study re-tests the above-mentioned relationship using the 
change in variables. Regression analyses using changes in the variables have at least two 
advantages over those using the level variables. First, these regressions are generally less likely to 
show spurious relationships between the variables than the regressions using the level variables. 
Second, these regressions allow us to examine the longer-term effect of ownership level, 
concentration and owners’ identity on market liquidity. This study has assumed so far that the 
relation between the above-mentioned relationships is contemporaneous, at least on a yearly basis. 
However, the effect of ownership variables on market liquidity may be gradual. For example, a 
change in ownership in year t may have an impact on stock market liquidity in both year t and 
year t + 1. As a result, this study uses the “lagged values of ownership structure”.  
 
This study follows Poon et al. (2013), and employs the change in variable regression pooled OLS 
dummy industry and year in order to control for endogeneity and time invariant problems. The 
following model is used to examine the effect of the change in ownership level and concentration 
on the change in market liquidity: 
Δ LIQit = α0+β1 Δ IOit+ β2 Δ INSOit+ β3 Δ BKOit+ β4 Δ LSit+ γ1 Δ MVit+ γ2 Δ Pit+ γ3 Δ VOLit+ 
+ ∑ 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑛𝑖=1 i+∑ 𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅
𝑛
𝑖=1 + εi………………………...………………………………………………….…...…(6.1) 
 
Where LIQ is market liquidity, IO is the insider ownership, INSO is the institutional ownership, 
BKO is the blockholder, LS is large shareholder, MV is market value, P is shares price, VOL is 
volatility, IND and YEAR is the industry and year dummies respectively.   
Moreover, this study investigates the effect of the change in owners’ identity on the change in 
market liquidity: 
Δ LIQit=α0+β1ΔEOit+β2ΔNEOit+β3 Δ NOHFFit+β4 Δ NOSHICit+β5 Δ NOSHOFit+β6 Δ NOSHPFit+β7 Δ 
NOSHGVit+β8 Δ NOSHEMit+β9 Δ NOSHCOit+β10 Δ NOSHFRit+γ1 Δ  MVit+γ2 Δ Pit+γ3 Δ VOLit+∑ 𝐼𝑁𝐷
𝑛
𝑖=1 + 
∑ 𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅𝑛𝑖=1 + εi....…………………………………………………………….…………………..………………..(6.2) 
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Where LIQ is market liquidity, EO is the executive ownership, NEO is the non-executive 
ownership, NOSHFF is free float shares, NOSHIC investment company ownership, NOSHPF 
pension fund ownership, NOSHGV government ownership, NOSHEM employee ownership, 
NOSHCO cross-holding ownership, NOSHFR foreign ownership, NOSHOF other holding, MV is 
market value, P is shares price, VOL is volatility, and IND and YEAR is the industry and year 
dummies respectively.   
 
Table 6.5 Panels A and B show that the effect of insider ownership on proportional bid-ask spread 
and price impact ratio is positively correlated pre, within and post financial crisis, whereas it is 
negatively related with real friction of market liquidity (i.e., number of trades , trade size, trading 
volume and turnover ratio). Moreover, it is noticeable from Table 6.5 that ownership 
concentration measured by blockholders and largest shareholders is positively correlated pre, 
within and post financial crisis, whereas it is negatively related with real friction of market 
liquidity (i.e., number of trades, trade size, trading volume and turnover ratio). In contrast, 
institutional ownership is negatively correlated pre, within and post financial crisis, whereas it is 
positively related with real friction of market liquidity (i.e., number of trades, trade size, trading 
volume and turnover ratio). These results are consistent with our findings in Chapter 4 and with 
Poon et al. (2013). However, the coefficient of the above-mentioned relationship is less 
significant in the crisis period in comparison with the pre- and post-crisis periods. In particular, 
the adjusted R
2 
is lower in most of the model specifications, with the 2007-2009 financial crisis 
relative to the pre-crisis period. 
 
With respect to the effect of owners’ identity on market liquidity within the 2007-2009 financial 
crisis, Table 6.6 Panels A and B document a positive relationship between executive and non-
executive director’s ownership and proportional bid-ask spread and price impact ratio and a 
negative relationship with real friction of market liquidity (i.e., trading activity) pre, within and 
post recent financial crisis. However, Table 6.6 shows that there is a negative relationship 
between free float ownership and proportional bid-ask spread and price impact ratio and a positive 
impact on real friction of market liquidity (i.e., trading activity) pre-crisis, within crisis and post 
the recent financial crisis. 
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Table 6.5a Pooled OLS in the Change in Variables Regression Results regarding the Relationship between Ownership Level and Concentration and Total Market 
Liquidity 
Table 6.5a presents results of the effect of ownership level and concentration on market liquidity in the pre-crisis (2004-2006), crisis (2007-2009) and post crisis (2010-2012) periods. The table 
contains coefficient values and t-statistics obtained from the estimation of the following model. Figures reported in parentheses represent t-statistics which are based on robust standard errors, 
where ***,**,* mean significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
Δ LIQit = α0+β1 Δ IOit+ β2 Δ INSOit+ β3 Δ BKOit+ β4 Δ LSit+ γ1 Δ MVit+ γ2 Δ Pit+ γ3 Δ VOLit+ ∑ 𝐼𝑁𝐷
𝑛
𝑖=1  +∑ 𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅
𝑛
𝑖=1 + εi…………………………………………………………………(1a and 2a) 
Δ LIQit = α0+β1 Δ IOit+ β2 Δ INSOit+ β3 Δ BKOit+ β4 Δ LSit+ γ1 Δ MVit+ γ2 Δ Pit+ γ3 Δ VOLit + γ4 Δ TZit + γ5 Δ NTit + ∑ 𝐼𝑁𝐷
𝑛
𝑖=1  +∑ 𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅
𝑛
𝑖=1 + εi………………………(1b and 2b) 
A brief description of the ownership structure, market liquidity and control variables is given below. Insider ownership (IO), institutional ownership (INSO), blockholders (BKO), largest 
shareholder (LS), proportional bid-ask spread (PBAS), Price impact ratio (Pimpact), trade size (TZ), number of trades (NT), firm size (MV), share price (P), return volatility (VOL), Industry 
(IND) and Year (YEAR)  Dummies. See Table 3.2 for variables’ definitions and measurements. 
 
Panel A The Effect of Ownership Level and Concentration on Total Cost of  Market Liquidity 
 
 Pre-Crisis                                 Within Crisis                                     Post-Crisis 
 PBAS 
(1a) 
PBAS 
(1b) 
Pimpact 
(2a) 
Pimpact 
(2b) 
PBAS 
(1a) 
PBAS 
(1b) 
Pimpact 
(2a) 
Pimpact 
(2b) 
PBAS 
(1a) 
PBAS 
(1b) 
Pimpact 
(2a) 
Pimpact 
(2b) 
Insider 
ownership  
0.13 
(5.24)*** 
0.12 
(5.00)*** 
0.40 
(8.25)*** 
0.36 
(7.81)*** 
0.10 
(3.14)*** 
0.03 
(1.11) 
0.33 
(4.98)*** 
0.16 
(3.60)*** 
0.04 
(1.16) 
0.05 
(1.46) 
0.13 
(2.81)*** 
0.12 
(2.55)** 
Large 
Shareholders  
0.04 
(1.35) 
0.03 
(1.22) 
0.10 
(2.04)** 
0.06 
(1.51) 
0.04 
(1.25) 
0.03 
(1.28) 
0.04 
(0.80) 
0.03 
(0.73) 
0.05 
(1.69)* 
0.06 
(1.76)* 
0.10 
(2.07)** 
0.10 
(2.10)** 
Blockholders  0.01 
(0.64) 
0.01 
(0.62) 
0.03 
(1.34) 
0.03 
(1.52) 
0.07 
(1.46) 
0.05 
(1.38) 
0.17 
(1.92)* 
0.12 
(2.11)** 
0.01 
(0.23) 
0.01 
(0.30) 
0.06 
(1.10) 
0.04 
(0.78) 
Institutional 
Ownership  
-0.24 
(-4.48)*** 
-0.23 
(-4.27)*** 
-0.54 
(-6.70)*** 
-0.47 
(-6.33)*** 
-0.02 
(-0.39) 
-0.03 
(-0.67) 
-0.04 
(-0.39) 
-0.05 
(-0.79) 
-0.08 
(-1.42) 
-0.07 
(-1.31) 
-0.02 
(-0.24) 
-0.01 
(-0.08) 
Market Value  -0.21 
(-5.93)*** 
-0.15 
(-3.76)*** 
-0.60 
(-8.97)*** 
-0.40 
(-5.89)*** 
-0.15 
(-2.92)*** 
0.01 
(0.30) 
-0.31 
(-3.54)*** 
0.04 
(0.72) 
-0.04 
(-0.99) 
0.01 
(0.11) 
-0.23 
(-3.51)*** 
-0.13 
(-2.07)** 
Volatility  0.19 
(4.73)*** 
0.18 
(4.67)*** 
0.20 
(3.06)*** 
0.17 
(2.84)*** 
0.05 
(1.01) 
-0.01 
(-0.35) 
0.19 
(2.14)** 
0.04 
(0.80) 
0.23 
(5.39)*** 
0.18 
(4.28)*** 
0.28 
(5.16)*** 
0.25 
(4.67)*** 
Share price  -0.20 
(-4.46)*** 
-0.18 
(-4.23)*** 
-0.31 
(-3.95)*** 
-0.26 
(-3.74)*** 
-0.16 
(-2.62)*** 
-0.04 
(-0.94) 
-0.14 
(-1.33) 
0.08 
(1.39) 
-0.15 
(-2.49)** 
-0.07 
(1.13) 
0.07 
(1.08) 
0.12 
(1.69)* 
Trade Size - 0.03 
(0.73) 
- -0.26 
(-4.15)*** 
- 0.02 
(0.32) 
- -0.34 
(-4.27)*** 
- 0.27 
(6.58)*** 
- 0.01 
(0.03) 
Number of 
Trades  
- -0.13 
(-3.68)*** 
- -0.43 
(-7.62)*** 
- -0.59 
(-19.21)*** 
- -1.24 
(-22.36)*** 
- -0.06 
(-1.45) 
- -0.20 
(-3.58)*** 
Industry 
Dummy  
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  
Time Dummy  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  
Constant -0.13 
(-1.32) 
-0.15 
(-1.46) 
-0.74 
(-3.25)*** 
-0.70 
(-3.27)*** 
-0.02 
(-0.14) 
-0.18 
(-1.33) 
-0.29 
(-0.81) 
-0.54 
(-2.06)** 
-1.72 
(-6.81)*** 
-1.83 
(-7.15)*** 
-3.21 
(-8.78)*** 
-3.19 
(-8.38)*** 
Adjusted R2 0.51 0.52 0.64 0.68 0.30 0.57 0.31 0.68 0.15 0.20 0.25 0.25 
Number of 
Observations   
678 678 678 678 678 678 678 678 678 678 678 678 
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Table 6.5b Pooled OLS in the Change in Variables Regression Results regarding the Relationship between Ownership Level and Concentration and Real Friction 
of Market Liquidity 
Table 6.5b presents results of the effect of ownership level and concentration on market liquidity in the pre-crisis (2004-2006), crisis (2007-2009) and post crisis (2010-2012) periods. The table 
contains coefficient values and t-statistics obtained from the estimation of the following model. Figures reported in parentheses represent t-statistics which are based on robust standard errors, 
where ***,**,* mean significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
Δ LIQit = α0+β1 Δ IOit+ β2 Δ INSOit+ β3 Δ BKOit+ β4 Δ LSit+ γ1 Δ MVit+ γ2 Δ Pit+ γ3 Δ VOLit+ ∑ 𝐼𝑁𝐷
𝑛
𝑖=1  +∑ 𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅
𝑛
𝑖=1 + εi 
A brief description of the ownership structure, market liquidity and control variables is given below. Insider ownership (IO), institutional ownership (INSO), blockholders (BKO), largest 
shareholder (LS), trade size (TZ), number of trades (NT), trading volume (VO) and turnover ratio (TR), firm size (MV), share price (P), return volatility (VOL), Industry (IND) and Year 
(YEAR)  Dummies. See Table 3.2 for variables’ definitions and measurements. 
Panel B  The Effect of Ownership Level and Concentration on Real Friction of  Market Liquidity 
 
 Pre-Crisis Within Crisis Post-Crisis 
 NT TSIZE TR VO NT TSIZE TR VO NT TSIZE TR VO 
Insider 
Ownership  
-0.08 
(-2.99)*** 
-0.02 
(-0.77) 
-0.13 
(-3.15)*** 
-0.17 
(-5.06)*** 
-0.13 
(-3.78)*** 
-0.02 
(-1.31) 
-0.06 
(-1.83)* 
-0.17 
(-4.97)*** 
-0.08 
(-2.42)** 
-0.04 
(-1.81)* 
-0.02 
(-0.70) 
-0.13 
(-4.33)*** 
Large 
Shareholder  
-0.04 
(-1.28) 
-0.05 
(-1.76)* 
0.09 
(2.39)** 
-0.08 
(-2.01)** 
-0.01 
(-0.31) 
-0.01 
(-0.05) 
-0.02 
(-0.63) 
-0.05 
(-1.38) 
-0.01 
(-0.16) 
-0.01 
(-0.33) 
-0.01 
(-0.41) 
-0.05 
(-2.28)** 
Blockholders -0.01 
(-0.32) 
-0.01 
(-0.06) 
-0.05 
(-2.38)** 
-0.03 
(-2.29)** 
-0.03 
(-0.74) 
-0.02 
(-0.74) 
-0.02 
(-0.30) 
-0.10 
(-1.77)* 
-0.08 
(-2.16)** 
-0.06 
(-1.60) 
-0.01 
(-0.20) 
-0.03 
(-0.69) 
Institutional 
Ownership  
0.11 
(1.94)* 
0.07 
(1.40) 
0.28 
(3.91)*** 
0.12 
(1.33) 
0.01 
(0.18) 
0.01 
(0.29) 
0.05 
(0.75) 
0.05 
(0.86) 
0.05 
(0.97) 
0.03 
(0.66) 
0.05 
(1.40) 
0.01 
(0.09) 
Market 
Value  
0.42 
(8.74)*** 
0.04 
(1.39) 
-0.20 
(-3.60)*** 
0.63 
(12.21)*** 
0.27 
(5.21)*** 
0.01 
(0.30) 
-0.08 
(-1.68)* 
0.34 
(5.84)*** 
0.44 
(8.15)*** 
-0.08 
(-2.36)** 
-0.06 
(-1.53) 
0.30 
(5.73)*** 
Volatility  -0.05 
(-1.07) 
-0.02 
(-0.60) 
0.26 
(3.95)*** 
0.03 
(0.55) 
-0.11 
(-1.99)** 
-0.01 
(-0.09) 
0.10 
(1.82)* 
-0.02 
(-0.30) 
-0.11 
(-2.62)*** 
0.15 
(3.98)*** 
0.12 
(3.48)*** 
-0.08 
(-1.73)* 
Share Price  0.14 
(2.61)** 
-0.04 
(-1.11) 
-0.25 
(-4.52)*** 
0.08 
(1.44) 
0.20 
(3.38)*** 
-0.08 
(-2.32)** 
-0.12 
(-2.09)** 
-0.02 
(-0.26) 
0.20 
(4.15)*** 
-0.25 
(-5.66)*** 
-0.07 
(-1.57) 
-0.05 
(-0.93) 
Industry 
Dummy  
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  
Time Dummy  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  
Constant  -0.05 
(-0.43) 
0.25 
(2.23)** 
-0.88 
(-4.63)*** 
0.34 
(2.45)** 
-0.25 
(-1.27) 
0.22 
(2.01)** 
-0.55 
(-2.95)*** 
0.03 
(0.14) 
0.06 
(0.30) 
0.42 
(2.18)** 
-2.18 
(-8.65)*** 
1.35 
(5.86)*** 
Adjusted R2 0.47 0.11 0.45 0.52 0.35 0.09 0.24 0.39 0.38 0.21 0.12 0.24 
Number of 
Observations  
678 678 678 678 678 678 678 678 678 678 678 678 
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Table 6.6a Pooled OLS in the Change in Variables Regression Results regarding the Relationship between Owners’ Identity and Total Market Liquidity 
Table 6.6a presents results of the effect of owners identity on market liquidity in the pre-crisis (2004-2006), crisis (2007-2009) and post crisis (2010-2012) periods. The table contains coefficient values and t-statistics obtained from the estimation of the following model. Figures reported in 
parentheses represent t-statistics which are based on robust standard errors, where ***,**,* mean significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
Δ LIQit=α0+β1 Δ EOit+β2 Δ NEOit+β3 Δ NOHFFit+β4 Δ NOSHICit+β5 Δ NOSHOFit+β6 Δ NOSHPFit+β7 Δ NOSGVit+β8 Δ NOSHEMit+β9 Δ NOSHCOit+β10 Δ NOSHFRit+γ1 Δ MVit+γ2 Δ Pit+γ3 Δ VOLit+∑ IND
n
i=1 + ∑ YEAR
n
i=1 + εi …………………………………………(1a and 2a) 
 
Δ LIQit=α0+β1 Δ EOit+β2 Δ NEOit+β3 Δ NOHFFit+β4 Δ NOSHICit+β5 Δ NOSHOFit+β6 Δ NOSHPFit+β7 Δ NOSGVit+β8 Δ NOSHEMit+β9 Δ NOSHCOit+β10 Δ NOSHFRit+γ1 Δ MVit+γ2 Δ Pit+γ3 Δ VOLit + γ4 Δ TZit + γ5 Δ NTit + ∑ 𝐼𝑁𝐷
𝑛
𝑖=1 + ∑ 𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅
𝑛
𝑖=1 + εi ……………..(1b and 2b) 
A brief description of the ownership structure, market liquidity and control variables is given below. Executive ownership (EO), non-executive ownership (NEO), free float holding (NOSHFF), foreign holding (NOSHFR), investment company holding (NOSHIC), pension fund holding 
(NOSHPF), government holding (NOSHGV), employee holding (NOSHEM), cross-holding (NOSHCO), other holding (NOSHOF), proportional bid-ask spread (PBAS), price impact ratio (Pimpact), trade size (TZ), and number of trades (NT), firm size (MV), share price (P), return 
volatility (VOL), Industry (IND) and Year (YEAR) dummies. The t-statistics are reported in parentheses. See Table 3.2 for variables’ definitions. 
Panel A The Relationship between Owners’ Identity and Total Liquidity Costs  
 Pre-Crisis Within Crisis Post Crisis 
 PBAS  
(1a) 
PBAS 
 (2a) 
Pimpact 
(1b) 
Pimpact 
(2b) 
PBAS 
 (1a) 
PBAS 
(2a) 
Pimpact 
(1b) 
Pimpact 
(2b) 
PBAS 
(1a) 
PBAS 
(2a) 
Pimpact 
(1b) 
Pimpact 
(2b) 
EO  0.09 
(4.15)*** 
0.09 
(3.88)*** 
0.25 
(5.32)*** 
0.22 
(5.01)*** 
0.06 
(1.64) 
0.01 
(0.10) 
0.23 
(3.49)*** 
0.09 
(2.21)** 
0.01 
(0.08) 
0.01 
(0.09) 
0.07 
(1.85)* 
0.06 
(1.54) 
NEO 0.03 
(1.61) 
0.02 
(1.30) 
0.11 
(2.79)*** 
0.07 
(2.06)** 
0.07 
(2.21)** 
0.02 
(1.00) 
0.14 
(2.29)** 
0.04 
(1.20) 
0.04 
(1.63) 
0.04 
(1.76)* 
0.01 
(0.36) 
0.01 
(0.23) 
NOSHCO 0.03 
(2.30)** 
0.03 
(2.23)** 
0.04 
(1.77)* 
0.04 
(1.85)* 
0.06 
(1.40) 
0.08 
(2.13)** 
0.07 
(0.92) 
0.11 
(1.87)* 
0.04 
(0.65) 
0.04 
(0.72) 
0.02 
(0.51) 
0.02 
(0.58) 
NOSHEM 0.01 
(0.28) 
0.01 
(0.28) 
0.01 
(0.09) 
0.03 
(0.39) 
0.01 
(0.24) 
0.01 
(0.20) 
0.07 
(0.95) 
0.07 
(1.24) 
0.03 
(2.05)** 
0.02 
(1.76)* 
0.03 
(2.20)** 
0.02 
(1.83)* 
NOSHGV 0.08 
(2.12)** 
0.09 
(2.42)** 
0.07 
(1.00) 
0.12 
(1.63) 
0.07 
(1.50) 
0.02 
(0.41) 
0.05 
(0.84) 
0.04 
(0.70) 
0.01 
(0.16) 
0.01 
(0.22) 
0.02 
(0.69) 
0.02 
(0.52) 
NOSHIC 0.08 
(1.79)* 
0.09 
(1.86)* 
0.18 
(2.56)** 
0.17 
(2.39)** 
0.01 
(0.31) 
0.03 
(0.99) 
0.03 
(0.45) 
0.02 
(0.38) 
0.01 
(0.09) 
0.01 
(0.17) 
0.01 
(0.22) 
0.01 
(0.13) 
NOSHPF 0.05 
(2.35)** 
0.04 
(1.74)* 
0.14 
(1.67)* 
0.09 
(1.33) 
0.03 
(0.67) 
0.01 
(0.15) 
0.01 
(0.11) 
0.03 
(0.55) 
0.04 
(1.08) 
0.04 
(1.06) 
0.01 
(0.01) 
0.01 
(0.04) 
NOSHFR 0.13 
(3.01)*** 
0.12 
(2.78)*** 
0.24 
(3.17)*** 
0.19 
(2.66)*** 
0.13 
(2.02)** 
0.11 
(2.17)** 
0.25 
(2.05)** 
0.18 
(2.28)** 
0.09 
(1.50) 
0.07 
(1.29) 
0.06 
(0.77) 
0.04 
(0.53) 
NOSHOF 0.24 
(2.59)*** 
0.25 
(2.54)** 
0.16 
(1.12) 
0.16 
(1.22) 
0.19 
(1.16) 
0.04 
(0.26) 
0.49 
(1.84)* 
0.23 
(1.02) 
0.24 
(1.85)* 
0.35 
(2.53)** 
0.16 
(0.89) 
0.12 
(0.69) 
NOSHFF -0.20 
(-2.73)*** 
-0.19 
(-3.55)*** 
-0.51 
(-5.86)*** 
-0.45 
(-5.58)*** 
-0.02 
(-0.27) 
-0.01 
(-0.13) 
-0.04 
(-0.44) 
-0.01 
(-0.01) 
-0.05 
(-1.04) 
-0.05 
(-0.94) 
-0.02 
(-0.30) 
-0.03 
(-0.44) 
Market value  -0.17 
(-4.00)*** 
-0.12 
(-3.11)*** 
-0.51 
(-7.00)*** 
-0.36 
(-5.04)*** 
-0.12 
(-2.30)** 
0.02 
(0.51) 
-0.26 
(-2.91)*** 
0.05 
(0.99) 
-0.05 
(-1.01) 
0.01 
(0.05) 
-0.25 
(-3.80)*** 
-0.15 
(-2.32)** 
Volatility 0.18 
(4.86)*** 
0.18 
(4.83)*** 
0.19 
(2.86)*** 
0.17 
(2.75)*** 
0.04 
(0.81) 
-0.02 
(-0.40) 
0.18 
(2.11)** 
0.06 
(0.96) 
0.24 
(5.73)*** 
0.19 
(4.50)*** 
0.30 
(5.71)*** 
0.27 
(5.17)*** 
Share Price -0.19 
(-4.16)*** 
-0.17 
(-3.89)*** 
-0.27 
(-3.40)*** 
-0.23 
(-3.31)*** 
-0.15 
(-2.57)** 
-0.04 
(-0.89) 
-0.12 
(-1.17) 
0.09 
(1.55) 
-0.16 
(-2.62)*** 
-0.08 
(-1.26) 
0.08 
(1.16) 
0.13 
(1.78)* 
Trade Size - 0.05 
(1.15) 
- -0.23 
(-3.44)*** 
- 0.02 
(0.37) 
- -0.34 
(-4.20)*** 
- 0.27 
(6.44)*** 
- -0.01 
(-0.04) 
Number of 
trades 
- -0.13 
(-3.36)*** 
- -0.41 
(-7.19)*** 
- -0.59 
(-19.44)*** 
- -1.25 
(-22.16)*** 
- -0.06 
(-1.39) 
- -0.21 
(-3.81)*** 
Industry Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  
Constant -0.12 
(-1.30) 
-0.15 
(0.55) 
-0.59 
(-2.70)*** 
-0.63 
(-2.91)*** 
-0.01 
(-0.07) 
-0.19 
(-1.44) 
-0.15 
(-0.45) 
-0.45 
(-1.85)*** 
-1.78 
(-6.72)*** 
-1.90 
(-6.96)*** 
-3.40 
(-8.53)*** 
-3.37 
(-8.12)*** 
Adjusted R2 0.54 0.55 0.64 0.68 0.31 0.58 0.32 0.69 0.15 0.21 0.22 0.24 
Number of 
Observations  
678 678 678 678 678 678 678 678 678 678 678 678 
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Table 6.6b Pooled OLS on the Change in Variables Regression Results regarding the Relationship between Owners’ Identity and Real Friction of Market Liquidity 
Table 6.6b presents results of the effect of owners identity on market liquidity in the pre-crisis (2004-2006), crisis (2007-2009) and post crisis (2010-2012) periods. The table contains coefficient values and t-statistics obtained from the estimation of 
the following model. Figures reported in parentheses represent t-statistics which are based on robust standard errors, where ***,**,* mean significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
Δ LIQit=α0+β1 Δ EOit+β2 Δ NEOit+β3 Δ NOHFFit+β4 Δ NOSHICit+β5 Δ NOSHOFit+β6 Δ NOSHPFit+β7 Δ NOSGVit+β8 Δ NOSHEMit+β9 Δ NOSHCOit+β10 Δ NOSHFRit+γ1 Δ MVit+γ2 Δ Pit+γ3 Δ VOLit+∑ 𝐼𝑁𝐷
𝑛
𝑖=1 + ∑ 𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅
𝑛
𝑖=1 + εi  
A brief description of the ownership structure, market liquidity and control variables is given below. Executive ownership (EO), non-executive ownership (NEO), free float holding (NOSHFF), foreign holding (NOSHFR), investment company 
holding (NOSHIC), pension fund holding (NOSHPF), government holding (NOSHGV), employee holding (NOSHEM), cross-holding (NOSHCO), other holding (NOSHOF), turnover ratio (TR), trade size (TZ), trading volume (VO), and number of 
trades (NT), firm size (MV), share price (P), return volatility (VOL), Industry (IND) and Year (YEAR) dummies. The t-statistics are reported in parentheses. See Table 3.2 for variables’ definitions. 
Panel B  The Relationship between Owners’ Identity and Real Friction of Market Liquidity 
 Pre- Crisis Within Crisis  Post- Crisis 
 NT TSIZE VO TR NT TSIZE VO TR NT TSIZE VO TR 
EO -0.06 
(-2.18)** 
-0.01 
(-0.27) 
-0.11 
(-3.07)*** 
-0.09 
(-2.67)*** 
-0.09 
(-2.57)** 
-0.03 
(-1.93)* 
-0.06 
(-1.72)* 
-0.14 
(-3.70)*** 
-0.06 
(-1.86)* 
-0.01 
(-0.51) 
-0.01 
(-0.60) 
-0.07 
(-2.39)** 
NEO -0.07 
(-2.82)*** 
-0.03 
(-1.35) 
-0.02 
(-0.87) 
-0.11 
(-3.47)*** 
-0.08 
(-2.31)** 
-0.02 
(-1.91)* 
-0.01 
(-0.09) 
-0.07 
(-1.91)* 
-0.02 
(-0.71) 
-0.01 
(-0.12) 
-0.04 
(-2.13)** 
-0.06 
(-2.21)** 
NOSHCO -0.01 
(-0.68) 
-0.01 
(-0.19) 
-0.01 
(-0.35) 
-0.03 
(-2.26)** 
-0.03 
(-0.77) 
-0.01 
(-0.39) 
-0.02 
(-0.52) 
-0.01 
(-0.22) 
-0.01 
(-0.33) 
-0.01 
(-0.21) 
-0.01 
(-0.43) 
-0.02 
(-0.88) 
NOSHEM -0.03 
(-0.76) 
-0.08 
(-2.40)** 
-0.01 
(-0.05) 
-0.11 
(-2.06)** 
-0.01 
(-0.11) 
-0.03 
(-1.05) 
-0.01 
(-0.01) 
-0.03 
(-0.67) 
-0.03 
(-2.10)** 
-0.01 
(-0.52) 
-0.01 
(-1.73)* 
-0.01 
(-0.93) 
NOSHGV -0.10 
(-2.28)** 
-0.02 
(-0.46) 
-0.17 
(-3.90)*** 
-0.04 
(-0.84) 
-0.08 
(-1.90)* 
-0.03 
(-0.94) 
-0.08 
(-2.12)** 
-0.13 
(-2.60)** 
-0.02 
(-1.02) 
-0.01 
(-0.04) 
-0.07 
(-1.51) 
-0.04 
(-1.53) 
NOSHIC -0.01 
(-0.12) 
-0.08 
(-1.72)* 
0.17 
(2.82)*** 
-0.06 
(-1.01) 
-0.02 
(-0.44) 
-0.03 
(-1.15) 
-0.03 
(-0.71) 
-0.05 
(-1.18) 
-0.03 
(-0.54) 
-0.04 
(-1.00) 
-0.04 
(-1.35) 
-0.05 
(-1.35) 
NOSHPF -0.10 
(-2.63)*** 
-0.03 
(-1.09) 
-0.01 
(-0.24) 
-0.09 
(-1.75)* 
-0.04 
(-0.86) 
-0.04 
(-1.16) 
-0.03 
(-0.62) 
-0.05 
(-0.86) 
-0.01 
(-0.13) 
-0.01 
(-0.20) 
-0.01 
(-0.21) 
-0.01 
(-0.14) 
NOSHFR -0.07 
(-1.32) 
-0.05 
(-1.22) 
-0.05 
(-0.83) 
-0.19 
(-2.94)*** 
-0.04 
(-0.64) 
-0.06 
(-1.86)* 
-0.05 
(-0.69) 
-0.12 
(-1.65)* 
0.09 
(1.62) 
-0.03 
(-0.77) 
-0.06 
(-1.46) 
-0.05 
(-0.91) 
NOSHOF -0.01 
(-0.08) 
-0.01 
(-0.02) 
-0.07 
(-1.32) 
-0.01 
(-0.06) 
-0.25 
(-1.01) 
-0.15 
(-0.99) 
-0.26 
(-1.45) 
-0.18 
(-1.08) 
-0.18 
(-1.89)* 
-0.43 
(-1.77)* 
-0.13 
(-0.78) 
-0.15 
(-1.17) 
NOSHFF 0.09 
(1.66)* 
0.06 
(1.17) 
0.09 
(1.66)* 
0.08 
(0.87) 
0.03 
(0.58) 
0.01 
(0.21) 
0.05 
(0.69) 
0.01 
(0.18) 
0.04 
(0.79) 
0.02 
(0.50) 
0.04 
(1.03) 
-0.01 
(-0.14) 
Market value  0.36 
(7.35)*** 
0.01 
(0.43) 
0.36 
(7.35)*** 
0.53 
(10.25)*** 
0.25 
(4.68)*** 
0.01 
(0.51) 
-0.08 
(-1.69)* 
0.29 
(5.12)*** 
0.45 
(8.10)*** 
-0.08 
(-2.45)** 
-0.07 
(-1.60) 
0.30 
(5.55)*** 
Volatility -0.04 
(-0.82) 
-0.01 
(-0.31) 
-0.04 
(-0.82) 
0.05 
(1.01) 
-0.10 
(-1.85)* 
-0.01 
-(0.27) 
0.12 
(2.10)** 
-0.01 
(-0.07) 
-0.13 
(-2.86)*** 
0.16 
(4.34)*** 
0.12 
(3.32)*** 
-0.09 
(-1.93)* 
Share Price 0.12 
(2.26)** 
-0.07 
(-1.67)* 
0.12 
(2.26)** 
0.03 
(0.63) 
0.19 
(3.30)*** 
-0.07 
(-2.11)** 
-0.12 
(-2.16)** 
-0.03 
(-0.45) 
0.21 
(4.21)*** 
-0.25 
(-5.44)*** 
-0.07 
(-1.54) 
-0.05 
(-0.99) 
Industry Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  
Constant -0.21 
(-1.75)* 
0.24 
(2.23)** 
-0.21 
(-1.75)* 
0.21 
(1.44) 
-0.29 
(-1.46) 
0.20 
(1.80)* 
-0.52 
(-2.63)*** 
-0.02 
(-0.13) 
0.15 
(0.64) 
0.45 
(2.26)** 
-2.08 
(-8.04)*** 
1.40 
(5.69)*** 
Adjusted R2 0.50 0.12 0.50 0.55 0.37 0.11 0.25 0.40 0.38 0.21 0.14 0.23 
Number of 
Observations  
678 678 678 678 678 678 678 678 678 678 678 678 
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Nevertheless, Table 6.6 shows that there is a positive relationship between the controlled 
shareholders (government, pension fund, employee, foreign, cross-holding, investment 
companies, and other holding) and proportional bid-ask spread and price impact ratio and a 
negative impact on real friction of market liquidity (i.e., trading activity) pre, within and post the 
recent financial crisis. These results are consistent with our findings in Chapter 5 and with Poon et 
al. (2013). However, the coefficient of the above-mentioned relationship is less significant in the 
crisis period in comparison with the pre- and post-crisis periods. Consequently, this study uses the 
annual changes in variables as a further test; we notice that our results remain unchanged with that 
reported in the main analysis section.  
 
6.6. Summary  
 
This chapter has examined how the ownership structure in terms of level and concentration and 
the owners’ identity are related to market liquidity during the recent financial crisis. In this 
chapter, the study period is divided into three sub-periods. The pre-crisis period includes 2004-
2006, the crisis period is 2007-2009 and the post-crisis period is 2010-2012.  The definition of 
crisis period is consistent with recent research papers (Akbar et al., 2013; Florackis et al., 2014; 
Kontonikas et al., 2013). However, this study follows Poon et al. (2013) and employs the Pooled 
OLS dummy year and industry in the main analysis. 
The findings in this chapter indicate that the insider ownership is significantly negatively related 
with market liquidity in the pre-crisis, crisis and post-crisis periods. These findings are similar to 
those obtained in Chapter 4 using the full period. Further, the blockholders and largest 
shareholders lower market liquidity in the three sub-periods, i.e., pre, during and post crisis. This 
negative effect is found under all market liquidity measures. The results on institutional 
ownership are consistent with our findings in Chapter 4, where a positive relationship is shown 
between institutional ownership and market liquidity.  However, our results reveal that the above-
mentioned relationship is less significant and strong during the recent financial crisis. In 
particular, the adjusted R
2 
is lower in most of the model specifications with the 2007-2009 
financial crisis relative to the pre- crisis period.  
Moreover, with respect to the effect of owners’ identity on market liquidity during the recent 
financial crisis, this study documents a positive relationship between executive and non-executive 
directors’ ownership and proportional bid-ask spread and price impact ratio and a negative 
relationship with real friction of market liquidity (i.e., trading activity) pre, within and post the 
recent financial crisis. However, this study shows that there is a negative relationship between 
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free float ownership and proportional bid-ask spread and price impact ratio and a positive impact 
on real friction of market liquidity (i.e., trading activity) pre, within and post the recent financial 
crisis. These findings are similar to those obtained in Chapter 5 using the full period. However, 
the coefficient of the above-mentioned relationship is less significant in the crisis period in 
comparison with the pre- and post-crisis periods. In particular, the adjusted R
2 
is lower in most of 
the model specifications with the 2007-2009 financial crisis relative to the pre- crisis period.  
Nevertheless, this study shows that there is a positive relationship between the controlled 
shareholders (government, pension fund, employee, foreign, cross-holding, investment 
companies, and other holding) and proportional bid-ask spread and price impact ratio and a 
negative impact on real friction of market liquidity (i.e., trading activity) pre, within and post the 
recent financial crisis. These results are consistent with our findings in Chapter 5 and with Poon et 
al. (2013). However, the coefficient of the above-mentioned relationship is less significant in the 
crisis period in comparison with the pre- and post-crisis periods. Consequently, this study uses the 
annual changes in variables as a further test; we notice that our results remain unchanged with that 
reported in the main analysis section. As a result, these findings are robust in applying different 
sensitivity specification tests such as the change in variables regression.  
 
One possible explanation for the consistency of the results between crisis and full period analysis 
is that the method of estimation that was used, which is pooled OLS year and industry dummy, 
helps us to control for endogeneity and spurious inferences. Following Poon et al. (2013), this 
study includes industry fixed effects to control for time-invariant omitted industry-level factors 
that affect market liquidity. Moreover, this study also includes year effects to control for cross-
sectional dependence; that is, market-wide factors that affect market liquidity. Furthermore, this 
study clusters the errors at the firm level in order to control for time-series dependence. This study 
concludes that applying these techniques controls for simultaneity and unobserved heterogeneity 
as well. Moreover, our results are in line with previous studies (Poon et al., 2013). The next 
chapter presents the overall conclusions drawn from the outcome of this research specify the 
limitations, and pinpoint avenues for future research. 
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Chapter 7 
Conclusions and Implications 
 
7.1 Introduction 
This study investigates the effect of ownership level, concentration and owners’ identity on 
market liquidity in the UK. A short summary of the evidence from the results of the three 
empirical parts of the thesis and its interpretations is presented and discussed in this chapter. 
Furthermore, together with providing a summary of the research findings, this chapter 
summarises and addresses other major issues such as a restatement of the research problem and 
the research question, a description of the research methods used to answer the research 
question, the implications of this study, the research limitations and avenues for further research. 
 
7.2 Restatement of the Research Problem and the Research Questions 
Ownership structure plays an increasingly important role in explaining market liquidity. Several 
studies have investigated the effect of ownership structure on market liquidity in the US capital 
markets (Brockman et al., 2009; Chiang & Venkatesh 1988; Heflin & Shaw 2000; Jacoby & 
Zheng 2010). In contrast, few studies to date have examined the ownership-liquidity relationship 
in the UK. This study therefore argues that as compared to other countries, UK not only has 
different attributes but there are also some major differences in its market structure and 
disclosure requirements (Fidrmuc et al., 2006). The aim of this study was to examine the effect 
of ownership level concentration and owners’ identity on market liquidity in the UK capital 
market. There are two primary hypotheses through which ownership structure can affect market 
liquidity: trading and the adverse selection hypothesis. Trading hypothesis posits that the 
number of shareholders participating in trade affects market liquidity. In contrast, adverse 
selection hypothesis posits that stockholders who reduce agency costs by providing internal 
monitoring also reduce market liquidity by creating adverse selection problems in the capital 
market (Bhide 1993; Bolton & Von Tadden 1998; Brockman et al., 2009; Coffee 1991; 
Ginglinger & Hamon 2007; Holmstrom & Tirole 1993; Jacoby & Zheng 2010; Rubin 2007; 
Zhou 2011 for more details). Previous empirical studies that investigate ownership-liquidity 
relationship often deal with the trading hypothesis. As a result, the purpose of this study is to 
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examine the ownership structure-market liquidity relationship from both adverse selection and 
trading perspectives.  
 
There is little consensus on the importance of adverse selection hypothesis in general, and even 
less consensus on the market liquidity-ownership structure relationship. This study follows Stoll 
(2000) and Brockman et al.’s (2009) suggestion by disentangling real and informational effects 
by first examining the impact of ownership level, concentration and owners’ identity on the real 
costs of trading. After measuring the real friction effects, this study examines the impact of 
ownership level, concentration and owners’ identity on market liquidity (e.g., bid-ask spread, 
and price impact ratio) while controlling for the known real friction effects. Moreover, this study 
uses proxies of ownership structure such as the insider-institutional holdings and ownership 
concentration; largest shareholder and blockholder. Therefore, this study reinvestigates the 
relationship between ownership level, concentration and owners’ identity and market liquidity in 
the UK capital market. In addition, the following important questions have yet to be answered in 
the ownership-liquidity relationship: (i) Blockholder ownership is just one dimension of 
ownership concentration, how does the largest shareholder, another dimension of ownership 
concentration, affect market liquidity. (ii) How do institutional and insider ownership affect 
market liquidity? (iii) How do insider, institutional and ownership concentration affect different 
proxies of marker liquidity? Moreover, this study investigates the effect of owners’ identity on 
market liquidity. Lastly, this study tests the above- mentioned relationship during the recent 
financial crisis.  
 
7.3 Summary of the Research Methodology 
A challenging issue in the market liquidity literature is identifying the fundamental nature of the 
components and central to this problem is measuring the different market liquidity proxies. 
However, low frequency measures of market liquidity, do not include complex measures and are 
usually provided directly by Datastream. In contrast, the adverse selection component of market 
liquidity has a different nature and needs to be paid more attention to, since it is more complex 
than other components of market liquidity. The measurements of ownership and its identity 
variables were consistent with previous studies that investigated issues related to ownership 
structure-market liquidity relationship. However, a slight difference exists in the measurement of 
the proportion of insider ownership and blockholder according to the UK Corporate Governance 
Code’s criteria.  
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Two models were constructed and a set of hypotheses were stated. The study data for the all the 
variables used in this research over the period between 2003 and 2012 was collected from 
Worldscope/ Datastream and BoardEx.  Thus, this study provides the most recent investigation 
on market liquidity in relationship to the impact of the UK Corporate Governance Code (2003) 
and Stewardship Code (2010). The sample data is based on firms listed in the FTSE All-Share. 
However, financial firms were excluded from the sample due to standard reasons.. Two main 
sources were used to gather the data; namely annual reports and Datastream. Information about 
insider ownership and blockholder variables was manually collected from BoardEx and annual 
reports respectively. Financial and market data were gathered from Datastream and some of 
them were calculated using Excel. The research hypotheses were derived and tested with pooled 
OLS year and industry dummies techniques, which helped the author in identifying the 
relationship between ownership level, concentration, owners’ identity and market liquidity. 
 
Selecting the appropriate estimation method is a very critical stage in conducting any research as 
it ensures that the study’s objectives will be validly achieved. In order to determine this validity 
in performing the analysis of the study, a careful examination of possible problems related to the 
nature of the data was undertaken. In general, most of the assumptions or the conditions of 
parametric methods were met, and thus a using non-parametric technique was not suggested 
statistically. Since the problems of heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation are not suspected in 
the first model, a pooled OLS regression was preferred over GLS regression, as it is assumed to 
control or correct for such problems, together with using the natural logarithm of the study’s 
variables to correct for non-normality. In the second empirical model, several checks were made 
to diagnose the problematic features of the data, and to determine the appropriate statistical 
technique and estimation method used to test the hypotheses. According to the findings of these 
tests, it was decided to use cluster robust estimation in the primary analysis as it is statistically 
suggested for controlling the problems of autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity. 
 
7.4 Summary of the Research Findings and Theoretical Implications 
The results of this study provide evidence that ownership level, concentration and owners’ 
identity do matter with respect to market liquidity in the UK. The empirical findings show that 
there is a relationship between ownership level, concentration and owners’ identity and market 
liquidity. In the first empirical chapter, this study relies on the adverse selection and trading 
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hypotheses whereas, in the second empirical chapter, depends on the above- mentioned 
hypotheses and information hierarchy hypothesis while investigating the role of owners’ identity 
on market liquidity. This study constructs a sample from all the publicly listed firms in the FTSE 
All-Share Index on the London Stock Exchange. The final number of non-financial firms 
reached 260 listed companies. The study covers a 10-year time period and provide up-to-date 
evidence as well as includes the effect of the recent financial crisis.  
 
This study investigates the empirical models using a pooled OLS year and industry dummy. The 
main challenge in any ownership structure studies is how to control for the endogeneity 
problem. The literature documents that ownership structure variables are endogenously 
determined (Brockman et al., 2009; Heflin & Shaw 2000; Poon et al., 2013; Rubin 2007). 
Therefore, using the traditional estimation methods will not provide consistent results because 
they fail to control for all the sources of endogeneity. The pooled OLS year and industry dummy 
control for two types of endogeneity, namely unobserved heterogeneity and simultaneity. 
Moreover, this study uses the “lagged values” for all ownership structure variables.      
 
7.4.1 The Effect of Ownership Level and Concentration on Market Liquidity  
This section displays the main results from Chapter 4. This chapter investigates the effect of 
ownership level and concentration on market liquidity in the UK.  The study records a 
significantly negative relationship between insider ownership and market liquidity. Prior studies 
that apply OLS report similar results (Chiang & Venkatesh 1988; Comerton-Forde & Rydge 
2006; Heflin & Shaw 2000; Rubin 2007). The results state that there is a negative relationship 
between market liquidity and insider ownership in the UK. This negative relationship is in line 
with the adverse selection theory (Chiang & Venkatesh 1988; Glosten & Milgrom 1985; 
Copeland & Galai 1983).  
 
In particular, there is a positive relationship between insider ownership and proportional bid-ask 
spread and price impact ratio. Interestingly, this study finds that insider ownership still has a 
positive and significant impact on both the proportional bid-ask spread and price impact ratio, 
once this study controls for trading activity (i.e., number of trades and trade size). In particular, 
after this study controls for the impact of trading activity (i.e., number of trades and trade size), 
the adverse effect of insider ownership on the bid-ask spread and price impact ratio become 
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lower, but there is still a positive and significant relationship between insider ownership and bid-
ask spread and price impact ratio.   
 
Therefore, this study’s results provide strong support for the adverse selection hypothesis that 
insider ownership increases the proportional bid-ask spread and price impact ratio even after 
controlling trading activity measures. Our results are in line with previous studies (see Chiang & 
Venkatesh 1988; Dennis & Weston 2001; Kini & Mian 1995; Rubin 2007; Sarin et al., 2000; 
Zhou 2011, for more details). With respect to the trading activity measures, this study uses 
number of trades, trade size, turnover ratio and trading volume; the study’s findings are 
consistent with the trading activity hypothesis, which suggests that insider ownership reduces 
the firm’s trading activity and that insider owners trade less then institutional investors 
(Comerton-Forde & Rydge 2006; Rubin 2007). This leads us to accept H1, which states that 
there is a negative relationship between insider ownership and market liquidity.  
 
With respect to institutional ownership, Chapter 4 documents that there is a positive relationship 
between institutional ownership and market liquidity. Specifically, our results reveal that there is 
a negative relationship between institutional ownership and both proportional bid-ask spread and 
price impact ratio. Moreover, after this study controls for the trading activity measures (i.e., 
number of trades and trade size), the results reveal that institutional ownership has a negative 
insignificant impact on proportional bid-ask spread but a negative and significant impact on 
price impact ratio. Our results reveal that institutional investors are not considered to be 
informed investors, which is in line with Fehle (2004) and Sarin et al. (2000). Thus, consistent 
with some of the previous empirical evidence, it is found that the institutional shareholders in 
UK firms are passive and ineffective when it comes to monitoring and they turn off their 
portfolio more often (Coffee 1991; Cosh & Hughes 1997; Franks et al., 2001; Goergen & 
Renneboog 2001; Maug 1998; Pound 1988). This leads us to accept H2, which states that there 
is a positive relationship between institutional ownership and market liquidity. 
 
With respect to ownership concentration, Chapter 4 reports that ownership concentration (i.e., 
large shareholders and blockholders) has a negative effect on market liquidity. In contrast with 
other previous results that use blockholders as sole measure of ownership concentration 
(Brockman et al., 2009; Heflin & Shaw 2000; Kini & Mian 1995), this study uses two 
dimensions of ownership concentration: blockholders and largest shareholders (top five large 
shareholders). Following the recent literature in the UK, this study uses blockholders who hold 
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3% and more of the share capital according to the disclosure requirements of the London Stock 
Exchange. Furthermore, this study uses another measure of ownership concentration, which is 
the top five largest shareholders, in line with previous studies (Jacoby & Zheng 2010; Rubin 
2007).      
 
The finding of this study show that there is a positive and significant the relationship between 
the blockholders and proportional bid-ask spread and price impact ratio. In terms of information 
friction effect, this study finds that blockholders still have a positive and significant impact on 
both the proportional bid-ask spread and price impact ratio, once this study controls for trading 
activity by employing a liquidity measure that is highly correlated with trading. Specifically, 
after this study controls for the impact of trading activity (i.e., number of trades and trade size), 
the adverse effect of blockholders on bid-ask spread and price impact ratio become lower, but 
there is still a positive and significant relationship between blockholders and bid-ask spread and 
price impact ratio. Accordingly, the results support the adverse selection hypothesis, which 
suggests that blockholders have access to the firm’s private information (Brockman et al., 2009; 
Heflin & Shaw 2000). This finding leads us to accept H3, for FTSE all share index; H3 states 
that there is a negative relationship between blockholders and market liquidity. 
 
Moreover, this study uses the largest shareholders as another proxy of ownership concentration; 
in fact, this study reveals that large shareholders are a decreasing function of the proportional 
bid-ask spread and price impact ratio. This study found that large shareholders’ ownership are 
significantly positively correlated with proportional bid-ask spread and insignificantly positively 
correlated with the price impact ratio. In terms of information friction effect, this study finds that 
large shareholders still have a positive and significant impact on both the proportional bid-ask 
spread and price impact ratio, once this study controls for trading activity by employing a 
liquidity measure that is highly correlated with trading. In particular, after this study controls for 
the impact of trading activity (i.e., number of trades and trade size), the adverse effect of LS on 
the spread and price impact ratio become lower, but there is still a positive and significant 
relationship between LS, spread, and price impact ratio. This finding leads us to accept H4, for 
the FTSE All-Share Index; H4 states that there is a negative relationship between large 
shareholders and market liquidity. This negative effect has also been reported by prior US 
studies (Brockman et al., 2009; Heflin & Shaw 2000; Jacoby & Zheng 2010).  
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7.4.2 The Effect of Owners’ Identity on Market Liquidity  
Chapter 5 empirically examines the effect of owners’ identity in terms of insider and outsider 
identity on market liquidity in the UK. The main findings in Chapter 5 suggest the proportion of 
shares owned by the executive board of directors affects the level of market liquidity. This is 
consistent with H1a, which predicts that executive director’s ownership is negatively related to 
the level of market liquidity. In contrast, the analysis of total costs and real friction of market 
liquidity produces interesting findings. Executive director’s ownership is found to significantly 
increase the proportional bid-ask spread and price impact ratio. More importantly, this study 
finds that executive directors with greater ownership in their firms have private information that 
affects the market liquidity inversely, after this study controls for the well-known trading 
activity measures such as number of trades and trade size, which implies that executive 
director’s ownership influences the information friction of market liquidity positively. As a 
result, the results provide strong support for the adverse selection hypothesis that executive 
director’s ownership increases the bid-ask spread and price impact ratio, which inversely affects 
the market liquidity (Heflin & Shaw 2000). On the other hand, one can interpret this result under 
the trading hypothesis, which argues that executive directors trade less in contrast with outside 
investors (i.e., institutional). That is, an increase in executive director’s ownership leads to a 
decrease in his/her motivation, which enhances the firm’s value, which leads to decrease in 
market liquidity. Our findings are in line with Coffee (1991), Comerton-Forde & Rydge (2006), 
Heflin & Shaw (2000) and Rubin (2007). 
 
The results for non-executive director’s ownership provide strong evidence for H1b, which states 
that the non-executive director’s ownership has a negative impact on market liquidity. This 
study finds that non-executive director’s ownership is positively and significantly related to 
proportional bid-ask spread and price impact ratio. Furthermore, the findings show that the 
relationship between the non-executive director’s ownership and real friction of market liquidity 
(i.e., trading activity measures) is negative and significant at 1% level.  Accordingly, the results 
support the adverse selection hypothesis, which suggests that non-executive directors play a 
significant role in motivating the chairman of the board of directors to monitor management and 
eventually reduce agency costs (Shivdasani 1993; Vafeas 2003b). Moreover, with respect to real 
friction of market liquidity, non-executive directors with greater ownership reduce the trading 
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activity that reduced market liquidity. Therefore, consistent with the trading hypothesis, non-
executive director’s ownership is assumed to mitigate the agency problem through aligning the 
supervisory board’s interests with those of shareholders and control the management; however, 
this leads to lower market liquidity.  
 
With respect to the outsider ownership identities, consistent with hypothesis H2, which states 
that there is a negative relationship between pension fund ownership and market liquidity, this 
study finds that the pension fund ownership is positively and significantly associated with 
proportional bid-ask spread and price impact ratio. Moreover, this study finds evidence that 
pension fund ownership decreases the real friction of market liquidity through decreasing 
trading activity measures (i.e. number of trades, trade size, turnover ratio and trading volume). 
Our results are in line with existing literature that has documented that pension fund has a strong 
incentive to engage in investor activism (Cremers & Nair 2005; Dittmar & Mahrt-Smith 2007; 
Officer 2007). These studies suggest that public pension fund activism destroys firm value 
because of the agency problems between fund managers and members, which leads to lower 
market liquidity.  
 
According to the adverse selection and trading hypothesis, this study hypothesised that foreign 
ownership decreases market liquidity. This study finds that foreign ownership increases 
proportional bid-ask spread and price impact ratio, while it has a negative impact on real friction 
of market liquidity such as number of trades, trade size, turnover ratio and trading volume, 
which leads us to accept H3, that there is a negative relationship between foreign ownership and 
market liquidity. Thus, these findings are consistent with the adverse selection hypothesis that 
foreign institutions are less likely to have a positive impact on market liquidity. This is due to 
the fact that foreign institutional investors are perceived to be better traders given that they are 
better informed (Grinblatt & Keloharju 2000; Seasholes 2004).  
 
With respect to investment banks’ ownership, this study’s results that there is a negative and 
significant relationship between investment banks’ ownership and market liquidity; this leads us 
to accept H4, which states that there is a negative relationship between investment banks’ 
ownership and market liquidity. In particular, this study finds that there is a positive relationship 
between investment company’s ownership and proportional bid-ask spread and price impact 
ratio and a negative relationship between investment company’s ownership and real friction of 
market liquidity (i.e., trading volume, number of trades, trade size, and turnover ratio). Our 
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results are in line with previous studies (Barabanov & McNamara 2002; Fehle 2004; Syamala et 
al., 2014). Regarding government ownership, our results find that there is a positive impact 
between government ownership and proportional bid-ask spread and price impact ratio and a 
negative impact of real friction of market liquidity (i.e., trading activity measures); this leads us 
to accept H5, which states that there is a negative relationship between government ownership 
and market liquidity. Our findings are in line with Brockman & Chung (2003).                                                                           
 
Finally, with respect to the free float shares, to the author’s knowledge few studies in the 
ownership-liquidity relationship take into consideration the free float as one of the determinants 
of market liquidity. Our results in Chapter 5 reveal that there is a positive relationship between 
market liquidity and free float shares. Specifically, there is a negative relationship between 
proportional bid-ask spread and price impact ratio and positive impact of real friction of market 
liquidity. This finding leads us to accept H6, that there is a positive relationship between free 
float share and market liquidity. Our findings are in line with Amihud et al. (1999), Bhide 
(1993), Holmstrom & Tirole (1993) and Zheng & Li (2008). Furthermore, the findings of this 
study reveal a marginally negative relationship between cross-holdings, other holdings and 
employee ownership and market liquidity, which is inconsistent with the result reported in (Park 
2009). With repect to these differences, it may be argued, that the sample size, time period and 
market environment of this study are different from that of Park (2009).   
    
7.4.3 The Effect of Ownership Level, Concentration and Owners’ Identity on Market 
Liquidity during the Recent Financial Crisis  
In Chapter 6, the study examined the effect of Ownership Level, Concentration and Owners’ 
Identity on Market Liquidity during the recent financial crisis. Following Akbar et al. (2013), 
Kontonikas et al. (2013) and Florackis et al. (2014), the study defines the crisis period as 2007-
2009. According to this definition, the crisis period includes three periods: pre-crisis (2004-
2006), crisis period (2007-2009) and post-crisis period (2010-2012). Following Poon et al. 
(2013), this study runs the pooled OLS industry and year dummies in the main analysis. Poon et 
al. (2013) argue that this method controls for the endogeneity problem. Therefore, and to control 
for the effect of endogeneity, the empirical strategy includes several steps to minimise the effect 
of such an issue in the estimation. First, following Brockman et al. (2009), this study controls for 
simultaneity by introducing the “lagged values” of the ownership variables. Second, to control 
for unobservable heterogeneity, this study follows Poon et al. (2013) and includes year and 
industry fixed effects by introducing dummies for each year and each industry within the non-
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financial sectors. Finally, this study follows Poon et al. (2013) and estimates robust standard 
errors to control for serial correlation and heteroscedasticity using the option “Robust” in 
STATA 11.   
The findings for both total liquidity costs and real friction of market liquidity suggest that the 
executive and non-executive director’s ownership is significant in the pre-crisis, crisis and post-
crisis periods. The findings also reveal that in the pre-crisis and crisis periods the executive and 
non-executive directors’ ownership have a marginally negative impact on market liquidity.  
Regarding the outsider ownership identities, the results reveals an insignificantly positive 
relationship between pension fund ownership (NOSHPF) and price impact ratio in the crisis and 
post-crisis periods and insignificantly negative relationship between NOSHPF and trade size 
(TZ) in the pre-crisis period. This means that in the pre-crisis and crisis periods pension fund 
ownership has a marginally negative impact on market liquidity whereas foreign ownership 
(NOSHFR) has an insignificantly positive impact on the proportional bid-ask spread (PBAS) in 
the pre-crisis period. Moreover, an insignificantly negative relationship is observed between 
NOSHFR and trade size (TZ) and number of trade (NT) in the pre-crisis period. This means that 
in the pre-crisis foreign ownership has a marginally negative impact on market liquidity.  
 
With respect to investment banks ownership (NOSHIC the findings reveals an insignificantly 
positive relationship between NOSHIC and the proportional bid-ask spread (PBAS) and price 
impact ratio (Pimpact) in the crisis and post-crisis periods. Moreover, an insignificantly negative 
relationship is also found between NOSHIC and trade size (TZ) and trading volume (VO) in the 
pre-crisis period. This means that investment banks’ ownership has a marginally negative impact 
on market liquidity. With respect to government ownership (NOSHGV), the findings further 
reveals an insignificantly positive relationship between NOSHGV and the proportional bid-ask 
spread (PBAS) and price impact ratio (Pimpact) in the crisis and pre-crisis periods. Moreover, 
the findings also show an insignificantly negative relationship between NOSHGV and trade size 
(TZ) and trading volume (VO) in the pre-crisis period. This means that government ownership 
has a marginally negative impact on market liquidity in the pre-crisis period. 
 
With respect to cross-holdings (NOSHCO), the findings suggest an insignificantly positive 
relationship between NOSHCO and the proportional bid-ask spread (PBAS) and price impact 
ratio (Pimpact) in the pre-crisis period. Moreover, the results also show an insignificantly 
negative relationship between NOSHCO and trade size (TZ), trading volume (VO), number of 
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trade (NT) and turnover ratio (TR) in the pre-crisis period. However, in both the pre-crisis and 
post crisis periods an insignificantly negative relationship between NOSHCO and trading 
volume. This means that cross- holdings ownership has a marginally negative impact on market 
liquidity. Similar, results are also found with respect to employee ownership (NOSHEM). With 
respect to other holdings (NOSHOF) the findings reveal an insignificantly positive relationship 
between NOSHOF and proportional bid-ask spread (PBAS), and insignificantly negative 
relationship between NOSHOF and number of trades (NT) in the pre-crisis period.   
 
Furthermore, regarding the free float shares the findings show an insignificantly positive 
relationship between market liquidity and free float shares (NOSHFF). More, specifically, an 
insignificantly negative relationship is observed between NOSHFF and proportional bid-ask 
spread (PBAS) in both the crisis and post-crisis periods. The findings also suggest an 
insignificantly positive relationship between NOSHFF and the turnover ratio (TR), number of 
trades (NT) and trading volume (VO) in both the pre-crisis and post-crisis periods.  These 
finding thus suggest there a positive relationship between free float share and market liquidity in 
the both pre-crisis and post crisis periods.  
 
7.5 Limitations of the Research 
 
This thesis has been empirically and theoretically conducted on a systematic basis with 
continuous reviews contributed by qualified and specialised supervisors and independent 
reviewers from different annual doctoral conferences. However, there are potential theoretical 
and methodological limitations of this study, which are worth noting, and therefore the findings 
should be interpreted with awareness of these potential limitations. The main delimitations that 
are presented in this study are mostly methodological in nature and can be grouped into three 
categories: namely, theoretical and empirical delimitations, inherent data and sample limitations 
and constructs and variables’ limitations. 
 
7.5.1 Theoretical and Empirical Delimitation 
 
 
An important limitation that should be taken into account is in identifying the theoretical and 
empirical implications of the findings of this study. It should be noted that there are diverse and 
contrasting theories, hypotheses and approaches in the area since the existing variations in 
institutions of corporations have been established over time and it is not possible to rely on 
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particular theoretical interpretations. The general premise of this study suggests that market 
liquidity can be used as an indicator of the adverse selection effect. Accordingly, the study does 
not provide a comprehensive evaluation of the role of governance mechanisms in market 
liquidity. Therefore, the reader should be aware of the danger of generalising the findings of this 
study on all aspects of corporate governance mechanisms and it is suggested that it should be 
interpreted according to the particular aspects used in this study. For example, while this study, 
among others, found that insider ownership plays an inverse role in market liquidity, recent 
studies have emphasised the role of insiders’ identity ownership on market liquidity (Chtourou 
et al., 2001; Peasnell et al., 2003; Yu 2008). However, considerable attempts are made to 
overcome these limitations by determining the way guided by the insights of related studies and 
the consistencies of the evidences contained in those similar studies. Equally, some of the 
provisions of the Code are also an excellent indication of the relevance and contribution of this 
study to the existing literature. 
 
7.5.2 Data and Sample Limitations 
 
For a number of reasons, it is difficult for studies in ownership level, concentration and owners’ 
identity and market liquidity that utilise a UK-based sample to randomly select samples. For 
example, there are a limited number of UK firms that provide sufficient and relevant ownership 
and market liquidity variables and release their information publicly. In addition, some of the 
UK Corporate Governance Code requirements give exemptions to smaller firms whilst some of 
the provisions do not apply to firms that are not large enough to feature in the FTSE 350. As a 
result, this study sample was selected based on pre-set criteria and therefore consists of a non-
random selection. Such a selection method probably leads to an inherent sampling bias and 
hence to possibly inaccurate associations that are generated from the sample composition. 
 
Moreover, due to the different nature of their accounting practices and the different regulations 
that guide their trading and governance practices, financial and investment firms were excluded 
from the study sample. This exclusion may lead to a problem in generalising the findings to 
other sectors and indices within the UK. Another problem with generalisation may arise in terms 
of using UK-based data to offer any insights into other geographic areas. That is, since other 
countries have different cultures, codes, idiosyncratic practices, economic aspects, and capital 
markets in terms of firms with different sizes and demands for high-quality executives, care 
should be taken with regard to generalising the findings of this study to firms in other countries. 
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Nevertheless, the similarity of this study’s results with those of studies using US data implies a 
high degree of generalisation may be possible with regard to these findings. Additionally, the 
importance of such study on the UK business environment comes from the crucial role that UK 
corporate governance plays in the field of global business regulations and practices as a 
respected leader in the global business community. That is, many of the governance and 
disclosure regulations of other countries, including those of the US, are largely inspired by those 
of the UK. Overall, the problems relating to data and sample limitation stated above are ones I 
ultimately chose to live with following similar related studies. I have stated such limitations in 
the analysis and the necessary delimitation this results in does not in my view detract from the 
validity of the study. 
 
7.5.3 Constructs and Variables’ Limitations 
Although this study mainly relies on previous theoretical and empirical works in constructing 
the empirical models and measuring the variables, some related limitations should be taken into 
consideration. In terms of independent variables, all ownership variables were collected and 
measured in a straightforward way, since they were provided in the annual reports and BoardEx. 
However, in some cases, the total liquidity costs contained some components that might be 
measured inaccurately. For example, the adverse selection component of the bid-ask spread 
needs a ‘high-frequency data’. However, due to the lack of disclosure about information with 
regard to this component this study measures the low frequency measures of market liquidity.  
 
In terms of control variables, even though this study employs a number of variables to control 
for the determinants of market liquidity, it is highly possible that other factors not controlled in 
this study’s analyses will affect the level and the structure of market liquidity; for instance, the 
analyst earning forecast; this exclusion is mainly due to the lack of data availability and the 
access to I/B/E/S file. Nevertheless, according to previous theoretical and empirical works, it 
can be claimed that the control variables that are included in this study’s analysis cover the most 
important firm-specific determinants. Finally, examining only a specific set of ownership 
structure is a limitation that should be taken into consideration when interpreting the results of 
the analyses. That is because, if other ownership variables affect the level and the structure of 
market liquidity, the parameter estimates may be biased. 
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7.6 Research Implications  
 
The findings of this study should be of particular interest to market participants such as 
investors, company managers and market makers and regulators. The results of this study 
provide new insights in this area which cover the implications of ownership level, concentration 
and owners’ identity on market liquidity. In particular, the evidence presented in Chapter 4 
shows that market liquidity is adversely affected by ownership concentration and insider 
ownership. This finding would help investors and portfolio managers in the formation of their 
investment strategies, to coincide their trading with those firms where market liquidity is 
expected to be high. The findings would also help them to achieve higher gains through 
avoiding high transaction costs, which may result when the market becomes illiquid in adverse 
market and macroeconomic conditions.  
 
Furthermore, the findings presented in Chapter 5 in relation to the effects of owners’ identity on 
market liquidity will help both investors and managers to manage their portfolio even more 
efficiently. The findings indicate that the identity of owners’ affect market liquidity in different 
ways. First, portfolio managers and market maker would know that the insider (i.e. executive 
and non-executive director) who is better informed about the firm’s private information and as a 
result may trade upon this information, which would reduce market liquidity. In contrast, the 
findings also reveal that different outsider identities of shareholders have different effects on 
market liquidity.  For example, free floats shareholders increase market liquidity whereas 
controlled shareholders (such as, employees, banks, pension funds etc.) would reduce market 
liquidity.  Second, findings on the effect of owners’ identity on market liquidity may also be a 
useful factor in the decision - making process of investors and portfolio managers who try to 
select the right stocks to trade and hold in their portfolio. They will direct their attention towards 
selecting stocks that expose them to low levels of ownership concentration, which are the stocks 
with low levels of controlled shareholders. In brief, the evidence provided in this study is 
expected to be of great importance and interest in the investment spectrum. 
 
In addition, the findings of this research would also benefit, firm managers (i.e. financial 
managers) policy makers and practitioners. For companies that are considering raising more 
external capital, raising cash will be easier, and liquidity risk will be lower during the time when 
the market is highly liquid. The findings of chapter 4 and 5 suggest that while deciding about the 
right time to gain access into the market, financial managers should base their decisions on 
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certain input variables, such as proportion of concentrated ownership and free float shares. Also, 
the findings concerning the relationship between owners’ identity and market liquidity could 
provide financial managers with new insights into the question of their market maker policies: if 
a firm’s stocks are held by executive and non- executive directors and controlled shareholders, 
market markets  are required to implement new liquidity-increasing financial policies to improve 
the liquidity of their stocks and thus reduce the transaction costs. Similarly, these findings would 
also be useful for the practitioners because it would help them in their forecasting and 
recommendations to their clients.  
 
A further policy implication of this study is related to the corporate disclosure policy about the 
ownership of firms. The findings indicate that firms should pay more attention to their 
ownership structure disclosure policy and improve quality of the disclosed information as much 
as possible. A poor disclosure policy might be the reason for deteriorating stocks’ liquidity, 
especially when investors are reluctant to hold or trade in stocks that have low liquidity levels 
and where poor quality firm-specific information is available to the market. Therefore, a firm’s 
executives will make decisions to invest more in the quality of their disclosure policy, which 
would help in improving activities about investors’ relationships. This will result in a lower level 
of information asymmetry between company managers and outside investors and would 
therefore reduce the level of divergence of opinion among investors. In addition, findings of 
Chapter 6 suggest a better disclosure policy will not only help improve market liquidity in 
normal trading periods but would also help improve a firm’s liquidity in timings when the 
market is down.  This leads to lower transaction costs and an increase in the amount of funds 
raised, by gaining easy access to financial markets. 
      
7.7 Key Areas for Future Research 
Although the findings of this study provide evidence that the ownership variables and its identity 
play a significant role in determining the level of market liquidity, some features exist that are 
not covered by this study but which could be relevant to the issue of market liquidity 
determinants. One attractive area for future research is investigating additional corporate 
governance characteristics that may affect market liquidity. An example of such additional tests 
would be investigating the impact of board size, independence, chairman and non-directors’ 
commitment in determining market liquidity. As mentioned earlier, the findings of this study 
reflect the role of ownership and its identity in determining market liquidity. 
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Thus, it might be difficult to generalise the findings to reflect all firms’ aspects. Therefore, 
investigating the effects of these attributes on other business aspects such as firm earnings 
management and analyst’s coverage could help in determining the exact impact of these 
ownership structures in controlling public firms and determining the level of market liquidity. 
Similarly, the examination of the impact of ownership level, concentration and owners’ identity 
is predicted to help further clarify whether these variables encourage the market liquidity to 
increase the firm’s value. Particularly, it would be interesting to conduct more focused 
investigation on the impact of ownership structure on market liquidity and how the market 
liquidity can affect the firm value.   
 
In terms of the impact of ownership structure, the findings with regard to chairs’ shareholder 
ownership shed some light on the negative impact of executive and non-executive ownership on 
market liquidity. For instance, investigating the role of the directors’ identity would provide us 
with a new insight into the role of directors’ identity on market liquidity. Moreover, the lack of 
findings with respect to the role of institutional ownership in market liquidity in this study might 
have been caused by the fact that no difference was acknowledged between institutional 
investors in terms of their investment horizons. Therefore, examining the role of institutional 
investors with regard to market liquidity after classifying them into long-horizon and short-
horizon investors might help to explain the passive role of institutional investors in the UK. 
 
Another interesting avenue for further research would be conducting a comparative study 
between the US and UK firms in terms of the impact of ownership structure and its identity on 
determining market liquidity. A comparative panel data research between these countries with 
regard to the role and effect of ownership and its identity on market liquidity would provide an 
interesting contribution to the field. Moreover, it might be interesting to perform a comparative 
study between the one-tier and two-tier board systems of an Anglo-Saxon and a Continental 
European country’s firms respectively on the impact of the ownership structure and its identity 
on market liquidity. In addition, a replication of this study utilising wider stock market data from 
different countries would be helpful in discovering an insight into the response of different 
environments to the phenomenon of ownership structure and market liquidity. Furthermore, as 
this study excludes some sectors, an opportunity might arise for further research into the impact 
of ownership structure and its identity on market liquidity in financial and investment firms. 
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Finally, although this study has totally relied on a quantitative method to investigate the 
relationships between market liquidity and ownership structure and its identity as this method is 
more relevant to achieve the research objectives, also employing a qualitative method in the 
form of elite interviews to investigate the subject matter in order to get the perceptions of all the 
stockholders would have been further informative. Therefore, as the literature that reports 
investigations into the relationship between ownership structure and market liquidity has mainly 
utilised quantitative approaches, supplementing these empirical investigations by using 
interview data would potentially increase the reliability and the validity of the results and 
therefore make a worthwhile contribution to our understanding of this area. 
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